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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the growth of US cultural influence in Andean and
Caribbean Colombia during World War II and the first half the Cold War (1930s-1960s).
Exploring Colombian-US collaboration in educational and cultural arenas, the study
articulates a mid-century shift in Colombian cultural orientation away from Europe and
toward the US. Analyzing the cultural complexities of Colombian-US relations during
those decades, it demonstrates why this shift began and how it was sustained.
While the study credits US cultural diplomacy with encouraging the shift, it
emphasizes the role of Colombians in building the new cultural infrastructure that
facilitated it. Intent on moving the nation toward capitalist modernity and minimizing the
threat of social and political revolution, the Colombian national government and the
Colombian Catholic Church aggressively enlisted US resources toward educational and
cultural reforms. In doing so, they followed the lead of the nation‟s emerging middle
classes, newly expanding professional groups, and modernist segments within the
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national elite as they engaged US cultural models to clear their own paths toward
modernity.
At the intersection of cultural and diplomatic history, this study presents intimate
views of transnational cultures and communities as they developed around schools,
cultural centers and mass media programs. Using the Colombian case, it demonstrates
how new venues for collaboration were redefining Latin American-US cultural relations
during the mid-twentieth century. In contrast to studies that frame inter-American
encounters as manifestations of empire, this dissertation demonstrates the frequently
overlooked yet crucial role of common interests in building cultural relations across
national borders.
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Introduction

The Infrastructure of Influence
This dissertation analyzes the growth of US cultural influence in Andean and
Caribbean Colombia during World War II and the first half the Cold War (1930s-1970).
Exploring binational collaboration in educational and cultural arenas, the study articulates
a mid-century shift in Colombian cultural orientation away from Europe and toward the
US. Analyzing the cultural complexities of Colombian-US relations during those
decades, it questions why this shift began and how it was sustained.
Colombian familiarity with US culture was limited before the 1940s. The US was
recognized as the premier military and economic power in the hemisphere, but its cultural
achievements went largely unrecognized. Colombian elites, who historically looked to
Europe for cultural inspiration, dismissed US culture as commercialized, inferior, and
inauthentic. For those in the general Colombian public, US mass media entertainment,
commercial advertising and consumer goods served as their primary cultural reference
points. Such media proffered only narrow representations of US culture. Yet, once a
formal program of US cultural diplomacy was initiated during World War II, the situation
changed dramatically. This dissertation demonstrates Washington‟s mid-century success
in establishing US cultural credentials in Colombia beginning in the 1930s.
The study emphasizes the role of Colombians in facilitating the spread of US
cultural influence in the middle decades of the twentieth century. US cultural diplomacy
appeared in the nation during a period of accelerated cultural change and Colombians
proved enthusiastic about engaging with it. Intent on moving the nation toward capitalist
modernity and minimizing the threat of social or political revolution, the Colombian
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national government and the Colombian Catholic Church aggressively enlisted US
education and cultural resources toward their ends. Simultaneously outside of
government and religious hierarchies, Colombians across class were also accessing US
resources to construct their own paths toward modernity. In the field of education, they
molded US resources to develop cultural and educational infrastructure that their national
government and national church had failed to provide for them. Particularly for the
emerging middle and professional classes, US educational and cultural resources became
more broadly accessible.
The chapters that follow historicize the founding and evolution of three USsponsored cultural projects in urban centers located on the Colombian Caribbean and in
the Colombian Andes: ”American” schools, binational cultural centers, and US mass
media programs. The narrative details the formulation of these projects, examines their
implementation, and tracks modifications as they evolved locally over the course of three
decades. I argue that these developing projects were central to the spread of US
educational and cultural influence in Colombia at mid-century; these schools, cultural
centers, and mass media programs were the infrastructure of influence. Supported by
such infrastructure, new transnational educational and cultural communities emerged.
Significantly, participants in these communities broke with longstanding Colombian
tradition of looking to Europe for cultural inspiration, resources, and models. Examining
transnational educational and cultural communities and the infrastructure that sustained
them, this study articulates the complexities of Colombian-US cultural relations at midcentury. Such analysis yields a more complex portrait of foreign/local encounters than is
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provided by more traditional political and economic approaches to US foreign policy and
inter-American relations.
Engaging both political narrative and cultural history, I argue that Colombian-US
relations (and by extension Latin American-US relations) have been too narrowly defined
both in scholarship and in popular perception as a function of official foreign policies that
emanate from national capitals. As a result, cultural interaction between Colombian and
US nationals outside of political and business circles is rarely considered as either
contributing to or defining of the binational relationships. Such an approach makes an
artificial distinction between the realm of political economy and culture. To overcome
this separation, I examine educational and cultural programs that are jointly maintained
by citizens of both countries to serve both elite and non-elite communities. I emphasize
the construction of community and culture as local processes while remaining interested
in the ways regional, national and transnational dynamics also construct these cultures.
Local processes, then, are set against a broader political chronology: mid-century
education reforms in both Colombia and the US, inter-American cultural diplomacy
during World War II, Colombia‟s bloody civil conflict known as the la Violencia, and the
first half of the Cold War.
Diplomacy Meets Culture
The schools, cultural centers and media projects that are the focus of this study
first began to emerge in Colombia (and throughout Latin America as a whole) in the late
1930s. At that time, foreign policymakers in Washington had grown increasingly
concerned over European influence in Latin America, and, in reaction, established a
cultural relations program within the US Department of State. By the time this program
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was created, European-sponsored schools, cultural centers, and libraries had been
institutional fixtures of Latin America‟s urban landscapes for decades. Yet prior to this
point, Washington had never perceived these institutions as a competitive threat. Since
World War I, US business interests had a considerable presence in the region‟s economy,
but in contrast to major European powers, the US government had taken little interest in
directly sponsoring cultural programs or institutions abroad.
US government disinterest in cultural diplomacy was rooted in pre-New Deal
beliefs about the role of government. Since the late nineteenth century, the US approach
to economic development and governing as a whole had favored private initiative,
investment, and control over government direction, regulation and funding.
Philosophically rooted in classical liberalism, with its deep distrust for the coercive and
corrupting power of the state, this ascendant economic philosophy placed faith in both
individuals and private concerns and allowed only a limited role for government in
national economic affairs. Challenges to this philosophy were frequent in the first third of
the twentieth century, and especially significant was the political activism of the so-called
“progressives.” They demanded stronger regulation of business and the national
economy to alleviate the social tensions that appeared with modern capitalism.
Progressives achieved some success with social legislation, but firm limitations on state
management of the economy remained. Not until the 1930s, when FDR‟s New Deal
linked social and economic concerns, did new space begin to open to more activist
governance. 1

1

Cheryl Greenburg, “Twentieth Century Liberalism: Transformations of an Ideology” in Perspectives on
Modern America: Making Sense of the Twentieth Century, ed. Harvard Sitkoff (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001), pp. 55-79. See also Steve Fraiser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the
New Deal Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
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Economic elite concern for keeping the US government out of economic and
business affairs did not extend across the national border. To the contrary, in the interest
of strengthening their enterprises representatives of business and industry strongly
encouraged diplomatic and military activism on foreign soil. In the early twentieth
century, Latin America was the most frequent target of this activism. Diplomats
characteristically employed heavy-handed pressure tactics on behalf of US business
interests. Diplomatic advocacy in support of oil companies, banana exporters, and other
business concerns is well documented.2 Washington used both military and diplomatic
resources to aggressively defend the operations and assets of US business interests in the
region. As a result, the history of US-Latin American relations between the late 1800s
and the early 1930s is marked by repeated violations of Latin American national
sovereignties. This was especially the case in Central America and the Caribbean basin,
which endured repeated US military interventions and occupations during the period.
Though an aggressive economic foreign policy was deemed necessary by the US
business community and successive US presidents, regarding cultural diplomacy the
tradition of deferring to private initiative and limiting government activity prevailed.
Many policymakers in Washington believed the diffusion of US culture abroad would
occur automatically with the expansion of American business, and to some extent this
proved a valid expectation. US film and music were popular in the region before the
formal cultural relations program began. Additionally, a number of US philanthropic
foundations and professional organizations had active cultural exchange programs with
2

For the Colombian case see Marcel Bucheli, Bananas and Business: The United Fruit Company in
Colombia, 1899-2000 (New York: New York University Press, 2005); Jorge Arango Villegas, Petróleo,
oligarquía e imperio (Bogota: El Ancora Editores, 1982); Richard Lael, Arrogant Diplomacy: US Policy
Toward Colombia, 1903-1922 (Wilmington, DE; Scholarly Resources, 1987); Stephen J. Randall,
Colombia and the United States: Hegemony and Interdependence (Athens: University of Georgia Press,
1992).
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Latin American universities and intellectual groups. While the Latin American programs
of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the
Guggenheim Foundation, the Institute of International Education, and the American
Council on Education received no funding from the US government, their efforts had
Washington‟s encouragement.3 But private cultural efforts in Latin American capitals
could not match the influential reach of well organized and well funded European
cultural diplomacy. Thus, even with emerging US dominance of aggregate foreign
business in Latin America, the lack of an official US cultural diplomacy left individual
European nations --Germany, Spain, Italy, England and especially France-- with
significantly stronger cultural presence and influence in the region. Only in the 1930s
under the threat of world war did the US government begin to recognize its weak cultural
influence in the region as a commercial and political disadvantage.
European cultural diplomacy in Latin America included sponsorship of private
bilingual elementary and secondary schools, language teaching institutes, and social
clubs. European countries funded academic exchanges, presentations of national culture,
musical and theatrical performances. Art exhibitions were also common. Notably, most
European cultural presentations focused on high culture and were marketed toward the
local elite in the national capitals and major ports of entry. This ensured European
programming a high profile in the national press. In contrast, US culture remained a

3

J. Manuel Espinosa, The Inter-American Beginnings of US Cultural Diplomacy, 1938-1948 (Washington:
US Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 1976). Espinosa worked for the
Department of State and wrote the history of the first decade of the cultural relations program as director of
the History Project of the Department‟s Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs (CU). Celebratory
insider‟s analysis needs to be approach cautiously, but Espinosa‟s detailed account is an indispensable
starting point for understanding the evolution of US cultural diplomacy and its Latin American roots. On
the role of private philanthropic organizations in promoting educational and cultural exchanges with Latin
America – see especially “Chapter II: Private Inter-American Cultural Exchange Activity.”
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largely unknown commodity. Popular perceptions based on stories or features in
newspapers, magazines and film, usually centered upon economic achievements,
technological advances, and the “American” quality of life. As compared with the
celebrated appreciation for European high culture among educated Colombians, the US
was found lacking. As Colombian intellectual Baldomero Sanín Cano explained in the
early 1940s:
The general opinion of Colombians of average culture about the saxoamerican
culture can be summed up in a few phrases: ‗they are great inventors; it‘s a
lifestyle of amazing activity; the Singer buildings and the Brooklyn Bridge are
stupendous architectural works; but in general they are very ignorant.‘4
The shift from classic liberalism‟s suspicion of government intrusion to New Deal
liberalism‟s beliefs in the responsibility of the state created an opportunity for official US
engagement in cultural diplomacy. However, it was not until fascist regimes in Europe
threatened world war that Washington reversed its aversion to cultural diplomacy and
implemented a program in Latin America. Fears that the US was losing influence in its
own backyard to anti-democratic ideologies spurred the development of a variety of
cultural initiatives in the years leading up to the Second World War. Following the lead
of both its European allies and soon-to-be enemies, the US placed education at the center
of its new cultural program for the region. With the onset of war, programming
4

“La opinión general entre las personas de cultura media colombianas acerca de la civilización
saxoamericana podia concentrarse en unas pocas frases: „son grandes inventores; la vida es de una
actividad asombrosa; los edificios de la Singer y el puente de Brooklyn son obras estupendas de
arquitectura. Pero en lo general son muy ignorantes.‟” Baldomero Sanín Cano, Un Pueblo en Defensa de un
Mundo: con unos Documentos Historicos de los Estados Unidos (Bogotá: Centro Colombo-Americano,
1943), p. 9. Sanín‟s assessment of how the US was perceived (before engaging in cultural diplomacy) was
valid. In the first half of the twentieth century, popular perception credited US industriousness and progress
but considered the yanqui devoid of culture. This perception was repeated over and over in the Colombian
press and especially by critics of US influence. When they first appeared in the 1940s, the Colombian-US
cultural centers took on the task of confronting this perception and broadly promoted a more balanced
understanding of US cultural achievements. The publication of Sanín‟s speech by the Centro Cultural
Colombo-Americano was part of the campaign to correct this perception. This issue will be explored in
greater detail in the body of the dissertation.
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accelerated. By the early 1940s, American-sponsored schools, cultural centers and
libraries were opening in the capitals and major cities of the region. At the same time,
Washington-funded educational film, radio and print-media campaigns reached a wide
Latin American audience. By the time the war concluded and communism was emerging
as the new threat to democracy, many of the temporary cultural programs that had been
enacted in the “other American republics” 5 to counter Axis influence became permanent
within the US foreign policy bureaucracy. Significantly, during the Cold War many of
the cultural programs that had been developed for Latin America became the models for
US cultural diplomacy around the globe. 6
Transnational Educational and Cultural Communities
Colombia‘s American Schools
American-sponsored schools (“American schools” henceforth) in Colombia and
world-wide are private, college-preparatory, pre-K/12 (pre-kindergarten through grade
12) community-owned schools. They offer US-accredited programs in English and award
official US high school diplomas to their graduates. Located in national capitals and
important regional cities, these American schools provide US-style education for children
of the host country, children of US citizens living abroad, and children of third country
nationals. Where local law demands, students in these schools must also meet national
curriculum standards and doing so entails delivering a portion of the total academic
program in the local language; such is the case in Colombia where certain subjects are
5

The phrase “other American republics” was the collective term for the nations of Latin America used by
advocates of Pan-American cooperation in the first half of the last century. The term had been used by US
and Latin American diplomats as early as the independence period, but its usage became more prevalent
during the era of World War II.
6
While the US Department of State‟s program of cultural relations originated with pre-war efforts in Latin
America, the limited scholarship on cultural diplomacy is largely focused on US-European relations during
the Cold War.
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taught in either English or Spanish to satisfy the requirements for the national
bachillerato certificate and the US high school diploma. While American schools are not
official institutions of the US government, many have received financial and professional
resource assistance from the US Department of State, which maintains an Office of
Overseas Schools. From initial grants to a few schools in Latin America in the early
1940s, the US program has grown to now assist approximately 200 schools and 110,000
students worldwide annually. 7 Levels of assistance to institutions have fluctuated since
the first grants were offered during World War II, but historically schools receive
periodic support for acquiring property and plant, for supplementing salaries of foreign
staff, and for improving academic programs. Though the criteria for receiving US
government assistance has changed slightly over the decades, recipients of grants have
always been schools with a student body of mixed nationality (rather than a student
population dominated by US nationals), US-accredited programs delivered in English,
and a board of directors that includes significant host-country representation. Schools
founded and operated by US religious organizations or corporations are not eligible for
assistance.
American schools in Colombia serve an upper-class segment of the population. In
name and in practice, these schools are strongly associated with US culture. Yet, as this
dissertation will make clear, they function within elite Colombian realities and have
evolved primarily to meet locally-determined needs. US nationals have usually occupied
the directorships and up to 50% of staff positions at these schools, but these individuals
most often accept such employment only for short-terms. In comparison, as US nationals
7

US Department of State, Office of Overseas Schools, “World Wide Fact Sheet – 2006-2007: American
Sponsored Elementary and Secondary Schools Overseas,” http://www.state.gov/m/a/os/1253.html
[accessed October 1, 2007].
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come and go from the schools, Colombians, who are the majority among juntas
directivas [boards of directors], faculty and staffs, exercise long-term, consistent
leadership and influence over the institutions. Also significant is the fact that over the
course of the twentieth century, the student bodies of Colombia‟s nine American schools
have been increasingly Colombianized; indeed, by the end of the twentieth century,
Colombian students accounted for 95% of enrollees at all but one of the schools. 8 As a
result upwards of 8,000 Colombian students pay for and receive a formal US-style and
US government sanctioned education annually. Most do not have to leave their own
neighborhoods to do so.
Bilingual at a very young age and possessing both Colombian and US education
credentials upon graduation, most American school graduates are well prepared to
negotiate opportunities across political and cultural borders. The importance of the
accreditation awarded to American schools in Colombia and Latin America by the
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS), a US regional educational
association, cannot be overstated: as a formal mechanism, the accreditation process
facilitates smooth access for Latin Americans to the US university system. Often, in the
range of 50% of graduating classes (varying by year and location) opt to attend
universities in the US. Many others students do so later for graduate or professional
training. Because the dual US and Colombian programs of the American schools are
rigorous by US and Colombian standards, the schools are widely regarded as among the

8

The absence of US students is much more pronounced in Colombia than it is in typical American schools
elsewhere. The violence and instability that has characterized Colombia since guerilla activity began in the
1960s and the drug cartel violence appeared in the late 1970s limited the number of US families living in
the nation.

11

best in the country. Graduates, who choose to study in Colombia, are accepted into and
attend the best national universities. 9
American schools in Colombia and around the globe foster the development of
transnational educational and cultural communities. I define these communities as groups
of individuals whose connections to each other result from shared participation in
educational or other cultural projects that function across international borders. Such
communities take both traditional and non-traditional form, and they may manifest by
physical communion of participants in schools, classrooms, and cultural spaces or by less
direct relationships such as those that develop from engagement in programs from afar.
People voluntarily (or involuntarily in the case of young children) affiliate with these
communities through a range of activities that might include enrolling in an American
school, participating in a foreign language learning program in a cultural center, or taking
part in an academic or art exchange program. Affiliation with transnational educational
and cultural communities may run long-term as in the case of a family that is connected
to the American school in Bogotá for generations or be as temporary as participation in a
radio English class. These communities are characterized by an active core of participants
whose activities often intersect with other cultural (and especially educational)
communities at home and abroad: schools share resources and compete on sports fields;
students move between schools as their educations progress; educators share curriculum
with colleagues; school staffs meet in professional development programs at universities

9

US Department of State, “World Wide Fact Sheet – 2006-2007: American Sponsored Elementary and
Secondary Schools Overseas.” For an overview of American schools in Colombia at the turn of the last
century see Michael Adams, “Leadership and School Climate: A Mixed Methods Study of United StatesAccredited Colombian Schools” (PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 2006).
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and colleges; and administrators establish extra-institutional links that pool educational
resources.10
Importantly, participation in transnational educational and cultural communities
allows individuals to gain first-hand knowledge of a foreign culture and to experience
varying degrees of identification with it. In these communities cross-cultural dialogues,
relationships and dependencies develop through which individuals alter and expand their
educational and cultural options. Most significantly, these relationships loosen the
influence of nation-states and geographic boundaries over individual‟s paths and
identities. In this dissertation, I argue that transnational educational and cultural
communities create groups of people who challenge the rigid foreign/local dichotomies
that framed analyses of US-Latin American relations under the dominant historical
paradigms of the twentieth century. Examining the cultures that evolve around these
communities underscores that individuals mold and refashion identities using the
resources available to them from local, regional, national, and transnational sources.
Traditional political and economic analyses of Latin American-US relations have
too casually accepted official versions of national identity that are formulated and
promoted by government and cultural elite. Overlooking complex questions of who and
what constitute Latin American and US cultures, they provide narrow assessments of
Latin American-US encounters. Analyzing transnational educational and cultural
communities as they develop locally, this study argues that regional, local and
transnational identities, and not just homogenized versions of national identity, are

10

Transnational educational communities are by definition also transnational cultural communities. In this
study I use the term “transnational educational and cultural communities” rather than the more general
“transnational cultural communities” to emphasize the role of cross-border educational processes in
constructing Colombian-US encounters.
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crucial to understanding encounters between foreigners and locals. Regional and local
cultures were not subsumed by the official and uniform projections of colombianidad
[Colombian-ness] or estadounidensidad [US American-ness] that officially circulated
around diplomatic projects. Because national identities are grounded in local and regional
realities, multiple and competing versions of colombianidad and estadounidensidad
always converged where these foreign cultures met. Viewing Latin American-US
encounters through various educational and cultural communities evidences how local,
regional, national and transnational cultures are constantly intersecting and evolving.
Binational Centers: The Colombo-Americano Cultural Centers
Like American schools, US-sponsored cultural centers in Latin America also
foster transnational communities. Known as binational centers (BNCs), these cultural
centers are similar to American schools in that they are autonomous, privately founded
institutions. They are run by boards of directors comprised of host-country and US
nationals, who are residents of the local communities. In contrast to the schools, however,
BNCs serve a largely middle-class population. They are less exclusive institutions and
are more accessible to non-elite populations.
The first BNCs were founded without US financing in Argentina and Brazil
between the world wars. These early centers, and the many more that were founded in the
region during and after World War II, were most commonly organized by Latin
American nationals who had studied in US schools and universities, had business
connections to US corporations, or had special interest in some aspect of US culture. US
nationals residing in the region often supported local cultural efforts and proved
fundamental to founding BNCs. When US cultural diplomacy was established in the late
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1930s as war loomed in Europe, cultural policymakers recognized the utility of these
centers for encouraging inter-American solidarity and hemispheric peace. Thus, they
began to openly encourage and financially support the establishment of new centers
throughout the region. At the close of the twentieth century, there were over 170 USaffiliated BNCs worldwide, and the largest regional concentration was found in Latin
America. 11
In Bogotá in 1942, the first BNC in Colombia appeared as the Centro Cultural
Colombo-Americano [the Colombian-American Cultural Center]. Its mission was to
promote “mutual understanding” between the peoples of Colombia and the United States
through language courses and cultural programs. Over the course of the twentieth
century, eight additional and independently operated Colombo-Americano cultural
centers were founded in cities throughout the country. Similar to the American schools,
each of the centers was run by a US director, who was hired by the individual boards of
directors at the institutions. Notably, Colombians usually formed the majority of the
board members and usually held the presidency. As was the case with American schools,
directors, volunteer board members, and paid teachers from the US typically worked for
the centers for a couple of years while the Colombian staff and board members had
significantly longer terms of service. Thus did Colombians, more than US nationals, offer
consistent and long-term leadership to these institutions. Grants from Washington were
awarded annually to many of the centers into the 1970s to assist with construction and
equipment costs, payment of employee salaries, purchase of teaching materials in the US,
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and organization and presentation of special cultural programs. By the early 1980s,
however, US government grants to BNC‟s worldwide ended. Some centers closed, but
many have continued to function and flourish owing to their local grounding. 12
The US established a formal cultural presence with the opening of the first
Colombo-Americano in Bogotá in hopes of balancing the cultural influence of European
nations. Immediately, the new institution became an arena for showcasing US cultural
achievement in the arts. Through lectures, music concerts, and art shows, the ColomboAmericano proved an effective forum for confronting the Latin American stereotype of
the US as commercially and technologically advanced but void of culture. At the same
time the first cultural center, and each of the sister institutions that followed, embraced a
commitment to exploring and promoting Colombian culture. As this study will make
clear, cultural programs of the Colombo-Americanos were just as likely to be Colombia
as US-focused.
This dissertation argues that the various Centros Culturales Colombo-Americanos
provided new and flexible educational options for the middle class at a time when
Colombia‟s national educational system was expanding and diversifying but unable to
keep pace with new demand. The cultural and educational programs of the ColomboAmericanos facilitated the adjustment of Colombia‟s rising middle and professional
classes to urban modernity. English classes were fundamental to this process but so were
business courses, bilingual secretarial programs, library services, and performing art
projects organized by the centers‟ boards and staffs. During this period the Catholic
Church and the Colombian upper class were losing their monopoly over national
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education, and with this change so too was lost their traditional power to direct and define
Colombian national culture. As the middle and lower classes gained greater educational
access and mass media became more accessible to them, alternatives to elite Euro-centric
educational and cultural forms reshaped the nation‟s social landscape. 13 The ColomboAmericanos‟ programs were important alternatives in a nation with scarce educational
options.
BNC‟s are fascinating institutions because they reveal how the construction of
Colombian identities was impacted by new, non-elite educational and cultural systems
that responded to the needs of surging urban populations. Transnational cultures
emerged around these centers resulting in a mid-twentieth century explosion in crossborder connections between middle-class and elite Colombians and individuals,
institutions and cultural communities in the US. The diversity of these connections
renders traditional views of Colombian-US relations that are built from analysis of
political economies narrow and incomplete. Examining the cultures of the Centros
Colombo-Americanos, shared political and economic philosophies of the US and
Colombian governments --especially staunch anticommunism and faith in capitalism-are much in evidence. However, equally evident is the centrality of common educational
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and cultural interests (among the peoples of both nations) in structuring broader
Colombian-US relations.
Mass Media Programs: Film, Radio, and Print
Compared to the Colombo-Americanos and American schools, the third USsponsored cultural initiative analyzed in this study was not an institution-based program.
Mass media programming was designed to reach the widest possible cross-section of
Latin American populations. These programs were not class exclusive, and they often
targeted the upper and middle classes. Still, they were specifically seen as the most
practical method of direct US contact with the impoverished masses, who lived mainly in
remote rural areas but were an increasing presence in marginal urban barrios. From the
earliest days of official cultural diplomacy, Washington organized educational radio, film
and print media programming to educate Latin Americans about their “good neighbor” to
the north. Simultaneously, mass media provided a platform for promoting visions of
inter-American unity and alternatives to European models of modernity. Thus, while the
early intent of this programming was educational and cultural, it was always embedded in
hemispheric politics and never far removed from the realm of propaganda. As war then
cold war influenced US cultural policies, the line between educational and propaganda
programming blurred. Mass media resources became more explicitly linked to global
rather than hemispheric politics. Educational and cultural themes did remain central to
programming, but informational and propaganda objectives had a clear impact on
resource production.
While schools and cultural centers in Colombia were run by local boards, mass
media programs were more directly operated by the US foreign policy bureaucracy.
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Diplomats were deeply involved in contracting with private Colombian radio stations to
broadcast US programs that had been developed with Latin America content. Through
their efforts, English lessons, popular and classical music, social and political
commentary, and news programs connected radio listeners to world communities beyond
their own. Establishing and maintaining local networks for US government funded
educational and propaganda film, diplomats directed the distribution of visual material
whose explicit or implicit themes were the benefits of democracy and capitalism over the
horrors of fascism, communism and socialism. Films emphasizing health and hygiene,
promoting the importance of education and literacy, detailing the development of
professions and career paths, presenting models for labor organization, and particularly
celebrating opportunities and choices enjoyed by the US middle class all brought an
official US message to enormous Latin American audiences.
Scholarship on US-Latin American relations during the second half of the last
century shows a pronounced tendency toward defining mass media as a tool of US
imperialism or (neo-imperialism). Commercial mass media was often the focus, but in the
process, official US cultural programs which employed mass media were reduced to
imperialist propaganda. While assessing US mass media programs as a means of cultural
domination is an important consideration, historicizing the uses of mass media resources
in local contexts is a necessary, if largely overlooked, first step. In tracking the evolution
of educational radio and film programs, it becomes clear that mass media programs met
overlapping US and Colombian socio-political objectives --not the least of which were
the related goals of maintaining fervent anti-Communism and extending the reach of
education to areas where it was lacking. This study details a high level of Colombian
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government collaboration with and repackaging of US radio and film content to meet
national needs. Many outside of the national governments also took advantage of US
mass media resources to supplement their own efforts in educational and cultural
outreach; regional educational bureaucracies, international organizations, schools,
educators, artists, intellectuals, student organizations, businesses, the Catholic Church, as
well as the new media, information and entertainments industries all took advantage of
the availability of US radio and film resources and materials to meet their own needs. In
the process, locals filtered the original intent of the mass media messages produced and
package in the US.
Differentiating between various forms of transnational educational and cultural
communities, this study considers how mass media education programs functioned both
in contrast to and in concert with the institution-based schools and cultural centers.
Analyzing the cultures that developed inside these various communities, yields visions of
Colombian-US encounters that are more complex than a simple foreign/local oppositional
frame allows. Most importantly, historicizing these communities demonstrates the
transnational dynamics that sustained rapid growth of US cultural influence in midcentury Colombia. This study recognizes American schools, binational centers, mass
media programming as well as the transnational communities they spawned as crucial
infrastructure of US cultural influence.
The Colombian Context: Geography, History, and National Identity
Before and after the foreign/local encounters that were initiated with the arrival of
Cristóbal Colón (Christopher Columbus, for whom the nation is named), Colombian
geography conditioned the growth of its isolated regional cultures. The fourth largest of
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the modern South American nations, Colombia is roughly divided into two halves, the
lowland east and the mountainous west. The nation is flanked by the Caribbean Sea to the
north and the Pacific Ocean to the west; separating these waters, the thin isthmus that
connects North and South America creates a short international border with Panama. To
the south, Colombia shares borders with neighboring Ecuador and Peru, while Brazil and
Venezuela are its neighbors to the east.
The eastern half of the nation is both enormous and sparsely populated. In its
northern sector, Los Llanos, lowland plains of grass are crossed by rivers that drain to the
Orinoco River and a border shared with Venezuela. In the larger southern sector,
grasslands give way to dense jungle whose rivers feed the continents principal river, the
Amazon. Difficult to access, this southern area is home to indigenous populations who
have historically lived with limited contact with the Colombian central-state. On the
nation‟s western border, along the Pacific Ocean, is another sparsely populated region of
rainforests, coastal plains, and jungle. On that coast, the city of Buenaventura grew with a
boom in coffee exports in the early twentieth century; it soon became the nation‟s
principal port.
Between the lowland east and the coastal west, Colombia in dominated by three
distinct ranges of the Andes. Most of the national population lives in this mountainous
interior. The region has always been difficult to traverse. Two northerly flowing rivers
between the Andean ranges have historically provided connection between the Caribbean
coast and the lowest elevations of the interior. Towns along the Magdalena and Cauca
rivers served as transportation and commercial ports for Andean cities located in the high
valleys of the mountains above. Reaching the interior ports by river from the Caribbean

21

coast historically involved a lengthy and uncomfortable trip against the currents. To reach
the principal cities higher up in the Andes required additional time, energy, and climbing
muscles.
As the principal population centers of the interior were always located at high
elevation, communication with and between Andean regions was extremely difficult
before the arrival of automobiles, radio, and air travel. Once these technologies were
available, they played an important role in accelerating national integration. Still, even
with modern transportation and communication, land travel between Colombian regions
remains arduous and time consuming. Distance between Bogotá and Medellín, for
example, is not great as the condor flies, but their elevations and locations in different
Andean chains makes for substantial separation between them; a journey from one to the
other involves a winding descent from the Savana de Bogotá [the Bogotá Plain] at 8,500
feet to the Magdalena River 7,500 feet below --only to then face steep new mountain
passes on the other side of the river in the climb to Medellín at 5,000 feet. In Colombia,
even travel within one of the three Andean chains involves series of climbs and descents
that make distances between cities and towns much greater than they appear on paper.
For Spanish settlers who arrived after the conquest, Colombia‟s Andean interior
offered tremendous agricultural opportunity, but its isolation kept it from developing into
an important imperial center. Home to indigenous agricultural societies when the
Spaniards arrived, the high mountain valleys and plains of the Andes offered volcanic
soil, substantial rainfall, equatorial sunshine, and abundant Indian labor for European
settlers to exploit. And they did. Land privatizations and abolition of communal
governments led to a loss of indigenous communities and identities. Miscegenation
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produced a mestizo or mixed race Indian-Spanish majority in the Colombian interior.
Because the region eventually became home to vast the majority of the national
population, the notion that Colombia is a mestizo nation of mixed Indian-Spanish heritage
prevails.
The Caribbean coast is a region of tremendous geographic and cultural diversity
that is far removed from Andean worlds. Geographically, the coast includes a sizeable
desert peninsula, the highest coastal mountain in the world, an enormous fresh water
estuary, lush coastal plains, grasslands and tropical rainforests. Various Caribbean islands
and remote archipelagos are part of the region as well. On this coast, local cultures
developed far removed from the mountainous center of the nation. As a result, many of
the peoples of the region have shared more in common with the cultures of the Greater
Caribbean than with those of Andean Colombia. Through the first third of the twentieth
century, the non-elite majority in and around the important Caribbean ports of Santa
Marta, Cartagena and Barranquilla had little connection to the central-state of the interior.
Before the arrival of the Spanish, many distinct indigenous groups had occupied the land,
but post-conquest, these groups diminished. That coastal Indians mixed not only with
Europeans but Africans brought to the region as slaves differentiates the coast‟s
race/ethnic mixture from that of the Indian-Spanish interior.
In the colonial era, the walled city of Cartagena de Indias [Cartagena of the
Indies] had been a silver and gold storage depot, a transfer point for precious metals and
merchandise that moved between the European metropolis and its enormous American
empire. The city became the continent‟s chief port of entry for imported goods, and this
included African slaves who were sold on Cartagena‟s plazas and dispersed southward
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throughout the continent. Within Colombia, many of the slaves were transferred to the
Pacific coast to provide labor for gold mining and sugar plantations. Others were kept
closer to Cartagena to work on ranches, farms, and in domestic service. Home by the
mid-twentieth century to one-sixth of the national population, Colombia‟s Caribbean
coast is distinguished by the black and mixed (African, Indigenous, and Spanish)
race/ethnic composition of its population. Like the Pacific coastal region and in contrast
to much of the Colombian interior, la costa [the Caribbean region] and Costeños [the
people of that region] have long been identified with blackness.
Colombian History and the Quest for National Unity
During the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century, the Colombian centralstate was defined less by its strength and achievements than by its weakness and failures.
Between brutal civil wars, governance handicapped by extreme partisanship, and regular
and forceful extra-governmental challenges to its authority, the central-state has suffered
what Marco Palacios calls “elusive legitimacy.” 14 With stable but ineffective democratic
institutions, the central government has historically operated in an elite bubble distanced
from the reality of the impoverished majority. Cultural divides, between classes and
regions, exacerbated such distance. Regionalism and violent rebellion presented further
challenges toward the consolidation of state power.15 Not surprisingly, exploration of
Colombia‟s claim to nationhood has been an important theme in historical scholarship.16
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Early post-independence Colombian political history fits a familiar Latin
American pattern. Two parties, Liberals and Conservatives, offered competing economic
and administrative visions for their new republic after independence. Initially, and
mimicking contemporary legislative debates throughout the hemisphere --including those
at the US constitutional convention in Philadelphia-- advocates of a strong a central-state,
Conservatives, clashed with Liberal proponents of greater regional autonomy. Liberals,
who were ascendant in the post-independence decades, selectively sought to eliminate
political, economic, and social structures that they considered vestiges of colonialism. As
elsewhere in Catholic Latin America, the two parties fought ferocious battles over the
role of the Roman Catholic Church in government. Particularly problematic were
attempts by Liberals to expand schooling because education had been controlled by the
Church since the early colonial period. Liberal demands for secularization of instruction
earned the wrath of the Church hierarchy and an anticlerical label. At the same time,
Conservative defense of Church power forged a powerful political alliance that held in
Colombian politics for more than a hundred years. While similar politics defined the
post-independence decades throughout Latin America, Colombia‟s partisan, two-party
politics sustained bitter intensity well into the twentieth century.
Brutal civil wars marked Colombia‟s nineteenth century as successively elected
Liberals and Conservatives implemented and reversed each other‟s legislation and
governing systems. In terms of suffrage and representation, the political system became
more inclusive until late in that century when electoral restrictions were reinstated. The
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two national parties garnered electoral and popular support through clientelism, a system
in which political machines sustained broad loyalties through agreements with local and
regional power players to whom they deferred and delivered national resources. An
important theme in Colombian scholarship, clientelism fostered fierce party identification
that cut across class and bridged the urban/rural divide that increasingly characterized the
nation.17 Yet, because partisan loyalty was structured in a local context, it did not fortify
the central-state and left regional states more powerful. Region not nation held greater
relevancy in the lives of most Colombians into the mid-twentieth century.
With electoral victories in the 1880s, Conservatives began decades of control of
the national government. Not until 1930 would a Liberal again hold the presidency of the
republic. Early opposition to this “Conservative Hegemony” sparked new civil wars
which were capped by the War of the Thousand Days in which perhaps 100,000
Colombians lost their lives. Toward the end of the three years of fighting in 1903, the
remote but valuable province of Panama seceded from the nation. Bogotá had long
supported the building of a transoceanic canal across the isthmus and, indeed, had
contracted with the renowned French builders of the Suez Canal to do it. When the
French project failed in the 1880s, the national government was too bogged down in civil
warfare and too controlled by partisanship to craft political consensus on a new canal
strategy.
US imperial ambitions played a role in Colombia‟s loss of the isthmus, and
revisionist history has emphasized that role. President Theodore Roosevelt‟s
17
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administration quickly recognized Panamanian independence, forcefully impeded
Colombia‟s attempt to quell the insurrection, and immediately secured a territorial
concession from the new government for the building of the canal. Yet, revisionist
paradigms that focus on US imperialism have de-emphasized the Colombian
complexities that also propelled Panama‟s secession. For the purpose of this dissertation,
these complexities are important to acknowledge. Bogotá‟s inability to prevent
Panamanian independence reveals the “weakness and uncertainty of Colombia‟s hold”
over territories on the nation‟s periphery, coastal Colombia‟s marginalization within the
Andean nation, and the debilitating effects of partisan violence on cohesive national
identity.18
From the perspective of Colombian history, the loss of Panama is indicative of the
disconnect that defined relations between the nation‟s regions and its central-state
through the mid-twentieth century. Beholden to economic elites from the most developed
and politically influential regions, incapable of enforcing legislative mandates nationally,
inclined to let partisan warfare replace compromise, and ignorant of the cultures and
needs of its rural and peripheral regions, the central-state was ineffective in fostering a
unifying national consciousness. Facilitating rather than moderating historical rivalries
over resources, the national government strengthened the hand of powerful regions at the
expense of weaker ones. In this process, regions on the periphery of the Andean interior
were especially marginalized. As a result, the government continually struggled to
achieve and maintain legitimacy in the eyes of its own people. Thus the secession of
Panama must be placed in proper Colombian perspective; the secession sits on a crowded
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historical continuum of regional rebellion against the elite controlled and ineffective
Andean central-state. Violent rebellion against rule from Bogotá began with
independence in the 1820s and continues into the present.
Compared to the urban Andes, many peripheral regions were beyond the interest
of politicians in Bogotá through the early decades of the twentieth century. Though
Caribbean coastal ports were essential to the nation‟s export economy, the non-elite
majority in and around these cities had limited opportunities to interact with agents or
symbols of the central-state. Government-supported schools, economic development
programs, and infrastructural projects could have facilitated greater connections between
the government and its distant coastal populations, but an inclusive national vision was
absent in the allocation of resources. Additionally, official government projections of
national identity or Colombianidad were framed by elite, urban Andean culture. When
such projections reached peripheral and remote rural regions, they held little relevance to
the lives of the populace. For many in those regions and especially the non-elite majority,
the “imagined community” of Colombia was a difficult proposition to sustain. 19
Many aspects of Andean culture were foreign to Colombians who lived in
peripheral regions outside the mountainous interior. Most residents of the Caribbean
coast, for example, would never travel in the interior and were unfamiliar with the
traditions and patterns of Andean life. On that coast, locals lived in closer contact with
the Greater Caribbean and worlds beyond. As compared to coast, the Andes were more
isolated from modern currents and international trends; the cultures of the Colombian
19
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Caribbean were more cosmopolitan. To many Costeños, Andean culture was parochial,
more focused on the past than the present, and overly formal. Even Andean Spanish,
when heard on the coast, could be difficult to understand –filled as it was with archaic
expression of the language. That definitions of Colombianidad emanating from the
central-state were constructed in an Andean frame marginalized coastal and other
peripheral cultures from the dominant formulation of national identity.
Adding to the cultural divides that challenged a unified Colombian identity was
elite monopoly over the projection of Colombianidad. Colombian elite took the lifestyles
of European upper classes as cultural models. In Bogotá as well as regional capitals
throughout the nation, elite culture was laden with the trappings of European high
culture: languages and expressions, education titles and degrees, clothing styles and
accessories, musical trends and art forms, food and beverage tastes, and concepts of
nation and citizenship. With elite projections of Colombianidad heavily infused by
European high culture, the frame had limited the resonance among the non-elite majority.
New communication technologies and expanded educational opportunities would
eventually provide a means for popular and middle-class Colombians to engage with and
influence the discourse of Colombianidad as urbanization, industrialization, and
modernity changed life patterns. However, until the 1930s the construction and projection
of national identity remained monopolized by Andean elites. Since more than threequarters of Colombia‟s population resided in that mountainous interior, it makes some
sense that national identity would evolve in an Andean context. Though the population
centers of the interior were themselves differentiated by geographic and cultural
diversities, they had stronger economic, political, and cultural connections to the central
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state. Thus, though claims of nationhood, of a Colombian national culture and Colombian
identity were always tenuous, they had greater resonance in the urban Andes than along
the nation‟s periphery. 20
In Pursuit of Modernity: Colombian-US Relations in the Early Twentieth Century
Colombia had entered the twentieth century desperate to recover from its most
recent civil war and struggling to adapt to a modernizing world. The task was daunting
and would require a degree of political consensus that the central-state had never been
able to achieve: “whether measured in literacy: in the construction of railways, roads, and
bridges; in the improvements of ports; or in urbanization or number of banks, Colombia
remained among the less developed countries of the region.” 21 Fortunately, coffee
production provided a key economic stimulus. Though vulnerable to fluctuations in the
global market, coffee became the undisputed engine of national development in the early
twentieth century and helped consolidate the disjointed nation. It provided crucial capital
for the expansion of state bureaucracy and the diversification of the national economy.
By the 1950s, coffee beans accounted for almost three-quarters of total Colombian
exports with the US purchasing the largest share of the crop. Compared with other key
exports (bananas, oil, and precious metals) and the important textile industry based in
Medellín, the coffee business developed as a unique agent of modernization and national
integration. Because the coffee industry was almost exclusively Colombian owned and
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not dependent on foreign technology, it provided needed stability for regional Andean
economies while limiting national reliance on foreign investment. As coffee consumption
spread from the Andes to the periphery with the growth of bean exports, it also evolved
into a popular symbol of Colombian national culture.22
Driven by coffee exports in the first third of the twentieth century, Conservatives
initiated a restructuring of the Colombian economy that produced some export
diversification, pockets of industrial growth, and higher levels of urbanization. To guide
development, they contracted foreign missions to shape more stable financial institutions,
build an integrated national transportation network, and recommend methods for
expanding educational infrastructure. In the Andean interior, which received most of the
new resources, expanding government bureaucracy extended the reach of the central-state
and facilitated the wider cultivation of Colombian national identity. While partisanship
had not disappeared at the level of governance, consensus over the need to modernize the
nation did emerge and it allowed for a reduction in violence among partisans.
Temporarily, civil war was eliminated as a national political strategy. Owing to coffee,
consistent rule by a single party, and emergent political consensus over the need to
modernize, Colombia was a very different country by the end of the 1920s when the
global depression hit.
Colombian-US relations were strained in the aftermath of Panamanian
independence, and official resolution did not come until Colombia formally accepted an
indemnity payment of $25 million from Washington in the early 1920s. Controversies
22
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still arose, but from that point forward Colombia‟s political leaders consistently embraced
the doctrine of the “North Star”; they pragmatically accepted aspects of US economic and
political hegemony and pursued the benefits of working with, rather than against, its
powerful hemispheric neighbor.23 Shared faith in capitalist modernity, theoretical
commitment to democratic government, and, later, a passion for fighting communism
grounded the binational relationship.
Significantly, economic relations between the two nations had proceeded apace
during the two decades of frozen diplomacy that preceded the settlement, and the onset of
World War I had seriously impacted these economic relations. Unable to export
agricultural and mining products to war-torn European markets, the Colombian economy
turned north to the US. Investment in Colombia by US corporations increased during and
after the war, and US products and financial services gained a presence in the urban
centers of the nation. Settlement of the Panama controversy provided a huge influx to the
national treasury that further energized the economy. While the indemnity payment
funded important national infrastructural projects, it also provided leverage for an
enormous extension of credit to individual Colombian departamentos [departments or
provinces] and municipalities by US banks. In addition, the Colombian government
welcomed the participation of US capital and oil corporations in its nascent petroleum
industry.
When economic depression began to create havoc in international relationships at
the end of the 1920s, the Colombian economy was linked to the US by exports, debt, and
foreign investment. Still, the overall national economy remained largely underdeveloped
and with less international dependence. Colombia certainly suffered in the economic
23
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crisis, but it suffered less than many Latin American nations whose primary national
industries were more dependent on foreign capital. Colombia‟s coffee exports declined
after 1929 but because all of its exports then comprised only 25% of gross domestic
product (GDP), Colombia was buffered from what would have been a greater disaster if it
had been more export dependent.24
Relative to its regional neighbors, Colombia resisted the politics of economic
nationalism in the depression and throughout the twentieth century. Where concern over
foreign control of regional and national industries elicited anti-foreign sentiments in Latin
America, nationalizations of foreign owned or affiliated industries occurred with some
frequency. 25 In Colombia, however, as David Bushnell explains, national control of the
coffee industry had the effect of depriving “economic nationalism …of a key target."26 In
the first half of the twentieth century, periodic appeals to economic nationalism did arise
in Colombia from organized labor in oil fields and on banana plantations where US
corporations were the dominant foreign presence. However, given national control over
the coffee industry, economic nationalism as an “aggressive force” never had broad
appeal and was much more muted in Colombia than elsewhere in Latin America.
In 1930, amidst global economic depression, elections brought Liberals to power
for the first time in the century. At the national level, leaders of both parties together with
representatives of the powerful coffee and industrial lobbies were determined to avoid
violence during the transfer of power. In a departure from tradition, they were successful.
Yet, violence characterized the transfers at lower levels. As Liberals across the country
24
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regained control of the local resources they had been denied since the late 1800s, they
took revenge on local and regional Conservatives whose dominance they had endured for
decades. The contrast of a peaceful central-state transfer with bloodshed in Colombian
regions underscored the difficult realties the new government faced: a continuing rift
more than a century after independence between the national government and the
citizenry; the persistent dominance of regional over national identity; the corrupting
influence of patronage (clientelism) on democratic processes; and the fact that violence
was still perceived as a legitimate political strategy by many Colombians.
Around the globe, economic depression bred reactionary governments, which
cultivated support through extreme appeals to nationalism. Fascist and military dictators
who came to power in the 1930s cultivated patriotism and manipulated its sentiments to
gain broad public support for their rule. As Colombia‟s new Liberal governments
confronted the economic crisis and the challenge of modernization, they too employed
nationalistic appeals, but moderation rather than radicalism defined their programs. Like
FDR in the 1930s, Liberal administrations in Colombia took an activist role in
restructuring and directing the national economy, modernizing government bureaucracy,
and addressing social problems that were obstacles to their national reforms. To
Conservatives who had held power for so many decades, Liberal reforms appeared
radical. The courting of socialist and communist support, defense of labor activism, and
broad expansion of the electorate alarmed their opponents. Most importantly, as relates to
this study, Liberals‟ attempts to restrict Church control over the national education
system reignited secularization debates. Yet, Liberal programs represented an effort to
prevent and not promote revolutionary change as national elites pursued modernity.
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Historiographical Considerations
National Identity and Region in Colombia
Colombia, it has long been observed, is a country of diverse regions. Owing to
geographical extremes and the regional isolation that results, many Colombians see their
country as un país de países [a country of many countries]. Historically, poor
communication and transportation between and within Andean, Pacific, Caribbean,
Amazonian, and Orinocan regions contributed to the perpetual weakness of central state.
Regional cultures flourished in relative isolation from the political center, and the notion
of Colombianidad as a unifying force was difficult to sustain.
During the period under consideration (1930s-1960s) Colombian government
efforts to modernize the nation involved expanding educational infrastructure and
promoting unifying national consciousness. The chapters that follow examine the growth
of US cultural influence during a period of accelerated cultural change that was fueled
from inside and outside the Colombian government. US-sponsored educational and
cultural programs are explored in their regional Colombian settings: in the Caribbean
cities of Barranquilla and Cartagena and the Andean cities of Bogotá and Medellín. In
focusing on programs in both Andean and Caribbean Colombia, the study engages two
central and overlapping themes of modern Colombian historiography: regionalism and
the construction of national identity. Both are relevant to the analysis of the foreign/local
encounters here examined.
Until the mid-twentieth century, historical scholarship within Colombia was
restricted by a straitjacket of partisan politics. Histories of the nation were written by
party loyalists that privileged the power of the central state and ascribed it undue
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legitimacy and control.27 In this literature and in the functioning of national politics, the
Andean region and its key centers of power, Bogotá and Medellín, defined the nation.
Areas on the periphery of the mountain peaks, plains and valleys of the nation‟s interior
were marginalized in official versions of history and official frames of culture. National
history (historia patria) presented Colombia as a politically and culturally cohesive,
Catholic and Andean state, and it gave little attention to the Caribbean coast or other
peripheral areas.
The complexities of region became more central to historical analysis after
production of partisan scholarship decreased. After mid-century as historians sought to
explain Colombia‟s inability to prevent violence and rebellion across the centuries,
regionalism received increased analytical attention. Scholars generally agreed that the
development of Colombian regions was grounded by the nation‟s geographic complexity,
but this was not an embrace of geographic determinism; scholars in second half of the
twentieth century recognized that geography alone was not constitutive of regionalism.
Given the extremes of physical separation within the Andean interior, on both coasts, and
in the peripheral river basins, distinct local cultures did indeed develop in relative
isolation. During the colonial times, the various regions engaged the resources and
constraints that their natural surroundings imposed, and they developed distinct political,
economic, and social traditions that would later make them identifiable within an
emerging nation. 28 Colombian regionalism, however, is not just a legacy of colonialism.
27
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It is also a modern construction informed by political and social processes. For example,
the post-independence, nation-building projects of the central state have been crucial to
the construction of region. On the one hand, national governments representing a narrow
band of Andean elites sustained their tentative grasp on power by keeping regional power
bases separate. With a monopoly on education and media, these elite were able to project
their characterizations of regions to the broader nation. In this process, the marginalized
regions on the periphery were defined from the center, and they suffered the biases of
elite Andeans. 29 Yet, regionalism was also a political force that could be employed
against the central-state --in reaction to its efforts to consolidate power, its exclusion of
certain regions from development projects, and in inter-regional disagreements over
resource allocation.30 Scholarship probing the intersection of race and region has added
much nuance to our understanding of the development of Colombian regionalism as a
complex historical process. 31
Increased scholarly attention has turned to Colombia‟s Caribbean region in the
last quarter century.32 In tandem with socio-political movements addressing the region‟s
underdevelopment, scholars have begun to consider Caribbean Colombia‟s
marginalization within the nation. Studies by social scientists, anthropologists, and
historians have articulated the tremendous geographic, cultural, and economic diversity
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of region. Their work has begun to consider how national culture was homogenized in an
Andean mold, to document the invisibility of Costeños in Colombian narratives, and to
challenge stereotypes of the region‟s people and their cultures. 33 Some Colombian
scholars rejoice that the boom in regional research has begun to free the coast from a
“historiographic prison”[cárcel historiográphica] to which it had been confined.34 This
dissertation takes inspiration from such scholarship that challenges narrow Andean
frames of Colombian history and culture. In analyzing Colombian-US encounters in both
Andean and Caribbean settings, the study seeks to join scholarly efforts to reinsert the
Colombian Caribbean into analyses of the nation.
An important aspect of this historiographical trend has been new attention to
coast‟s relationship not just to the Andes but to the Greater Caribbean. With a 1,600 km
Caribbean coastline, half a million square kilometers of territory in that sea, and
populated Colombian islands as far north as the Nicaraguan coast (where the locals speak
creole English), Colombia has long had a presence in the multinational world of el caribe
[the Caribbean]. The minimal attention afforded la costa in narratives of the twentieth
century has left the nation‟s connections, and especially its cultural connections, to the
Greater Caribbean inadequately explored. 35 While Panamanian independence greatly
decreased the interest of the Andean elites in the north coast, the new historiography
recognizes that the region‟s ties to the Caribbean basin were not severed at that time.
Post-Panama, Colombia‟s Caribbean region remained an important site of foreign/local
33
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encounters, where transnational currents impacted regional development and the
construction of Costeño identities. Scholars now argue that Colombia‟s Caribbean coast
and its territories should be explored as a frontier: a dynamic border within a
multinational world. Ignoring regional complexities that are rooted beyond the nation‟s
northern shore, traditional Colombian historiography “has not permitted comprehension
of the historic processes of the region.”36
Contact Zones, Imperialism and Dependency
Adapting Mary Louise Pratt‟s definition of “contact zones,” I view the
transnational cultural communities that evolve on the Caribbean and in the Andes as sites
where “peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each
other and establish ongoing relations.” 37 Like Pratt, I am interested in the “interactive,
improvisational dimensions” of the foreign/local encounter that are “so easily ignored or
suppressed” by analytical predisposition to finding “conquest and domination.” 38 When
we look too intently for the imperialist, the communist, the foreign invader or their
agents, we miss the diversity and sinuosity of cultural contact. In looking to the “contact
zones,” this study supplements existing macro-political views of the Colombian-US
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relationship with regional, local, and community cultural perspectives that prove less
useful for marking difference than for revealing “copresence, interaction, interlocking
understandings and practices” even where “radically asymmetrical relations of power”
might be identifiable. 39
The contact zones explored in the historiography of Latin America-US relations
during most of the twentieth century were usually economic, political and military sites:
diplomatic bureaucracies and legislative chambers, oil fields and banana plantations of
US corporations, and military occupation zones. Cultural sites were rarely considered.
When more intimate cultural interaction between US and Latin American nationals was
presented in scholarship, it was generally restricted to social descriptions of diplomatic
high society or military engagements.
Diplomacy and economics dominated the historiography of US foreign relations
for much of the twentieth century. Before the 1950s, many historians of US foreign
relations wrote within the consensus or traditional school. Their analyses focused on
diplomatic negotiation and foreign policy strategy, and they viewed US foreign policy as
well-intentioned and largely successful in meeting noble objectives. Relatively few of
them addressed Latin America, but those who did regarded paternalistic US policies in
the region favorably. 40 The realist school, which supplanted the consensus approach, was
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influenced by the increasingly polarized politics of the early Cold War. Though more
critical of US policies than consensus historians, realists took a pragmatic approach to
detailing international power struggles, articulating the options policymakers faced, and
assessing the outcomes of decisions. They emphasized elite power politics, and like the
consensus historians before them and the revisionist school that followed them, their
analyses were almost exclusively based on US archival sources. In approaching Latin
America, many realists (joining with social scientists and politicians) focused on the
challenges of modernization. Their analyses demonstrated faith in a diffusionist model of
development under which Latin America would modernize with guidance and resources
transferred from the US and other developed capitalist economies. 41
Appearing in the 1960s, the revisionist school was highly critical of US foreign
policy, which it framed as a tool of US economic interests. Revisionist historians rejected
diffusionist theories and policymakers who argued that development and modernity
would filter down to the “third world” via foreign investment and leadership. They
argued that the principal objective of US foreign policy had long been the global
maintenance of an “open door” for US foreign investment. Narrowly framing foreign
policy as economic policy and highlighting the imperialist past and the neo-imperialist
present of the US, revisionist historians had tremendous influence on the historiography
of Latin American-US relations. Indeed, Latin America was an increasingly important
41
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theme in revisionist scholarship; the new formulations of empire and neo-imperialism by
William Appleman Williams and other influential revisionists heavily considered the
relationship between economic foreign policy, US territorial expansion and military
intervention in the Central America and the Caribbean Basin. 42
Many politicians, intellectuals, and students in Latin America, from the far left to
the far right of the political spectrum, were receptive to the critical turn in US
scholarship. In so far as the region was perceived as a potential target of international
communism, Washington considered it important. However, Latin American agendas that
addressed issues marginal to the Soviet-US conflict were largely ignored by US
diplomats. As a result, there was a developing sense among Latin Americans that the US
“Cold War fixation entailed neglect and subordination” and that “it perpetuated ongoing
patterns of the exploitation and underdevelopment.”43 Revisionist-influenced theories of
dependency grew out of this frustration and drew upon the strength of anti-imperialist
politics in the region.
Dependency theory entered the historiography of US-Latin American relations in
the early Cold War and was well established as a dominant trend in the 1970s. Though
waning by the 1990s, its influence has been broad. In its basic formulation, the theory
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was a Marxist-influenced argument that assigned blame for the conditions of poverty in
the underdeveloped world to capitalist powers. Latin America, dependency theorists
argued, was maintained in a state of underdevelopment through its dependence on the
capitalist controlled world financial system, which restricted the regions‟ role in the
global economy to the exporting of raw materials and primary products.44
Notably, both scholarly dependency theory in the US and anti-dependency
politics in Latin American (with which it was closely tied) departed from the revisionist
tradition in conceding a role for culture in the political economy. Yet, in the Marxist
tradition, culture was only analyzed within the context of a totalizing capitalist system.
Dependency theorists saw culture as an “ideological instrument” employed for the spread
of capitalism. 45 With cultural experience always subordinated to economic processes,
dependency theorists were not prepared to see diversity and complexity in Latin
American-US cultural interaction. Though they were better at recognizing cultural
contact zones than scholars of earlier generations, historians employing dependency
frames were constrained by their own rigid oppositional dichotomies
(capitalism/Marxism, imperialism/anti-imperialism, developed/underdeveloped) from
thoughtful exploration of cultural interaction in local rather than global context. Because
they were inclined to see dominance and averse to recognizing collaboration and
reciprocity in foreign/local encounters, dependency theorists often defined cultural
interaction in the vein of imperialism. They charge US culture --manifest as language,
mass media, consumer goods, lifestyle, and especially higher education-- with erasing
44
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local culture. As the US solidified its status as an economic, military and political
superpower in the post-war world and US commercial and cultural products became more
conspicuous in foreign markets, they expressed increasing fear that foreign cultural
domination would destroy “authentic” local and national cultures. 46 Thus, through the
dominance of dependency theory, simplified notions of cultural imperialism gained and
retained currency in scholarly literature and public consciousness. 47
As John Tomlinson suggests, no “coherent thesis” was employed by those who
have charged the US with cultural imperialism. It was engaged differently from all
quarters. In academic and leftist analyses of Latin American-US relations, cultural
imperialism was most often employed in critiques of the expansion of US media. Such
critiques presumed the power of film, radio, television, print publications, and advertising
to change or “colonize” culture.48 Reflecting class prejudices of Latin American
intellectuals toward the lower classes, a pronounced concern for the vulnerability of the
masses to US ideological manipulation via comic strips, animated cartoons, paperback
46
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books, television soap operas, and women‟s magazines was a characteristic theme of the
literature.49 Charges of cultural imperialism were also common in broader critiques of
capitalism and modernity, which sounded the alarm against the increasing visibility of
US consumer goods in local markets. Like the analysts who charged media imperialism,
those who focused on culture as a capitalist commodity imprecisely ascribed power and
meaning to US media and commercial products. Effect from consumer goods, cultural
interaction, and media reach was commonly assumed but infrequently articulated.
Finally, allegations of cultural imperialism also proved popular within discourses of
national identity. Identifying US culture as an invading force, national governments or
others could manipulate identity politics to gain leverage for their own national
projects.50
Significantly, for the purpose of this dissertation, some US educational
institutions and US-sponsored education projects were charged with facilitating US
cultural imperialism around the world. As culture was scrutinized as a capitalist tool, “the
demonology of the imperialist other was extended not only to the North American
corporations, policymakers, and military agents, but also to cultural brokers and
institutions of higher learning.” In the process, “university professors, librarians, and
foundation workers were charged with constituting the new imperialist front.”51
Arguments against US-sponsored education projects in foreign countries have
historically focused on higher education programs. Exchanges that brought foreigners to
49
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the US for university study were harshly dismissed as indoctrination programs that
stripped individuals of their authentic, national cultures and created surrogates for US-led
capitalism. Illustrative is the explanation by Nguyen Khac Vien of the role of education
in securing local support for the US global agenda; in a Spanish-language paperback that
was translated and published in Medellín in 1973, the Vietnamese Marxist charged that
foreign students and intellectuals were awarded…
scholarships, trips to the United States and important positions in international
organizations. In the United States, they adopt a North American lifestyle and a
North American mindset; they are overwhelmed by the material power of the
yanqui and they are placed in the hands of organizations that guide them
politically, converting them little by little to Washington loyalists. Once they have
returned to their countries, these intellectuals, with the financial and technical
assistance from the United States, organize unions, student organizations and
political parties trying to create a social base and ideological justification for
their social classes, which are in the service of neocolonialism.52

Elite Latin American families had historically sent their sons to Europe for
university educations. They studied in Spain, Italy, England, Belgium, and especially
France. Yet, by the second half of the twentieth century more and more of Latin
America‟s sons and daughters were choosing an education in the US. This change, and
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the shift in elite Latin American cultural orientation from Europe to North America
provided ammunition for critics across the political spectrum; in Colombia and Latin
America such critics equated formal education, training, or living experience in the US
with the loss of national identity. With growth in the number of Latin Americans awarded
US educational credentials --diplomas, degrees, certificates, and titles-- multiplying in the
years following World War II, charges of cultural imperialism increased.
Charges of cultural imperialism that centered on US education almost exclusively
focused on higher education. In doing so, they ignored the reality that Latin Americans
experiences with US education systems, bureaucracies, institutions, models, ideologies,
and methodologies were not limited to the university level. By the time theories of
dependency and cultural imperialism had come into academic and political vogue in
Latin America during the 1960s (and in the US shortly thereafter), many Latin Americans
had engaged in US-sponsored or US-influenced education programs at home. Schools
were the most obvious way such engagement unfolded and this was not confined to the
American schools that were sanctioned by the Department of State. US-styled schools at
the primary and secondary level had been introduced in the urban centers of the region by
Protestant missionaries in the mid-nineteenth century. As US businesses established a
stronger Latin American presence after World War I, they, too, became founders of UStype schools, which served the children of both their US and local employees; when
formal US cultural diplomacy began in the late 1930s, independent and non-secular
American schools joined this mix. Taken together, these schools introduced US-modeled
education below the university level to a wide range of social and economic classes.
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In addition to the traditional education programs based in primary and secondary
schools, other US-style education programs proliferated in the region. The decision at
mid-century by many Latin American governments to require English language study in
national secondary schools formalized a role for “American English” in the region. The
spread of English language learning centers, like (but not restricted to) the ColomboAmericanos, in urban areas was a related educational phenomenon. Another major
addition to educational cityscapes of the period were public and private libraries. Many
developed with the professional support of US-trained librarians who introduced US
books, information classification systems, and other elements of library science.
Advances in print technology and growth in the publishing industry also played a role in
the widening US presence in Latin American education. Translation of English-language
educational materials into Spanish was an enormous US undertaking through the early
Cold War. Included among the non-commercial print resources circulated by the US
inside and outside of libraries and schools were cultural magazines, textbooks,
bibliographies, US literary “classics”, and comic books. Finally, with modernization of
national economies a prime objective of local government and business elites, new
vocational, business, and technical training programs also developed with noteworthy US
support.
Cultural History and Questions of Dominance
As an analytical frame, dependency theory was on the declined by the late 1980s,
but attention to the role of culture in US-Latin American relations did not fade. To the
contrary, interest increased substantially. A boom in post-colonial scholarship helped to
fuel this process; placing cultural encounters at the center of inquiry, post-colonialism
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sought to explain how local identities and culture developed in the wake of imperialism.
Social scientists continued to pursue cultural questions as well, and they opened new
paths for research that encouraged interdisciplinary scholarship. Simultaneously, within
the discipline of history, the formerly minor sub-field of cultural history was gaining new
stature. Increasingly, studies of US history, Latin American history and inter-American
relations placed new emphasis on the ways culture constructs and is constructed by
social, political, and economic relationships. Significantly, as the century drew to a close,
culture was no longer dismissed as an adjunct to economics and politics.
This dissertation takes inspiration and direction from research that positions
culture beside, and not behind, politics and economics in analyses of Latin American-US
relations, US foreign policy and US history more generally. Since the 1990s, work in the
fields of cultural history and cultural studies have moved scholarship beyond the
constraints of political economy to reveal social complexities that were formerly masked
in traditional, state-centered political and economic narratives. Historical analysis of race,
ethnicity, gender, and sexuality has been particularly effective toward this end. 53 New
analytical approaches to media, religion, education, philanthropy, marriage, arts and
entertainment, sports, community and travel are also redefining narrow views of interAmerican cultural relationships. 54
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With the turn toward culture in scholarship, more complex views of foreign/local
encounters emerged and simplified notions of cultural imperialism lost currency.
Questions of imperialism remained at the center of inquiry, but as research shifted away
from metropolitan archives and closer to sites of cultural contact, previously overlooked
dynamics within contact zones complicated analyses of dominance. The oppositional
dichotomy of coercion/consent, which had often been employed in such analysis, was
reconsidered. That coercion alone did not secure the dominance of one group over
another --that it required the intellectual consent of the dominated-- had long been
understood. Yet, charges of cultural imperialism had always rested more heavily on the
coercive side of the equation. Attention to local realities in contact zones, however,
produced more nuanced articulations of how consent was granted.55 At the same time,
research in contact zones also forced reconsideration of the foreign/local oppositional
dichotomy itself. New analysis clouded the categories “foreign” and “local” revealing
that they were not always oppositional, mutually exclusive nor jointly exhaustive of the
range of local realities. Questioning the dichotomy, scholarship began to consider how
complex regional, national, and transnational influences construct local culture.
Studies of post-colonialism, inter-American relations and US history continue to
probe the intersection of culture and imperialism because the US had a formal empire
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May, eds., ―Here, There
and Everywhere‖: The Foreign Politics of American Popular Culture (Hanover, NH: University Press of
New England, 2000); Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spencer, eds., In From the Cold: Latin America‘s New
Encounter with the Cold War (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). Baseball has received significant
attention: Louis A. Pérez, On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and Culture (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1999); Alan M. Klein, Sugarball: The American Game, the Dominican Dream
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Rob Ruck, The Tropic of Baseball: Baseball in the Dominican
Republic (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1998); Adrian Burgos, Jr, Playing America's Game:
Baseball, Latinos, and the Color Line (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).
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during the twentieth century; because it continued to have one at the start of the next
century; and because it has had substantial influence on the world economy and in
international politics. That the US exercised strong influence over Latin America in some
significant areas is clear. In economic affairs, for example, the US share of world markets
and leadership of global financial systems gave Washington a dominant influence over
economic policies and processes of some Latin American nations. Owing to its global
leadership during and after World War II, its early leadership within the Organization of
American States and the United Nations, and the weight of its polarizing campaign
against global communism, US political influence in the region has been periodically
dominant as well. Yet, we cannot casually assume that strong US influence over specific
economic or political developments afforded it dominance in all other realms. It is crucial
to see that US influence was never total, often temporary, and always challenged. And it
is incumbent upon historians of inter-American relations not to assume US dominance
without articulating precisely the context in which the relationship existed. 56
Toward understanding Latin American-US relations during the twentieth century,
imperialist paradigms are and will continue to be useful to scholars. Yet, we must also
recognize the limits of the frames. To the extent that studies of empire emphasize power
relationships and privilege the oppositional dichotomies (coercion/consent and
foreign/local), they will offer only limited views of relationships that defy the dichotomy.
Not all encounters between foreign and local ideas, resources, and individuals are
reducible to those power relationships that exist in their midst. Furthermore, not all ideas,
56
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resources and individuals can be so tightly categorized as uniquely foreign or decidedly
local. For the purpose of this study, approaching US-sponsored educational and cultural
projects through the lens of power relationships restricts our ability to see how
transnational collaboration evolves through common interests, intersecting needs, and
shared philosophy rather than through coerced or consensual submission to foreign
authority.
Within educational settings, a multitude of power relationships are certainly
observable, and we might easily frame them using the oppositional dichotomy of
coercion/consent. National governments mandate curriculum, school administrators hire
and fire staff, and classroom teachers discipline students. Other forms of power that
impact learning are identifiable as well: gender, class, and race/ethnic constructs have
historically influenced who goes to school and what they study; training programs are
often built around the stated needs of local businesses; arts programs are dependent on
the cultural tastes of sponsors. This study recognizes that these and other forms of power
relations exist within transnational communities but rejects the notion that these
relationships exclusively condition educational and cultural processes.
In the period covered by this study, it is clear that US educational and cultural
models and philosophies became more influential throughout Latin America. In the
Colombian case, changes in national political leadership together with an emerging
bipartisan consensus for education reform brought an end to constitutionally sanctioned
Church authority over the national education system. This represented a radical departure
from tradition, and it brought the elite monopoly over national educational resources to
an end. But, as politicians, economic interests, and developing middle and professional
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classes turned to education as a vehicle for national modernization, the limited
educational infrastructure of the nation was ill prepared to accommodate rapid change
and increased demand. In this context, foreign educational resources were welcomed and
encouraged by Colombians as never before. As Europe was first fighting and then
recovering from a debilitating war, US educational models proved especially available,
accessible and adaptable for meeting needs in the rapidly diversifying educational
environment.
In Colombia, national and regional educational bureaucracies, private and public
schools, and national business interests strongly encouraged US educational and cultural
influences. Additionally, Colombian intellectuals, artists, students and parents embraced
US cultural resources as the nation pursued basic literacy, cultural reforms, access to
higher education (in-country and abroad), routes toward professionalization and wider
career opportunities. Significantly, flexible US programs and resources stood in stark
contrast to the existing European-modeled and Church-controlled national education
system that offered limited options for Colombians below the upper class. Equating
European and Catholic educational models with elitism of the past and US approaches
with modernity, many Colombians came to appreciate the value US culture placed on
public education, and many sought to emulate it; though inequities within the US system
were acknowledged and criticized (with noteworthy attention to racial discrimination),
Colombians at all levels welcomed US influence as they constructed more modern and
inclusive educational and cultural infrastructure.
It is, however, a mistake to see the increased US influence in Colombia as
constituting cultural imperialism or cultural dominance. This study reveals that
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Colombians established educational contacts with US educational institutions, solicited
US resources to meet local needs, and turned to US models as alternatives to existing
educational and cultural programs. Via such resources, US influences spread among
some educational and cultural communities, over some national education policies, and
among some individuals in Colombia. But this influence was neither static nor
uncontested, and it often dissipated as it evolved over time. In the middle decades of the
twentieth century, Colombians, and not Washington policymakers, reformed their
national education system and reframed national culture using all of the local, regional,
national and transnational resources available to them.
Limited attention to mass media and higher education aside, US-sponsored
education and cultural programs in Latin America and the transnational communities they
spawned have received insignificant attention from scholars outside the field of
education. Historians have acknowledged US-sponsored education programs in Latin
America as an important component of Washington‟s program of cultural diplomacy, but
few have studied these programs on the ground. Owing to this lack of attention, charges
that US-sponsored projects facilitated cultural imperialism or cultural domination have
yet to be adequately critiqued. US cultural programming in Latin America and the
transnational educational and cultural communities it fostered are important cultural sites
of inter-American contact. When these and other cultural sites are overlooked in
scholarship, our understanding of Latin American-US relations remains framed by
political economy. We fail to recognize the spread of US cultural influence in the region
as a response to local realities. We fail to recognize the significant Colombian role in
building the infrastructure of US educational and cultural influence.
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Chapter One

Pan American Education
Simón Bolívar, like so many wealthy South Americans of his and subsequent
generations, received an education abroad. Born in Caracas, the future Liberator of
Caribbean and Andean lands studied in Spain as a teenager, traveled through Napoleonic
Europe, and visited the independent United States during its (and his) early and formative
years. He returned to his homeland with definite ideas about governance and
independence, and he eventually led a protracted military campaign that resulted in the
expulsion of Spain from many of its American colonies.
Under Bolívar, the Republic of Colombia was formed in 1819 as a political union
of the newly independent territories in the northwest corner of the South American
continent. Known to history as Gran Colombia, to differentiate it from the smaller and
later emerging nation of Colombia, the short-lived political union included Venezuela,
Nueva Granda (today‟s Colombia including Panama) and Ecuador. In an age of changing
but still threatening European imperial ambitions, Bolívar inspired and championed Pan
American unity as a powerful deterrent to external threats from Spain, Europe and
elsewhere. Elected as the republic‟s first president, he served two consecutive terms from
1819-1830.
When it came to the practicalities of governing, Pan American inspiration alone
could not sustain union in the wide and diverse territory of Gran Colombia. As Bolívar
continued campaigns of liberation in Peru and Bolivia further to the south in the Andes,
his dreams and the rhetoric of unity crumbled in the young nation to the north. When the
hero of independence returned to actively assume his position in the national capital at
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Bogotá, the challenges were overwhelming. Tensions between the advocates of a strong
and centralized national government and the proponents of regional autonomy through
federalism prevented consensus and coalescence around a unified national project.
Desperate to provide the new country with stability, Bolívar turned to heavy handed and
dictatorial measures that enraged his political opponents and led to assassination
attempts. When Venezuela withdrew from the union in 1830 and Ecuador soon followed,
Bolívar‟s Pan American dream met its demise. Conscious of his failings and suffering
poor health, Bolívar resigned his leadership. He left the Andean highlands for the
Caribbean coast to await passage to exile in Europe. A fallen hero, Bolívar died at Santa
Marta on the Colombian coast shortly thereafter. He was financially and politically
ruined.1
Despite his sad and unfortunate demise, time quickly elevated Bolívar to a high
pedestal that few South American heroes have occupied. Statues of Bolívar are common
on central plazas throughout the region; countries, cities, currency, schools and
universities bear his name; and his political failures are hardly considered in romanticized
histories of national and continental liberation. Though his experiment with Pan
American union proved illusory, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador and Panama have
historically embraced their Bolivarian roots and regularly employ the Liberator‟s rhetoric
to minimize regional and cross border controversies that have come with modernity. In
this and other ways, Bolívar‟s Pan American dream has proven easily adaptable and
readily available to the modern world.
1
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This dissertation considers not Bolívar‟s Pan American dream of 1830 but a new
version of Pan Americanism that framed inter-American relations a century later. The
new Pan Americanism of the 1930s was a political philosophy that grounded a
hemispheric campaign aimed at preventing the spread of radicalism and warfare from
Europe to the Americas. Borrowing from Bolívar and identifying with his unifying
image, this new political philosophy regarded regional unity as crucial to the long-term
stability of Latin America. Adapting Bolívar‟s approach to the modern world, the new
Pan Americanism emphasized not unified nationhood but international cooperation
among existing nation-states. Alarmed by the potential influence in Latin America of the
variant forms of fascism then developing in Spain, Portugal, Germany and Italy,
Washington policymakers championed this approach as the best deterrent to conflict in
the hemisphere. Cautiously encouraged by governments and influential elements
throughout Latin America as well, the new Pan Americanism was fundamental to the
climate of cooperation that characterized Latin American-US relations during the global
economic crisis of the 1930s, in the build up to war in Europe, and for the duration of
World War II.
The transnational educational and cultural projects examined in this study grew
out of this new Pan Americanism, and this first chapter provides crucial historical context
for exploring foreign/local encounters that occurred where Colombian and US education
systems, philosophies and resources converged. It begins with an overview of the new
Pan Americanism as organized from Washington in the 1930s. Focused on fostering
cooperation within the hemisphere, Washington initiated and funded activities aimed at
increasing “mutual understanding” among the peoples of the Americas. The Office of the
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Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, a war-time agency, was charged with developing
the Pan American project, and this section details its organization, leadership and
approach. Because education was the privileged arena for much of the new programming,
the balance of the chapter considers educational realities that conditioned Colombian-US
collaboration. It historicizes the limited scope of the Colombian educational system, the
role of politicians and the Catholic Church in maintaining elite exclusivity in Colombian
classrooms, and reforms of the 1930s that promoted modernization, expansion and
secularization of the system. For comparison, the chapter then considers the remarkable
growth in US schooling during the first half of the twentieth century and the growing
appeal of US educational models for Colombians. While state and local efforts drove
growth in the US system, by the late 1930s the federal government was carving out a role
for itself in defining educational modernity for the nation. While the constitutional
barriers to federal control over domestic education were significant, Washington found
new channels for asserting US educational authority abroad.
The New Pan Americanism of the 1930s
In his first inaugural address in 1932, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) called for
better and more respectful relations between the United States and its hemispheric
neighbors, and he soon asked his staff to propose “some practical means to express the
good-neighbor policy.”2 In a series of subsequent hemispheric meetings at Montevideo in
1933, Buenos Aires in 1936 and Lima in 1938, the Roosevelt administration joined with
the nations of the Americas to change the dynamics of inter-American relations.
Sponsoring or seconding a series of cooperative agreements ranging from commercial
2
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planning to educational exchange to pledges of mutual defense, the US State Department
made hemispheric solidarity the fundamental aim of the Good Neighbor policy. To
achieve this goal, the department initially focused on economic stability. Confronting
continuing economic crisis at home and abroad and concerned about the approaching
European war (as well as conflicts in the Far East, Spain, and Palestine), the department
saw long-term stabilization of the regional economy as essential for social peace and
stable governance. Thus, negotiation of reciprocal trade agreements with the Latin
American republics became the first order of the day. As these negotiations occupied the
department‟s time in the years before Europe went to war, they brought new attention to a
region Washington had long taken for granted. Through these negotiations, the Foreign
Service bureaucracy gained a deeper understanding of Latin American economies and
markets. At the same time, they developed broader knowledge of Latin American society
in general and began to engage more comfortably in new forms of diplomacy.
The goal of broad hemispheric solidarity had roots in an earlier Pan American
movement that emerged at the close of the 19th century under US leadership. At that time
a representative body, the Pan American Union (PAU), was established to address
regional issues and promote greater understanding and cooperation among the peoples of
the Americas. Centered in Washington, the PAU‟s primary objective was fostering a
sense of Pan American identity to facilitate better hemispheric relations. Importantly, as
the PAU worked to bridge the divided between the Americas, it also attempted to
dismantle barriers to cooperation between Latin American countries themselves. 3
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Historically, Latin American nations were suspicious not only of the US but of each
other; even as they celebrated shared Latin American cultural identity, they were
disinclined toward regional political and economic cooperation. Though this internal
Latin American dynamic was a serious obstacle toward PAU objectives, interventionist
US foreign policy presented the greatest challenge to hemispheric understanding and
cooperation.
In the first three decades of the twentieth century, the US established a strong
military presence in the Caribbean and Central America. As it added various Latin
American parcels to its national territory and exercised temporary military and economic
control over others, the US was rightly seen as an imperialist power. The Panama Canal
Zone, a ten-mile wide strip across sovereign Panama, became US national territory.
Puerto Rico became a US possession after the Spanish American War. The US military
occupied Cuba and US politicians inserted the Platt Amendment, which explicitly
sanction the right of the US to intervene in Cuban affairs, into the island‟s constitution.
And multiple interventions in Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and
Honduras were carried out in the name of US economic interests and regional stability.
Because the US was the region‟s preeminent military and economic power, its
interventionist activities in the first third of the twentieth century gave its hemispheric
neighbors reason to question the sincerity of the US-led Pan Americanism of the PAU.
new body. Historical analysis of the PAU is surprisingly sparse though the organization is frequently
referenced in scholarship. For basic overview of the organization and its founding see: Clifford B. Casey,
“The Creation and Development of the Pan American Union,” The Hispanic American Historical Review
13, no. 4 (November 1933), pp.437-456; Gilderhus, The Second Century: US-Latin American Relations
Since 1889; Gilderhus, Pan American Visions: Woodrow Wilson in the Western Hemisphere, 1913-1921
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986); Walter Scott Penfield, “The Legal Status of the Pan
American Union,” The American Journal of International Law 20, no. 2 (April 1926), pp. 257-262. The
publications of the PAU were numerous. The Bulletin of the Pan American Union was published in the
principal languages of the hemisphere and is widely available to scholars. The proceedings of the various
hemispheric conferences sponsored by the PAU are also available.
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Though willing to engage in cooperative programs in the areas of science, education and
culture, the countries of the hemisphere understood that regional power did not rest
within the PAU. Thus, this early twentieth-century Pan Americanism enjoyed only
limited credibility among Latin Americans, and it was barely acknowledged in the US.
Among select scientists, intellectuals, and academics, however, Pan Americanism was
beginning to gain professional currency. Transnational educational and cultural
communities were emerging.
US foreign policy shifts in the 1930s gave the Pan Americanism promoted by the
PAU a new lease on life. While US tariffs reforms, cooperation in the sciences, and
educational exchanges helped to improve Latin American-US relations in some
professional and business communities, FDR‟s explicit rejection of military intervention
strategies, more than anything else, contributed to the new climate of cooperation in the
hemisphere. At the PAU conference at Montevideo in 1933, the US signed Article 8 of a
hemispheric “Convention of Rights and Duties” which unequivocally rejected
intervention by one nation against another. The next year after the Cuban government had
unilaterally abrogated the Platt Amendment, Washington did the same.4 With the formal
reversal of its long-standing interventionist policy and new diplomatic attention to the
region, the US immediately gained political leverage with its Latin America neighbors.
As World War II approached, goodwill generated by FDR‟s Good Neighbor initiatives
cleared the path toward greater solidarity in the Americas. While historians debate the
motivations behind and the achievements of the Good Neighbor initiatives, it is clear that
4
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many Latin American governments recognized and appreciated the shift in US policy
during FDR‟s presidency. Though it remained to be seen how long the noninterventionist politics would sustain, at least temporarily cooperative programs and a
discourse of mutual respect replaced coercion and military force as the tools of US
foreign policy in the region.5
The PAU and its predecessor organization, the International Bureau of American
Republics, had held more than a half dozen regular conferences and various special topic
meetings between its founding in 1889 and the late 1920s. In the quest for modernity that
marked the early twentieth century, science, technology, culture and education were
frequent topics addressed at these gatherings, and exchanges involving scientists and
academics were a common result. Representatives from Washington always attended and
forwarded agendas at these conferences, but private philanthropic and professional
organizations from the US played more important roles. Given the US tradition of
deferring to private initiative and limiting government activity, organizations such as the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Institute of International Education, and
the American Council on Education played crucial roles in funding, administering and
promoting the transnational cultural contacts established at the conferences. While most
of the developing contacts occurred in the realm of elite academia and never the left the
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institutional level, the work of the PAU and US private organizations laid an important
base for the official US cultural diplomacy that would later emerge. 6
In the field of education, PAU activity was wide-ranging. Identifying language as
a serious barrier to cultural understanding, the PAU consistently used conferences to
encourage the teaching of the Spanish in US schools and the teaching of English in Latin
American schools. This practice would later be taken up as a recommendation in the
formal plans of US cultural diplomacy. 7 At Havana in 1930, a special inter-American
gathering of “Rectors, Deans, and Educators in General” met to follow up on education
resolutions passed at an earlier PAU conference. As a result of that conference, the InterAmerican Institute of Intellectual Cooperation was created within the PAU and
government-sponsored exchanges of university students and professors ensued. 8 When
the PAU met at Buenos Aires in 1936, collaborative education activities were further
expanded with the signing of the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American
Cultural Relations. Additional cultural conventions were approved that covered
exchanges of government and academic publications, inter-American tours of national art
collections, and the circulation of educational films. 9
Washington‟s renewed interest in Pan Americanism initially resulted from FDR‟s
friendlier policies in the hemisphere. Owing to the budget constraints of the era and the
sense that interventions complicated rather than solved problems, the president took a
6
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friendlier approach which respected the sovereignty of American states. As the 1930s
progressed, however, intensifying US interest in Pan Americanism became a function of
its fears over Latin American vulnerability to anti-democratic forces. Well before the
outbreak of war across the Atlantic, Washington displayed tremendous concern that Latin
American nations were being used as sources of raw materials by aggressive and
potentially hostile European nations. In addition, US leaders continually sounded the
alarm that radical influences from abroad --at this stage fascism was the primary concern- were penetrating the region. Justifying the growing expense of its new diplomacy to a
skeptical Congress and asserting a notion of shared inter-American culture in the late
1930s, the State Department framed budget requests against a fear that “foreign countries
are inculcating ideas totally alien to the Americas.”10
A sense that Axis influence in Latin America had increased through sustained and
well-funded German, Italian, and Japanese economic and cultural campaigns spurred
development of more activist and cooperative diplomacy by the United States. While the
activities of the Axis powers were of immediate concern and singularly fueled the
successful drive in Congress toward the funding of similar US programs, it was
simultaneously recognized that many friendly countries had also gained influence in
Latin America through economic and cultural programs. Chief among them were Britain
and France. Schools, clubs, libraries, and cultural centers sponsored by European nations
in Latin America suddenly concerned the State Department. Academic exchanges
between European and Latin American universities along with official European
educational and technical missions to various nations of the region were equally
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disconcerting. In economic areas, the Department of State found that many development
projects in Latin American countries had been dependent on European experts for years.
That European countries, especially Germany, had provided technical experts at no
charge to the requesting Latin American countries provided justification for initiating a
similar US program at no cost.11
Rather suddenly, Washington became determined to offer an alternative to
European cultural influence and present its own models of modernity to its southern
neighbors. Having already committed to establishing formal government cultural
relations with the region at the 1936 Buenos Aires conference, the US began to create
organizational infrastructure to carry it out. Formulating a philosophy to guide cultural
diplomacy, “mutual understanding” among the peoples of the Americas was identified as
the essential ideal to be cultivated. Such understanding, policymakers reasoned, would be
achieved not through propaganda campaigns and one-sided promotion of US culture but
through reciprocal cultural exchange and open dialogue. From these encounters, it was
hoped that Americans throughout the hemisphere would grow more tolerant and
appreciative of their differences and, just as importantly, discover their common interests
and shared culture. To the extent that a broad formulation of Pan American identity could
be cultivated and propagated, Washington believed hemispheric unity would be
strengthened. Justifying the nascent cultural approach to diplomacy and the
administration‟s requests for sizeable increases in appropriations for Latin American
cultural programs, Secretary of State Cordell Hull told Congress:
In a political sense, it is wise to have friends close at hand…In a general sense,
we feel that in these troubled times in the world it is a real advantage to have
11
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friends near at home of similar outlook and purpose with whom we can cooperate
and who will cooperate with us in time of need. The work is extending rapidly
because of these new friendships, particularly in fields with which heretofore the
Department has had very little to do.12
To implement the terms of cooperative agreements signed by the United States
and various American republics at Montevideo, Buenos Aires, and Lima, FDR had
established the Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation with the American
Republics in May 1938. This committee grew out of the Committee of Inter-American
Affairs that had earlier been formed by the president within his cabinet. Reflecting the
expanding scope of US attention to Latin America, the interdepartmental committee
included representatives of thirteen federal departments and agencies who were involved
in formulating and implementing initiatives for the region. Congress approved legislation
authorizing special funds for the committee the following year based on a report
proposing seventy-four interdepartmental projects of hemispheric cooperation. Included
in the document were educational programs proposed by the US Office of Education and
the State Department that aimed to increase “mutual understanding” among the people of
the hemisphere. 13
The State Department, which had oversight and organizational responsibilities for
all of the interdepartmental initiatives, followed the lead of the PAU and privileged
education and cultural exchange as key arenas for Latin American programming. That
education had an especially crucial role to play in new programs was signaled from the
top. FDR himself called for an increased role for education in American foreign policy.
Addressing the National Education Association in 1938, the president referred to the
12
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alarming situation in Europe and framed fascist policies as a war against education and
culture. The US and its allies, he argued, needed to take up the cause:
when the clock of civilization can be turned back by burning libraries, by exiling
scientists, artists, musicians, writers, and teachers, by dispersing universities,
and by censoring news and literature and art, an added burden is placed upon
those countries where the torch of free thought and free learning still burn
bright.14

In 1938, the Department of State formally established a Cultural Relations
Program specifically for Latin America. The new cultural program complemented
existing Good Neighbor programs in the areas of commerce, educational interchange and
social development, and it aimed to foster Pan American unity while building resistance
to antidemocratic and radical forces. Promoting a more positive image of the United
States in Latin America was an important and related goal. With the outbreak of
hostilities in Europe in 1939, US diplomatic programs in Latin American accelerated and
became more explicitly tied to the war. Development of hemispheric unity through
“mutual understanding” remained the goal, but programs were now targeted more
precisely at countering the economic penetration, propaganda campaigns, and expanding
cultural influence of the Axis powers.
The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
As war took over Europe, it was common perception in Washington that the Nazi
plan for world domination involved organizing a “fifth column” of supporters in the
Americas. Such a column, it was thought, would facilitate Axis occupation of Latin
America and provide a launching pad for their attacks on the US. German nationals in the

14

Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Address to the National Education Association,” 30 June 3 1938, in Roosevelt
and Lurton, Roosevelt‘s Foreign Policy 1933-1940: Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s Unedited Speeches and
Messages, p. 142.

67

hemisphere along with Latin American nationals of German, Italian, and Japanese
descent were expected to make up the core of the column. That such immigrant
communities were plentiful in the region was grounds for much US concern. As war
demanded greater attention and resources of the State Department, coordination of the
government‟s increasing Latin American activities became taxing. Responsibility for
programming soon shifted to a new agency, the Office of the Coordinator of InterAmerican Affairs (OIAA). While the State Department resisted the control of the OIAA
over Latin American programs, as a practical matter it needed the assistance of the new
agency to both maintain and increase programs in the hemisphere. 15
The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs was founded in August
1940 and served as a war agency until its closure in May 1946. During its six-year
existence, it employed approximately 1000 employees in addition to the personnel of its
five subsidiary corporations and the twenty volunteer committees of US citizens (called
“Coordination Committees”) in Latin America. Thirty-two year old Nelson A.
Rockefeller was appointed by FDR as the coordinator of the new agency. Though the US
tradition of limited government and deference to private initiative had been replaced by
more activist governance in the 1930s, the administration still hoped business,
philanthropic, and professional organizations would continued to play a leading role in
new US programs in the hemisphere. Well connected to the most powerful actors in US
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business, cultural and philanthropic communities, young Rockefeller proved a solid
choice to lead the OIAA. He answered directly to the president.
Rockefeller‟s family name and his connections to the petroleum industry would
later provide fuel for revisionist historians, who saw only economic and strategic
motivations in the Pan Americanism of the Good Neighbor and World War II years. But,
to frame Rockefeller strictly as an economic and government operative is to miss a prime
example of complexities that typify Latin American-US encounters. Rockefeller had
worked in Venezuela, had traveled extensively in Latin America, and was enthusiastic
about the region‟s history, culture and languages. He was a humanitarian who believed
not simply in philanthropic donations but in personal philanthropic activism and
empowering individuals. As Darlene Rivas has shown in her analysis of Rockefeller‟s
activities in Venezuela, he embodied the tensions of modernity: he preached faith in free
enterprise but had reservations about corporate power; he believed strongly in US
leadership but recognized its potential abuses; he believed in the freedom of the
individual but was equally concerned with community welfare. Based on his experiences
in Latin America, Rockefeller brought to the OIAA a belief in “missionary capitalism.”
He believed that capitalism needed be reformed so as to be more conscientious, respectful
of the individual, and supportive of the common good.16
Under Rockefeller, OIAA leadership was “drawn from the business world” and
offered a wide-range of expertise. 17 The OIAA‟s programs were varied and changed
throughout the war, but they were generally grouped within one of several organizational
divisions: Commerce/Economics, Transportation, Information (radio, motion pictures,
16
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publications, and press), Health/Sanitation, Food Supply/Nutrition, and Culture. As a war
agency, the OIAA was officially empowered to address matters of an immediate nature.
Yet in practice Rockefeller the “missionary capitalist” was more ambitious. Under his
leadership the OIAA was “as much interested in long-range projects looking toward
improvement in conditions in the hemisphere as they were in those concerned with the
war effort.”18
At its establishment, the OIAA‟s most immediate concern was a new economic
crisis in the region. The war cut Latin America off from many of its crucial European
markets. The US government initiated programs by which it purchased large quantities
of raw materials to alleviate the problems of supply. The US benefited from such
purchases and also avoided economic chaos in the region by preventing inroads by Axis
agitators. Additionally, the OIAA immediately took an active role in developing and
implementing new cultural programs to counter Axis influence. OIAA organizational
committees of art, music, literature, publications, education and cultural interchange were
formed. Intensifying exchange programs that had been running since the late 1930s, the
OIAA arranged for year-long interchanges of leaders in education, literature, law,
medicine, music, and arts between the United States and Latin America. It also offered
travel grants for shorter visits to students, teachers, and experts in various fields. OIAA
leaders hoped that all Latin American travel grantees would report positively about the
United States once they returned home. They believed positive public testimonies about
life in the US would soften lingering views of the US as an imperialist power and counter
anti-US propaganda perpetuated by Axis powers and their local supporters.19
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Extending cultural programming into the region, the OIAA developed mass media
campaigns to “educate” Latin Americans about the war and US-led mutual defense
preparations for the hemisphere. But film, radio, and print media campaigns also focused
more broadly on inter-American education, health, and cultural topics that continued to
emphasize Pan American identity. And by the early 1940s, the OIAA also began to fund
libraries, US cultural centers, and existing schools founded by US nationals in the
region.20 The OIAA viewed these institutions, grounded in local Latin American
communities, as the most effective means of fostering “mutual understanding” and
building long-term support for the United States and the principles of democracy.
In the spirit of the Good Neighbor policy, the developing program of cultural
relations was reciprocal. Informed by a sense that hemispheric solidarity and
understanding required that United States citizens be educated too, Rockefeller asserted
that the “lack of understanding is the basic problem we have in this field and I think
inability to speak each other‟s language has been one of the great contributing factors in
that.”21 Rockefeller‟s personal experiences in Latin America informed his explicit belief
that US citizens were wholly ignorant about Latin American culture, and he prioritized a
US-based program of education about Latin America. 22 The responsibility for domestic
inter-American programs was shared between the OIAA and the US Office of Education
(which was part of the Federal Security Agency during war). One major program
promoted the teaching of Spanish and Portuguese in US public schools. Others focused
on developing the teaching of Latin American history and culture in US universities and
20
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schools and circulating teaching materials, traveling exhibits, and books about Latin
America. In addition, informative pamphlets, art exhibits, music, film and radio
programming were targeted at the general population.23
Overall, governments throughout the region proved very receptive to the efforts of
Rockefeller and the OIAA. While remaining suspicious of US power, in the volatile
global climate of the day many agreed that “mutual understanding” was a necessary first
step toward better relations along the hemisphere‟s north-south axis. And they welcomed
the opportunity to reshape the inter-American relationship. However, accompanying
Latin America‟s general willingness to engage in new economic, political, and cultural
relationships with the US was a more skeptical reception to the notion of Pan American
identity. Some Latin Americans embraced the inclusive hemispheric identity proffered by
Washington, yet many others resisted the label. Their reasons varied.
First, the cultivation of broad hemispheric identity faced the road blocks of
nationalism and anti-imperialism. Since the late nineteenth century, anti-US imperialism
had proven an important fountain of nationalist sentiment in Latin America. In Colombia,
where resentment of the US role in Panamanian independence always lingered and was
easily stoked, denunciation of US power and influence was a dependable tool for rallying
public opinion around domestic campaigns. Second, those who resisted US-sponsored
Pan Americanism often advocated for building cooperative Latin American identity in its
stead. Political realists, like Colombia‟s Eduardo Caballero Calderon, understood that US
influence would likely intensify after the war and saw the strengthening of Latin
American identity as the solution; distinguishing Bolívar‟s Pan Americanism from
Washington‟s version, he argued that there was no “Pan Americanism possible or
23
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desirable if Latin-Americanism does not exist first.”24 Without Latin Americanism, he
and many others believed Pan Americanism would facilitate US dominance. Third, Pan
American identity collided with Hispanidad, a very potent force in Latin American
identity politics. Hispanidad took many forms but in general it manifest as a celebration
of those Latin American cultural traditions which were rooted in Spain. The essential
elements of Hispanidad were Roman Catholicism and the Spanish language, but all of the
socio-cultural structures with which religion and language overlapped were elements as
well. For many Latin Americans, Hispanidad summarized the cultural essence of their
nations and served as the primary unifying cultural force in the region. In reaction to
Liberal secularism, the embrace of Hispanidad was particularly pronounced among
Conservative intellectuals and politicians in Colombia from the late 1880s forward.
During the Spanish Civil War of the 1930s, the victors had fought under a banner of
Hispanidad and prescribed it as the antidote to the secular evils of modernity. Ardent
supporters of the Spanish movement were prominent in Colombia and throughout Latin
America, and their rhetoric further challenged the US assertions of hemispheric
identity.25
Individually and combined, variant forms of nationalism, anti-imperialism, Latin
Americanism, and Hispanidad grounded individuals‟ rejection of Pan Americanism. Yet
to see Pan American identity simply as a fabricated and politically expedient construct
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imposed from Washington is to oversimplify complex hemispheric identity politics. As
this study will demonstrate, there were many Latin Americans who embraced Pan
American identity. For them, nationalism, Latin Americanism, and Hispanidad did not
automatically conflict with broad and inclusive hemispheric identity. Differences would
always exist between the Americas, but efforts to understand difference and acknowledge
commonalities provided a strong basis for establishing shared identity.
Speaking to the secondary school students of Barranquilla on Pan American Day
in 1942, for example, industrialist and intellectual Ramón Emiliano Vélez offered pointed
criticism of past US foreign policy. Recounting that the Monroe Doctrine had promised
“solidarity and protection” to Latin America, he reminded the audience that military
imperialism had been the result. Given past abuses, he warned that Colombia and Latin
America needed to remain on guard against future US interventions. Yet, he
simultaneously signaled optimism about new trends in Latin American-US relations.
Vélez was most enthusiastic that educational and cultural exchange was at the center of
the new philosophy. Equating the new Pan Americanism with Bolívar‟s ideal, he framed
it as worthy of celebration and encouraged students to participate in its construction. 26
The collaborative Colombian-US education and cultural programs examined in
this study demonstrate that many Colombians willingly engaged in constructing the new
Pan Americanism and did not reject Pan American identity. For some modernists, it was
a pragmatic decision. Pan Americanism presented the option of symbolically linking their
less developed nation with the modern and powerful US. Hopeful that the benefits of
modernity would flow with cooperation and cautiously optimistic about the US
commitment to “mutual understanding,” these modernizers saw concrete benefits to the
26
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new Pan Americanism. At the same time, the embrace of broad American identity
allowed Colombians to differentiate their nation and national culture from its elite
European roots. As warfare gripped Europe, advocates of Pan Americanism continually
drew a contrast between the new, democratic and peaceful America and the violent,
traditional, and old mother continent.
The National Education System in Colombia
Church Authority, European Influence, and Elite Exclusivity
Until the mid-twentieth century, education in Colombia was largely in the hands
of the Catholic Church and structured around a tiny, elite fraction of the national
population. Battles over secularization were a major political theme through the
nineteenth-century and pitted Liberals against a Conservative-Church alliance. When
Liberals periodically held control of their government in the decades after independence,
their efforts at educational reform were often limited to the opening of philosophically
Liberal secondary schools to provide elite families with a secular educational option for
their sons. More radical secularization efforts were initiated with Liberal reforms in the
1870s when broader Church privileges and power came under heavier assault. At that
time, Liberal rhetoric decried the “ideological and economic” domination of church over
the nation. Yet then as earlier, Liberals didn‟t have resources or the manpower at their
disposal to convert a Catholic education system to a secular one. Though they gained
support in their efforts toward secular education from artisans in urban centers and,
overall, increased enrollments slightly, they did not have the resources to push their
ideologies of reform in the rural areas. 27
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For their efforts to expand and secularize education, Liberals would be branded
anti-clerical and earn the wrath of the Church. Like almost all Colombians, however,
most Liberals were Catholic. Though some anti-clericalism was evident among
individual party leaders and followers, demands for education reform and expansion were
not a Liberal assault on religious faith. Most Liberals accepted a role for the Church in
religious “indoctrination” of children, and few questioned the appropriateness of teaching
Catholic doctrine in the schools. Instead, they opposed Church influence over
pedagogy. 28 Liberal support for secularization of education reflected beliefs in the
principles of republican governance rather than an attack on religion. They well
understood that the Church was a “common denominator” in a nation marred by repeated
outbreaks of civil warfare, and contrary to Church and Conservative rhetoric, they were
interested in reining in and not eliminating the nation‟s “only institution capable of
bringing cohesion to the disjointed society.” 29
During Conservative political rule from the 1880s through 1930, a period called
the Conservative Hegemony, a campaign was initiated to reverse what the Church
perceived as a strong current of secularization in Colombian society. Reversal started at
the top. Under a new constitution, Roman Catholicism was acknowledged as the religion
of the nation and was formerly recognized as an “essential element of the social order.”
To give meaning to constitutional phrases, a separately negotiated concordat between
Bogotá and the Vatican was signed in 1887 to clarify the role of the Church in society.
Reacting to secularization in Europe with activist diplomacy, the Vatican secured from
Colombian Conservatives the concession that education in the nation would be
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“organized and directed” in accordance with Catholicism. To ensure that teaching would
be in “conformity with” Catholic doctrine, the concordat gave the national Church
hierachy control over textbook choices and right to officially denounce and pursue
expulsion of teachers.30 Later, when the Conservative government took steps to increase
the number of schools, Church approval became a legal requirement for new primary and
secodary establishments.31 In effect, with the consent of ruling Conservatives, the Church
exercised constitutionally-sanctioned hegemony over the national education system
through the first third of the twentieth century.
At the turn of the nineteenth century in the midst of a brutal civil war, Colombia‟s
illiteracy rate stood at 66%.32 As the war ended, Conservatives working within the
parameters of the concordat took steps to expand and improved educational programming
as a means of modernizing and unifying the nation. They created a Ministry of Public
Instruction to lead the necessary reforms, and by the early 1920s, the ministry was
exerting greater control over secondary education. Schools licensed to grant the
bachillerato certificate, a diploma required for university study, had to conform to a
standardized national curriculum established by the government and approved by the
Church.
Through the 1920s, Conservative campaigns to expand education barely achieved
modest gains. When Liberals assumed control of the government in the early 1930s,
ending nearly fifty years of Conservative rule, only 30% of Colombian children of
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appropriate age were enrolled in a primary school. 33 The majority of those enrolled
attended for only for a year or two and never completed the program. Just 12% of those
enrolled in rural primary schools reached the final or third year. In urban schools, which
had a six year program, less than 2% of enrollees reached that final year. Enrollment
figures at the secondary level were even more sobering. Of the total who attended
primary school, less than 7% completed the program and moved onto the secondary
level. 34 Illiteracy rates in Colombia directly reflected the limited reach of education, and
as new school reform efforts were debated in the 1930s, approximately six in ten
Colombians over ten years of age could still neither read nor write. Even with this high
illiteracy rate Colombia was better off than some of its regional neighbors, yet for elites
who judged national progress against European standards, the limits of literacy were
increasingly seen as an obstacle to modernity. 35
In the first three decades of the twentieth century, responsibility for primary
education rested not with the national government but with the departments. Males and
females, who were educated separately, had approximately equal representation in
primary school populations though female enrollment was higher in rural areas and lower
in urban centers. Secondary-level schools or colegios were the responsibility of the
national government, but only 25% of the colegios in Colombia were government-run
schools and many that carried the official designation were administered privately. In
granting educational authority to the Church, Conservatives had relied upon it to build
and run secondary-level colegios. Unlike primary schools, Colombian colegios served
33
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elite and upper-class families. Levels of enrollment were slightly higher for males than
females, though higher percentages of females were educated in private schools and
males significantly outnumbered females in government or official schools. In colegios,
males received a classical education based on European models and university
preparation was the primary goal. By decree, the government established a standard
national curriculum, but until the 1920s colegios had complete freedom to establish
course priorities. Coursework included: Spanish, Latin, French, and, to a lesser extent,
English; rhetoric, philosophy, and Catholic religion; mathematics and physics; geography
and history.36 In contrast, females at the colegio level received a moral and religious
education infused with class and gender-appropriate training for household
responsibilities.37
In the first third of the twentieth century, colegios could be divided into four
categories. First, Catholic schools, run by the national Church or Catholic religious
orders, represented more than 50% of all colegios. They catered to a slightly higher
percentage of girls than boys, and many were founded and staffed by members of
religious congregations of European, and especially French, origin. Owing to the
dominance of French friars and nuns in these schools, they offered an education that was
“classic and literary” but in many cases culturally French.38 The second most popular
type of colegio was a lay [laico] institution run by Colombians, some of whom had left
religious life. Such schools were Catholic in orientation and were most frequently found
in urban centers where Church colegios could not meet enrollment demands. These lay
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institutions accounted for close to 40% of all colegios. Third, a small group of colegios
were founded by Liberals as an alternative to Catholic education. These schools often
stressed scientific over classical and religious education and were frequent targets of
poltical attacks by the Church hierarchy and their Conservative supporters. Lastly, a
small but growing number of colegios were founded and staffed by foreigners, mostly
German and British nationals, and modeled on their own national curricula. They usually
served local children of resident foreigners but also appealed to upper-class families who
wanted an alternative to the French and Catholic influence within Colombian schools. 39
Strong transnational currents have historically circulated within Colombian
education, and colegios founded by foreigners contributed to such currents. However, it
is crucial to recognize that the greatest source of foreign influence on the nation‟s
education system came from Europe via the Vatican. The Vatican‟s veto power over
educational programming gave international Catholicism and its European cultural
traditions strong influence in the nation‟s schools. More significantly, the concordat of
the late nineteenth century between the Vatican and ruling Conservatives effectively
opened Colombia‟s classrooms to direct European influence in the form of teachers. The
document allowed European religious congregations, which were then being displaced
from classrooms of the Old World by the forces of secularization, to immigrate freely to
Colombia and establish new schools. Providing the Vatican with a solution for its
displaced congregations and offering Colombia a means to expand educational services,
the concordat facilitated the arrival of over forty religious communities by 1930. The
majority arrived from France, but German, Italian, and Spanish congregations arrived as
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well. 40 Some of these congregations took up educational work in the national territories
where the central state lacked a presence. They established schools in indigenous
communities and among other marginalized populations on the periphery of the nation.
However, most of the new congregations remained in the urban centers of the Andean
interior, and following Colombian tradition, established colegios that served the upper
class. In Bogotá in 1891, soon after the new influx of European religious had begun, 40%
of the friars and 20% of nuns in the city were foreigners, and most were members of
French orders. In urban areas outside the capital and particularly in less-cosmopolitan
regional capitals, European friars and nuns had an even more dominant presence in
schools. Through the 1920s, their presence increased. 41
Because so many elite Colombians were educated by foreigners, schools were
important sites of foreign/local encounters. In Colombian classrooms, students came into
close contact with European cultures and languages. With a preponderance of educators
from France, emphasis on the study of the French language, and high numbers of FrenchSpanish bilingual schools, it is hardly surprising that so many wealthy Colombians
developed cultural affinity for France. Strong French influence was reflected in elite art,
fashion, and music. The works of French writers and philosophers filled the personal
libraries of upper-class families. Colombian writers printed their books in Paris. And
when they sent their sons to study in the universities of Europe, Colombians showed a
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preference for France and French-speaking regions. Italian, British, Belgian, and German
educational influences, while less pronounced, also marked European influence on
Colombian culture.42
Given the limited reach of Colombia‟s education system and the strong European
cultural influence in elite colegios, it is clear that “educational institutions deepened the
cultural chasm between the elites and the masses.” 43 Elite constructions of
Colombianidad reflected shared experiences in national classrooms led by Europeans,
university study in European capitals, and travels to and from the Old Continent. In a
largely illiterate nation, elites held a monopoly on the projections of national identity via
books, newspapers, and magazines. And resulting in part from foreign-influenced
educations, such projections carried many references and symbols whose meanings were
lost on the Colombian majority.
At the level of pedagogy, a secular alternative to Colombia‟s Catholic educational
model was offered by German educational theorists who had growing influence among
some Colombian educators. German philosophies framed education scientifically and
proffered systematic approaches to learning and teacher training. German graduate
programs in education and other disciplines were popular with Europeans and North
Americans by the late 1800s. Colombians, too, were interested in German educational
models, and reformers in both parties contracted German pedagogical missions in the
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1870s and in the 1920s. The forging of a unified German state from distinct regions in the
second half of the nineteenth century had impressed Colombian politicians whose own
nation suffered regional fragmentation. For Colombian observers, the German education
system offered a model for facilitating national cohesion among divided peoples. 44
Germany offered a model of modernity that appealed to Colombian elites of the
younger generations. Its extensive public school system was directed by the state,
coordinated with national economic planning, and charged with fostering German
identity among the children of the nation. That the unified German state soon purchased a
third of Colombia‟s major exports was also instrumental in shifting some elite attention
toward that European nation.45 Predictably, both of the German education missions to
Colombia became bogged down in the divisive partisanship and Church politics that
characterized education policy debates in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Yet German recommendations helped to define educational discourse as the nation
pursued modernity. Particularly important in the 1920s was the German mission‟s strong
insistence that parental obligation for the education of children should be established in
the law. Of course, the nation did not have the infrastructure and the national elite then
lacked the will to educate all Colombian children, but this recommendation helped frame
debates over compulsory education that drove Liberal educational reforms in the 1930s. 46
The 1930s: Secularization, Modernization and Cultural Change
The return of the liberals in 1930 brought new energies to educational reform and
initiated the formal decline of Church hegemony over educational and cultural affairs.
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Reflecting growing bipartisan consensus that the existing educational infrastructure
would not support modernity, the elite privileged education as a vehicle for developing
and integrating the national economy, addressing social instability, and legitimizing
central-state authority. In a sharp departure from tradition, elites across party proved
willing to support a broad extension of educational services to historically less-favored
classes. Shared faith in the transformative power of education grounded this building
consensus, but serious disagreement remained over the best methods for achieving
reform. 47
Educational reform had to respond to the dynamics of urbanization. In Colombia,
as across the hemisphere, cities were on the rise and urban agendas were increasingly
driving national development. Over the course of the century, as the nation grew from
four to forty-two million people, urban populations increased from less than a fifth to
almost three quarters of the national total. As urbanization changed a predominantly rural
and agricultural country into a “nation of cities,” the combined impact of industrialization
and tremendous expansion of the urban service sector made Colombia less rural and its
economy less agricultural. Indeed, while agriculture dominated the Colombian economy
for the first half of century, it accounted for less than 20% of GDP at century‟s end. 48
Efforts to reform education and expand educational services had to respond to the new
urban reality.
Alfonso López Pumarejo, who was elected to the presidency in 1934, initiated the
Revolution on the March [La Revolución en Marcha]. Often compared with the New
Deal, López‟s revolution radically shifted debates in national politics by emphasizing
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social and labor issues. 49 Like the New Deal it was a moderate program that aimed for
economic and social stability and was decidedly not revolutionary. López expanded
government management of the economy, courted the middle class, embraced organized
labor, and initiated a limited program of agrarian reform. Ending literacy requirements
for suffrage, he broadly opened the political process. Historiography concludes that the
immediate achievements of the Revolution on the March were modest at best, yet the
long-term impact of the López reforms was far from marginal. Reflecting building bipartisan consensus for addressing obstacles to modernity, La Revolución en Marcha
made the nation “truly face up for the first time to its social question.” 50 In doing so, it
broke with governing traditions and forever altered Colombian politics.
In educational affairs, López sharply turned up the heat in the century-old
secularization debate. When he identified the Church as the primary obstacle to
educational reform and modernization, hope for bipartisanship in education policy hit a
wall. López concentrated on asserting state control over education and launched a direct
assault on the hegemony of the Church. With a constitutional amendment in 1936, he
eliminated the requirement that education be “organized and directed” in line with
Catholic teaching. At the same time, primary education was made free and obligatory
although no provisions were made for funding the expansions required to meet the new
obligation. The Church and most Conservatives adamantly, yet unsuccessfully, fought
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these constitutional changes. Opposing obligatory education, the Church asserted that the
decision to educate a child rested with the head of the family, the father. It also mounted
strong resistance to a ruling that permitted admission of students who were illegitimate
by birth to primary, secondary, and professional schools. Denial of admission based on
other social, racial, or religious distinctions was also prohibited. Beyond the reduction in
Church control and establishment of state supremacy in educational affairs, the López
education reform policies had multiple other objectives: implementing sound economic
policies to allow for proper budgeting for education and social programs; improving
quality of life for the nation‟s impoverished, rural majority through literacy and
schooling; establishing adult education programs; nationalizing the system of teacher
training; beginning a nationwide school construction program; funding school cafeterias
to provide meals for poor students; and reforming the National University and building a
centralized campus. Most controversial was the effort to establish and enforce state
inspections of private schools because it brought secular authority into Catholic
classrooms. 51
Loss of its constitutional privilege in the 1930s weakened Church authority, but it
remained a powerful force in education. Still educating the majority of Colombian
secondary students, it used the power of the pulpit to denounce Liberal education
reforms. Condemnations of parents who sent their children to secular schools were
frequent and threats of excommunication were not uncommon. 52 As “the longstanding
competition between Liberals and the church to train new members of the cultural and
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power elite” continued under new political conditions, new Catholic universities were
opened in urban centers to increase Church influence and counter Liberalism in the
public universities.53 At the same time, the middle class became the new target group of
both Liberals and the Church in their battle to define and direct modernity. This growing
class had much to gain if Liberal reforms could be fully implemented. Historically, postprimary schooling options had been limited as the Church, Conservatives, and Liberals
themselves privileged the educational demands of the elite. Educational options were also
changing for women as a discourse of gender and modernity developed and informed
reform efforts at the primary and secondary levels. Sex segregation remained virtually
absolute in secondary schools, but opposition to curricula based on traditional genderroles grew louder. And the gendered structures of education were radically altered when
López opened Colombian universities to women for the first time in 1935.
For all its grand plans to transform society through education reform, very little
change in levels of schooling occurred during López‟s first term. At the end of the 1930s,
only slight increases in enrollments had been achieved and two-thirds of Colombian
children still did not attend school.54 Yet, the supremacy of the central state had been
asserted and the Church had been constitutionally stripped of its official role in education.
Colombia “was beginning to adapt to modern currents,” and while Vatican and Catholic
European influences on the system remained strong, they faced increasing competition
from alternative local, regional, and transnational educational and cultural outlets. 55
Importantly, the López administration paired education reforms with a campaign
to promote Colombian culture and national identity. In the eyes of Liberal leaders, it was
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essential to get the Colombian people, who were scattered across geographically
disjointed and culturally distinct regions, to think as a nation. Historically, they were
more likely to identify with region than nation, and the lack of national consciousness
made it difficult to build broad popular support for a reform agenda. Traditionally
Colombianidad had been constructed and projected from within elite Andean and literate
culture, and it was far from representative of the lived experience of most in the nation.
As a building block for national unity, its value was minimal. The weakness of the central
state, bitter partisan politics and the nation‟s long history of civil warfare had also worked
against the development of Colombianidad as a unifying force. So, too, had lack of
schools which could have taught national history and geography or introduced national
symbols to young and impressionable generations. Thus, in order to develop national
consciousness, Liberals began to construct and project more inclusive frames of
Colombianidad. Educational expansion facilitated this process, but cultural programming
was not limited to classrooms. On public plazas in rural villages and urban barrios,
government programs presented music, dance and theatrical performances that celebrated
the nation.56
Implementing its educational and cultural projects, Liberals engaged the new
technologies of communication. Emerging mass media offered the government powerful
new tools for promoting its modernization projects and for legitimizing its authority.
Radio and film were especially important to educational reforms, and both were used
extensively in non-traditional programming to bring services to individuals and
communities outside the reach of formal educational infrastructure. These technologies
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proved especially useful in rural zones. Though urbanization was rapidly changing
rural/urban demographics, 71% of Colombians still lived in rural areas through the
1930s.57 That a sizeable education gap differentiated the countryside from the more
educated cities was evidenced by a 30% differential in literacy rates between zones.58 In
their quest for modernity, Liberals developed rural progams to reach both children and
adults; they prioritized programs to improve literacy rates and foster national culture in
those zones. Lacking the infrastructure and resources to establish schools on a wide scale,
they employed mass media. Radio programming, educational film, and new literacy
materials arrived in rural areas via radio receivers and traveling schools [escolares
ambulantes] operated out of trucks. Government presentations of folkloric dancers,
musical groups, and film celebrating national culture were also important in rural
educational outreach.59
Significantly, while government harnessed new mass media channels for its
modernization projects, the same technology was increasingly available to others for
disseminating alternative cultural, political and commercial ideas and images. Aided by
rising literacy rates, new professional groups, education communities, labor unions and
non-elite political organizations were gaining influence within Colombian society by
using mass media channels to participate in national discourse. In this process, the elites
in and out of government and the national Catholic Church lost their traditional power to
filter and authenticate Colombianidad. Proliferating mass media channels allowed nonelite voices to project their own cultures and challenge both the traditional elite and the
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newly emerging Liberal frames of Colombianidad. As Marco Palacios explains, within
the Andean core and on the national periphery “new cultural meanings emerged, new
beliefs and even ways of expressing feelings, which broke the prevailing Catholic
rigidity.” Rapidly, the “hegemony of the elitist culture of letters, both religious and
secular, went up in smoke.”60 Simultaneously, the national government was forced, like
never before, to respond to the political demands of non-elites in marginalized regions.
Greater competition for national resources ensued as the political process contended with
mobilizations of electorates and interest groups that were facilitated by mass media. In
the commercial sphere, the marketing of goods and services via new media channels also
began to have an impact; changing patterns of consumptions fostered new consumer
cultures and further altered traditions.
Searching for Models and Resources
Viewed from the field of education, Colombia experienced an explosion in
educational programming and infrastructure from mid-century forward. As the national
education system was reformed and expanded by successive administrations from both
parties, participation in primary and secondary schooling increased significantly and
illiteracy rates dropped exponentially. Vocational and business programs provided new
training and employment possibilities for workers. New post-secondary options --more
universities, new academic disciplines within universities, and flexible short-term
professionalization and technical courses-- gave students and their families more career
choices. Many remained outside the practical reach of education and educational reforms,
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but many others were able to take advantage of the new educational offerings. This was
particularly true for the small but growing urban middle and professional classes.
While government reform efforts initiated by López in the 1930s were
fundamental to the subsequent growth in Colombia‟s national education system, it is a
mistake to see only official state efforts behind such growth. Rather, both public and
private initiatives drove reform and expansion. Visions of modernity and educational
reform were not the exclusive province of elites and the national government they
controlled. Among others, the rising middle classes, new urban economic sectors, and
emerging professional groups formulated their own visions of modernity. Assessing their
own educational needs and searching for resources to address them, they placed demands
on existing educational infrastructure, on their national and regional governments, and on
the private sector. And following pattern that was well established in Colombia
education, they also looked abroad for the resources and models that could meet their
needs.
As alternatives to elite visions of modernity circulated widely at the start of the
1940s, Colombians across class began to engage with US educational and cultural models
and resources. Such engagement had traditionally been muted by elite preferences for
European culture, but the new focus on modernity had laid bare the deficiencies of
Colombia‟s European-Catholic education system. As hemispheric collaboration
accelerated in the build up to world war, education became an important theme in
Colombian-US relations not only because FDR and his administration placed it at the
center of their Pan American initiatives but because reform of education was a priority
for Colombians across class and region.
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The US Education System: Expansion and Change before Mid-Century
In the turn-of-the century US, the national education systems was extensive at the
primary level but had less depth at the secondary level and beyond. Study at the
university level was largely restricted to the upper classes. Driven in part by the social
reforms promoted by the Progressive Movement in the first decades of the century,
secondary and vocational education programming began an expansion that would rapidly
bring post-primary options to communities throughout the country. As secondary
education enrollments increased, university and college programs grew dramatically.
With new departments, programs, and institutions, the US university system began to
attract more US students to graduate study. A decline in the number of US citizens
pursuing graduate studies in Europe (especially Germany) resulted from the greater
availability of programs at home. Latin Americans, too, began to respond to increased
graduate and undergraduate programs in the US. Some of the new movement of students
from Latin America to the US resulted from PAU exchange activities and growing
economic relations between the two Americas. 61 Yet, a substantial boom in Latin
American enrollments in US universities did not occur until Washington established
cultural diplomacy in the region.
Significantly, growth in US education in the first half of the twentieth century also
coincided with the emergence of new educational theories promoted by John Dewey.
Dewey led a movement against traditional education and its emphasis on rote learning.
Encouraging a progressive and child-centered approach to education, he argued that
school curriculum and classroom practice should be relevant to the lives of the children.
Education had to respond to the times. It had to recognize the modernity of the present.
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Dewey proposed professionalization of teaching and the adaptation of educational
services to urban and rural realities.62 Importantly, by the second decade of the twentieth
century, Latin American educators and policymakers were increasingly aware of John
Dewey and US educational philosophy and models. 63
Over the decades covered by this study, US educational philosophy and models
developed as important influences on Colombian education. The US system differed
greatly from its Colombian counterpart, but in the midst of the global economic crisis of
the 1930s reformers in both countries were similarly concerned with engaging the
transformative power of education to modernize and unify their nations, foster social
stability, address the challenges of urbanization and rural life, and promote economic
growth. As both national governments claimed greater roles in the education of their
citizenry, dynamics of regionalism and race were also critical themes. Examining the
transnational educational communities that formed around US-sponsored education
programs in Colombia, this study reveals the complex cultural encounters that unfolded
as Colombian and US educational systems and reform efforts converged in local
communities. To contextualize this convergence, overviews of US education in the first
half of the twentieth century and contemporary educational activism by the federal
government conclude the present chapter.
The High School Movement
While Washington has always taken interest in the schooling of its citizens, the
responsibility for education rests with the states because the US Constitution denies the
federal government a directing role. As such, states have historically maintained
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independent school systems for the benefit of their citizens. Still, even though it was
prohibited from establishing a national educational system, the federal government had
nonetheless always been involved in some areas of education. It played an influential role
in the founding of most state educational systems; as the nation expanded to the West,
territorial governments‟ plans for education were important considerations in applications
to Congress for statehood. It also had a historical role in running schools in federal
territories that were outside the jurisdiction of any state. For example, it established,
funded and maintained a school system (based on a Southern US race-segregated model)
in the Panama Canal Zone. And the fact that the schools of the District of Columbia were
under federal control made the US government responsible for a larger school system
than many states. Additionally, by the early twentieth century, the federal government
had begun to assert greater influence over the educational affairs of the nation through
grants tied to specific federal education projects or objectives. Such was the case when
aid to state-based vocational education programs was initiated in 1917.
The US system of free public education had historic roots in New England of the
seventeenth century, but the concept of the free public education (at the elementary or
primary level) was only gradually enshrined as a tenet of US democracy. Strong public
interest in “Americanizing” the millions of immigrants who arrived in the US during the
nineteenth century played an important role. Free public schooling ensured faster cultural
assimilation of immigrant children than would have otherwise been possible and offered
a path to national unity. By the early twentieth century, each state provided elementary
schools for the education of their citizens and required attendance of all children.
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Secondary schooling, by comparison, did not become part of mainstream public
education until later.64
At the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, just 18% of ageappropriate students attended secondary schools in the US, and only about half of the
attendees earned a graduation diploma. Low enrollment and participation rates, however,
rapidly increased as the “High School Movement” emerged. 65 Local advocates of
secondary education reform and expansion throughout the US led this movement which
succeeded in raising aggregate enrollment in public and private high schools to 73% by
1940. Graduation rates increased from 9% to 51% in the same period. As Claudia Golden
explains, this “rate of increase was nothing short of spectacular and the levels attained
were unequaled by any country until much later in the century.” 66 By comparison, in
Europe, contemporary efforts to expand secondary education and graduation rates were
less successful before mid-century. Increases came at a significantly slower pace than in
the US. While the US adapted high schools to the needs of non-college bound students,
most European secondary systems were slower to do so. They continued to privilege
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university preparation. 67 This difference helps to explain the increasing attractiveness of
the US models and philosophies to Latin American educators and reformers.
Reflecting the reality of local control over schooling, the High School Movement
was driven by grassroots efforts in 125,000 autonomous districts around the country. The
movement empowered local communities to craft their own visions of modernity and
negotiate social balances with the forces of urbanization, industrialization, and
technological change. And while many state governments and professional organizations,
like the National Education Association, encouraged this movement, the federal
government had “practically no part in the story of expansion.” 68
Before its remarkable growth spurt, the primary function of US secondary schools
was preparation for college. As such, and as was the case in Colombia, secondary
schooling was largely the privilege of the elite. But the High School Movement extended
post-primary educational resources to the working and lower classes and “transformed
secondary schools from preparatory institutions to schools that awarded terminal degrees
to the vast majority.” 69 Whereas approximately half of all high school graduates went to
college in 1910, by 1933 only 25% of graduates did so. High schools continued to offer
college-preparatory programs for the increasing aggregate numbers of college bound
students, but they also introduced new options for students interested in a terminal
diploma. The classical or the Latin-scientific scientific curriculum had been the standard
college-preparatory program throughout the nation before this change. In addition to
English, math, history, and science, it emphasized the study of classical Latin and Greek
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and modern French and German. As more and more non-college-bound students entered
high schools, the “English curriculum” emerged as the most popular alternative. Study of
Greek language and classics was eliminated and Latin was reduced to an optional
language choice. French became the most studied foreign language, and as German
decreased in popularity during and after World War I, Spanish garnered more interest.70
The introduction of vocational, technical, and business courses as electives or complete
high school programs evidenced the ability of locally-based educational systems to adapt
to community needs. 71 Of course, as segregation in schools of the US South
demonstrates, such a decentralized system also allowed community prejudices to be
structured into the system.
High graduation rates fell just before World War II and continued their decline
during the war. That so many teenage boys went to war and some teenage girls went to
work in war industries explains this decline. After the war, graduation rates recovered
and continued to rise. The GI Bill, which paid for the college educations of many
returning soldiers and is credited with spurring the mid-century boom in post-secondary
education, also provided returnees with financial assistance for the completion of high
school. From a regional perspective, the Southern states that maintained segregated
schools for whites and blacks were slower to join the expansion of secondary education;
there, graduation rates for both races were far behind the rising national averages. 72 With
regard to gender divisions, the trend in US public high schools was toward coeducation,
but private schools, and especially Catholic ones, were more likely to maintain gendersegregation in their classrooms. Overall, female graduation rates before and during the
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High School Movement were higher than male rates in every region. As a practical
matter, a high school diploma allowed girls to qualify for more modern, respectable, and
comfortable office jobs and by-pass less desirable factory labor.73
Federal Government Activism in Education
The global economic crisis of the 1930s shifted the traditional federal-state
relationship within education. Because education was most often funded locally through
property taxes, the “fortunes of education” began to “rise and fall with the ability and
willingness of real estate owners to pay taxes.”74 As the Depression introduced economic
crisis to communities around the country, the educational growth of the previous three
decades was threatened, and school closures at all levels were common. Defining the
Depression as a national crisis, FDR initiated new educational activism to address the
developing problems. Under New Deal liberalism the federal-state relationship with
regard to education began to shift. As FDR‟s Advisory Committee on Education would
later point out, “for the first time, there was implied recognition of a Federal obligation to
maintain at least a low minimum of educational opportunities throughout the Nation, and
thus to relieve the strain of the acute local financial distress.” 75 Importantly, as the federal
government became more directly engaged with education in the states and asserted new
authority in the field, it would also begin to actively project US educational philosophies
and resources abroad.
Calls for increased federal aid to education were not new in the 1930s. Indeed,
formal advisory committees appointed by Presidents Warren Harding and Herbert
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Hoover made such recommendations in the 1920s, but they were ineffective in making
the case to Congress.76 In 1936, FDR appointed his own advisory committee to
specifically review federally funded vocational programs. A year later, when there were
various education reforms bills before Congress, Roosevelt asked his committee to
expand their scope and consider the broad relationship between federal and state
governments in educational matters.77 The president‟s request had the important impact
of slowing a variety of educational finance bills, which were at the time moving through
Congress. Until the findings of FDR‟s Advisory Committee on Education were reported,
legislators agreed to extend deference to the president.
Each of the several bills that were then moving through Congress would have
altered the federal-state relationship with regard to education. Testimony at congressional
hearings for the bills, by professional educators and advocates of increased federal aid,
reveals a high level of concern for the preservation of state control over education. Yet
the basic notion that “a citizen of one of the sovereign States is none-the-less a citizen of
the Nation” underscored testimony. 78 Overall, hearings emphasized the difficulties
brought on by the Depression, the inequality of education from state to state and,
particularly, the injustice of low quality Negro education.
When the Advisory Committee on Education released its report in 1938 it naively
asserted that “the American people are committed to the principle that all of the children
of this country, regardless of economic status, race, or place of residence, are entitled to
an equitable opportunity to obtain a suitable education, so far as it can be provided in the
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public schools.”79 In forwarding a program of expansive federal aid and federal
participation in the education of its citizens, the committee recognized the need to
maintain the delicate constitutional balance between the states and the federal
government. Popular fear of “centralized schools” was a concern committee members
openly acknowledged, yet they demanded more active leadership from Washington. 80
Calling for excellent schools with provisions for vocational training, strong
teaching staffs, modern and safe facilities, plentiful instructional materials, and part-time
adult education programs, the report made the case for a huge federal expenditure of
$855,500,000 over six years. Funds would be distributed as grants for a variety of
programs; local schools would receive support through grants to their states; funds for
teacher training and school district reorganizations would be made available; vocational
education grants to schools would continue; adult education programs (3.6 million
American adults had not finish elementary school and 3 million more were illiterate)
would be created; a library service for rural communities would be initiated; and
educational research grants would be offered to institutions of higher learning through the
Office of Education.81 Clearly, the program was ambitious. And the enormous expense
concerned one member of the committee, who could not recommend “the expenditure of
a large sum of money for education when the greatest present need of the majority of the
supposed beneficiaries is bread.” He favored a more modest program. 82
While the committee found that local, Depression era funding problems had
begun to wane by the second half of the decade, the majority saw no reason to abandon
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the drive for greater federal involvement in education. Indeed, as the economic forecast
for the country improved, the committee encouraged federal leadership to seize the
opportunity to correct the problems of inequality that plagued American education. “In
most cases the worst injuries of the depression have been repaired, and there is general
disposition to build anew a sounder foundation.”83 Of particular concern to the committee
was the education of black Americans:
All the statistics for length of school term, average attendance, educational
qualifications of teachers, type of school buildings, and other factors indicate that
a wasteful neglect is characteristic of the treatment of Negro school children in
most of the areas where they are required to attend separate schools. 84
While conscious that the issue of race had serious potential to sidetrack any legislation
resulting from their report, the committee insisted that distribution of aid to states with
separate Negro schools undergo greater scrutiny than would be required in nonsegregationist states. Grants to segregationist states, they argued, “should be conditioned
upon an equitable distribution of Federal funds between facilities for the two races.” 85
The committee was specifically concerned that states would reduce expenditures on
Negro schools in portion to the amount such schools were funded by the federal
government.
Calls for greater federal involvement in national education programs increased
just as the government was developing Pan American programming around educational
collaboration. With education emerging as an important focus for both domestic and
foreign policy, Washington developed new connections to educational communities at
home and abroad and began to exert greater influence over them. Significantly,
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acknowledgement of a federal obligation toward US children living abroad grew out of
the legislative debates initiated by the presidential advisory committee. Of particular
importance was the recognition by the federal government of an obligation to educate US
children living on “federal reservations.” New Deal employment and modernization
projects had moved large numbers of workers and their families onto federal lands across
the country. In 1937, an estimated 20,000 students were living on more than 300
federally controlled “reservations” from dam sites to lighthouses to army posts to national
parks and forests. Local school districts within the states were expected to educate the
workers‟ children, but without the benefit of property tax contributions many of these
districts experienced financial emergencies. While FDR authorized provisions for schools
on certain large projects (the Tennessee Valley Authority projects, for example), his
administration grossly overlooked the education of children on most federal lands. As the
National Education Association pointed out: “for some, Congress makes excellent
provisions; for some, the use of Federal funds is authorized; while for others, absolutely
no provision is made by the Federal Government.”86
The problems of educating US children abroad were, for the first time, officially
detailed and addressed by the 1938 report. As part of the discussion of education on
federal reservations, the committee recommended funding for schools that served US
children at “foreign stations” (diplomatic and consular missions abroad). 87 Angry parents
at both foreign stations and federal reservations claimed “that the Federal government
was avoiding an obligation that it should assume,” and recommended that Congress
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“establish a permanent policy by which all children of Federal employees on Federal
Reservations or at foreign stations will be assured the right to an education.” 88
Children living at foreign stations (excluding for those living in the Panama Canal
Zone and at major military posts where school systems had already been established by
Congress) were estimated to make up about 10% of the total number of children living on
federal reservations. And while they were in number less significant than the children
living on federal reservations within the continental United States, their problems were
no less significant: “Federal personnel, when sent to a foreign post where school facilities
are inadequate, face a school problem of a characteristic somewhat different from that
found on reservations, but perhaps fully as serious.”89
In 1937, approximately 38,000 Federal employees were stationed outside the
continental United States. The majority lived in US territories and possessions (“outlying
areas”) while approximately 17,000 lived in foreign countries. The Advisory Committee
on Education estimated that 2,500 school-age children accompanied their parents at
foreign stations. Many of the parents worked in the diplomatic and consular services as
employees of the Department of State; 15 ambassadors, 40 ministers, 500 consuls, and
thousands of lower ranking employees staffed the United States missions around the
world. In addition, representatives of the Departments of Treasury, War, Navy,
Agriculture, Labor and Commerce were also working abroad on behalf of their
government, and the numbers were readily increasing in Latin American under FDR‟s
Good Neighbor programs.90
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US government employees accepting positions abroad often found school
placement for their children difficult. Depending on location, schools were available, but
outside major urban centers there were few options. And even in the capitals, schooling
alternatives were limited at best; seldom were there independent American schools
available. As a result, children could enroll in expensive private schools, “foreign”
schools run by European nationals, or be sent home. 91 The report found that…
Parents frequently find it difficult to locate suitable school facilities that are
within their means. Often the school situation is so unsatisfactory that parents
find it necessary to send their children back home to continue their education,
which includes a separation of the family and a serious financial burden for
employees with low incomes.92
Those who did place their children in independent, denominational, or local schools
frequently complained to State Department representatives. Differences in teaching
methods were a central concern. Parents were frustrated with extraneous assignments and
time consuming, traditional instruction. Many lamented the “failure” of these schools to
prepare their children for college in the United States. 93 The committee reported that…
Upon returning home from a long term at foreign posts, parents frequently
express regret that their children failed to acquire an American point of view.
They are handicapped in meeting situations in their home country upon leaving
school. Many feel that their children have been placed at a disadvantage of
several years in comparison with American trained youth.94
In light of its findings, the committee condemned the lack of an educational policy for
children at foreign stations as “unjust to many parents and their children.” 95
The committee‟s attention to education at foreign stations revealed that the
Department of State had been aware of the school problem faced by employees abroad
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for more than “a generation”. Yet, the department claimed it had “never been in a
position to assume any responsibility for its solution.”96 As such, employees of the
diplomatic and consular staff were left to find their own remedies; in the absence of
acceptable schools, home schooling and private tutoring were options for some, but
others had no choice but to refuse transfers and terminate their service abroad.
Built directly from the recommendations of the Advisory Committee‟s 1938
report, a new legislative initiative, the Federal Aid to Education Bill of 1939, addressed
the broad issues of inequality in US education. Significantly, it included provisions for
the education of children at foreign stations. The favorable report by the majority of the
Senate subcommittee strongly suggested that “there is not the faintest hope that any
degree of equality of opportunity will or can exist in these United States” without federal
aid to education. 97 Opponents felt differently, and used their influence to stop the
movement of the bill past the full committee. Senator Robert Taft, who led the
opposition, argued that beginning a program of federal aid to education represented a
departure “from a basic policy pursued since 1789.”98 Critical of New Deal spending,
Taft also opposed the significant expenditures required by the bill. Additionally, given
the bill's attention to the inequality of Negro education, Taft expressed a common
Northern sentiment that “in effect, the bill is a bill for the relief of the Southern States.” 99
As war loomed in Europe, it is noteworthy that both opponents and advocates of
federal aid to education employed anti-German rhetoric during the bill‟s 1939 hearings.
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George Zook, Vice Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Education, used an anecdote
to stress the need for equality of education in a democracy:
Several years ago I was talking with a very prominent educational officer in
Germany and telling him some of our problems in secondary education including
our problems in the development of citizens. He looked at me with something of a
pitying look and said, ‗Well, you people in America ought to know by now that
democracy does not work. We tried it in Germany and we know. You cannot lift
the level of the average up to the level of the best. Nobody can do that, not even
you Americans.‘100
Senator Taft, in opposition, matched Zook‟s attempt to appeal to growing anti-German
sentiment:
Federal control of the educational field presents a threat to individual freedom. In
no way more than the schools have the totalitarian states of Europe spread the
doctrines of communism and fascism. The man who can educate the children of
the country can spread throughout this country any current ―ism‖ which happens
to be predominant in Washington.101
Anti-German and anti-Axis sentiment would eventually play a crucial role in
securing federal aid for US-sponsored schools and educational programming in Latin
America. While Congress funded neither the broad domestic reforms nor the plans for the
education of US children abroad in 1939, the Department of State would soon begin a
program of funding for American schools, US cultural centers, and mass media education
programs in Latin America. The approaching world war had begun to alter the US
government‟s approaches to foreign aid, and the onset of a new “national emergency”
forced intense focus on the “good neighbors” in the hemisphere.
Two years later, when the Educational Finance Bill of 1941 was introduced in
Congress, this modified version of the 1939 educational funding bill suffered the same
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fate as its predecessor. It died in committee. Interestingly, the new bill did not include a
provision for aiding in the education of US children at foreign stations. Funding was still
needed, but as the OIAA and the Department of State took an increasing interest in
American schools abroad, they found other approaches to securing funds. Attached to a
bill promoting federal aid to education, whose controversial provisions would reshape the
federal-state relationship in education and ignite racially-charged debates over states
rights, the funding of American schools overseas would surely be long delayed. In a
climate of world war, the OIAA and the Department of State found a more expedient
approach to such funding and, in doing so, helped to define the new educational activism
of the federal government.
Educational and Cultural Convergence
This chapter provides important context for the seven chapters that follow.
Moving forward, I argue that US educational and cultural influence in Latin America
increased markedly through transnational relationships that were fostered by the Good
Neighbor policies, the new Pan Americanism, and US cultural diplomacy. Historically,
the region had looked to Europe for cultural inspiration and based its national education
systems on French, Spanish, and German models and philosophies. Yet after the First
World War as Latin Americans looked more intently toward the North, they saw the US
as a “modern” nation with a powerful industrialized economy, stable democratic
governance, and social stability based on a thriving middle class. The contrast with
Europe, a continent that spent the first half of the century at or heading into war, was
stark. Though the US was plagued with its own problems during those decades, it
increasingly held appeal to Latin Americans as a model of modernity. Cultural
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stereotypes of the Yankee were reconsidered by some, and many in the region developed
new familiarity with the culture, history, and geography of its Northern neighbor.
Significantly in this process, the US system of public and private education came to be
widely recognized in Latin America as a model worth emulating. Among Latin American
politicians, policymakers and educators, there would be clear acknowledgement of
deficiencies in the US system and race segregation in the schools of the US South was
particularly troublesome for some. But, overall Latin Americans began to recognize
much of value in US educational and cultural models.
In the Colombian case, engagement with US educational and cultural
philosophies, models, and resources was evident from many corners in the middle
decades of the twentieth century. Government leaders, national educational and cultural
bureaucracies, intellectuals, academics, educators, parents, students and especially
business leaders all accessed US resources as they constructed their own version of
modernity. Most significantly, and as the chapters ahead demonstrate, the emerging
Colombian middle and professional classes proved extremely enthusiastic about US-style
education and philosophies. The European-influenced, elite-monopolized national
education system offered only limited opportunities for these classes, and as their ranks
increased demands for educational services could not be met by existing infrastructure.
Middle class students and families found US-styled alternatives to traditional education
tremendously appealing, and they took advantage of educational resources and
opportunities that the OIAA initiated: language courses, business training, secretarial
programs, professional development seminars, technical/scientific instruction, and open
access to universities. Moving forward, this study demonstrates that US educational and
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cultural influence in Colombia flowed not only from the top down, but from the bottom
up and, more significantly, from the middle outward.
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Chapter Two

Foreign Classrooms in Latin America
This chapter analyzes the demand for independent, non-sectarian US-sponsored
schools (American schools) in Latin America and the decision of cultural diplomats to
begin supporting them in the early 1940s. As the last chapter detailed, domestic education
reformers in the 1930s had asserted a federal obligation to US children at foreign stations
but had failed to convince Congress of a duty to act. In the field, the Department of State
recognized a lack of suitable educational options for the children of its employees as well
as other US citizens residing abroad, but it made little effort to address the problem. On
the eve of the world war, the OIAA acted in its stead. Rising numbers of US families
living in Latin America, changes to US citizenship statutes, and implementation of a new
US Foreign Service marriage policy had the effect of increasing the pool of US students
abroad and this garnered OIAA attention. Significantly, however, the OIAA decision to
fund American schools was not simply motivated by a desire to provide educational
opportunity as a matter of fairness. By the early 1940s, the agency was beginning to
recognize the broad utility of these schools. While they were both crucial to the growth of
US businesses in the region and increasingly necessary in support of diplomatic staff at
foreign stations, these schools also provided US access to influential and elite Latin
American families and were an effective means for countering Axis influence.
The chapter begins with a statistical portrait of US citizens living in the Latin
America at the start of World War II and surveys the various types of schools founded by
US citizens in the region. Contemporary changes to US citizenship statutes and State
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Department personnel policies that impacted the demand for these school are also
considered. Next the chapter surveys schools sponsored by immigrants from Axis nations
in the region. It considers Latin American and US governments‟ concerns that these
schools were indoctrinating children to fascist ideology and organizing fifth columns to
support an eventual Axis invasion of the hemisphere. The closure of two prominent
German schools in Bogotá and Barranquilla is analyzed against the backdrop of an
emerging Colombian-US alliance. Finally, the chapter details how fear of German
influence in Latin American classrooms convinced cultural diplomats to encourage and
financially support new and existing American schools in the region.
Diplomats, Businessmen, Missionaries and US-sponsored Schools in Latin America
US Citizens Residing in Latin America
The number of US citizens living in Latin America at the start of World War II
was estimated by the State Department and the OIAA at 60,000. The largest
concentration was found in the Panama Canal Zone; 25% of the US citizens in Latin
America were zonians living on what had been Colombian national territory only four
decades earlier. Zonians were primarily military but also civilian employees of the US
government, and many lived with their families on the military bases and towns around
the canal. There were actually more US dependents in the zone than US military or
civilian employees, and US-styled schools were provided for their children. The US
employees of the zone were joined by thousands of local employees. Some were
Panamanians but many others were from the West Indies, Colombia and other areas of
the Greater Caribbean. Originally brought to Panama as labor for the construction of the
canal, many of these workers, who were racially categorized as “black,” stayed on after
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the project was completed. They continued to make a living as direct employees of the
canal or in the large service sector that support life in the zone. The US government
provided schools for the children of all residents of the zone, but significantly, these
schools were racially segregated. Zonian society was modeled on the regional racial
structures of the US South.1 After Panama, the next highest concentration of US citizens
was found in Mexico, where over 22% of the Latin American total lived. Cuba had the
third highest concentration of US citizens at almost 10% of the total and was followed by
Brazil, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and Argentina. Colombia, which had the
eighth highest total in the region, was home to just 2,797 US citizens, and this was
approximately 5% of the total US citizenry living in Latin America. 2
After assignment to military posts, private employment opportunities were the
major reasons individual US citizens and their dependents took up residence in the
region. Among the US citizens in Latin America in 1942, approximately one-fifth were
classified by the State Department as “income-earners.” This category excluded military
personnel, students, dependents (wives and children), and missionaries. Surveying US
income-earners resident in Latin America at the start of the war, the State Department
found that 55% were employed by US businesses while 15% were employees of foreign
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firms. US lawyers, doctors, or dentists with established local practices were 13% of the
total. Civilian employees of the US government including diplomatic and consular staffs
were 8%. “Other income-earners,” a catch-all category that included engineers and
teachers, accounted for 8% of those earning a living in the region. Notably, the greatest
number of US citizens employed in Latin America lived and worked in Mexico. There,
the US employment situation was unique as more US citizens worked for Mexican or
foreign firms than US businesses. The second highest number of US income-earners was
found in Venezuela, where US oil companies had a strong presence. Most incomeearning US citizens in that nation were employed by US firms. Reflecting the
development of strong economic ties between Colombia and the US after World War I,
Colombia ranked fourth in the total number of resident US income-earners. It had slightly
less than third-ranking Cuba and slightly more that Brazil and Argentina. 3
US government employees and military personnel were a very small percentage
of total US citizens living in Colombia in 1942. Just ninety-eight individuals (or 3.5%) of
the total 2,797 US citizens were employed by the diplomatic and consular services, the
military or other departments of the executive branch. There were a few US lawyers and
doctors (eleven individuals, combined) and a several dozen “other professionals” (a
category that was dominated by engineers). There were 748 US businessmen employed
by US corporations and smaller numbers employed by Colombian or foreign firms (167).
An additional 132 US businessmen were “engaged independently in business.” In the
field of education, there were 107 US teachers employed in Colombia, and three-quarters
of these worked in religious schools most of which had been established by US Protestant
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missionaries. Finally, dependents of income earners comprised 45% of total US citizenry
in Colombia. Between wives and children, this group amounted to 1,272 individuals. 4
Given the limits of the Colombian national education system, the usual short-term
nature of US business assignments abroad, and both language and cultural differences,
enrolling US children in official Colombian government schools was seldom an option
for US families. In the absence of the network of independent and non-sectarian
American schools that would later emerge, some US families in Colombia exercised the
option of sending their children to Protestant schools founded by US nationals. In
Barranquilla and Bogotá, schools founded by US Presbyterians had well established
secondary programs. Families who lived at a distance from these cities boarded their sons
of daughters with friends who lived near the campuses. A second schooling option for
locally-residing US families was bringing private tutors from the US to teach their
children. This was an expensive option and difficult to arrange from abroad. Yet a third
option was enrolling children in the highly-regarded bilingual schools run by German or
other European nationals in the principal urban centers of the country. Wartime politics in
the 1930s would add an undesirable political dynamic to an education in a German or
Italian school and, for many, language barriers made these schools unlikely options. Still,
lacking other high-quality schools, it was a choice made by some US families. Finally, a
fourth option was splitting up the family and sending children home to attend school in
the US. Those who exercised this option usually employed tutors to teach the younger
children but sent older children home to live with relatives and attend public high
schools. For others, it meant paying for expensive private boarding schools at home. The
choice to separate the family was difficult and many parents were unwilling to do it. As a
4
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result, some employees rejected assignments abroad over educational concerns. For those
already employed abroad, educational challenges often forced sales of businesses or
resignations of position as they returned home with school-age children. Significantly, as
the number of US families living in Latin America increased in the build up to the world
war, they placed pressure on the US government to support independent, non-sectarian
schools with US curricula. Like education reformers at home, they pressured their
government to recognize an obligation for the education of their children.
Surveying US Schools in Latin America
Prior to establishing formal US government support for the education of US
children abroad, Rockefeller‟s OIAA financed an exhaustive survey of all schools in
Latin America founded and operated by US citizens. On behalf of the OIAA, Andrew
Corry conducted a tour of the entire region over nine months in 1941 and 1942. Concern
for Axis influence over Latin American school children and their parents was behind the
investigative project. Visiting 100 schools and conducting 750 interviews, Corry‟s main
objective “was to determine how the dangerous influence of Axis-oriented schools can be
neutralized or, better said, counteracted by appropriate activities of American-sponsored
schools.”5 The survey identified 505 schools in Latin America that were sponsored by US
citizens, corporations, and religious communities. Schools fell into one of three
categories. Two-thirds of these schools were denominational and affiliated with the
proselytizing missions of US-based churches. Almost all were Protestant. Most of the
remaining one-third were company schools which served either the children of private
companies‟ US employees or the children of local, national employees. Only a small
minority, just twenty-five schools (or less than 5% of the total) had neither religious nor
5
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corporate affiliation. 6 These independent and non-sectarian schools were the ones that
would soon be offered funding and grouped under the label “American Schools.”
National and regional capitals throughout Latin America had a small number of
large US Protestant schools with both primary and secondary sections. These schools
catered to upper-class families who might be Protestant, non-Catholic or disillusioned by
traditional Catholic education. Many of these schools were well regarded and valued as
an alternative to Catholic dominated and European-styled curriculum. In Colombia,
where the Catholic Church dominated secondary education, two high-quality and eliteexclusive schools, the Colegios Americanos, had been founded at Barranquilla and
Bogotá in the mid-to-late nineteenth century by Presbyterian missionaries. These schools
had separate campuses for boys and girls. They emphasized English, but taught most
subjects in Spanish. Given the constitutional control of the Catholic Church over
educational services, religious activity and religious teachings in these schools were
severely restricted. The majority of US Protestant schools in Colombia and throughout
Latin America, however, were not such elite institutions. Most were small primary-only
schools located in both urban centers and rural zones. Indian populations were the
contemporary target of many US Protestant missions in Latin America, and reflecting this
focus more than half of the total US denominational schools in the region were located in
heavily-indigenous Peru and Bolivia. Though paling in comparison, Colombia with
thirty-six denominational schools had the third highest number in the region. Chile,
Brazil, and Mexico followed.7 Within South America, more than a dozen different USbased Protestant denominations operated schools, and in the aggregate, Adventists had
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the strongest presence with more than half of the schools. Presbyterian, Methodist, and
Baptist schools were less numerous, but because they were often concentrated in specific
countries they had a dominant presence in some education markets. In Colombia, all but
one of the US denominational schools was Presbyterian.8
Schools sponsored by US companies, the second category of schools identified by
Corry, were found throughout the region but were most common in mining towns of the
Andes, around Venezuelan oil fields, on the fruit plantations of the Caribbean, and near
rubber operations in the Amazon Basin and especially Brazil. As local schools were rare
in the remote areas where these industries were centered, many countries required US and
other foreign companies to provide such schools for the education of children of local
employees. Indeed, 80% of the US company schools in South America served
exclusively local rather than US populations. These schools were usually primary-only
and taught the national curriculum in the local language. In some locations, such schools
significantly extended the reach of limited national education systems. In South America,
50% of the company schools were in Chile. There, where US corporations dominated
copper mining, eighty-one company schools enrolled over 16,000 students. Brazil‟s
twenty-nine company schools had 10,000 pupils. 9 These schools were essentially national
schools with little educational relationship to the US. They were built and maintained by
the US corporations and the director was often a US citizen, but teaching staffs were
comprised of nationals of the host-country. Venezuela, where tremendous oil reserves
brought local and foreign workers and families to remote fields, also had a significant
number of these schools; of its thirty small company schools, twenty-two taught the
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national curriculum in Spanish to Venezuelan children while eight offered a US-style
curriculum in English to US children and some upper-class locals whose parents were
affiliated with the oil companies. Colombia had just five company schools. Tropical Oil
and the Colombian Petroleum Company, both US concerns, operated three schools while
the United Fruit Company ran two. Each of the company schools in Colombia were
primary-only and taught a US curriculum in English. Colombian law did not require
foreign companies to provide for the education of their local employees‟ children; thus,
while a few students were the children of Colombian managers, most were US
nationals. 10
Finally, the third category of US-sponsored schools was independent and nonsectarian (American schools). These schools were founded and operated by US nationals
and were usually located in the national capitals or important regional cities. They had
small student bodies. At the time of Corry‟s survey, most were primary-only although it
was not unusual for a few secondary-level students to be tutored in these schools.
Because it was common for US government and business employees to be stationed in
Latin America for short assignments that infrequently exceeded two or three years, most
parents desired a US-style education for their children. They wanted their children to be
able to easily transition back into schools in the US when their assignments or time
abroad ended. Language barriers prevented many from enrolling in private schools or in
the high-quality and elite-serving US Protestant schools, but so too did finances; US
citizens who chose to live and work overseas were usually drawn from the middle classes
in the US. Families of salesmen, engineers, bank managers, export representatives, and
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Foreign Service staffers could not pay high tuition rates. And since many US
businessmen were self-employed or the sole sales representatives of their firms in a
region, no company schools existed for many US children. Independently operated US
schools, then, developed out of necessity and were most often started by the wives of US
businessmen and Foreign Service employees as cooperative efforts at homes schooling. 11
As this study will demonstrate, these schools were founded to serve the needs of US,
European and binational children, but once they grew, left the confines of private homes
and established an institutional identity, they rapidly attracted local populations. Based on
the recommendations of the Corry report, these independent schools and not US
denominational or company schools began to receive US government assistance in the
early 1940s.
Corry calculated that almost 60,000 children were enrolled in US-sponsored
denominational, company and independent schools in Latin America. He estimated that
since 1910 close to one million children had attended these schools, and only small
percentages were not nationals of the host country. In Colombia, 2,664 pupils were
enrolled in US-sponsored schools in 1942. US nationals were the majority of the 133
students who attended the schools funded by petroleum and banana export companies as
well as in the two small independent schools at Barranquilla and Bogotá. The rest, the
more than 2,500 students who attended US-sponsored denominational schools, were
Colombian nationals. Comparatively, Colombia had significantly fewer students enrolled
in each type of US-sponsored school than countries with larger US corporate presence. 12

11
12

Corry, “Memoir,” p. 31.
Ibid., pp. 22- 27.

119

As Rockefeller‟s OIAA and the Department of State sought to bolster US schools
in Latin America as a counterbalance to Axis cultural influence, the Corry report revealed
that most existing US-sponsored schools in the region hardly reflected US educational
philosophy, standards, models, or culture. His report argued that lack of US curriculum
was a lost opportunity for gaining cultural influence. Over 90% of these US-sponsored
schools taught only the national curriculum, and few included US content in subjects.
Indeed, 79% did not even offer English classes; bilingualism was “not a prominent
objective” of US-sponsored education in Latin America. 13 Excepting the schools
exclusively serving US children, few other schools sought a US affiliation or label.
Company schools for the children of local employees essentially functioned as national
schools and were required by host-country laws to adapt to local standards and
curriculum. Many were integrated into the local culture. Given their vulnerability as
targets of anti-imperialists, they purposefully did not stand out as foreign. Similarly, most
denominational schools “seldom if ever consciously term[ed] themselves „American‟
schools.”14 Their affiliation was with denominations and not nations. The high-quality
US-sponsored Protestant schools which served the upper class and were an alternative to
Catholic and European-style education were an exception. In Colombia these schools
marketed themselves less on their Protestant affiliations and more on the modern, USstyle approach they took to education.
Marriage, Citizenship, and Demand for US Classrooms Abroad
The earliest independent, non-sectarian American schools in Latin America were
neither owned nor run by businesses or government, but they served the needs of both.
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They were institutions that were locally operated by communities of families who came
together far from home around common educational goals. Sewing machine and
typewriter salesmen, geologists and telephone engineers, clerical secretaries, bank clerks,
ambassadors, and especially wives built the earliest American schools as mothers and
fathers of young children. In examining the demand for American schools abroad and
Washington‟s emerging commitment to them, it is crucial to recognize families at the
center of demand, rather than business and government.
Changes to US government immigration and citizenship statutes in the mid-1930s
produced an important classificatory increase in the number of US families living
overseas and added new voices to the demand for American schools in foreign cities.
Before the 1930s, statutes created obstacles to citizenship for many US-born women (and
their children) that lived abroad. While marriage in the US was historically regulated at
the state level, federal law encouraged some types of marriages, discouraged others, and
denied citizenship to certain children born to US parents. 15 Gender bias written into law
limited the pool of children who were considered US citizens abroad and contributed to a
delay in recognition of a federal obligation to them. Under the Expatriation Act of 1907,
the principle that women‟s citizenship derived from her husband was established in law.
While a US male who married a foreign woman passed citizenship onto his wife and her
children, US females who married foreigners were stripped of citizenship. Any children a
woman had going into the marriage lost US citizenship as well. In the aftermath of
women‟s suffrage in the early 1920s, newly empowered women‟s organization pressured
Congress to eliminate such gender bias in citizenship and immigration statutes. With the
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Cable Act of 1922, Congress did so, but it left a variety of conditions in place that
continued to allow loss of citizenship for women and their children and continued to give
preference to US men and their families in matters of immigration, naturalization, and
citizenship. Women who lived abroad with their foreign husbands, for example, were
subjected to periodic US residency requirements in order to maintain their citizenship. 16
Through the Citizenship Act of 1934, women‟s citizenship was finally “separated
from marriage consequences” and extended residency abroad no longer resulted in loss of
citizenship. Importantly, the law also eliminated gender bias in the granting of citizenship
to children born overseas. This was a significant change that meant that citizenship of a
child was now established by blood relation to a US parent and not derived from
citizenship of the father.17 During the 1930s, as US education reformers, legislators and
diplomatic policymakers considered the question of education for US children at foreign
stations, the children of US mothers were no longer excluded from the pool of students
that the federal government was beginning to acknowledge.
The new citizenship law of 1934, however, also created a US residency
requirement for some children of US citizens overseas. Children born to two US citizen
parents were not subjected to the new residency requirements as long as one parent had
lived in the US prior to the birth of the child. But, in transnational families --families in
which a US citizen was married to a foreign national-- US citizenship would not transfer
to children until they had lived in the US for a total of five years before reaching age
eighteen. An oath of allegiance to the nation at the age of twenty-one was also required. 18
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This new residency requirement for the maintenance of a child‟s citizenship created a
difficult situation for some US parents overseas; remarkably, at a time when US
diplomatic missions were increasing in size in Latin America, the children of US Foreign
Service employees along with other US government agencies were not exempt from the
new residency requirements. Given a contemporary rise in the number of transnational
marriages among this population (detailed below), this placed more and more families in
a difficult position. In order to establish or maintain a child‟s citizenship, these and other
transnational families had to endure some level of family separation; children might be
sent home to live with relatives or one parent might return to live with the child in the
United States for the five year period. From a family perspective, neither of these options
was ideal. These requirements made it likely that some foreign born children with one US
parent would never be granted citizenship. Ironically, from the perspective of overseas
parents with few good schooling options for their children, one indirect benefit of the
residency requirement was that the child would be in the US during important school
years.
The hardship imposed by the residency requirements for some children was
recognized and partially addressed in subsequent legislation. Under the Nationality Act of
1940 foreign-born US children with one US parent still had to live in the US for 5 years
in order for citizenship to transfer to them, but now they were required to do so between
the ages of 13 and 21. This change extended the age for completing the requirement
upward by three years while simultaneously ensuring that these children would be
resident in the US at least partly during secondary school years. This upward shift of the
age of residency to the teenage and early adult years reflected the important role
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lawmakers believed schools in the US could play in teaching and fostering loyal
citizenship among these foreign-born children. At that time, a residency requirement was
also imposed on the child‟s single US parent; in order to transfer citizenship, that parent
had to have lived in the US or one of its outlying possessions for 10 years (before the
birth of the child) and half of those years had to have been after the age of 16. Residency
requirements for both the US parent and child aimed to eliminate a category of people
who lived their entire lives abroad, were considered culturally foreigners and US citizens
“in name only” by policymakers.19 Significantly, residency requirements for US
citizenship suppressed demand for American schools in Latin America.
Marriage and family policies imposed on State Department personnel also directly
impacted the demand for American schools abroad. The children of employees of the
Foreign Service and other US government agencies did not by themselves account for the
total demand for US-style education abroad, but they were a growing and influential
subset of that demand. Over the course of the 1930s and early 1940s, growing numbers of
US Foreign Service officers and clerks were posted to Latin America. While increasing
numbers of these employees brought spouses and children with them, these percentages
were then relatively low and the lack of schools for children was one consideration that
acted to suppress the numbers of families arriving at foreign posts. The more significant
trend in marriage and family demographics at foreign stations was for US government
employees to marry foreign spouses and begin families abroad. By 1936, approximately
19% of all Foreign Service officers had married alien spouses. Furthermore,
approximately 27% of the US citizens on clerical staffs at embassies and consulates had
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done the same, and the marriage trend in both categories of employment was
strengthening. 20 Such transnational marriages were viewed unfavorably by Washington,
and contemporaneous State Department personnel regulations attempted to halt them.
In November of 1936, FDR issued Executive Order 7497 that officially banned
the marriages of Foreign Service Officers to aliens. Ministers and ambassadors were
exempt from the regulation. Although clerks were also exempt, this was only temporary
and by the 1940s, the ban also applied to them. Executive Order 7497 required that any
Foreign Service officer intending to marry a foreign national had to request and receive
permission to do so from the Secretary of State. The order made clear that such requests
would likely be denied and result in termination of the individual from service. The main
justification provided for the new regulation was the requirement that all Foreign Service
officers be fully available for transfer at the discretion of the president and the service.
Marriages to foreign nationals, it was argued, made for “messy‟ situations that limited the
locations to which the couple could be posted.21 Messy situations had been on the rise in
the “shuffling” of US diplomats between European posts in the build-up to World War II.
Wives of German, Russian, French and British nationality accounted for 70% of all alien
wives of officers, and as the Old Continent came closer to open hostilities, marriages
effected and at times made difficult the placement of personnel. 22 Citizenship residency
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requirements for children and US adults in transnational marriages complicated
placement even further.
The ban of foreign marriages was reported by the New York Times to have hit the
Foreign Service “like a bombshell.” Given diplomats‟ long-term residencies outside of
their home countries, it was only logical that transnational marriages would occur with
some frequency. Surveying foreign diplomats accredited to their national embassies or
legations in Washington, the paper also reported that many foreign diplomats had wives
from the US or other countries even though many of their own “governments impose
marriage restrictions.” 23 The State Department acknowledged their discomfort in
imposing the ban and made clear that they did not question the valuable contributions
foreign wives made to US diplomacy. These women were “in most cases very fine
persons.” But as war approached, the Department now believed these marriages to be
“against the Government‟s best interests” and thought it best “that our young men should
be married to Americans.”24 In issuing the order the Department had made clear it “has
felt loath” to act on the ban, but “in the present condition of world affairs, however, any
tendency further to increase the number of marriages of this character must be regarded
with concern.”25
Significantly, the salaries for Foreign Service officers were far from lucrative.
While lower costs of living at many Latin American posts allowed officers to live at a
relatively higher standard than they did at home, officers were not wealthy men. They
were middle class and their pay level reflected it. The department understood that low
salaries made it difficult for the young and single officers to return stateside for
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vacations, and this reduced their opportunities to meet “American girls.” Better pay and
regular trips home were seen as long-term solutions, but in the short-term it was hoped an
official ban on marriages to aliens would eliminate the problem. 26 Below the rank of
officer, where pay levels were in a lower middle-class range, clerk and secretary
positions were more likely to be occupied by females than males, and approximately half
of these lower ranking positions were filled by foreign nationals of the host country. 27
Thus it was not unusual for marriages to originate from within diplomatic staffs at foreign
stations.
As developing tensions in Europe limited the growth of diplomatic missions there,
the US Foreign Service experienced a growth spurt in Latin America. Amidst the climate
of Good Neighborliness that the US was working hard to foster, the State Department‟s
ban on transnational marriages stood in sharp contrast to the rhetoric of Pan American
unity. Mutual understanding may have been the goal of the new cultural diplomacy, but
the marriage ban demonstrated that it clearly had limits. Official policy encouraged Latin
American-US cultural contact, but for the very people charged with officially facilitating
it locally, marriage became a national border that they could not cross. The marriage ban
within the Foreign Service clearly reflected State Department concern with the placement
of diplomatic personnel, but a general suspicion of foreigners and questioning of their
loyalties underpinned the policy in the lead-up to the world war. Commentators
recognized the undercurrent of suspicion and felt that the State Department was opening
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itself to charges of extreme nationalism – the very phenomenon that “it has been the
policy of the Administration to combat.”28
Significantly, by 1940 US-sponsored overseas education was a topic of concern in
Washington. With an increasing US family presence in Latin America and growing calls
for government support of schools from diplomats, the overseas business community, and
domestic education reformers, it was not surprising that in 1940 exemptions to the
residency requirement were extended to many US children who were previously
regulated by it. All children of US government employees who lived overseas with their
parents were now exempt; it no longer mattered if one of a child‟s parents was a non-US
citizen. Additionally, the children of employees of businesses, foundations, and private
organizations that were based in the US (whether commercial, educational, or religious)
were also exempt. As the US diplomatic, cultural and business presence in Latin America
was then growing, this alleviated a significant burden on transnational families. Still,
these exemptions did not cover everyone and a built-in gender bias persisted against
women. If a US parent in a transnational marriage was a housewife, unemployed,
employed by a foreign business or organization, or self-employed, their children were not
eligible for the exemption.29 Still, the extension of the exemption in 1940 ensured that
fewer children of US citizens would be sent home for schooling, and this increased the
local demand for independent, non-sectarian American schools. US government support
for overseas schools emerged as the pool of parents and students demanding better
educational options increased abroad.
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Axis Schools in Latin America
Fifth Column Fears
As discussed in the first chapter, during the 1930s debates over education reform
in the US recognized the existence of US children abroad and identified the serious
problems many parents faced in securing quality education for them. Articulating a
federal government obligation to these children was an important outgrowth of those
debates, and it helped to expedite the establishment of a formal assistance program for
American schools in Latin America. Yet the willingness of the State Department and the
US Congress to support these schools had more to do with fears of Axis influence in the
region than concern for its obligation to its own citizens abroad. In Latin America,
schools affiliated with German, Italian and Japanese immigrant communities were
prominent on the educational landscape. Given Axis rhetoric of world domination,
German, Italian and Japanese schools began to receive critical attention from hostcountry governments, the national and international press, and Washington.
The Corry report heightened OIAA and State Department fears that Axis and
other European-sponsored schools in Latin America produced strong foreign cultural
influences in the region. Corry stressed that “the associations and friendships” formed in
and around schools “among students, and their elders, are very basic stuff of popular
cultural influence.”30 He estimated that schools sponsored by non-US foreigners
constituted approximately one-third of all schools in the other American republics. Many
of these schools were local institutions that had been originally established by immigrants
to meet educational needs in communities without classrooms. Some were secular, but
others were religious. As was the case in Colombia, the majority of denominational
30
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schools were Catholic and were operated by religious orders of French, Spanish, Italian,
Belgian and, in some cases, German origin. Only one in five foreign denominational
schools was non-Catholic and these were almost exclusively Protestant schools founded
by US, British, and German nationals. Jewish schools founded by Europeans were a
small percentage of the foreign-sponsored schools as well. Corry concluded that in
comparison to the foreign-run Catholic schools, which were often highly-regarded, nonCatholic denominational schools “as a rule find the upper class and upper-middle class in
great part inaccessible.”31
As the Axis alliance was activated, schools associated with Germany, Italy and
Japan in Latin America received more intense and widespread scrutiny. The Corry report
estimated that there were 888 Axis-sponsored schools in Latin America. German schools
were the majority at 75% of the total compared to 11% and 14% for Italian and Japanese
schools, respectively. By far the greatest concentrations of presumed Axis schools were
in Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay where 90% of the schools identified as German were
located. Most of Italian schools were also in these three countries. The 127 Japanese
schools identified in the report were mostly in Peru and Brazil. 32 Overall, Corry estimated
that Axis schools educated up to two-thirds more Latin American nationals than the
aggregate US company, denominational, and independent schools.33
To those nations with the majority of the Axis schools, sizeable immigrant
populations from Germany and Italy --and to a much lesser extent Japan-- had come in
the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Immigration had been encouraged by Latin
American governments for a variety of reasons: as a vehicle for modernization of labor
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and economies, to settle vulnerable and sparsely populated national frontiers, and to
racially “whiten” national populations. 34 Arriving immigrant groups often faced a
common Latin American reality which was a lack of government funded schools for their
children. As a result, many immigrant communities established their own schools in the
rural or urban pockets where they settled. 35 Japanese schools were established in
commercial, fishing and agricultural communities on the Pacific coast. Italian and
German schools were found in rural communities as well as in capitals, large cities, and
regional centers along the Atlantic. Most of these Axis schools operated without financial
assistance of the host nation and relied on religious and private funding. Occasional
educational grants or assistance to such schools from the German, Italian and Japanese
governments or private organizations in their home countries were not uncommon, and
they became more frequent as the world war approached. 36 The Corry report argued that
many of the German schools, though independently founded by immigrant groups, were
directly controlled from Berlin.
Broadly, German schools in Latin America fell into two categories. German
community schools served first and second generation German immigrant communities
throughout the region. The US and some Latin American governments believed these
community schools, whether based in frontier areas settled by German immigrants or
urban neighborhoods dominated by immigrants and their descendents, were
indoctrinating Nazi ideology among the young and preparing them to assist an eventual
34
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Nazi conquest of the Americas. Corry considered these schools incubators of fifth
columns. The second type of German schools offered college preparatory programs and
served wealthy upper-class nationals of German descent. Because German educational
theories had modernist appeal in the early twentieth century, these schools were also
popular with non-German Latin American elites. As a result, as Europe moved toward
war in the 1930s, these schools were a source of great concern for those worried about
Nazi influence over Latin America‟s ruling classes. Indicative of that concern, these
upper-class schools became targets for closure by national governments as Nazi
ambitions played out in Europe. At the same time, the more numerous immigrant
community schools were targeted for nationalization rather than elimination.
Corry further classified German schools in Latin America in one of two
categories. They were either subversive or collaborationist. Most “subversive” German
schools were community schools located in areas where the majority of residents were
German immigrants or citizens of German ancestry. According to Corry‟s investigation,
their educational programs emphasized German nationalism, framed Pan-Germanic
identity as a racial identity, and connected students to all aspects of German culture.
German was the language of instruction and all texts came from Berlin. As the Nazis rose
to power in Germany and headed towards war, Hitler Youth groups, Nazi salutes, intense
German nationalism, and a general atmosphere of militarism were characteristic of many
of these community schools. In the process of “Nazification,” Corry argued, “the political
aspirations, civil institutions and cultural traditions of the host-republics are
depreciated.”37
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In comparison to the subversive schools, Corry labeled the institutions that served
elite German and Latin American populations as collaborationists. These were highquality schools with both primary and secondary sections. According to Corry, they
received significant support from Berlin because they offered the opportunity to gain
influence among the host-countries‟ upper classes. In these schools, German nationalism
was more muted because Germans were often a minority in the student body but also
because Nazis did not want to alienate nationals of the host-country. Their goal was to
build pro-German sympathies “among patriotic nationals belonging to influential social
groups,” to stress cultural “co-partnership” and promote German language and culture as
a “complement to the national culture.” 38 Serving an elite university-bound population,
they met national curriculum standards. Corry found that many schools in this category
had earned such high prestige that even US families in Latin America patronized them.
It is clear that Corry (and those in Washington who responded energetically to his
report) painted German, Italian, and Japanese schools in Latin America with too broad a
brush and assumed direct control of them by Axis governments. Not all schools in
immigrant communities were “subversive” and not all “collaboration” produced Axis
sympathies among Latin American nationals. Yet, it is also clear that Berlin recognized
the value of German schools and did attempt to unify school programs under Nazi
ideology. The Corry report mapped in detail the organizational links that tied German
schools in Latin America to the Nazi Party, and this was no fiction; subsequent historical
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analysis drawn from German archives bears out an extensive Nazi campaign to control
German schools in the Americas. 39
Max Paul Freidman‟s Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign
against the Germans of Latin America in World War II provides a detailed account of
US-led program to deport German nationals from “vulnerable” areas of Latin America
during the war. Freidman‟s study is meticulously researched and provides a fascinating
account of the deportation program. Significantly, it draws on US, German, and Latin
American archives. As it relates to the present discussion, Freidman argues that Berlin
manipulated and “misused” the “transnational sentiment” of both German immigrants
and the descendents of German immigrants abroad. Working through Latin Americanbased secret Nazi organizations, Berlin “bungled” its campaign to “bring the expatriate
German communities into the Nazi fold” and only succeeded in destroying the local
reputations of the “communities they claimed to champion.” 40
Drawing on German archives, Freidman details how Nazi cultural activities in
Latin America were encouraged and funded by the Auslandsorganisation, a department
of the Nazi Party formed to promote Nazism among German peoples abroad. As relates
to educational and cultural activities, this department privileged German community
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schools and social clubs in Latin America as essential sites of influence with Germans
abroad and local elites. Under orders from Berlin, local Nazi supporters “marched into
meetings with boards of directors of German schools and German clubs to demand
control as the true representatives of the Fuhrer.”41 Many of these takeovers were initially
successful, but they eventually led to the closures of many of the schools by the host
governments, based on growing distaste for and suspicion of local Nazi political
activities. In retrospect, Berlin‟s manipulation of German nationalism through expatriate
organizations like schools and clubs in Latin America failed to produce “legions of foot
soldiers ready to seize the hemisphere.” 42 Yet in the moment, Nazi activities, and
particularly those involving children and schools, fed intense fears in the US over fifth
columns. Significantly, many Latin American governments themselves were cautiously
monitoring Nazi political activity in the region and reacted forcefully to Nazi programs in
schools and clubs
Though many German, Italian, and Japanese schools were not actively affiliated
with or funded by Axis governments, the perception that all were bastions of fascism and
totalitarianism played powerfully to US and Latin American policy makers. Beginning in
the late 1930s, many Latin American countries placed legal restrictions on foreign
schools and social organizations. With the outbreak of world war, this trend accelerated.
Perceiving an Axis threat to national sovereignty, Latin American governments
introduced new measures designed to check the influence of Axis educators. New laws
decreed the teaching of national curriculum, employment of national teachers, and
reductions in the use of foreign languages in private school classrooms. While these
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measures theoretically applied equally to the existing US-sponsored and non-Axis foreign
schools, it is clear that they were enforced disproportionately as controls on Axis funded
institutions. The result was the closures of many German, Japanese, and Italian schools
just as American schools began to expand and flourish. 43
The Latin American backlash against Axis schools logically began in the areas of
the region with largest German, Italian, and Japanese populations. Years before the Corry
report sounded the alarm in Washington over Axis influence among school children,
some Latin American countries were already taking action to curb Axis activity in
national classrooms. Brazil took the lead. There, Gertulio Vargas came to power via a
military coup in 1930, promised democracy but ruled by decree, and assumed
authoritarian control by 1937. While flirting with fascist models and implementing a
corporatist state, Vargas‟ Estado Novo [New State] eventually rejected European fascism
and gradually embraced inter-American solidarity. As war developed, Vargas joined the
Allied cause, and Brazil was the only independent Latin American nation to send troops
to fight in Europe.
As in Colombia, education reform was at the center of Vargas‟ vision of
modernity. Like Liberals in Colombia, Vargas privileged classrooms as laboratories of
nationalism and worked to extend federal control over them. Free public education had
been mandated during the early nineteenth century, but a century later few Brazilians
were receiving it. As little as 39% of the school-age population attended primary schools
in 1930 and a significantly lower number actually completed it. Public secondary schools
were few in number, but private schools were more plentiful and outnumbered public
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schools by a ratio of 4:1. Similar to Colombia, many of these private schools were run by
religious orders, but Brazil had many community-based private schools functioning in
immigrant settlements where foreign languages rather than Portuguese were the medium
of instruction.44 It was Vargas‟ efforts to federalize these schools and institute a national
curriculum that first drew Washington‟s attention to Axis education in the Latin America.
Vargas‟ decrees placed heavy restrictions on foreign schools and immigrant
communities in general. One law, banning the use of foreign languages in public and
private schools, greatly affected Italian, German, Polish, and Japanese immigrant
populations. German immigrant schools alone, concentrated in Southern Brazil,
numbered 2,500 in 1937. Targeting areas where immigrant populations had been resistant
to speaking Portuguese and unwilling to acculturate into Brazilian society, the new law
was a function of Vargas‟ ongoing campaign to establish unifying Brazilian identity via
government-imposed nationalism. But having faced a coup attempt by Brazilian fascists
months earlier, it was equally an attempt to contain what he perceived as a growing
foreign threat to Brazil from European fascists.
Vargas‟ moves to crack down against foreign influence were accelerated after the
absorption of Austria by Nazi Germany. Fearful of the territorial ambitions of Hitler and
questioning the allegiance of Brazil‟s German population, Vargas and his appointed
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regional governors began an assault on “sources” of foreign propaganda. In the powerful
southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, the federal government began to take over “suspect”
private schools in February of 1938 -declaring that the children of immigrants born in
Brazil “are Brazilian and must be educated as such.”45 A subsequent law in that state
forbid “foreign governments and foreign associations” from subsidizing schools “in any
way.”46 On the national level, new laws banned non-Brazilian flags, insignia, and
uniforms in schools and clubs; they allowed censorship of reporting and commentary by
the foreign press; and they restricted Brazilians from joining foreign social
organizations. 47
After a coup attempt in May 1938, Vargas communicated to FDR that “advocates
of foreign doctrines attempted a coup against Brazilian democracy,” and he provided the
US with incentive for initiating its own campaign against Axis influence in Brazil. 48 As
the new US program of cultural diplomacy was then emerging, Brazil became the initial
focus. In June of 1938, Secretary Hull announced the campaign directly to the Brazilian
people; in a statement read over Brazilian radio he made a plea for cooperation to arrest
Axis influence. He indicated that schools had an important role to play in the campaign:
These cooperative efforts must be made not only by statesmen and diplomats, by
business and commercial men of the countries in the Western Hemisphere but
also by educational institutions, which can be such a powerful factor in
influencing public opinion to achieve these influences.49
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At the same time, other Latin American governments began mounting their own
crack downs on Axis schools. In Argentina, concern for Nazi influence in the late 1930s
led to a government investigation of German and Italian community schools. German
schools proved to be of greater concern because German immigrants, as compared to
Italians, assimilated less into the national culture. The final investigative report charged
that the Association of German Teachers in Argentina had been formed under the
direction of Berlin in 1936 and was subsequently used as a vehicle for ensuring loyalty to
Germany and Hitler. Citing examples of directors of German schools in Argentina being
first approved by Berlin, the report argued that some schools were submitting to Hitler.
More alarming to Argentine nationalists was the content of school textbooks which
canonized Hitler, instructed children to practice the Nazi salute daily, and emphasized
that the German race was superior to all others. In Buenos Aires, phrases culled from
such texts were interpreted as a Nazi assault on Argentine nationalism and sovereignty. 50
In reaction to the report, the Argentine Congress instituted tighter control over foreign
schools which included new requirements that the national curriculum be taught in
Spanish. Strict new regulatory processes were implemented for all foreign schools. As a
result, many Axis-oriented schools in Argentina were forced to close. Existing USsponsored schools were required to comply with the new regulations in Argentina as they
were with similar regulations enacted throughout the hemisphere during the course of the
war. Significantly (and as the Colombian case will demonstrate) the quality of these
schools‟ academic programs improved under the new regulations. Providing a standard
50
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US-style program on top of the required national curriculum, many of these schools
developed rigorous academic programs that proved attractive to families of the upper
class. 51
The nationalization and closings of Axis schools in Brazil and Argentina received
substantial attention in Washington and in the US press, particularly the more numerous
German schools. As the backlash against Axis schools spread across the region in the
early years of the war in Europe, news of Nazi schools continued to fill newspapers and
radio broadcasts in the US. Among the cases noted were the forced closures of three
private German schools in Uruguay (for having “a Nazi political tinge”), the shutdown of
all German schools and social clubs in Guatemala in 1941, Chilean “curbs” on Nazi
schools, and a proposed educational “clean up” in Colombia “to eliminate totalitarian
influence in all schools.” 52 While the US press praised Latin American efforts to suppress
Nazi influence in classrooms, such reporting also fueled increased anxiety in the US;
headlines seemed to confirm that a “fifth column” was indeed forming south of the Rio
Grande. That schools were Axis laboratories was widely accepted, and when the Corry
report was later released, it gave statistical foundation to these fears. And US diplomatic
pressure on Latin American governments to act decisively against Nazism increased.
Schools were just one element of “fifth column” alarm in the US press and
government before the US entered the war. Another important focus, and one that had
direct bearing on Colombia, was the threat of Nazi sabotage to the Panama Canal.
Reflecting the high priority Washington placed on its protection, substantial US press
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coverage emphasized the vulnerability of the canal to Nazi infiltration. Press attention to
the German presence in nations surrounding Panama was also constant.53 The Colombian
legation in Washington, ever sensitive to canal-related issues, monitored allegations in
the US press and kept Bogotá informed of the growing sensationalism in reporting.54
Soon, Washington was redoubling its efforts against Nazism in the nations surrounding
Panama, and, thus, was significant energy expended convincing the Colombian
government that protection of the canal was in its best interests.55 US diplomatic pressure
to deport suspected Nazis sympathizers, close German schools and clubs, and shut-down
German-owned business was forceful, but it met a largely positive reception. 56 US Oil
interests in Colombia also pressured Bogotá on the Nazi sabotage issue; the Minister of
War reported that two US companies, Tropical Oil and the Andian Corporation were
“beginning to get alarmed” [empezando a alarmarse] and they wanted Colombian
military protection against the threat of sabotage. The companies emphasized the
importance of Colombian petroleum to the fuel supply of the allies. 57
US pressure on the Liberal government in Bogotá to support the allied cause and
arrest German influence was balanced by calls from the far right of the Conservative
party to remain neutral. From that extreme right, demands for Colombian neutrality were
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often infused with anti-imperialist rhetoric and open expressions of sympathy for
Germany: “Colombians! Do not forget that Germany was the last free country that
recognized Panama as an independent republic.” 58 From fringe elements, but a limited
number of mainstream Conservatives as well, came great rhetorical resistance to Pan
American unity that invigorated political discourse of Hispanidad. 59
It is clear that Bogotá and the Colombian people were also on the receiving end of
German pressure to reject the Allied cause. Substantial Nazi propaganda material was in
circulation in Bogotá before Colombia broke diplomatic relations with Berlin in late
1941. Pamphlets collected by the Ministry of Foreign Relations reveal that the best printquality Nazi propaganda materials then circulating in Bogotá were printed in either
Buenos Aires or Madrid.60 But locally printed materials were also common and usually
more precisely crafted toward convincing locals that Germany and Colombia shared
long-term friendship or that both nations had benefited from their developing economic
ties. 61 Anti-imperialism was a common theme in these pamphlets, but before the US
entered the war the British government was the more frequent target of this type of
German attack. That locally printed anti-British materials were circulating among
university students proved most troubling to British diplomats. 62
As the US edged closer to official engagement in the war, the Colombian legation
in Berlin noted shifting attention in Nazi propaganda to US imperialism that gave
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particular focus to the Panama Canal. 63 According to Bogotá‟s representative in Berlin,
Nazi press and radio were preparing the German public for Latin America‟s eventual
rupture of relations with them; acknowledging that efforts at inter-American solidarity
against the Axis had been largely successful, the German press continuously focused on
the “pressure, as much economic as political, that the United States exercises over South
America” so as to suggest that Latin American nations could not act on their own
accord.64 In the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, two weeks before Colombia would
formally break relations with Germany, it issued a stern warning to Berlin that Colombia
would “impede, by all possible measures, direct or indirect threats to the security of the
Panama Canal from Colombian territory” as well as other acts against American
solidarity. 65
Closure of German Schools in Colombia
Excepting the immigrants proceeding from neighboring countries, the
number of foreign-born residents in Colombia was statistically insignificant through the
early 1900s, and this absence reflected the failure of nineteenth and early twentieth
century government attempts to encourage large-scale European immigration. Just over
one-half of 1% of the national population was foreign, and approximately half of that
figure was Latin American nationals. 66 Still, small groups of immigrants, both permanent
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and temporary, did arrive from the Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and North America,
and if their influence was not well pronounced nationally it was stronger at the regional
level. In the cases of German, Italian, English, French and US citizens, many arrived in
Colombia as trained professionals, engineers, technicians, or merchants. Colombian
historiography specifically credits these foreign nationals with a disproportionate and
“undeniable” role in the development and modernization of national infrastructure of
communication, transportation, and education along with a key role in the growth of
commerce and industry. 67 By the 1930s, the greatest concentrations of these immigrant
populations were in and around Barranquilla, the Caribbean coast in general, and Andean
Bogotá. The Santander region in the northeast reaches of Andes was convenient to the
petroleum fields and so it also attracted nationals from these countries. Medellín, with a
regionally strong economy built both on coffee profits and a well-developed textile
industry, attracted some of these immigrants as well.
Given the relatively low figures of foreign immigration, Colombia did not have an
extensive problem with Axis-oriented schools during the rise of European fascism.
Where the few German-founded schools existed, they were very well-regarded and
patronized by the Colombian upper class. Logically, prominent German schools existed
in Bogotá and Barranquilla; two smaller schools, in Medellín and Cali, had strong
connections with German education as a result of the German pedagogical mission of the
1920s. These four schools, like many in Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala and elsewhere,
were forced to close during the war as Nazi political activity received government, press,
and Allied attention. Comparatively, Italian schools in Colombia were Catholic schools
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that were founded and staffed by Italian religious orders. There were more of them, but
they received less scrutiny and faced fewer restrictions. Japanese populations in
Colombia were so small --a total of 233 individuals in 1938 were concentrated in two
areas along the Pacific coast-- that they did not have formal schools. 68
After Pearl Harbor, US pressure on Latin America to control resident Axis
nationals increased dramatically. As the Cory report demonstrates, Washington assumed
that every ethnic German in Latin America was sympathetic to the Nazis. Combined with
a lack of confidence in Latin American governments‟ abilities to deal effectively with
fifth column threats, this sentiment drove a strong current of diplomatic pressure,
emanating from US embassies, legations, and consular offices, to clamp down on Axisaffiliated businesses, political activities, schools, and social clubs. One important pressure
tool was the “Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals” which identified Axissympathetic individuals in Latin America with whom US citizens and businesses abroad
were barred from dealing. Many “blocked” individuals ended up on deportation lists
provided to national governments by US embassies. Friedman‟s study of the deportation
of German nationals from Latin America shows that many innocents fell victim to the
fifth column hysteria that characterized Washington‟s diplomacy in most Latin American
capitals.69 Yet, as the Brazilian case reveals, Latin American action against Axis
influence was not reducible to Washington‟s pressure.
Indeed, the hierarchy of the Colombian Catholic Church placed significant
pressure on the ruling Liberals to stop Nazi activity among school children. Though the
Church‟s hegemony over education in private secondary schools was diminishing under
68
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Liberal reforms, priests and nuns regularly worked as teachers in private non-Catholic
schools to satisfy the extant legal requirement that all Catholic students be provided with
religious instruction. In Bogotá, the Chaplain of the Foreign Catholics, a priest and a
German national, provided religious instruction in the Colegio Alemán de Bogotá [the
German School of Bogotá]. His report to the Papal Nuncio, the Archbishop of Bogotá
and the church hierarchy was presented to the Ministry of Foreign Relations in a call to
stop Nazi and German Protestant abuses in Colombian classrooms. Father Richard Struve
Haker‟s assessment of the “Nazification” of the Colegio Alemán provides an important,
if somewhat biased, window into the Axis influence in the German schools of Colombia.
According to Struve Haker, the Colegio Alemán de Bogotá began to receive direct
funding from Berlin in the late 1930s; in exchange, the school forfeited the right to select
and hire its own teachers. New teachers arriving from Germany were all members of the
Nazi party. Gradually, Nazism became more prominent in the colegio among the
teachers, parents of the school association, and the junta directiva. As this happened, the
Catholic priest began to have problems at the school.
Letters demanded that I give the Nazi salute and sing the Nazi song of HorstWessel-Lied in order to enter the school, which I refused to do because the salute
and song are anti-Christian. Nazi propaganda among the German children
resulted in the formation of two youth organizations, among the Colombian
children there was effective propaganda …70
Before it was closed by government decree in 1942, the student body of the Colegio
Alemán de Bogotá was 75% Colombian. It served the upper class of the capital and was
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considered among the best secondary institutions in the city. 71 Father Richard observed
that an initial negative reaction to Nazi activity by some of the more influential
Colombian families forced the administrators and teachers to proceed cautiously.
Above all, the priest and his superiors were most concerned about the assault on
Catholicism within the classrooms. The priest alleged that the professor of Protestant
religion was a strong Nazi party member who had told students that their Catholic priestprofessor “did not speak in historic truths” [no versaba de verdades historicas]. Worse,
Catholic religious classes were regularly cancelled by the school; the scheduled hours
were instead used for Nazi indoctrination through singing, ceremonies, and festivals. It
reached the point where children were not sent for Catholic religious classes. 72
A portion of the student body of the school was children of German Jews who had
fled Germany only to encounter Nazism within their new educational community.
Members of the Anti-Nazi Freedom Movement, a Bogotá based organization which
fought Nazi activities in Colombia and was led by Jewish refugees, actively resisted the
Nazification of Colegio Alemán from their seats on the school‟s board of directors. From
within the colegio, both Jewish and Catholic parents were initially successful in mounting
opposition to the Nazi movement, but German victories in Europe worked against them:
Until recently, there had been strong openly anti-Nazi currents in the colegio
which limited the professors from spreading propaganda beyond the German
children organized as Hitler Youth. It was precisely the anti-Nazi activity of Klein
and Herrnstadt that the colegio recognized and feared, as Klein had slowed down
the Nazification of the schools through organized opposition to the establishment
of a board of directors composed of Nazis, while Herrnstadt was known to
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impede, through his protests, the spreading of propaganda –even clandestine
propaganda-- in his daughter‘s class. 73
Some members of the school community lobbied for Colombian government intervention
to prevent a Nazi takeover of the school, and other members served as informants to the
National Police and US Embassy. 74
In Barranquilla, the local Colegio Alemán was founded in 1912 to serve a
growing German population. By the 1930s, before Nazification began, it was, like its
sister school in Bogotá, highly-regarded among the upper class. However, the German
population on the coast was more prominent and influential, and, thus, the colegio had a
more dominant position on the local education stage than the school in Bogotá. The
German language was emphasized in the academic program. By 1940, the locallyestablished school received financial subsidizes, materials and teachers from Berlin. Like
the school in Bogotá, it came to fit the “collaborationist” model identified in the Corry
report. The student body was comprised of 253 students of whom only 26% were
German nationals, the children of recent immigrants or resident businessmen; 65% of the
students were Colombian citizens but many of them were of German and mixed GermanColombian ancestry. Reflecting the quality of the school and its attractiveness to parents,
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9% of the student body was children of third-country nationals who resided in the city. 75
Historically, US children were among those attending the school. Indicative of its
popularity (and the demand for quality secondary education in Colombia), student
turnover was very low and new students were only accepted for kindergarten and the first
year. 76
In Barranquilla, the Colegio Alemán was joined by the Club Alemán, a popular
German social club, as an important cultural center in the city. Throughout the 1930s and
through the end of 1941, social events held at both institutions filled the páginas de
sociedad [society pages] in the local press. Even as banner front-page headlines began to
detail German aggression against Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, and France, formal
dances, concerts, and festivals at the club and school were chronicled or advertised on the
society pages in both Spanish and German. 77
At Barranquilla in 1919 Germans aviators and Colombian investors had founded
the oldest commercial airline in South America, SCADTA (the Colombian-German Aero
Transport Society). Given Colombia‟s topography and the great travel distances between
population centers, the establishment of regular air service was immediately successful
and it became a tremendous source of pride in Barranquilla (and around the nation). 78
SCADTA tied the city to modernity by connecting it to the world. For the
accomplishments of SCADTA‟s German management and personnel, Barranquilleros
extended immigrant Germans much goodwill. As internal and international flights
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increased through the 1930s, however, the Colombian government recognized the
growing value of air transport as a vehicle for national integration and modernization. At
the end of his first term, President Lopéz moved to establish greater Colombian control
over SCADTA. Reflecting Colombia‟s historically moderate approach to economic
nationalism, he aimed to establish a 51% share in the airline among Colombian nationals.
Washington applauded the move but remained concerned that German and Austrian
pilots continued to fly the company‟s air fleet. Fears that experienced German pilots
might take marching orders from Berlin and bomb the Panama Canal produced strong US
pressure on Bogotá to remove German pilots and administrators from the company. USbased Pan American Airlines actually owned a majority share in the company and this
facilitated diplomatic maneuvering that led to the nationalization of the airline, the
removal of German pilots, and the creation of Avianca, Colombia‟s national airline. 79
The example of the Colombianization of SCADTA underscores that US and Colombian
economic and political objectives often converged. It is a reminder that US diplomatic
pressure in Latin America must be critically assessed in relation to objectives of national
governments in order not to overstate the significance of US pressure.
A key turning point in Colombian tolerance of school Nazification came with the
bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Colombia had early embraced the US-led
efforts for inter-American unity against Axis aggression, and after the war came to the
Americas via Hawaii, Colombia called on all of the other American republics to
collectively break relations with the Axis powers. President Eduardo Santos gave
unwavering support to the Allied powers; acknowledging how crucial the Panama Canal
would become in a two-theater war, he even agreed that a US presence on Colombian soil
79

Bushnell, Eduardo Santos and the Good Neighbor, 1938-1942, pp. 18-23.

150

might become necessary to protect the isthmus. Liberals and many Conservatives
supported Santos‟ alignment with the Allies, though some prominent Conservatives
preferred neutrality and made much of the issue in attempts to gain political advantage.
The day after Pearl Harbor, and in line with many Latin American countries, Colombia
immediately broke relations with Japan. Shortly thereafter, it did the same with Germany
and Italy. In the wake of these diplomatic declarations, new powers were granted to the
National Police allowing the dismantling of organizations and clubs whose activities
threatened national sovereignty. Police were also granted control over the internal
movements of foreigners, including the power to detain and relocate them. A full
declaration of war against Germany came in June 1942, when a German submarine sunk
the Resolute, a Colombian ship en route from Colombia‟s Caribbean islands of San
Andres and Providencia. After abandoning the sinking vessel, the defenseless crew was
gunned down by the Germans as they drifted on a life raft.80
Adding to existing pressure from the Church, anti-Nazi German refugees, proAlly Colombians, and the US embassy, powerful photographic evidence of Nazi
indoctrination activities on Colombian soil was presented to the directors of the National
Police by their Barranquilla branch. Found during a house raid, three dozen photographs
of ceremonies at the Colegio Alemán and Club Alemán in Barranquilla revealed that
Nazi pomp was at home on the Caribbean coast. In the photos, Nazi swastikas and flags
adorned ceremonial stages. Uniformed party members stood before crowds that included
children. Everyone gave the Nazi salute.81 An accompanying report charged that other
Nazi political activities observed clandestinely in schools and clubs were compromising
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national security. Outlining the structure of the Nazi organization in Colombia and
comparing it to a Communist organization, the report identified a hierarchical command
that flowed down from the Office of Foreigners in Berlin (the Auslandsorganisation ) to
national and then local groups and finally to secret political cells. Explaining the weight
of the pressure applied by Nazis on German immigrants in Colombia, the report noted
that since 1936 German social clubs had expelled any member who did not belong to the
party. Indicative of the contemporary popularization of radio technology, the report also
alleged that since the breaking of relations with Germany the month before, clandestine
radio had been used to communicate with Nazi sympathizers in rural areas of the nation;
“they have installed speakers with the aim of providing the public with news that
broadcasters in Berlin produce in Spanish.” 82
The Nazification of the Colegio Alemán was especially alarming to the police.
Reflecting a commonly held belief in the transformative power of education and concern
over abuse of that power, they charged that indoctrination in the school was so effective
that students “became true followers of Hitler‟s creed” [se tornan en veraderos adeptos
del credo hitlerista]. Similar to the Bogotá case chronicled by the Church and parents,
professors in Barranquilla had been fired and replaced with Nazis. Free tuition was
offered to families of German descent who could not afford the colegio and “in this way
the home was conquered through the school” [en esa forma se conquistaba el hogar por
medio de la escuela]. Children whose parents were part of local, regional, or national
government were also offered free tuition. Describing the ceremony celebrating the first
of May at Colegio Alemán, the report compared it to the best ceremonies in Munich,
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Hamburg, or Cologne with the red flags, Nazi crosses, and uniforms received directly
from the German military. To the police, themselves men of uniform, the brown Nazi
uniforms that had been smuggled into the country were an affront to Colombian
sovereignty, and they demanded aggressive action by Bogotá to eliminate the threat. 83
The month after Pearl Harbor and the rompimiento [the “break” in relations with
Axis powers], the Colombian Ministry of National Education acted on the police report
and imposed new restrictions on all schools within Colombia. While German schools
were the immediate target of Decree 91 of 1942 (January 21), the new regulations of the
ministry applied to all schools in the nation. As such, the decree should be seen broadly
in the context of Liberal education reforms rather than as a simple reaction to Nazi
propaganda activity. The goal of national unity and the integration of the disjointed
nation through education --a central tenet of the Liberal reform program-- underpinned
the new regulations. Colombian schools, the decree asserted, “must serve in the first
order the interests and ideals of the Colombian nation” and “form citizens that jealously
guard the ideals of the patria and are capable of serving it.” The primary function of
schools was defined as the teaching of the language, history, geography and civics of
Colombia. Spanish was to have preference in all institutions, and while foreign languages
were recognized as important, they were defined as auxiliary. Strikingly absent in the
school subject prioritization in the decree was any reference to religious instruction and
Catholic dogma; in many ways, the decree reinforced earlier constitutional changes that
had controversially signaled the end of Church hegemony over education.
Specifically addressing schools founded and operated by foreigners, the new
restrictions banned school names that “suggest affiliation with a foreign country.” The
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Colegio Alemán de Barranquilla, for example, violated that new mandate. The name of
the popular school sponsored by US Presbyterians in the same city, Colegio Americano
[the American School] was originally chosen in the nineteenth century to suggest
affiliation with the US, but because the Spanish term Americano could be interpreted
more broadly to include everyone in the Americas, its name did not violate the new law.
Exceptions were made for official establishments named in honor of an allied,
neighboring or friendly country by national, regional, or local governments. In addition,
busts, sculptures, or portraits of foreign heads of state were banned. Exception was made
for just one leader of a foreign nation, “His Holiness the Pope.” And no singing of the
national hymns of foreign nations was allowed unless it was at a school ceremony
honoring an ally on their national day. Finally, in terms of academic programs within
schools operated by foreigners, the decree now required that Colombian history, civics,
geography and literature be taught in schools. And most importantly, these subjects had
to be taught by Colombians and exactly follow Ministry of Education curriculum
guidelines. 84 Importantly, while Decree 91 of 1942 was specifically formulated as a
measure to arrest Axis influence in the schools, given that so many Colombian secondary
schools were founded, operated and staffed by foreign-born Catholic priests, brothers,
and nuns, the decree strengthened the Ministry of Education‟s authority vis-à-vis the
Church and its foreign-born educators.
The decree did not specify sanctions for violations of the new regulations, but it
encouraged the reporting of breaches. The first major sanctions came just days after the
decree was issued when the closings of the German schools at Bogotá and Barranquilla
84
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were ordered by the Ministry of National Education. 85 In its official statement, the
ministry said these schools attacked the essence of Colombian nationality and attempted
“to form a spirit among youth that is in open rebellion with national sentiment.”86 Two
schools in Cali and Medellín with connections to German educators were closed in the
following months. Germán Arciniegas, Colombia‟s Minister of National Education at the
time of the first closures, later told the New York Times that
even the parents of the students…had believed their sons were merely
studying the German language when as a matter of fact, they wore uniforms and
German swastikas and were drilled in the tactics of the Nazis. 87
Comparatively, schools serving Italian immigrants in Colombia were almost all
Catholic schools staffed by Italian religious orders and none were closed. In Barranquilla,
the community of Italian nationals was three times greater in number than the German
community, and Italians were second only to Spaniards as the largest foreign national
grouping in the city. (There were just slightly more Italians than Syrio-Lebanese and five
times as many Italian as US citizens.) The National Police section in Barranquilla
monitored the activities of Italians along with Germans on the coast. And when
individuals were connected with German or Italian schools or clubs --as a board members
or financial officers, for example-- they were more likely to be labeled peligroso
[dangerous] in police reports submitted to the Office of Foreigners. Still, such reports
also reveal that a large percentage of Italians on the coast were Catholic men married to
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Colombian women, and, overall, they were less likely to be deemed dangerous and
qualify for deportation or detention. 88
In Barranquilla and Bogotá, the closure of the German schools left parents and
students in a difficult position. Elite Colombian families, who were the majority in these
school communities, acted swiftly to place their sons and daughters in other private
schools, but classrooms were a limited commodity in Colombia and placement of
Colegio Alemán students in other schools was not guaranteed. The two tiny, independent
US-sponsored schools in Bogotá and Barranquilla found new demand for their services,
but these schools were then primary-only institutions. In Barranquilla, non-Nazi
educators and former teachers from the German school quickly organized a new colegio
to serve the community‟s needs. Taking advantage of the furniture and resources of the
closed colegio, the Colegio del Prado opened under a Colombian director within three
weeks. The school program was quickly approved by Colombia‟s Ministry of National
Education.89 Interestingly, as German influence declined in the city with the closing of
the popular school, the new Colegio de Prado was established in a modern neighborhood
that had been built by US nationals and was popular with the local elite.
Funding American Schools: A Permanent Program Takes Shape
In 1940, the New York Times reported that tuition in Ecuador‟s German and
Italian schools “has been nominal and sometimes free.” Highlighting growing anti-Axis
sentiment in that nation‟s capital, the paper detailed the effort by Ecuador‟s former
88
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Minister of War to establish an “American” school in Quito. A committed Pan
Americanist, the minister believed a US-type school would help counter the influence of
the Axis powers among upper-class Quiteños. The New York Times acknowledge the
valuable double function schools like the colegio in Quito could play: “not only will this
school fill a very important need [demand for US-style education among US and
Ecuadorans], but it will also become a new link in the program of closer relations
between the United States and this country.” 90 When the school opened that same year, it
received no “official” financial backing from the United States government and it was
struggling; founded by a foreign national, it was technically not even a US-sponsored
school. Later congressional testimony, however, revealed that the US Embassy had
supported its establishment and quietly aided its development. A State Department
representative in Quito “was doing everything in his power” to assist with the founding of
“a school for these nationals in Quito, Ecuador.”91 That school, Colegio Americano de
Quito, would be among the first schools in Latin America to receive a grant when a
formal funding program was initiated by the OIAA.
The last impediment to official US government support for independent USsponsored schools overseas was congressional approval. The OIAA had wide leverage in
allocating funds for cultural programs in Latin America, and in the early 1940s, it began
to offer small grants to assist a limited number of schools like the Colegio Americano de
Quito. Yet, by then it was already clear to diplomats, businesses, academics, educators,
parents, and students that a more permanent and extensive solution was needed to address
the problems of educating US children abroad. By then, it was also clear to the US
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diplomatic bureaucracy that the nation had relatively limited cultural influence among
Latin American elites as compared to European nations --both allies and enemies. The
failure to engage in cultural diplomacy and to encourage and support US schools abroad
had left the US at a serious disadvantage in this regard, and this failing became obvious
with the rise of Nazism. In the end, fear among US politicians that Axis influence was
winning over Latin American elites to Nazism convinced a skeptical Congress and
secured long-term funding for independent, non-sectarian American overseas schools.
Berlin‟s expenditures on German elementary and secondary schools in Latin
America during the 1930s and 1940s were estimated at $6,000,000.92 So prominent were
German schools in Latin American cities that members of a US congressional delegation
became alarmed by their numbers on a fact finding tour of the region in 1941. On return
to Washington they informed their colleagues that they had been “forced to take
cognizance of the existence of German schools down there, which have not been
established just since Hitler came to power.”93 Everywhere the delegation went, US
diplomats, embassy and consular staffs, businessmen and their wives impressed upon
them the need for US-sponsored schools in the region. On their return, the visiting
Congressmen argued that the United States had ignored cultural diplomacy for too long.
They were especially concerned that there were too few independent and non-sectarian
American schools in the region to counterbalance the Axis schools.
Recognizing that schools were a vehicle for spreading influence, supporting US
business and diplomacy abroad, and sustaining friendly relations with host countries, US
support for American schools in Latin America began in 1941 with small grants. After
92
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consulting with the State Department, the OIAA made these grants to independent, nonsectarian American schools. The support was intended to cover operating expenses or to
be used toward the purchase of capital equipment that would boost the prestige of the
schools. Grants initially targeted crisis situations that had been brought on by the war. As
the Corry report indicated, some existing American schools in Latin America were
suffering. With the start of hostilities in Europe donations had fallen off, some US
citizens were leaving for home, and US teachers were resigning. At the same time,
demand for American schools in Latin America was increasing as Axis schools closed
and more Latin Americans embraced Pan Americanism. 94 Seizing a key opportunity to
gain influence, promote its visions of Pan American identity, and foster mutual
understanding among the elite, Rockefeller‟s OIAA initiated support for American
schools with the hope they would attract those Latin Americans who had previously
enrolled their children in the German schools. To a large extent, this did begin to occur
during the war.95 These funds provided a solution to the educational problems of some
US families living in the region as well as an educational option for nationals looking for
an alternative to Catholic and European dominated education.
By 1943, the OIAA had significantly increased its funding of American schools in
Latin America. That year it granted a total of $250,000 to nine schools in Central
America, South America, and the Caribbean. With such grants, the OIAA and the State
Department signaled that support for such schools had become critically important:
It seems imperative in light of recent developments that the United States
Government should not only assist, financially and in other ways, good

94
95

US Department of State, The Cultural Cooperation Program 1938-1943, p. 29.
William Schurz, testimony, HR2599, 15 Feb. 1943, p. 342.

159

nonsectarian schools now existing, but should also embark upon a large-scale
and long-term program for the establishment of new schools.96
Convinced of the necessity of such assistance, the OIAA transferred this funding
program to the Department of State in 1943. As the OIAA was a temporary agency, the
Department of State‟s assumption of the program ensured the continuance of funding for
such schools after the war.97 With this administrative transfer, support for independent
US-sponsored schools became an official budgetary line item of the US government.
Between the end of the Second World War and the 1964 founding of the
Department of State‟s Office of Overseas Schools, the number of United States citizens
working abroad increased significantly. Resulting in part from the expansion of US
diplomatic missions and the rise of multi-national corporations, a growing number of US
citizens abroad fueled the founding of hundreds of elementary and secondary schools for
US children and foreign nationals in Latin America and throughout the world. After the
world war and in a climate of Cold War, the US government readily offered support for
many of these schools.98
Conclusion
Before the US traditions of limited government and deference to private
initiatives were radically altered by the New Deal, the State Department took little
interest in the education of US children abroad. Though the Department historically
complied with US business demands for activist foreign policy, it ignored growing calls
for official assistance with schooling. Beginning in the 1930s, however, demands for
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assistance became more difficult to ignore. Several factors worked to encourage US
government interest in the schools its citizens had founded or wanted to found abroad.
First, the new Pan Americanism increased the US diplomatic presence in Latin
America. Increases in diplomatic staffs in the region also resulted from the forced
closures of foreign stations in occupied Europe and Asia; once the war began, the
Department of State had a surplus of experienced civil servants and diplomats who were
displaced from the war zone. Many of these surplus employees were reassigned to the
region where US diplomatic programs were actually expanding. Assistant Secretary of
State Dean Acheson explained that “whereas many of the nations with which we have
been dealing elsewhere in the past are now temporarily out of the picture, South America
is more in the picture than ever before.”99 The jump in the number of US government
employees living in Latin America increased the number of US parents searching for
suitable schools for their children.
Second, with the encouragement of the executive branch there was substantial
growth in the number of US firms opening offices in Latin America from the late 1930s
forward. The State Department‟s contemporary foreign economic policy led to growth in
the number of private US citizens and, as a result, US families living abroad. Secretary of
State Hull‟s reciprocal trade agreements encouraged greater commerce between the US
and Latin American countries. And as the war began to close European markets to raw
materials and products from the Americas, inter-American trade increased the number of
US nationals and US children living below the Rio Grande. One result was that
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businesses began to pressure the Department of State for assistance in locating schools
for the children of their US employees.
Simultaneously, changes to citizenship statutes and Foreign Service personnel
policies had the effect of increasing the number of children in Latin America who could
claim US citizenship. Children of US mothers and foreign fathers who lived abroad were
no longer excluded from citizenship and a 1940 nationality act ended citizenship
residency requirement for many children and parents. The act ensured that fewer families
would be forced to send children home during important schooling years. Yet,
eliminating this residency hardship did not change the fact that there were still very
limited school options for US children in Latin America. In fact, these changes only
exacerbated demand as more families stayed in region for longer terms. The State
Department began to publicly acknowledge that US overseas business growth was
dependent on solving the education problems of its citizens abroad. In appeals to
Congress for school funds, the Department would eventually be quite explicit:
Schools are very important in keeping American business men and women
in Latin America, because a great many of them do not want to go to South
America unless they are assured that there are American school facilities there
for their children. If they are not assured of that, they simply will not go. They
serve that very useful purpose.100
Third, the Corry report revealed that nationals of the host countries made up a
large percentage of the student populations of existing company, denominational, and
American schools. While European culture had historically been favored by Latin
American elites, when they were given the option of US-style education for their children
many embraced it enthusiastically. To the delight of the State Department and the OIAA
both the independent, non-sectarian schools and the high-quality denominational schools
100
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sponsored by US citizens frequently attracted children of host-country government
officials and business leaders. As such, foreign policymakers in Washington came to
recognize that US-sponsored schools in Latin America presented an opportunity for US
citizens to mix among the ruling classes. They saw an opportunity to make up for the
years of non-engagement in cultural diplomacy that had left the US at a competitive
disadvantage with European nations in cultural arenas. As US diplomats formulated
cultural relations programs around the goals of mutual understanding and Pan American
identity, administrators of US-sponsored schools in Latin America emphasized the value
of building long-term cultural relationships within communities:
What goodwill exists in the minds of these people toward North America is not
so much the result of our recent and occasionally naïve efforts as it is the result of
the long-term work which has been carried on by our schools, church groups, and
those few businessmen who came here sensitive…101
Short-term good neighborliness would not be enough. Between the late 1930s and early
1940s, the OIAA and the State Department became convinced that the growing US
business and diplomatic presence in Latin America necessitated some form of assistance
to US-sponsored schools. Given escalating war-time spending, convincing Congress that
a formal assistance program was warranted would prove another challenge. But armed
with the knowledge that existing US-sponsored schools were attracting influential locals,
justification for an assistance program could be framed as crucial to achieving interAmerican unity against anti-democratic forces.
Fourth, contemporary educational reform agendas in Latin America and the US
created fertile ground on which American school could be established. In Colombia, the
limited national education system had long been structured around European Catholic
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models and significantly staffed by foreign-born educators. Historically, there was little
resistance to foreign influence in education. As Liberal reforms of the 1930s encourage
the growth of schools at all levels and sought to break the grip of the Catholic Church on
education, independent and non-sectarian schools sponsored by US nationals were
warmly welcomed by government and private citizens. In the US, as the educational
reform movement turned to Congress and demanded equalization of nation‟s education
system, the federal-state relationship in education was increasingly debated. In this
process, many politicians and educators asserted a federal responsibility for the education
of all US children and the discourse dovetailed nicely into arguments for recognition of
US children abroad. US education was still recovering from the Depression, but over the
previous three decades it had been strengthened by the High School Movement and the
professionalization of the teaching field. Building upon transnational educational
connections established through the PAU, organizations like the Institute of International
Education, the American Council on Education, and the National Education Association
proved very willing and enthusiastic about addressing the challenges of US education
abroad.
The conditions at home and abroad were conducive to formal US government
support for American schools in Latin America, but overseas education was still a low
priority for a Congress and a presidential administration negotiating New Deal liberalism
in the wake of a depression and in the build up to a world war. Though more and more
politicians, diplomats, and professional educators were pressuring the federal government
to assist American schools in Latin America, it was wartime fears of German fifth
columns more than a sense of obligation to its citizens abroad that expedited
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Congressional support for a school assistance program. As US fear of Nazi influence
among upper-class Latin Americans reached a climax, consensus over the importance of
American schools abroad was achieved for the first time.
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Chapter Three

Local Schools, Transnational Schools
This chapter treats the founding and early growth of American schools in
Barranquilla and Bogotá from the late 1930s through World War II and the early postwar. It demonstrates how both US support for American schools and Colombian policies
toward them developed in the context of world war. Placing the intimate lives of families
at the center of diplomacy, it details how US businessmen, wives, and diplomats joined
with Colombian elite and other resident foreigners to create educational options for their
children. In the process, they influenced the direction of US cultural diplomacy and gave
substance to emerging Colombian-US cultural relations.
While the two schools here considered were initially designed to meet the
educational needs of US and other foreign families, each rapidly began to serve elite
Colombian populations. Historicizing these institutions and their cultures, the chapter
provides a window into new transnational communities that were emerging in the Andes
and on the Caribbean. Exploring these communities, it demonstrates how common
interests in education and shared experiences with it energized Colombian-US cultural
collaboration.
To begin, a demographic overview provides a statistical portrait of foreigners who
resided in Colombia during the middle decades of the twentieth century. As the number
of European nationals living in the nation declined, the number of US citizens residing
there increased substantially. As resident US business, military and diplomatic personnel
increased during war and post-war, more US families were living in urban Colombia and
in need of schools for their children. This first section considers demand for American
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schools as a function of demographic change. Subsequent sections examine the founding
and early development of the first American schools in Colombia, the Colegio Karl C.
Parrish in Caribbean Barranquilla and the Anglo-American School of Andean Bogotá.
Importantly, each of these sections details how the independent schools began to attract
the attention of both local Colombian elite and cultural policymakers in Washington.
Yankees and Europeans: The Changing Demographics of Foreigners in Colombia
On the eve of World War II, Colombia‟s national census documented relatively
few foreign nationals residing in the nation. Non-Colombians represented just slightly
more than one half of 1% of the nation‟s population (or 56,418 foreigners in a total
population of 8.7 million people). The Contraloría General de la República, the
government agency responsible for the census, considered the figure very low when
compared to the more developed nations in the region. Latin Americans were 47% of the
total foreign population and individuals from neighboring countries were the majority.
Venezuelans made up approximately half of the foreign total, and their most significant
concentration was found in the Department of Norte de Santander [Northern Santander]
in the Northeast interior of the country. The department‟s capital, Cucuta, sits close to the
Venezuelan border and the people on both sides of the international demarcation share a
regional culture that transcends national distinction. After Norte de Santander, the
Departments of Cundinamarca and Atlántico, whose capitals are Bogotá and
Barranquilla, respectively, were home to the next greatest concentrations of foreigners.
Yet as compared to Norte de Santander, the foreign populations in Barranquilla and
Bogotá were more diverse and decidedly more European. Slightly more foreigners lived
in Caribbean Barranquilla than Andean Bogotá, and because Bogotá was more than two
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times larger than Barranquilla, the foreign population constituted a much higher
percentage overall in the Caribbean port. Barranquilla had a more obvious foreign
community on its streets and in it neighborhoods. While many of the foreigners in Bogotá
were formally tied to embassies (or legations) and were most visible in diplomatic social
circles, foreigners in Barranquilla were more integrated into the broader economic and
cultural life of the city. The numbers of foreigners in the nation‟s other principal cities of
Cali, Cartagena, and Medellín were at that time significantly lower. 1
With the exception of nationals from neighboring countries, the 1938 census
categorized foreigners broadly by region or continent. As the figures were complied and
analyzed against the backdrop of a looming world war, the Contraloría determined that
future censuses should include more specific country breakdowns of foreign nationals.
Cognizant that the war in Europe could soon affect immigration, the Contraloría regretted
not having identified foreign residents more precisely by nation so as to track more
closely future changes.2 After Latin Americans, Europeans were the second major foreign
grouping, and they made up 43% of the total resident foreigners (24,396 people). There
were only slightly more Western than Eastern Europeans.
Of the remaining foreign population, approximately 7% were classified as Asians,
and the largest concentration were Middle Easterners who lived mainly on the Caribbean
coast. Most were Syrians, Lebanese, and Palestinians that had come to the Colombian
Caribbean in relatively large numbers beginning in the late 1800s. Establishing
commercial networks linking Barranquilla with the interior regions of coastal
departments, they quickly integrated into upper and middle-class Costeño society. In a
1
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region where descendents of Spaniards, Africans and Indians distinguished the coastal
mestizaje from the more dominant Spanish-Indian strain of the Andean interior, árabes or
turcos (Arabs or Turks, as they were commonly called) found few racial barriers to social
integration and miscegenation.3
North Americans, a category that grouped US and Canadian nationals together,
represented less than 4% of the total foreigners (just 2,152 people). 4 While the US
population in Colombia was quite small in 1938, it was trending upward as European
populations were moving in the opposite direction. These demographic trends were
crucial to the demand for American schools and growing US cultural influence in the
nation. The overall upward trend for US figures continued until guerilla warfare and drug
trafficking made Colombia a less desirable posting for US citizens and their families by
the 1970s.
Based on Colombian census figures for 1938 and US State Department estimates
for 1942, the number of US citizens living in Colombia increased by about 30% over that
four year period. Part of the increase was the result of new citizenship statutes that
reclassified some US mothers and their children as citizens. The elimination of US
residency requirements for families overseas meant that families could stay longer and
grow larger without having to return home for periods in residence. An increase in US
diplomatic staff and cultural personnel that came through Pan American programming
was also an important factor. Washington placed great emphasis on Colombia in its
wartime diplomacy. Strategically located near the Panama Canal and home to an
3
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influential German community, US policymakers prioritized Colombian support for Pan
American unity against the Axis powers. Though not very well developed economically,
Colombia possessed rich oil reserves and mineral deposits and, compared with its
neighbors, had tremendous potential that could be harnessed during and after the war. At
that time, and indeed throughout the century, Washington considered Colombia to be the
most democratic of the other American republics; as David Bushnell has pointed out, by
the early 1940s Colombia “came closer to exemplifying the democratic ideals for which
the United States claimed to be striving than did the systems of most Latin American
nations.”5
As the foreign population in Colombia increased (but decreased as a percentage of
the national population) so, too, did the US presence. By 1964 the Colombian national
population had doubled from 8.7 million (1938) to 17.5 million. Of the 75,053 foreigners
censused in 1964, a total of 7,561 were US citizens, who now represented 10% of the
total foreign nationals resident in Colombia. This was a sizeable change from 1938 when
they comprised less than 4% of that total. Most significant, US citizens alone accounted
for 29% of the increase in foreign presence in quarter century before 1964. Clearly, more
US citizens were taking up residence in Colombia, both temporarily and permanently, in
the middle decades of the twentieth century. Within this upward trend, a change in the
gender demographics should be noted. Whereas in 1938 65% of all US nationals in
Colombia were male, a quarter century later (1964) a 52%/48% male/female split
characterized this population. Many factors drove the overall trend toward gender
equalization among US residents in Colombia: more marriages between US and
Colombian citizens, increasing numbers of women in US diplomacy, and the expansion
5
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of foreign religious missions and US businesses in the nation. Additionally, in the US,
women were disproportionately employed in the broad field of education below the
university level; therefore women were more likely than men to accept assignments in
Colombia (and Latin America more generally) as US teachers, administrators, and
librarians engaged in cultural diplomacy.
Other important trends between 1938 and 1964 are noteworthy. Approximately
one third of the foreign population of Colombia was Venezuelan or Ecuadoran during
this period, but overall European presence declined. While Europeans were 43% of the
total foreigners in 1938, their percentage of the total foreigner population declined to
40% in 1951 and to 33% by 1964. Thus, as the US presence was clearly increasing, the
overall European presence was on the decline. Contemporary immigration restrictions
placed on Eastern Europeans by Colombian law were a factor, yet among Western
European nations, only Spain recorded increases as a percentage of the total foreign
population. (Such growth reflected the turmoil of the Spanish civil war, repression under
the Franco regime, and the resultant migration of effected peoples to Latin America.) The
German presence, which is everywhere noted as particularly strong prior to the war,
declined rapidly in proportion to other foreign nationals. While more Germans than US
nationals lived in Colombia through the 1930s, by 1951 the size of these communities
were approximately equal. By 1964, however, the German population had declined to
approximately half the size of the US resident community. The small French and British
populations also declined slightly, representing just 2.3% and 1% of the resident
foreigners respectively in 1964.6
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Children and teenagers were part of the changing demographics of foreign
nationals in Colombia, and they impacted the developing national system of private and
public schooling. Unfortunately, statistics for foreign youth in Colombia are imprecise
before mid-century. In 1951, there were 9,071 foreigners under 20 years of age living in
Colombia, and the vast majority was from bordering South American, Central American
and Caribbean nations. Together, Latin American children and teenagers accounted for
more than two-thirds of the total foreign youth. At that time, there were just 753 US
children and teenagers residing in the nation, but they were 8.3% of the total foreign
youth and this figure far exceeded those for any individual Western European country. In
the aggregate, Western European youth represented approximately 22% of foreign youth
in Colombia; individually, however, German youth were just 6% of the overall total,
Spaniards and Italians each amounted to only 3%, and British and French youth made up
just 2% each. Soviets made up less than 1% of the total foreign youth.
As compared to their Latin Americans age cohorts, both US and Europeans youth
were disproportionately concentrated in the national capital at Bogotá, the Caribbean port
of Barranquilla, and the increasingly important industrial center of Medellín in the
Andean interior.7 By 1964, the population of foreign youth in Colombia had increased
dramatically, with children younger than 15 years of age totaling 19,498. Latin American
nationals showed sizable increases at this age level and now accounted for three-quarters
of all foreign children in Colombia. The proportion of US children rose to 13% (or 2,614
individuals) of all foreign children. Notably, the US figure surpassed the aggregate total
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of all Western European children in Colombia, which amounted to just 11% (2,082
individuals). Spanish children were the largest single Western European group at 3.8% of
the total while German and Italian children were by then just 1.2% each. British children
amounted to barely one-half of one percent and there were only a handful of French
youth.8
The changing demographics of foreigners in Colombia mirrored increasing US
and decreasing European cultural influence in the nation. Understanding those changing
influences, however, requires not just simple scrutiny of census data, but analysis of
contact zones where US and Colombian nationals interacted. Beginning in the late 1930s,
American schools in Caribbean and Andean cities were one important arena for such
contact. As US populations increased and moved toward gender parity in Colombia, more
US children were living in those cities. US parents sought schooling that would
eventually allow smooth transition for their children into secondary schools, colleges, or
universities at home. At the same time, some upper class-Colombian families began to
embrace and help direct the US-style education offered in these local institutions.
Historicizing the emergence of these schools and analyzing the cultures of the
transnational educational communities they fostered articulates an important arena where
traditional European cultural influence was displaced at mid-century.
The Colegio Karl C. Parrish in Barranquilla
Constructing a Transnational Educational Community on the Caribbean
The first independent, non-sectarian US-sponsored school in Colombia opened in
Barranquilla in 1938. The Colegio Karl C. Parrish was founded through the efforts of a
group of US, Canadian and British families in residence in the city, which then had a
8
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population of approximately 152,000. Some of the income-earning parents of the English
speaking children who would attend the colegio were employed by US, Colombian, or
other foreign firms; others owned independent enterprises or had a professional practice
based in the city. Many were long-term residents of the Colombian Caribbean. Others
lived there for shorter periods and they (and their families) would transfer in or out of the
country based upon employment. Some of the US families were subjected to US
residency requirements for the maintenance of their children‟s citizenship. With plans to
eventually send their children to North American or British high schools and universities,
many of these parents wanted a school that would allow their children to transfer in or out
of other English speaking schools at “home” and abroad “with no loss of scholastic
standing.”9
Barranquilla and the coastal region were, as Colombian historian Eduardo
Posada-Carbó explains, historically more “open to the outside world compared to the rest
of the country.”10 On its streets, in its traditions, and in its cultural institutions, the
influences of the world beyond the shoreline were obvious. The official Colegio Parrish
version of its own institutional history celebrates this openness and the “truly
cosmopolitan, international character” of the school at its founding. 11 The Propeller Club,
a private group of “American” men, took the lead in founding the colegio. Club
members who were city-based administrators for US petroleum corporations and the
United Fruit Company were important to these efforts, but enthusiasm for the project
equally came from salesmen and the independent professionals who were members of the
9
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club. 12 As they laid plans for the school, their project was joined by others from the
foreign colony. Canadian, British, Dutch, and Norwegian families expressed interest in
sending their children to the school, and they participated in its founding. Upper-class
Colombian families also proved enthusiastic during the initial planning. As war in Europe
was moving closer to reality, many of the locally residing foreigners and local Colombian
parents were aware of and uneasy with the Nazification then under way in the Colegio
Alemán de Barranaquilla, the premier foreign school in the city. North Americans,
Europeans, and Colombians founded the Colegio Parrish in part to offer an English
language alternative to the Nazi-affiliated German school.
For the first years, the new American school occupied two houses in the
Barranquilla‟s exclusive El Prado neighborhood. This was one of a number of modern
urban housing developments that had been built by Parrish & Co., a real estate venture
owned by Karl C. Parrish, who had died in the early 1930s and for whom the school was
named. Parrish, a US citizen who lived with his family in the city for three decades
before his death, had originally come to Colombia at the turn of the century pursuing a
career in mining. From the mines of the Andes, he eventually found his way to the coast
where he became an influential contributor to Barranquilla‟s modernization. As Parrish‟s
housing projects multiplied, they provided new urban spaces not just for the local elites
and foreigners but the emerging Barranquillero middle class. Notably, these urban
developments were planned with contemporary US urban and suburban neighborhood
models in mind, but the architecture itself combined tropical design with Colombian,
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Italian, Greek, Moorish, French, and German architectural styles. 13 Through his
involvement with urban planning, Parrish became instrumental in the modernization and
expansion of city services. According to Posada-Carbó, Parrish and his company had
“direct involvement in practically every single step of Barranquilla‟s urban development:
the paving of its sandy streets, the organization of public services, and the construction of
its aqueduct and sewer system.” 14 Perhaps most significantly, Parrish and his brother
Robert played a crucial role in securing the dredging of the mouth of the Magdalena
River. The powerful and muddy Magdalena met the blue Caribbean just a few kilometers
past Barranquilla, but the sediment it carried from the volcanic Andean interior clogged
the mouth and interfered with ship passage between river and sea. While Barranquilla‟s
river docks received all shipments from the interior heading to the Caribbean and beyond,
shipments arriving from abroad or exports from the interior had to move over a railway
between the city‟s docks and its Caribbean port, Puerto Colombia. The permanent
opening of the mouth of the river changed Barranquilla forever by connecting it more
closely to the sea. For this and other reasons, Barranquilleros have long equated the name
Parrish with Colombian modernity. 15
The Parrish family was well integrated into Barranquilla society, and some of
Karl‟s children and children‟s children remained there and lived as locals throughout the
twentieth century. With US citizenship and Colombian residency, the extended family
13
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lived a binational existence on the multicultural Caribbean coast. They were
transnationals in every sense. Their lives crossed borders and defied the simple national
labels carried on their residency papers and passports. They were connected to families,
communities, and businesses at “home” in the US, but their daily lives were rooted in a
Colombo-Caribbean reality. There, on that coast, where local families, communities, and
businesses claimed them as well, the name Karl C. Parrish was a fitting title for the new
colegio. While it identified the school with US-style education and modernity, it equally
grounded the institution in local Barranquillero culture. To this day in the city, the name
Parrish is as much considered local as foreign.
At its opening in 1938, the Colegio Parrish enrolled about two dozen students
from the foreign colony. There were a few Colombian students in the school as well.
Initially, US children outnumbered all others, but the immediate trend was toward greater
Colombian than US enrollment. By 1942, when the school had grown to forty-five
students, more than a third was Colombian, and because the tuition and fees were double
the average private school rate in Barranquilla, these were exclusively upper-class
nationals. Interestingly, as a contrast, most of the US students were members of the US
middle class; their fathers were salesmen, infrastructure engineers, bank managers, and
representatives of export firms. These men were high school graduates and some had
university degrees, but they were not wealthy. At home in the US, they lived comfortably
but in Colombia their standards of living were higher. Favorable monetary exchange
rates, lower prices of food staples, and cheaper labor and service costs abroad increased
disposable income for many of these US families. Corporate benefits extended to
employees as incentives for accepting and then remaining in an overseas position, which
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for some included tuition assistance for children, raised living standards further.16 Class is
a culturally specific construct, and in Colombia as elsewhere wealth was the fundamental
marker of elite status. Yet in a nation with so few schools, a formal education was also an
important marker of that class. That those members of the US middle class who lived in
Colombian cities often had both a high standard of living and education credentials (a
high school diploma and/or a university degree) facilitated their acceptance into local
elite culture.
Over time, the increasing number of Colombians in the Colegio Parrish student
body was reflected on the school‟s board of directors; originally the board was composed
of all English-speaking foreigners but by the early 1950s half its members would be
Colombian nationals. 17 Through the war years, the school had a small teaching staff.
Initially one of the founders had gone to the US, recruited a single, female teacher, and
accompanied her to Barranquilla. By 1942, the teaching staff totaled three: two young
women from the US, one of whom acted as director of the school and also taught the
older students, and a Colombian woman, who taught the Spanish, history and geography
curriculum that was then required by law.18 Teacher turnover tended to be high and there
was annual demand for more teachers to handle increasing enrollment. Unfortunately,
recruitment posed a serious challenge for the board of directors. Hiring US teachers and
getting them safely to Barranquilla during the war proved difficult, and ocean
transportation was a particular concern after the sinking of the Resolute. The school
continually asked the local US consul, the embassy in Bogotá, the OIAA, and the State
16
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Department for assistance in recruiting and facilitating transportation for new teachers.
The board especially wanted new teachers to be placed on priority air transportation lists
that were controlled by the US government for the limited weekly flights between Miami
and Barranquilla. But their requests were ignored and teachers often arrived late.
Although demand for teachers increased, teacher turnover remained high, and
transportation and recruitment issues continued. Therefore, it became common for
locally residing native English-speaking women --some the wives of Colombians, others
married to US, British, and Canadian businessmen-- to join the teaching staff. 19
In these early years, the school enrolled students in grades kindergarten though
nine. English was the language of instruction and assessments were based on the New
York State Regents exams. Still, Spanish was emphasized. Indeed, even before Decree 91
of 1942 place restrictions on foreign schools and foreign language instruction, Spanish
was a daily subject beginning in the third grade. A stated objective of the school was that
students would learn to “speak perfect Spanish and have a good knowledge of Colombian
history and geography.”20 Non-English speaking students were required to enroll in
language tutoring before entering any grade except kindergarten. 21 Outside of class, US
fathers taught baseball to interested students, and there was plenty of interest; the game
had arrived in Colombia decades earlier and was popular throughout the coast.
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Colombian dads coached student fútbol [soccer] teams.22 Basketball, already growing in
popularity nationally, was also a part of the physical education program of the school. 23
Significantly, no religious instruction was offered at the colegio, and this reflected
two important aspects of religious dynamics in Colombia. First, the Catholic Church was
historically weaker on the Caribbean than in the Andes. Like the national government,
the Church had long skewed its resources toward the interior and paid less attention to the
coast. As a result, there was less social deference to Church authority in the region. 24
Thus, at the time of its founding the school felt little pressure to offer Catholic religious
instruction, and the lack of Church reaction to the decision also signaled Liberal success
in limiting Church influence over national education. Second, because many of the
foreign families of the new colegio were not Catholics but Protestants, not offering
religion classes was a means to avoid antagonizing the Catholic Church. At that time, the
Catholic hierarchy was deeply concerned over Protestant activity across the nation, and
schools started by foreign Protestants were its number one target.25 Extreme rhetoric
within the Church even charged that Pan American cooperation was nothing more than a
veiled attempt by the US at spreading Protestantism in Catholic lands. 26 While this topic
will be explored more broadly in a later chapter, it is important to here underscore that
the decision by the founders to keep the colegio secular signaled their desire to steer clear
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of this inter-American controversy. They committed to building up Pan American
sentiment and avoiding engagements that might tear it down.27
Graduation ceremonies for those students completing the Colegio Parrish
elementary program and moving on to secondary schools elsewhere were held annually
beginning at the end of the first year. Student graduation speeches, music performances
by the student body, and addresses by invited speakers provide insight into the
developing transnational culture of the school. Graduating students usually gave an
address based on a paper they had researched and written. Both US and Colombian topics
were popular in these addresses by US, Colombian and third-country nationals, but most
papers focused directly or indirectly on the war. Not surprisingly, Pan American themes
were common and included celebratory comparisons of George Washington and Simón
Bolivar. Invited speakers were most often US businessmen (often fathers of students or
school board members) or US and British diplomats; like the students, these adults also
chose the war and Pan American unity as general themes. Indicative of the high standing
of the young school among Colombians, speakers also included well-known local
politicians like the Governor of Atlántico (the department of which Barranquilla is the
capital).
Music education was a strong part of the colegio‟s academic program, and
commencement ceremonies featured musical performance. The playing of both the
Colombian and US national anthems was an important part of the ceremony even though
the inclusion of the US anthem was a technical violation of Decree 91 of 1942 that
attempted to limit foreign influence in schools within the nation. According to the decree,
national hymns of friendly countries could be played only at school ceremonies honoring
27
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those countries‟ national days. The target of that provision in the decree had been Axis
schools and clubs, and in a time of war there was little outrage for public playing of the
anthems of the Allied nations. At the ceremonies, younger students performed songs they
were taught by the school‟s music teacher. Reflecting the both international make-up and
contemporary politics of the school community, folk songs from the Allied nations and
Axis-occupied lands were performed and European classical music was often played. 28
In the school‟s first decade, only between two and five students graduated at the
end of grade eight. By that age, those US and other foreign students still at the school
usually moved on to high schools in their home countries, though it was not unusual for a
foreign student to be tutored through grade nine or ten. Colombians enrolled in local
private secondary schools, but some also moved on to schools abroad. In those years,
graduates from the eighth grade were more likely to be girls than boys, and because US
and other foreign children tended to come and go with the transfers of their parents to
other countries or reassignments to the US, graduates were also increasingly more likely
to be Colombian nationals. However, the line between foreign and local (or foreigner and
Colombian in this case) was imprecise among students and graduates of the Colegio
Parrish. In this developing transnational education community, many of the Colombian
students were themselves the children and grandchildren of foreign immigrants who had
married into elite local families. Such students included several members of the Parrish
family itself. Indeed, programs for the school‟s commencement exercises from that first
decade and beyond suggest a high degree of transnational marriages among the
28
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Colombian families of Colegio Parrish that is identifiable by the strong presence of
traditional Lebanese, Syrian, German, Anglo (US/British/Canadian), and Italian family
names among graduates.29
Family names are indicative of the cultural diversity of the Colombian upper class
in Barranquilla and the transnational currents that historically break on Caribbean
shores.30 For the purpose of this study, the case of Colegio Parrish underscores the need
to be cautious of granting too much significance to individuals‟ citizenships as
determinants of their identities. The identities individuals cultivate do not exclusively
follow the flag, and multiple versions of national culture, which inform identity, exist
simultaneously. If we want to understand the complexity of foreign/local encounters in
contact zones, we have to acknowledge that citizenship status has historically limited our
understanding of the terms “foreigner” and “local.” Citizenship is itself socially
constructed and it is artificially imposed as a powerful identity upon individuals whose
economic, cultural, and political ties and personal identities may be more regional than
national or transnational than nation-specific.31
On the Colombian Caribbean, a multi-cultural world connected as much to the
Greater Caribbean as to the Andean interior, upper-class Colombian students and families
at the new Colegio Parrish lived culturally between the false and static borders of
29
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“foreign” and “local.” Their national identification cards and passports declared them as
Colombian citizens, but they were much more. The might equally identify or be
identified in a regional context as Costeños and Barranquilleros. Many might see
themselves as Caribeños [people of the Caribbean], a category that implied both foreign
and local identity at the same time. Additionally, many of these Colombians were
connected to “foreign” nations and cultures through recent (or distant) family ancestry,
through family economic activity, and certainly through their voluntary affiliation with
the transnational education community then developing around the Colegio Parrish. The
identities of the US, British, Dutch, and Norwegian students and families that participated
in the founding of the school were equally complex. Like Karl C. Parrish himself, they
too defied simple and static categorization as foreigners. Looking inside the campus and
classrooms of the Colegio Parrish (and the other American schools on the Caribbean and
in the Andes) reveals the cultural complexities of the space between foreign and local.
Connecting the Colegio Parrish with US Cultural Diplomacy
Given the lack of schools in Colombia, contemporary education reforms efforts of
Liberals, increasing currency of Pan Americanism, and the closing of the German school
in Barranquilla, local Colombian demand for space in the Colegio Parrish almost
immediately exceeded supply. It quickly became obvious to local US businessmen whom
Rockefeller‟s OIAA had enlisted as volunteer advisors that the high demand presented an
opportunity for greater US contact with the upper class. If increasing influence among
upper-class Colombians was an objective of wartime foreign policy, expanding the young
school with US government assistance seemed a logical move. This message filtered up
from local US businessmen in Barranquilla, through the US embassy staff in Bogotá, and
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to the OIAA in Washington: “When more children can be accommodated, many better
class Colombians will send their children to the school.”32 Indeed, with minimal
assistance from Washington, this had already begun to happen. By 1947, the student body
had grown to 130 students, and over 60% (80 students) were Colombian nationals, and
there were long waiting lists for the lower grades.33
Rockefeller‟s OIAA depended heavily on the assistance of US citizens living in
Latin America as it formulated and implemented its wartime cultural and educational
programs for the region. Based on his own experiences with business projects and
investment in Venezuela, Rockefeller understood that locally residing US businessmen
were a key resource that could be tapped in each of the other American republics to
advise the OIAA on local affairs. Accordingly, volunteer businessmen were recruited to
join Coordination Committees (alternately Coordinating Committees) in Latin American
capitals and major cities. These committees were charged with advising the OIAA on
how best to adapt programs to local realities, coordinating the implementation of
programs, and reporting on the effectiveness of OIAA efforts. 34 With the exception of
Panama, each Latin American country had a national Coordination Committee based in
the capital city; it was headed by an executive secretary, who was paid by the OIAA, and
it had between five and twelve unpaid members. In most locations, subcommittees for
press, radio, and motion pictures worked under the national Coordination Committee.
These subcommittees were directed by OIAA employees and had paid staffs comprised
largely of nationals of the host-country. During the war years the OIAA had a total paid
32

Sours, “Proposed School Building For The Karl C. Parrish School Barranquilla.”
Appendix 8, Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee on Financial Aid to Schools in Latin America,
United States Department of State, 27 June 1947, General Records of the US Department of State, Record
Group 59, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NARG 59),
810.42711/7-2347.
34
Rowland, History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, p. 248.
33

185

staff of 687 in Latin America. 35 As relates to the Colegio Parrish and Barranquilla, each
national Coordination Committee also formed regional sub-committees in the important
urban centers of their host country. These regional committees reported directly to the
national committee and were comprised of volunteer, locally resident US businessmen. In
Colombia, regional subcommittees were formed in Barranquilla, Medellín, Cartagena,
Cali, and Bucaramanga with smaller, less formal advisory committees in several other
cities.
Membership on the regional sub-committees changed as businessmen and their
families were transferred in and out of the region. It is clear from a review of the records
of the Colombian regional sub-committees that turnover also increased as the demands of
committee work interfered with individuals‟ business and personal affairs. In
Barranquilla, volunteer committeemen were employed by both US and Colombian
businesses. Employees of National City Bank of New York, Westinghouse Electric
International, Singer Sewing Machine, United Fruit, and the General Sales Corporation
served during the course of the war along with US engineers and managers employed by
Avianca, Colombian electric utilities, and Barranquilla‟s Department of Public Works.
Volunteer businessmen who served on regional subcommittees were often
married with children. Some had US wives, others were married to Colombians, and still
others had married third-country nationals. As parents of children overseas, many of
these couples had faced the difficult challenge of securing a US-style and Englishlanguage education for their sons and daughters. In the case of Barranquilla, several of
members of the regional Coordination Committee had been founders of the Colegio
Parrish, were members of its board of directors, and had children in the school. Both
35

Ibid., p. 259.

186

Thomas Roche, of the General Sales Corp., and Myron Reed, of the Colombian
Electricity Company, for example, were Coordination Committee volunteers in
Barranquilla; they were US citizens married to Colombian wives and their children were
enrolled in Colegio Parrish. Both served simultaneously on the school‟s board of
directors and the regional Coordination Committee. As the fathers of 1939 graduate
Rosalvina Roche and 1943 salutatorian Myron Reed Jr., as well as younger children
enrolled in the colegio, these businessmen were interested in strengthening the school‟s
academic programs, expanding and improving its property and plant, and building its
standing in the community. 36 Another primary concern of some of the Coordination
Committee members was the addition of a full high school program to the colegio that
would allow local US children to remain with their parents in Barranquilla while
receiving academic preparation to “carry on in the universities and colleges in the
States.”37 Through their positions as advisers to the OIAA, businessmen and fathers
Roche, Reed and Karl C Parrish, Jr. (son of the school‟s namesake, and member of both
the school board and the Coordination Committee), among others, advocated for direct
US government financial assistance to the colegio.
In appealing for aid for the school, the Barranquilla Coordination Committee
acknowledged the important benefits a strong US-style school would bring for the local
US families. Yet, the weight of its appeal was crafted around wartime concerns and
diplomatic objectives --strategic arguments that then held greater currency in
Washington. First, in the wake of the closing of the German school, the committee
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argued that Washington had to seize the moment and supplant German influence in
education: “if we wait too long the present emergency may be over and the best
opportunity will have passed.” 38 Emphasizing the competitive nature of official
European cultural diplomacy, which the committeemen had observed for years, they
insisted that “unless we provide the essential facilities to implement our good-neighbor
policy, some other nation will do it in our stead.”39 They also argued the diplomatic value
of personal contact in school communities. Fostering inter-American friendships and
promoting mutual understanding among the Colombian upper class, they explained,
occurred with little manipulation in classrooms, on playgrounds, on school boards, and
within PTAs. 40
The new building plan proposed by the school board, drafted by the regional
Coordination Committee, and presented to Washington by the national Coordination
Committee in Bogotá had as a goal the accommodation of 200 students. A sizable lot had
been donated by Parrish family in the El Prado neighborhood, and this location ensured
that the school would continue to attract the Colombian upper class. Because almost all
the US children in Barranquilla were then enrolled in the school, the proposal made clear
that 75% of the student body in the expanded school would be Colombian. In contrast to
children who had attended the German schools, the Colegio Parrish students would not be
taught to respect totalitarianism; from US-style education, they would naturally become
“future boosters of Democracy.” 41
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Andrew Corry had visited the Colegio Parrish in 1942 as part of his tour of Latin
American schools. He considered the colegio to be in good standing but “too small” for
impact “as a cultural force outside of the community that patronizes it.” He recommended
a donation of books to the school‟s small library believing that the “cultural force of the
school could be strengthened in proportion to the circulation of the books.”42 He didn‟t
anticipate the rapid growth the school experienced during the war. When nothing more
than a book grant arrived from Washington, the school community went forward with
expansion plans on its own. They issued a local bond and raised the capital necessary for
constructing a new building for the school. Private initiative rather than US government
assistance drove the expansion. But as the school grew and the Colombian upper class
became the majority among the student body, Washington took greater notice and more
substantial financial grants to the school began to flow by the end of the war. 43
The Colegio Nueva Granada in Bogotá
Transnational Education in the Andes
When the Colegio Karl C. Parrish opened in September 1938, flights between
Barranquilla and the Bogotá had made travel and communications between the Andean
interior and the Caribbean coast quicker and more convenient for those who could afford
the fare. The days of the long journey by river and mountain roads between the two cities
were ending for the Colombian upper class and the foreign business and diplomatic
communities. Air travel was increasingly part of the culture that Colombian elite shared
with North American and European residents of their country.
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Just weeks after the Colegio Parrish opened that September, a US-style school for
English-speaking children also appeared in Bogotá. Named the Anglo-American School,
it was a collaborative effort between US, British, and Canadian parents resident in the
capital, and like the school in Barranquilla it quickly attracted the attention of the
Colombian upper class. At the time of the founding of the Anglo-American School,
German and French schools were the premier colegios patronized by foreign diplomats,
businesses and families in the capital. For US and other English-speaking children in
Bogotá, who were fewer in number there than on the coast, home-schooling was a
common educational option.
Doris Samper had come to Bogotá from her native US and married a Colombian
in 1927. Her children were born at a time when US citizenship did not transfer to those
with foreign fathers, but the statutes of 1934 corrected the impediment for her children
and those of other US mothers. By 1936, when her children had reached school age and
were then considered US citizens, Samper wanted them to receive a US-style education.
She anticipated sending them to the US for secondary school --in part to satisfy the
residency requirements that remained in effect for some citizens born abroad-- and she
wanted that transition to be smooth. Home-schooling was her only option in the Andean
city of approximately 300,000, but it was a daunting task for any parent. Samper turned
to the Calvert School of Baltimore, Maryland for assistance. Other US parents in Bogotá
had previously relied on the Calvert system for home-schooling, but Samper had personal
knowledge of the program; her grandfather had been employed correcting papers in the
school‟s Home Instruction Department. Through this department, the school offered
programs, curriculum and correcting services via the mail to guide the education of
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“children in places inaccessible to good schools, or in foreign countries.” 44 As Samper
assumed the role of teacher, the children of other English-speaking foreign and
transnational families joined the classroom in her home. The children of Rockefeller
Foundation employees were among the first.45
As the US and British diplomatic and business presence in the capital increased in
the 1930s, demand for schooling was on the rise and began to over-burden homeschooling mothers like Doris Samper. As had been the case in Barranquilla, parents in
Bogotá wanted their children to be prepared for an eventual transition into US, British or
Canadian education systems in their home countries. In Bogotá, there were many
excellent private schools that welcomed foreign children, and those who had been raised
bilingually could enter with ease. Differences in curriculum, however, created potential
roadblocks for foreign students who later returned to their home countries to continue
their schooling. Complete subjects had been missed, English language skills –written
language especially-- were deficient, and college entrance requirements, which were
often specific to national curricula, were not met. Another major issue was the school
calendar. In Bogotá, the school year began in February and ended in November. Students
arriving from or returning to North America or Europe, where the school calendar ran
from September to June, faced practical problems related to the start and completion of a
school year. (Notably, many of the schools on the Colombian Caribbean, public and
private, operated not on the calendar of the interior, but on the September-June academic
year that was common throughout the Caribbean and North America.)
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As the number of students needing home-schooling increased, the Englishspeaking community in Bogotá made the decision to establish a school. A committee of
parents was formed in the spring of 1938. It included fathers employed by Shell
Petroleum, the Royal Bank of Canada, General Motors, Texas Petroleum, Singer Sewing
Machine Company and the Rockefeller Foundation. These fathers joined with Doris
Samper and the other wives and mothers who assisted in her home school to consider a
more formal approach to educating their children. At their request, several foreign
companies agreed to pay start up costs and the initial salaries for the teaching staff. 46
Thus, in the absence of formal schools sponsored by their home governments, the
educational needs of these families were provided through private initiative.
As compared to the coast, the Catholic Church was a potent political force in the
capital and throughout the interior. In deference to Church authority, Conservatives had
years earlier required approval by the clergy for all new colegios in the country. 47 Yet on
the coast, there had been no pressure on the Colegio Parrish to comply, and they had not.
In the interior, it was a different matter. With battles brewing between Liberals and the
Church hierarchy over education reform, formal Church approval was less crucial than it
had been in the past. Yet as a practical matter, it was both desirable and necessary in a
city where the Church wielded tremendous political and cultural influence. Foreign
schools traditionally sought and received Church approval, and they used this to attract
upper-class Colombians to their programs. The Colegio Frances [the French School], for
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example, advertised in magazines that their program had “the approval of the National
Government and the Distinguished Archbishop Primate.”48
That the new Anglo-American School would be English-speaking, nonsectarian,
and coeducational (most Colombian schools were sex-segregated following Church
educational tradition) made it potentially controversial and, thus, doubly important to
secure the sanction of the Archbishop. That the Church campaign against foreign
Protestant schools was then generating Catholic anger toward some US-sponsored
schools added to the expediency of the prelate‟s approval. Doris Samper together with
Fred Dever of the Royal Bank of Canada, both the spouses of Colombian citizens,
originally requested approval of Archbishop Ismael Perdomo, but they did not receive it.
Family connections, however, allowed them to secure it on a subsequent attempt. Dever‟s
Colombian wife was a cousin of Monseñor Emilio de Brigard who sat high in Church
hierarchy and eventually replaced Perdomo as archbishop; family ties allowed Dever to
secure formal approval. This move would not stop criticism of the coeducational
classrooms of the new school from within the Church and the wider Catholic society in
the capital.49 Church pressure was constant. In 1947, for example, when the mothers of
the PTA convinced the school board to allow girls to wear slacks rather than the
traditional schoolgirl skirts and dresses, Catholic reaction was strong around the city. The
school board was forced to reverse the change in dress policy out of concern for the
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reputation of its female students. Slacks were henceforth only allowed for physical
education days when classes hiked in the mountains surrounding the city. 50
For the first year, the parent committee hired a US couple as a teaching principal
and teacher: Principal Joseph Hornsby Spear and Maty Welles Spear, a graduate of
Wellesley College. This choice was an early example of the tradition of hiring married
couples as teachers or administrators that has long been common in American schools
abroad.51 Joined by a Colombian woman and an American wife, the Spears modeled the
school on “the best private schools” in US. Their approach was traditional. They
continued to rely on the Calvert System, and they expressly rejected “so-called
„progressive‟ methods of education” then popular in the US as “untried theories.” 52 The
school offered enrollments in grades one through six but was prepared to educated
enrollees through grade eight. To the Calvert program of reading, writing, math and
science, the schools added music, calisthenics, and leatherworking. After the Spears
returned to the US, they were replaced by a Canadian teaching couple who converted the
school from the Calvert system to an in-house academic program based on the curriculum
of the Ontario school system. By 1941, the Anglo-American School formally added a
secondary program. The war in Europe was then heating up and direct US participation
seemed likely. When war came, British parents were less willing to send their children to
secondary schools at home, so the academic program was expanded to meet this new
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demand. 53 Soon, both the dangers of and limitations on ocean travel created higher
demand for secondary programs from US parents as well. The previously discussed
exemption of most US children from a stateside residency requirement together with the
expansion of the US diplomatic staff in the city greatly added to the demand for high
school instruction.
After the breaking of relations between Colombia and the Axis powers and the
subsequent regulation of foreign schools that came under Decree 91 of 1942, the AngloAmerican School was forced to change its name; foreign-sponsored schools could not
have names that suggested an affiliation with a foreign state. While the school became
known as the Colegio Nueva Granada, little else changed. (In Barranquilla, the Colegio
Karl C. Parrish did not have to change its name; Karl C. Parrish may have been a
foreigner by citizenship, but his name suggested much that was local.) Under the Spears,
the school had allowed students only to talk in English and even banned Spanish
conversation at recess and punished students for speaking it. However, increasing
Colombian enrollments and changing educational philosophy reversed this policy before
Decree 91. When it was issued, the school already employed a Colombian to teach the
geography, history, and literature of the republic, and thus, the school was in compliance
with the most enforced provision of the new law. At the same time, as was also the case
in Barranquilla, English remained the primary language of the school. Though a clear
violation of the Decree 91‟s mandate that foreign languages be “auxiliary” and not
primary in instruction, teachers at the Colegio Nueva Granada continued “teaching in
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English without any repercussions.” 54 As is clear from the case histories of both USsponsored schools in Colombia, Decree 91 was selectively enforced against German
schools. While strengthening the authority of the Ministry of National Education over
both Catholic schools run by foreign religious orders and the schools run by foreign
Protestants, the newly founded independent and non-sectarian American schools were not
targeted.55
When the school had opened in 1938 under its Anglo-American name it had just
twenty-eight students of whom most were US, British or Canadian nationals. Technically,
the only Colombian enrollees at the start of that year were a brother and sister who had
previously been living in the US.56 Still, there were a number of binational students who
did not fit exclusively into just one national category. The US/Colombian children of
Doris Samper and the Canadian/Colombian children of Fred Dever, for example, were
defined by their family trees and their citizenship statuses as both locals and foreigners.
They along with other binational students constituted an ever present minority in
American overseas schools.
By the end of the first year, enrollment had almost doubled to fifty-five, and as
was the case in Barranquilla, students with Colombian citizenship accounted for most of
the growth. Even before the forced closure of Bogotá‟s Colegio Alemán created a new
pool of students for the Anglo-American School, Colombians were the largest national
group enrolled. At the start of the 1941-42 academic year, when the school enrolled a
total of 111 students, there were twenty-six US children compared to thirty-eight
54
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Colombians, eight Canadians, twenty-six Britons, five Dutch, and three Swiss. One
Mexican, a Czech, a Romanian, an Assyrian, and a Spaniard rounded out the
international student body. 57 After that year, as the number of students continued to
increase, the school moved twice to new locations to accommodate demand. The board of
directors took advantage of high profile rental properties that became available in early
1942 due to the war. First, the former German social club --which still had an enormous
portrait of Hitler hanging in the entrance-- was rented by the board. The Colombian
national police initially provided protection to the colegio at this new site because
anonymous threats were received; Nazi sympathizers were blamed. Later, as the demand
continued to increase, the colegio moved to a larger location --the former Japanese
embassy. 58
Cultural Transition: From Anglo-American to Colombian-US School
Clearly, the world war facilitated expanding US educational influence among the
Colombian upper class at the expense of the Axis powers. Schools and clubs affiliated or
associated with Axis nations were forced to close, suspected Nazis were detained or
deported, and Axis diplomatic delegations left the country. But the war also ushered in a
period of declining cultural influence for the European Allied powers relative to the
growing US presence. Many of these nations were forced to drastically decrease or end
cultural diplomacy in Latin America as the war at home consumed their attention and
their national budgets. Allied diplomatic staffs in Bogotá decreased, businesses recalled
employees, and governments called their men home to military service. Against this
overall European decline, the US cultural presence in Colombia rose. In the 1940s as
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Colegio Nueva Granda transitioned from the fledgling Anglo-American School to an
expanding Colombian-US institution, it signaled the broader displacement of European
by US culture in the microcosm.
When Bogotá‟s German school was forced to close in 1942, Jorge Pinzon was one
of many Colombian students who eventually transferred to the newly renamed Colegio
Nueva Granada. Pinzon immediately missed the sports and physical exercise programs
that were emphasized in German education: “Sports as such were definitely not very well
organized, a far cry from those in the German school from which I came.” 59 Though
physical education was part of the academic program, Colegio Nueva Granada was
struggling financially and had neither the resources nor enough students to make an
extracurricular sports program viable. What the school did have was a strong sense of
community, enthusiasm for the Allied cause, and a culture of democracy. Pinzon
remembers that the war was a constant theme at the school, and some were suspicious of
him as a former student of Nazi teachers. He remembered being called into the
principal‟s office to be warned that “this was an American school, and that I should be
very gentle with the girls, or else.”60 As events in Europe and on the high seas played out,
the administration kept the students abreast of positive developments. When there was
news of the sinking of a German submarine, the director “went cheerfully around the
upper grade classrooms, writing this event on the boards.”61 Yet the Allied spirit that
infused the school community during the war muted a developing academic tension
between the US and British models of education and culture. While the colegio‟s
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program was originally drawn from the best “features of the British and American
traditions,”62 before the end of the war US educational traditions were more pronounced
and this was causing “internal dissension in the school administration.”63 To students, the
tensions seemed subtle; as Pinzon recalled, for example, his English teacher was a British
national who specifically “tried hard to see that we learned to speak and write British
[and not American] English.” 64 But for the parent community, concerned for the school‟s
long-term stability and interested in securing financial grants from the US government,
the Anglo-American character of the school was increasingly a liability.
In his report for the OIAA, Andrew Corry had emphasized the need for a quality
American school in Bogotá explicitly because the opportunity existed to supplant
European cultural influence among the upper class: “The need for a school fully equal in
quality to the existing French and German schools that have been operating for many
years in Bogotá is felt with special keenness at this time, when the cultural ties with
Europe, which used to be so strong, have been weakened.” 65 Corry recognized the
Colegio Nueva Granada (it was still named the Anglo-American School at the time of his
visit in 1941) as an admirable international collaboration but not a true US-sponsored
school. Given the international make-up of the student body, it tended toward
international rather than binational instruction and it had no Colombians on its school
board. Corry was not convinced that supporting the school was the best approach toward
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the goal of mutual understanding, Pan American unity and strengthened Colombian-US
cultural relations. 66
Members of the Colombian-American Association of New York, a group of
Colombian and US businessmen who promoted commercial relations between the two
countries, agreed with Corry‟s assessment and concerns. The association strongly
supported the founding of a new American school in Bogotá rather than support of the
existing school. Interested in promoting greater economic and cultural links between
Colombia and the US, they wanted to address the educational needs of all US and
Colombian families working to that end. Because of the colegio‟s existing and strong ties
to British culture, the school did not fit their vision and needs. Members of the
association had begun lobbying the State Department/OIAA to support a new school just
before the US entered the war. They had even enlisted high-profile US Catholic support
in the person of Bishop John O‟Hara, the US Catholic Church‟s special envoy to Latin
America. 67 Meanwhile, in Bogotá, the US Ambassador and the OIAA‟s national
Coordination Committee for Colombia strongly supported the idea of an American
school in the capital. Yet they were then unsure whether the Colegio Nueva Granada
should receive support or whether a new colegio should be founded. Importantly, at the
time, the Coordination Committee in the capital was not as closely linked to the existing
school as the regional committee in Barranquilla was to the Colegio Parrish. 68
During the war, British enrollment declined as a percentage of overall
enrollments. Comparatively, Colombian and US enrollment in the course of the war rose
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dramatically. As a result of these changes, the existing school rapidly took on a stronger
binational character. As Astrid Leonard has shown in her institutional history of the
colegio, school philosophy statements in the 1940s began to emphasize the need to
prepare students for entering US rather than US, British, and Canadian universities and
colleges. As secondary students had advanced through the upper grades, administrators
added a new grade level yearly to accommodate them. Different graduation requirements
in the US and British educational systems, however, created curriculum conflicts in
programming. With limited resources, the expanding school had to make a decision about
which national program it would privilege. Given the decreasing percentage of British
students and an increasing Colombian interest in US higher education, administrators
began to adapt to the requirements of US education. Though there were concessions to
the needs of British students, like the addition of a British history course in grade eleven,
secondary programming reflected the school‟s stronger US rather than Anglo/British
character.69
The school retained an international student body after the war. In 1946, when
student population had reached 235 students, seventy-nine students were Colombian,
sixty-nine were US, fifty-three were British, and thirty-four were third-country nationals.
Two years later, however, when enrollment had increased by more than 54%,
Colombians and US citizens accounted almost all of the growth. Binational students then
represented approximately 15% of the student population, and they were US/Colombian,
Colombian/British, or British/US children in the main. Children from other nations
remained an important minority as well, but the raw number of British students was
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declining. 70 Fewer British were now living in Bogotá than before the war, and
significantly, for those who remained in the Colombian capital, the Colegio Nueva
Granda no longer served their educational needs. Dissatisfied with the US character of
the school, the British community would found a new school, the Colegio AngloColombiano in the 1950s.71
Support from Washington
As the British character of the Colegio Nueva Granada was fading during the war,
it garnered greater attention from cultural bureaucrats in Washington and became eligible
for financial support from the OIAA. When the war started, the OIAA had channeled
funds to independent, non-sectarian American schools on an emergency basis hoping to
prop them up to counterbalance Axis schools. Soon the agency began a broader grant
program for schools in strategic areas of the region. Based partly on the findings of the
Corry report, the OIAA and State Department decided that financial assistance would
only be offered to schools that met a strict set of criteria that were developed around the
foreign policy goals of mutual understanding and Pan Americanism. To be eligible
schools had to have been founded by US citizens, offer a US curriculum, and be nonsectarian and not-for-profit. They had to be independent of business or industry.
Enrollment of a high percentage of US children was expected, but a significant portion of
the student body had to be nationals of the host-country so as to give the school a
binational character. The schools would have to meet the educational requirements and
laws of the host country so as to be collaborative educational efforts, and host-country
parents had to be well represented on the boards of directors. Schools that met these
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criteria were considered the most likely to foster better inter-American relations between
US citizens and influential Latin American elites. 72
From the start, the OIAA wanted to avoid the European model of direct
government financial aid to overseas schools. In some countries, like Brazil and
Argentina, such direct support of schools by foreign governments had been outlawed
when the Nazi Auslandsorganisation‟s school program became known. Rockefeller did
not want the American schools to be viewed as an arm of US foreign policy, and stressed
that they were to be collaborative, binational and locally controlled. As funding for grants
increased in the early 1940s, Rockefeller turned to American Council on Education
(ACE), a private educational foundation, for assistance in implementing the aid program.
Beginning in 1942, the council handled the distribution of US government grants to
American schools in Latin America. The council also created the Inter-American School
Service (IASS) to assist schools with hiring and recruitment of teachers and
administrators, selection and purchase of teaching materials from the US, annual
budgeting and long-term financial planning, and the strengthening of academic programs
through professional development. 73
As the philosophical and organizational transition of the Colegio Nueva Granada
from Anglo-American international school to Colombian-US binational colegio began,
crucial support from the US government began to arrive. A $6400 grant in 1945 was
awarded by ACE in part to allow the school to increase salaries so that US teachers could
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be retained and new ones could be attracted.74 The grant ensured that the school would be
hiring more US and not British teachers. That same year, upon request from the school
board, IASS recruited two new US teachers and helped hire an “American” director.
These new employees were recruited according to the candidate criteria set at the local
level by the colegio‟s school board. Such criteria reflected the gender norms and racial
attitudes within the parent community of the Bogotá school, and IASS applied those
criteria in candidate screenings in the US. Female teachers were offered positions at 75%
of the salary of a male in the same position, and for the directorship only “white males”
without heart conditions (due to the high altitude) were considered. 75 With IASS acting as
a candidate screening service and placement agency, the colegio was able to annually
secure new US teachers and administrators that met the local board‟s gender and racial
criteria. Additionally, the professional services offered by IASS in curriculum assistance
and professional development began to connect the school with educators, institutions,
and organizations in the broad US education community. At a critical phase in American
school development, IASS played a crucial role in fostering transnational dialogue,
connections, and community among educators, parents and students throughout the
hemisphere.
Conclusion: Colombianization of American Schools
Margarita Dever de Serna, whose Canadian father had been instrumental to the
founding of the Anglo-American School, was raised in a Spanish-speaking home. When
she entered the school her father helped to establish, she did so without English fluency
and it was initially very difficult for her to adapt to the new language of instruction.
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However, as a transfer student from a Catholic girls‟ school in the city, she loved the
more open environment of her new school. She was thrilled that the students did not have
to wear uniforms and were given recess time to socialize. After graduating from eighth
grade from what was by then called the Colegio Nueva Granada, Margarita went abroad
for high school. She went not to her father‟s homeland, Canada, but to the US, where she
attended a Catholic boarding school staffed by nuns. After studying in the US beyond
high school, she returned to Bogotá and became a teacher at her alma mater, the Colegio
Nueva Granada.
During her early teaching years, Margarita met her husband, Julio Serna. As
children, Serna and his brothers had been students in the Colegio Alemán in Bogotá.
When it was shut down by the Colombian government in 1942, the Serna boys were sent
by their parents to a military academy in the US. Back in Bogotá after graduation, Julio
and Margarita met, married and started a family of their own. Based on their own
experiences with schools in Bogotá and the US, they continued their traditions of USstyle education with their own children. Their siblings did the same. Over the course of
the twentieth century, the Dever and Serna families embraced the local American school
as their own as did many other upper-class families across Colombia. In the seven
decades following the founding of the Colegio Nueva Granda, eight members of
Margarita and Julio‟s extended families would serve on the school board, on the teaching
staff, or in the administration. Forty family members would be graduates by the year
2005. More than thirty members of the extended family would still be students at the
colegio in that same year.76 Like their parents and grandparents before them, the youngest
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generation was expected to graduate in Bogotá and pursue higher education not in Europe
--as had been the tradition of the Colombian upper class when the colegio was founded-but in either the United States or at home in Colombia.
The establishment of American schools in Colombia assisted locally-residing US
families, but as the case of Margarita Dever de Serna suggests, it benefited Colombian
and other foreign families as well. Immediately after their founding, the first two
independent, non-sectarian American schools in Barranquilla and Bogotá began to attract
families of the Colombian upper class. Though both schools remained relatively small
through the 1940s, they were growing steadily. Demand for US-style education was high
in Colombia, and across the twentieth century as seven more American schools appeared
in urban centers, Colombian citizens were clearly driving the growth. Bogotá‟s Colegio
Nueva Granada served 1,400 students by the 1960s. In the capital where the US
diplomatic and business presence was strongest, the school retained a US majority, but
44% of the student body was Colombian. Bogotá was, however, the exception to the
student body rule. By the 1960s, in each of the three additional schools considered in this
study, Colombianization of the student bodies was clear. In Barranquilla, Colombian
students were 70% of the 600 strong student body, and there were only slightly more
students from the US than third countries. At Medellín, where the Colegio Colón opened
shortly after the war, 75% of the students were Colombian, and there were actually more
students from third countries (15%) than from the US (10%). At Cartagena, the Colegio
Jorge Washington had opened in 1952 with a name that clearly suggested affiliation with
a foreign nation and, thus, clearly violated Decree 91. Regardless, the school immediately
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developed a Colombian majority and the student body was more than 75% Colombian
within its first dozen years. 77
Excepting the student body of the Colegio Nueva Granada in Bogotá, Colombians
were 95% of all children enrolled in American schools in Colombia by the end of the
twentieth century. 78 Across the decades as they grew from small primary-only to large
pre- K/12 institutions, these locally controlled, community schools responded to the
needs of the populations they served. As a result, their academic programs as well as their
school boards, faculties, and administrations were also Colombianized to high degrees.
Yet the schools retained strong ties to education communities in the US and deep
commitment to close Colombian-US political, economic, and cultural relations. This
dissertation argues that transnational educational and cultural communities, including
those that developed around American schools in Colombia, are crucial to understanding
Latin American-US relations in the twentieth century. Beginning around mid-century, as
the US became the global education leader, US models and resources developed as
important alternatives to traditional Catholic and European schooling in Colombia. As
this study will demonstrate, upper-class Colombians who embraced their local American
schools did so to engage with these alternatives; they chose to access the educational,
cultural, and economic resources proffered by the US to construct paths toward and
across modernity.
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Chapter Four

Cultural Change in the Colombian Capital
As Colombia‟s education system began to expand from the 1930s forward, it
brought a period of rapid cultural change to the nation. As the traditional upper-class
exclusivity of the system was dismantled, higher literacy rates, increasing enrollments in
secondary schools, and expansion of university programs accelerated the decline of
Church and elite hegemony over national culture. New mass media channels, over which
diverse alternatives to elite and Catholic culture were carried, contributed heavily to this
process of change. Historically, narrow formulations of Colombianidad were grounded
by European high culture, but by mid-century those elite frames gave way before a new
sense of modernity. In this process, European cultural influence declined as the US
gained new stature as a legitimate cultural producer and a cross-class cultural resource.
Analysis of the early evolution of US-sponsored cultural centers in Colombia
demonstrates this transformation in a local context. It reveals how transnational
educational and cultural communities within the Americas were redefining interAmerican relations.
The next two chapters analyze the original US-sponsored cultural center in
Colombia, the Centro Cultural Colombo-Americano de Bogotá. This first chapter
contextualizes the center‟s founding and its early development within the broader
dynamics of cultural change; the second chapter explores that cultural change in detail
via Colombian-US encounters in the programs of the center. This current chapter begins
with an example of converging Colombian and US cultural agendas; it demonstrates how
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a Colombian librarian and diplomat began to direct US cultural resources toward national
educational and cultural reform. It then considers changing notions of culture in
Colombia that were facilitating such convergence. Next, the chapter historicizes the
earliest US cultural centers in Latin America and articulates Washington‟s growing
enthusiasm for them as a reaction to strong European, and especially Nazi, cultural
influence in the region. Finally, the growth in US cultural programming in 1940s Bogotá
is analyzed against declining European cultural influence in the city.
Pan Americanism, Cultural Resources and Common Interest
Daniel Samper Ortega was an “engine of Colombian culture.”1 He was a novelist,
historian, librarian, and educator. As director of the Biblioteca Nacional [National
Library] in Bogotá throughout the 1930s, Samper used limited resources to build the
library‟s collection and advocate for wider dissemination of Colombian literature among
the populace. The literary record of the nation had until then laid scattered in private
collections and university libraries accessible only to the elite. To the average literate
citizen, it was largely unavailable and unknown. Fueled by new enthusiasm for education
reform and increasing literacy in the nation, Samper gathered this literature, edited it, and
published it anew in a 100-volume collection. When the Ministry of National Education
published the collection a few years later and made reasonably priced volumes widely
available to the public, Colombia‟s literary canon became more widely available. 2
In Colombian political tradition, poets, historians, and other men of letters often
led the republic as president, served as government ministers, and represented the nation
1
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as diplomats overseas. In the late 1930s, following the tradition, Samper was appointed
cultural attaché for the Colombian legation in Washington. Given the energetic Pan
Americanism of the era, he was a logical choice for the high-profile assignment. As he
accepted his posting to the US capital, Latin America held new prominence in US foreign
policy, and Washington‟s new program of cultural diplomacy was in a crucial formative
stage.
Samper believed that better inter-American relations would grow out of increased
cultural exchange, but he knew first hand that fostering mutual understanding between
the people of Colombia and the US would require a substantial allocation of resources.
There were many areas where inter-American cultural resources were lacking, but as a
librarian Samper best knew about books and literature. Few books on the US were
available to Colombians in Spanish or English. Indeed, Samper‟s wife had tried to read
about the history and culture of the US prior to the couple‟s departure for Washington,
but her searches for reading materials in Bogotá came up empty. Even in the very library
of which her husband was director, the premier public library in the nation, she could
locate just one book on the US and this dealt with the colonial era. In contrast, books
treating European topics were plentiful; histories, literature and other cultural studies of
France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and England were abundant in Spanish translation. 3 Thus,
it become immediately clear to the Sampers that books had a role to play in better cultural
relations in the Americas. Translated editions of US history and literature books in Latin
American libraries and Latin American editions in the US libraries would increase
opportunities for mutual understanding in the hemisphere.
3

This story, told by Samper in Washington, was often repeated by cultural policymakers in Washington as
they justified the expenditures of the new cultural relations program with Latin America. US Department of
State, The Cultural-Cooperation Program 1938-1943, p. 34.

210

In his new role in the US, Samper fully engaged in the public discourse of Pan
Americanism, but he did not cede to Washington the power to define the discourse.
Indeed, he was publicly critical of the early US efforts to secure inter-American unity and
warned that Washington must earn rather than expect Latin American respect. Pan
American rhetoric of mutual understanding, he believed, would always ring hollow in
Latin America if true reciprocity and open dialogue were not the basis of inter-American
cultural relations. In 1941 he told an audience of Pan American enthusiasts at the
University of Chicago…
You forgot Latin America for centuries, and now you want to win our good will
and our markets in a day; but you continue to misunderstand us, thinking that we
ought to mold ourselves to your mind and methods instead of trying to mold
yourselves to our temperament.4
In Samper‟s view, US leadership in the hemisphere was a foregone conclusion, but he
firmly believed Latin Americans had important roles to play in constructing the new Pan
Americanism.
Samper recognized an historic shift taking place as Latin America moved out of
the economic and cultural orbit of Europe and increasingly looked north toward the US.
He was pragmatic about the shift: “Madrid, in the past, was the distributing granary of
ideas and the intellectual center for the meeting of all the former Spanish colonies. In the
future, this role will likely be performed by New York.”5 Acknowledging that the US had
“resources, transport and organizations that we lack,” Samper argued that Latin American
nations would greatly benefit from their emerging economic and cultural alignment with
4
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the US. Because of the US abuses of the past, proceeding cautiously and maintaining a
level of skepticism were essential, but Samper believed the whole region would “profit
from the knowledge, experience and technique of their older sister, in the same way that
all [American nations] have profited from and will continue to take advantage of the ageold European culture.”6
During his days in Washington, Samper became convinced that more Latin
Americans would have to learn the English language in order to take full advantage of the
US resources available to them. French had long been the second language of educated
Colombians, but twentieth-century realities brought reprioritization. Earlier generations
of Latin Americans had taken up French to learn the “ideas, methods and aspirations that
had originated in France,” and they applied them in winning independence and building
their nations. Now learning English, he believed, would bring great cultural, political and
economic benefits to the modern generations of Latin America. 7 Returning to Bogotá at
the end of his service in Washington, Samper was well prepared to tap into the cultural
resources proffered by the US under the new Pan Americanism.
When the first US-sponsored cultural center in Colombia, the Centro Cultural
Colombo-Americano de Bogotá [the Colombian-American Cultural Center of Bogotá]
opened its doors in September 1942, Samper was a founding member of its board of
directors. The Colombo-Americano, as it has since been known locally, was the first of
eight US-sponsored binational centers (BNCs) to open in Colombia as part of the new
Washington program of cultural diplomacy. Offering language classes and cultural
programs to the residents of the capital, the first Colombo-Americano created new spaces
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where foreign/local encounters played out and the rhetoric of Pan Americanism and
mutual understanding was implemented and tested. Speaking for the board at its formal
inauguration, Samper expressed optimism that US-Latin American relations had entered
a new phase. Based on personal contact with US citizens, he was more enthusiastic about
the binational relationship than he had previously been. His experiences in the US
representing his nation, observing wartime Pan Americanism, teaching in the university
system as a guest lecturer, and participating in cultural activities in communities across
the nation, convinced him that a “desire to be helpful” and “sincerity and integrity” were
“notable characteristics of the contemporary North American.” 8
Clearly, Daniel Samper Ortega had a new appreciation for the peoples, cultures,
politics, and socio-economic systems of the US. Yet his encouragement of ColombianUS cultural relations through the Colombo-Americano in Bogotá should not be
misinterpreted. Samper was not an agent of US imperialism nor was he a surrogate of
North American hegemony. He had not adopted a North American lifestyle or mindset
while living in the US. He was loyal to Colombia not Washington. Far from encouraging
US cultural imperialism or cultural dominance, Samper‟s efforts toward establishing the
Colombo-Americano represented an appropriation of accessible educational and cultural
resources for the benefit of Colombians. Samper was an active member of Spanish,
Venezuelan, and Panamanian academies of history and fine arts for similar reasons. 9
Though he had developed enthusiasm for the new Pan Americanism, Samper was first a
Colombian nationalist. His passion was the broad dissemination of Colombian culture
and the modernization of the nation, and he saw the Colombo-Americano and its links to
8
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US as helpful toward both of those ends. The times demanded new cultural approaches
for strengthening the nation, and to Samper the culturalist, the nationalist, and the
modernist, the establishment of the Centro Colombo-Americano de Bogotá was a positive
step in that direction.
Colombian Education Reforms and Changing Notions of Culture
The emergence of US cultural centers, American schools, and mass media
cultural programs in Colombia took place as Liberal reforms granted new social functions
to education and culture.10 Under the new political formulation, both education and
culture would serve as unifying forces in the nation, and their roles as class-specific
markers of difference would be reduced. Liberal education reforms that aimed to improve
the lives of millions of impoverished Colombians through expansion of education and
schooling had the ultimate goal of modernizing the nation. The trend toward urbanization
presented unique challenges for schooling, but because most of the population still lived
in rural areas (71% in 1938, 61% in 1951) rural Colombia received much of the
attention.11 While schools for children and literacy programs for adults took center stage,
they were joined by equally intense cultural campaigns aimed at building broad national
consciousness among the Colombian people. Such consciousness had long been lacking
in Colombia where people more often identified with region than nation. A century of
partisan politics and civil warfare had severely restricted the development of
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Colombianidad as a unifying force, but the lack of schools in the nation was also a major
contributing factor.
Schools play a basic role in educating children about the geography, history,
civics and culture of a nation, and in their absence a key arena for fostering national
consciousness is lacking. Through the 1920s, while the majority of Colombian children
received no formal education at all, many who did attend schools usually completed no
more than a year or two at the primary level. As a practical matter, quality primary and
secondary education remained accessible only to the children of the upper class. Owing
to the strong presence of European religious in the schools attended by these children,
elite framing of Colombianidad typically reflected a familiarity and an affinity for
European, and especially French, culture. Strong European cultural influences were
projected in the books, magazines, and newspapers written by and for the elite, and such
narrow framing of Colombianidad contributed to the alienation of the Colombian
majority from official versions of their own national culture. Significantly, as Liberal
education reformers attempted to create a stronger national consciousness and expand
schooling and literacy, strong European influence over Colombian curriculum and
instruction was viewed less favorably. Thus, while targeting Nazi influence in Colombia
in the short term, Decree 91 of 1942 had also addressed long-term concerns over
European influence in the classroom by requiring the teaching of Colombian history,
geography, and civics by Colombian citizens.
Alfonso Lopéz Pumarejo, who was elected to the presidency twice during Liberal
rule and was responsible for stripping the Church of its constitutional role in education,
believed a broader-based and unifying national consciousness was essential to
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modernization. He hoped such consciousness would allow Liberals to enlist all
Colombians in a unified effort towards national progress. Under Lopéz, his Liberal
predecessors and successors (his terms were non-consecutive), the task of cultural
management was vested in the Ministry of National Education. 12 Education ministers
were charged with leading the Liberal education reforms and organizing unifying cultural
initiatives. But the Ministry of National Education was a revolving door, and ministers,
whose appointments were often based on political affiliations rather than professional
qualifications or interest, served short terms. 13 This constant turnover in leadership meant
that most of the ministers did not have time to formulate or implement broad initiatives,
and as a result, education reform and cultural management were less developed than they
might have been.
Peter Wade has observed that in Colombia before mid-century, the “promotion of
culture had always meant the promotion of „cultured values,‟ that is, the cultural activities
associated with intellectual European circles and closely connected with formal education
and the arts.”14 This reality was very much evident in the approaches of Liberal
governments to education reforms and cultural diffusion in the 1930s, but it is equally
clear that notions of culture underwent significant revision before mid-century as
education reforms played out. Clearly, ministers and the bureaucracies they led equated
education and culture and believed that individuals could acquire the cultured values
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which they lacked through formal education. 15 However, as ministry officials examined
the lives of the Colombian majority, who lived in relative isolation, largely in poverty,
and without the benefits of formal education, the separation between elite-defined
cultured values and the lived realities of most Colombians became obvious. The elite
culture that had long been promoted in the nation‟s schools had limited utility in rural
Colombia where poverty set the pattern of daily living. Even as a mass migration of rural
Colombians to the nation‟s cities ensued, elite culture continued to lack relevancy for the
majority.
The official cultural programs that accompanied education reforms reflected the
various philosophies, passions, and biases of ministers and sub-ministers. By 1940, the
ministry‟s various programs and initiatives in the area of cultural outreach had been
drawn together under the organizational umbrella of the Division of Cultural Extension
and Fine Arts. This emerging bureaucracy within the ministry funded, sponsored, and
collaborated with museums, theaters, art schools, performance groups, and cultural
organizations; the combined leadership of these public and private entities formed a
cohort of cultural managers charged with the diffusion of national culture. Jorge Eliécer
Gaitán, a populist leader who would be assassinated in 1948, was then a rising political
force within the Liberal Party and the Minister of National Education. As compared to
most leading politicians of his day, Gaitán had risen from modest origins. The son of a
bookseller father and school teacher mother, he graduated from the National University
15
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and was awarded a scholarship for graduate study at the University of Rome. While his
years in Italy increased his deep appreciation for European high culture, his approach to
cultural management was grounded by his middle-class upbringing.
As minister, Gaitán served for just one year, but during that time he proffered a
new approach to cultural diffusion. Gaitán accepted the premise that formal education
would improve the lives of the Colombian majority and that literacy was the most basic
necessity. And believing high culture had a place in the construction of Colombianidad,
he did not abandon the promotion of traditional high culture among the populace. Instead,
Gaitán called for the “democratization of culture” [democratización de cultura]. His call
was grounded by two important philosophical shifts with regard to cultural diffusion that
were gaining currency as Liberal education reformers confronted the realities of
Colombian society. First, more equitable division of the nation‟s cultural resources
between social classes, between urban and rural communities, and between Andean and
peripheral regions was newly desirable. The urban, Andean elite had long held a
monopoly over formal educational and cultural programs and as a result “the benefits of
civilization have not arrived” [los beneficios de la civilización no han llegado] for a large
portion of the Colombian people.16 Greater equity in distribution of resources, Gaitán and
Liberal reformers hoped, would begin to correct this imbalance. Second, Gaitán and
others began to officially embrace popular culture in its multiple and diverse forms.
Because traditional high culture lacked relevance in the lives of most non-elite
Colombians, few benefits would come to them from “the acquisition of decorative and
vaguely educative knowledge” [la adquisición de conocimientos decorativos y
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vagamente educativos]. Instead, there was new rhetorical emphasis on developing
cultural programs around the “actual lives” [la vida efectiva] of people --built upon
essential needs but also those interests and activities that gave meaning to people‟s
lives.17 In practice, the forms of popular culture endorsed by the official cultural
bureaucracy were often limited to the realm of folkloric traditions; such forms could be
repackaged as authentic Colombian expressions and employed as unifying markers of the
new Colombianidad. Excluded from official programming were more contemporary
manifestations of local and regional culture especially those considered commercialized,
crude or of foreign origin. 18 However, outside official cultural management, the new
mass media had already begun to project broader forms of popular culture via airwaves,
magazines and film, and this counteracted the restrictiveness of official programming.
Thus as Ministry of National Education programs introduced new, officially-sanctioned
frames of Colombianidad, an alternative range of customs, festivals, music, and sport also
received attention and encouragement through new media channels. The definition of
Colombian culture was broadening.
It was within these currents of education reform, democratization of culture and
new mass media channels that Washington‟s cultural diplomacy appeared in Bogotá and
gave rise to new US cultural influence. With the establishment of American schools and
binational centers, US cultural resources were more readily accessible in Colombia than
ever before. Some members of the elite, like those affiliated with American schools,
employed US resources in very personal projects toward the education their children.
Others, like Daniel Samper Ortega, seized the opportunity to use the resources in national
17
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projects of modernization that privileged educational expansion and cultural diffusion.
Yet the Colombian elite did not have a monopoly on US resources. Notably, the
educational and cultural programs in the Centros Culturales Colombo-Americanos were
available to a broad segment of the national population, and the emerging middle and
professional classes were the most frequent participants. Examining the early
development of the Colombo-Americano Cultural Center in Bogotá reveals growing US
cultural influence among non-elite classes.
Spontaneous Presence: US-sponsored Binational Centers in Latin America
Like the independent schools founded by US citizens in Latin America, the first
US-sponsored binational cultural centers (BNCs) in the region began without formal
assistance from the US government. The first was founded in Argentina in 1927 as the
Instituto Cultural Argentino-Norteamericano [Argentine-North American Cultural
Institute]. A group of Argentine businessmen, educators and intellectuals, most of whom
had business or cultural connections in the US, founded the institute with hopes of
strengthening ties between the two countries. Through the efforts of the Pan American
Union, the organization initially received encouragement and assistance from private US
foundations including the Institute of International Education and the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. 19 Between 1927 and 1940, eight other BNCs were
founded in the region: five were in Brazil, while Chile, Uruguay, and Honduras each had
one. All were non-profit entities. As in the Argentine case, growing interest in these
cultural centers in Latin America was in part a function of the increased commercial
relations between the US and individual nations, cities, communities, and industries of
the region. However, the diplomatic emphasis on cultural exchanges that grew out of the
19
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conferences of the Pan American Union at Montevideo in 1933 and Buenos Aires in 1936
facilitated the process as well. 20
Most of the early BNCs were founded by Latin American nationals who had been
educated in US universities. They viewed the US favorably, associated it with modernity,
and wished to maintain their personal cultural connections with it. At their founding,
many of these centers also enlisted the support of locally residing US citizens, who saw
the institutes as a way of maintaining ties with their homeland. Additionally, some of the
earliest centers were established through the efforts of local Latin American governments
themselves in the interest of stronger relations with the US. What is noteworthy about
these early centers is that they were always privately funded. They relied on contributions
from nationals of the host country, local businesses, US expatriates and US firms with a
presence in the local economy to provide funding for exhibits, social gatherings, lectures
and courses in US culture and language.
FDR‟s State Department took interest in the existing BNCs beginning in the late
1930s. As soon happened with independent American schools in Latin America, the
international climate made the institutions attractive sites for the promotion of Pan
Americanism and hemispheric unity. Initially, the State Department offered cultural
publications to boost the small libraries which many of these centers maintained, but little
in the way of financial support was offered to them. It was not until Rockefeller‟s OIAA
became aware of European-sponsored cultural centers in Latin America and concluded
that the US was losing influence in the region that official financial support to BNCs
began to flow. When the second center in Latin America was founded in Rio de Janeiro
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in April 1937, for example, it joined similar British, French, German, Italian, Portuguese,
and Argentine cultural institutes that had previously been established in that city. It soon
became clear, however, that the privately funded US cultural institutes could not compete
for public attention with the more substantially endowed European cultural centers. Most
European cultural centers were official governmental organizations of European foreign
ministries and received substantial subsidies from them. Language classes were their
most common activity, but cultural performers, musicians, lecturers, and art exhibits sent
from Europe also drew large Latin American audiences. 21
The eight existing US-sponsored cultural centers in Latin American gave the US a
formal cultural presence where it had been lacking. And because these BNCs were
privately funded and came at no cost to the US taxpayer, they conformed to the
traditional US preference for private over government initiative. However, as tensions
mounted in Europe and Washington increasingly became concerned with inter-American
unity, ceding cultural competition to European powers, whether Axis or Allied, grew less
palatable. Cognizant that subsidized European centers were providing more credible
programs than the private US-affiliated BNCs could afford to offer and ever concerned
about Axis influence in the region, the OIAA initiated a program of direct financial
support for these institutions in the early 1940s. 22 In addition to supporting existing
centers, the OIAA encouraged and funded the founding of new ones in strategic
locations. The Centro Cultural Colombo-Americano de Bogotá was one such center.
By 1943, a total of twenty US cultural centers had been established in Latin
America. Throughout the war years, as most German, Italian, and Japanese cultural
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centers were forced by host-country governments to close, US-sponsored BNCs
continued to appear and prosper. By 1945, there were twenty-seven such BNCs in Latin
America receiving US subsidies, and these institutions had opened an additional 20
branches in other neighborhoods or nearby cities. Significantly, the Latin American trend
of establishing these centers went global with the Cold War, and at the close of the
twentieth century, there were over 170 US-sponsored BNCs worldwide, with the largest
regional concentration still in Latin America. 23
US government funding of these centers originally began as grants from the
wartime budget of the OIAA. Technically, the OIAA transferred lump funds to the
American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS), a private foundation which initially took
responsibility for evaluating and disbursing the grants. Such a funding scheme avoided
the impression that BNCs were direct dependencies of Washington and reinforced their
lack of official status within the US government. Both the OIAA and the State
Department continually asserted that these centers were independent, locally controlled
institutions; they stressed that local efforts were behind the BNCs and that they had
“grown up spontaneously.”24 Additionally, ACLS oversight of grants allowed many of
them to avoid conflicts with laws in some of their host-countries that banned clubs and
organizations from receiving direct subsidies from foreign governments. As discussed
earlier, such laws had first been implemented by Vargas in Brazil in the late 1930s. Other
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countries soon followed suit and issued similar bans simultaneously with their closings of
German, Japanese, and Italian schools.
Rockefeller considered BNCs invaluable sites where negative stereotypes of the
US could be challenged, transnational cultural connections fostered, and mutual
understanding achieved. And while he valued the spontaneity with which the earliest
centers appeared, it is clear that the OIAA and, later, the State Department began to play
a more active role in supporting or encouraging the spontaneous interest of Latin
Americans in establishing new centers. Still, as the new centers were established
throughout the 1940s, they remained local institutions. Indeed, the OIAA and State
Department only offered grants to those that were grounded in local initiative. In these
early years, both privately and publicly, US cultural diplomats and policymakers stressed
that Washington did “not control or wish to control cultural centers.”25 Throughout the
1940s, centers deemed worthy of US government support met specific criteria. They had
to be run by binational boards of directors with both Latin American and US
membership. In addition to English language instruction, they had to offer cultural
programming that was grounded in reciprocity and would increase understanding of both
host-country and US cultures; programs had to reach the “emerging middle class” while
also appealing to intellectuals of the host country; evidence was required that suggested
the promise of economic self-sufficiency of each center; all services had to be offered on
a democratic basis with every effort made to avoid class restrictions; centers had to
abstain from activities that might be interpreted as propaganda for the US government;
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and funding would only be granted if the particular center wielded cultural influence (in
the direction of mutual understanding) in its local and regional community. 26
By 1943, Rockefeller argued that BNCs together with American schools should
be supported on a long-term basis and not simply for the duration of the war. The State
Department agreed and assumed responsibility for financial and other resource assistance
to these cultural institutes as well as to the increasing number of American schools. 27
While Congress pressured the State Department to ensure that all cultural centers quickly
became self-supporting, it continually approved funds for ongoing support when this did
not happen. Arguments that BNCs were “strong-holds of inter-American relationships”
and that they “were sponsored largely by nationals who are friendly to us” proved
effective in winning consistent congressional support throughout the war and well into
the Cold War.28
In most centers, English teaching quickly evolved as the primary function, but all
had cultural programs to supplement the language classes. 29 In the first decade, the US
government paid the salaries of center directors (who were always US citizens) and
additional administrators, and it provided salaries for a few teachers from the US. In
addition to covering much of the startup costs for centers opened during the war,
Washington paid up to 20% of the annual operating expenses as well. Local revenue
came from English classes, but in the interest of keeping tuition and fees low so as to
attract the middle class, Washington‟s salary and operating budget subsidies were
essential.
26
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Reflecting a high-level of goodwill afforded the US as it took the lead in the fight
against fascism, much of the Latin American press positively reported on the appearance
of each new BNC. Such coverage allowed US educators, who directed and staffed the
centers, and diplomats to explain the US philosophical approach to cultural relations to
the host community. A clear distinction was usually drawn to distinguish the US
approach from that of existing European-sponsored cultural centers. Carl Sauer, the first
director of the Centro Cultural Colombo-Americano in Bogotá articulated the contrast for
the Bogotá press: while European nations‟…
principal and, perhaps, only concern is making known their culture and
introducing their knowledge in this country, to influence in one way or another
the Colombian national culture, our desire is diametrically opposite. We don‘t
aim to do such a thing.30
Sauer, like other BNC directors and US cultural diplomats across the region, consistently
stressed that reciprocity was the basis of US cultural policy and asserted that the US had
as much to learn from Latin America as Latin America had to learn from the US. While
the rhetoric of mutual understanding through reciprocity was emphasized in cultural
center literature as well as in internal and external policy documents of the OIAA and
State Department, what is most significant is that this philosophy also structured the
operation of most centers. Because the institutes were not dependencies of the US
government, had independent boards of directors composed in the majority by nationals
of their host countries, and were expected to focus as much on local as US culture, US
BNCs develop very differently than their European counterparts.

30

“Un Brillante Realidad Son Los Institutos Culturales Americanos,” El Liberal (Bogotá), 12 December
1942.

226

Founding the Center at Bogotá
As occurred in other areas of the hemisphere, local nationals initiated the
campaign to establish a BNC in Bogotá. In 1939 on a trip to the US, Colombian Jorge
Obando Lombana met with representatives of the State Department to discuss the
founding of a binational cultural center in Bogotá. Obando was a member of the
Colombian-American Chamber of Commerce, an organization founded jointly by
Colombian and US businessmen in the 1920s as commercial relations between the two
nations were increasing. The organization had close tied to the Colombian-American
Association of New York which was then advocating for an American school in Bogotá.
At the time of Obando‟s meeting in Washington, the new US program of cultural
diplomacy was not yet in place so no official assistance could be offered. Still, the State
Department encouraged this private initiative. Back in Bogotá, and with the assistance of
the local members of the chamber, Obando formed the Associación Cultural ColomboNorteamericano (ACCN or Colombian-North American Cultural Association) in July
1940. The founding committee of the ACCN was constituted by six Colombians and
three US businessmen who resided in Bogotá.31 Members made little progress toward the
establishment of a cultural center.
As Europe went to war and Washington‟s concern with Axis cultural influence in
the Americas heightened, the local efforts toward founding a cultural center received a
boost from the OIAA‟s coordination committee in Bogotá. As residents of the capital, the
US businessmen who volunteered for the committee were well aware of formal European
cultural activity around them. As business travelers, many were also aware of the centers

31

Gloria Valencia de Acosta, “El Centro Colombo-Americano de Bogotá: su Constitution, Historia y
Realizaciones, 1942-1992,” 1992, CCA/Bogotá MSS, Folder: Historia Centro Colombo-Americano.

227

sponsored by US citizens in Brazil and other regions of the continent. Convinced that a
cultural center offered the best approach for promoting mutual understanding and
fostering Pan Americanism on a long-term basis, the coordination committee called on
the OIAA and the State Department to establish a center in Bogotá. While the committee
believed that the ACCN was committed to the project, they felt that it was not
“sufficiently well organized to launch a cultural institute.”32 They strongly suggested the
appointment of new committee to steer the project. In Washington, Rockefeller‟s OIAA
was concerned that the project remain a local initiative and preferred that Colombian
spontaneity drive it. Only after Obando and other members of the ACCN agreed to form
part of a new board of directors did the OIAA approve a grant of $20,000 to cover startup and operational costs for the first year. 33 This was an impressive level of funding for
the era. Simultaneously, the nascent center received a strong endorsement from
Colombia‟s Minister of National Education, who declared he was “enthusiastic for
collaboration.”34
Subsequently, US national Robert Parrish (brother of Karl C. Parrish for whom
the new English-speaking colegio in Barranquilla was named), the director of a
Colombian mortgage bank and a coordination committee member, was elected president
of the board of this new institute. It was renamed the Centro Cultural ColomboAmericano. Though Parrish initially headed the board, it had a Colombian majority from
the start with seven Colombian and three US members and the presidency thereafter
32

Edward H. Robbins, Monthly Report on Present Status of Projects and Requests for Colombia, 30 May
1942, p. 2, NARG 229, DI/CCC, B1377, F: Project Reports 1942-Feb. 1943.
33
Kenneth Holland to Robert Parrish, 22 January 1943, NARG 229, DI/CCC, B1361, F: Colombian
American Center.
34
Acta #3 de Centro Colombo-Americano [minutes of the meeting of the board of directors, hereafter Acta
#], 18 June 1942, Libro de Actas de Centro Colombo-Americano - Bogotá 1942 (hereafter Actas1),
CCA/Bogotá MSS.

228

always passed to a Colombian. 35 The board approved statutes for the cultural center that
explicitly defined its objectives: to teach Spanish and English courses employing nativespeaking professors; to offer business courses and other programs to meet educational
needs of the community; to create an examining body to award diplomas; and to foster a
“wide understanding of the intellectual and artistic production of Colombia and the
United States” via a library, conferences, art exhibits, concerts, and translation of
educational materials. Additionally, the statutes explicitly stated that the center would be
“removed from all manner of speculation and business.” 36
The Colombo-Americano first opened in the city center in a house rented by the
board from its owner, the wife of President Lopéz. The capital was then growing and
extending north and south along the high mountain plain of the Sabana de Bogotá. Many
of the downtown homes of the upper class were then being converted to businesses or
divided up into apartments to accommodate a growing middle-class workforce in the city
center. Inaugurated in September 1942, the Colombo-Americano appeared on the cultural
stage of the city with fanfare typical for a diplomatic capital. Yet, for an institute that
would soon be dominated by the middle class, the formal inauguration and gala had an
elegant and elite feel. The 300 invited guests and their spouses included the foreign
diplomatic delegations of the capital, Colombian government officials, sub-officials of
the Ministry of National Education, and owners and representatives of local Colombian
and US businesses. 37 By the date of the inaugural, the US had been at war with the Axis
powers for eight months, and Colombia had declared war on Germany two months
earlier. Not surprisingly, the inaugural speeches framed the founding in the rhetoric of
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Pan American unity and celebrated the day as a cultural triumph for democracy over
fascism and totalitarianism. Typical were the fulsome words of US Ambassador Arthur
Bliss Lane, who called the center a “flower of a grand international ideal” and toasted
cultural cooperation in the Americas while lamenting that “so many parts of the world are
found subjugated to brutal slavery, as much physical as intellectual by Nazi and Japanese
oppressors.”38
Extensive and positive press coverage announced the opening, reprinted speeches
verbatim, and encouraged the public to visit the center. Indicative of the high interest the
center generated among the city‟s emerging professional population, over 3,000 people
visited the center during a two-week open house period that followed the formal
inaugural. Most prominent among the curious visitors were secondary and university
students, educators, journalists, government bureaucrats, military officers, employees of
local businesses and members of the judiciary. 39 Such occupational groupings, which
disproportionately benefited from expanding secondary and university educational
options in Colombia, formed the base of the new middle and professional classes.40
The enthusiasm with which members of professional and middle classes
embraced the Centro Cultural Colombo-Americano signaled an important paradigm shift
in Colombian society. Constructing their own life paths and confronting modernity with
these resources, non-elite Colombians were developing greater familiarity with US
culture. In contrast to traditional elite identification with and promotion of European high
culture, the middle and professional classes gravitated towards US cultural models. As
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they did so, European cultural influence in Colombia was displaced and US cultural
influence spread. Elites participated in this process, and as the Colombianization of
American schools indicates, sectors of the national elite were also increasingly drawn to
the US as a cultural alternative. The next chapter articulates the cross-class cultural shift
away from European and toward US culture by analyzing foreign/local encounters within
the Centro Cultural Colombo-Americano de Bogotá. Before proceeding, however, it is
important to consider the changing European cultural presence in the Andean capital
during the 1930s and 1940s.
Cultural Competition: European and US Culture in the Andes
In 1939, as the local group of Colombian and US residents began working to
establish a formal US-sponsored cultural center in Bogotá, the German diplomatic
mission regularly sponsored cultural activities in local theaters as well as in the capital‟s
German school and club. Germans had less cultural dominance in the Andean interior
than they had on the Caribbean coast because the national capital had a large diplomatic
community with representatives from across the globe. But as a community, German
residents still had a strong presence. The German cultural center, a section within the
diplomatic mission, offered free German language instruction in the capital. Courses
were offered in the evenings at the Colegio Alemán and promoted in front page
newspaper advertisements that asked “Do You Want to Learn or Practice German?” 41
Performances by classical musicians, lectures by German philosophers, and the donation
of German literary classics in Spanish translation to schools and libraries increased
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Berlin‟s cultural visibility in Bogotá.42 However, as the Auslandsorganisation cloaked
German cultural activity in Nazism‟s pomp, symbolism, and reverence for el Fuehrer, the
interest and tolerance of Bogotanos and their national government decreased. 43 With the
breaking of diplomatic relations between Bogotá and Berlin after Pearl Harbor, the
subsequent closings of the Colegio Alemán and the Club Alemán in Bogotá, and the
detainments and deportations of many German residents of Colombia, formal German
cultural activity came to a definite halt. Not until the rehabilitation of Germany was under
way in the early years of the Cold War would a formal German cultural center appear in
the Colombian capital and reestablish cultural programming.
At the same time, an effort by Imperial Britain was underway to institutionalize
its own cultural presence in the Andean capital. The British diplomatic mission in Bogotá
had long promoted the high culture of the empire with lectures and publications
celebrating British language and literature. It took a more formal approach in the 1930s
as London grew concerned with anti-British propaganda it attributed to Germany and
Italy. The British Council, a division of the British Commonwealth and Foreign Office,
had been founded in London in 1934 expressly to spread British culture and language and
to expand and improve the nation‟s cultural relationships around the globe. Building
understanding of British foreign policy was one of the organization‟s stated objectives. 44
The nation maintained a sizeable empire at the start of World War II and had long been
engaged in English language teaching in the educational institutions of its colonies. With
the establishment of the British Council, however, the Foreign Office signaled its interest
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not only in promoting the King‟s English but in showcasing the cultural achievements of
his subjects. Significantly, the Council planned a stronger British cultural presence not
only within but outside the empire as well. 45
Through the British legation in Bogotá, the Council sponsored lectures and
musical performances around the capital. When the directors of the Council formally
visited Colombia in 1939, they signed a cultural agreement with the Ministry of Foreign
Relations and Ministry of National Education. Based on that agreement, it brought
several individuals from the United Kingdom to teach English in Colombian national
schools. Each teacher was paid by the British government, but they were assigned a
teaching position in a colegio or a university in Bogotá at the discretion of the Colombian
government. In the evenings, these same teachers formed the staff of the new Instituto
Cultural Colombo-Británico [The Colombian-British Cultural Institute] which was
inaugurated in Bogotá in March 1940. The institute opened several months before
planning began to establish the Colombo-Americano.
The Instituto Cultural Colombo-Británico initially offered courses in the English
language (for individuals, groups, and children), British Literature, business
correspondence and shorthand. A library carrying books and periodicals in English was
available to members. The institute had a board of directors composed of seven members,
and a majority of four were prominent Colombian citizens; Mariano Ospina Pérez, who
would be elected President of Colombia in 1946 when Conservatives regained power,
was an original member of the board. By 1941, new branches of the institute had opened
in Medellín, Barranquilla, Cali, and Santa Marta. All of these centers would close in the
years following the war, victims of post-war recessions and budgetary cuts in the Foreign
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Office, but while they were open, they annually attracted increasing numbers of students.
By 1946 the Council‟s institutes had approximately 1,200 students in Bogotá and an
equal number enrolled among its four regional centers around the country. 46
Comparatively, the Centro Cultural Colombo-Americano in Bogotá had 1,000 students in
that same year.47
Subtle rivalry at the local level between the various Colombo-Americanos that
opened across the country and the cultural institutes of the British Council is evident
throughout this study. However, given these organizations‟ shared mission of teaching a
common language as well as the strength of the US-British alliance during World War II
and the Cold War, their competition for students and cultural influence in Colombia
never broke the public face of Anglo-American unity. 48 As demand for English language
instruction exploded in Latin America across the twentieth century, both US cultural
centers and the institutes of the British Council found sizeable student populations to
serve.
That BNCs like the Colombo-Americano were not dependencies of the US
government marked an important distinction from the British and other European cultural
centers in Bogotá. Like the Colombo-Americano, the various British cultural institutes
had boards of directors with strong Colombian representation, but these centers were not
autonomous and locally controlled because the managing director of each institute was a
dependent employee of the crown. In comparison, the managing directors of USsponsored cultural centers were private citizens, who were contracted by the local boards.
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They were drawn heavily from academia and the field of education more specifically. In
contrast to both the directors and teachers of the British institutes, they were not
government employees. They answered not to Washington but to the local board.
A second crucial distinction was the emphasis placed on cultural reciprocity in the
new US-sponsored BNCs as compared to British and other European institutes. Because
they prized European high culture, Colombian elites were very receptive to French,
Italian, Spanish, German and British cultural diplomacy which aimed less for cultural
reciprocity (for mutual exploration of both their own and Colombian culture) and more to
disseminate their own cultures. The US consciously took a different approach. As
Washington began to assist the first BNCs in Latin America, commitment to such
reciprocity was a practical necessity. Given the history of US intervention in the region, a
cultural approach similar to the British or Germans would have left the centers especially
vulnerable to charges of cultural imperialism. Educators and cultural diplomats involved
with these centers were sensitive to such charges and constantly reiterated their aversion
to imposing culture. During World War II, Nazism was most often the foil against which
they distinguished the US approach: “the Axis powers are trying to bring about a cultural
death of the peoples they conquer, in order to facilitate their political assimilation.” 49 A
few years later, Soviet Communism would become the new foil. Still, the US very openly
distinguished its approach to cultural diplomacy from that of its allies as well.
When US assistance to BNCs began in the 1940s, demonstrable cultural
reciprocity became a criterion for receiving financial grants. More than for the purpose of
neutralizing charges of cultural imperialism, Washington‟s commitment to such
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reciprocity was grounded by its goal of fostering hemispheric unity. Cultural programs
became an arena for exploring not simply the cultural divide that separated US and Latin
America but those cultural bridges that linked them as well. Reciprocal celebration and
exploration of broadly defined American cultural forms showcased shared histories,
geographies and philosophies of government along with common interests, values, and
aspirations among the peoples of the hemisphere. These practices encouraged Latin
American and US nationals to negotiate the meaning of Pan Americanism for themselves.
Significantly, a common and explicit assertion of those participating in the discourse of
Pan Americanism at the BNC level was that modern American cultures were no longer
defined by their European roots.
In Spain‟s former American colonies, Hispanidad --in its cultural rather than
political formulation-- constituted a dominant cultural force. Sharing language, religion,
history and traditions with Spain, many Latin Americans had cultural affinity for their
former mother country. But beginning during their independence movements, Latin
American leaders had also turned to France for inspiration, philosophy, and ideology to
guide their political separation from Spain. Just as their North American neighbors had
done in establishing their own republic, they borrowed from Paris those republican
philosophies that their monarchical mother country did not offer. Over time, France
developed as a cultural counterweight to Spain. Throughout the nineteenth century,
French culture was embraced by many in Latin American ruling classes as modern and
worthy of emulation. French language, arts, philosophy and education were considered
the height of culture. In the Colombian case, as detailed earlier, French influence among
the upper classes was especially pronounced; the dominance of French religious orders
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within the nation‟s secondary schools secured the familiarity of the elite with things
French.
In Bogotá, the French diplomatic mission had long sponsored cultural activities in
theaters, universities and schools that appealed to elite cultural tastes. The capital‟s
prominent Colegio Francés (renamed Colegio Pasteur to comply with Decree 91 in 1942)
also served as an important venue for French cultural activities. A more formal French
cultural center was planned in 1936, when an agreement was signed by the Ministry of
National Education and the French diplomatic legation to found an institute of French
“high culture” in Bogotá.50 Escalating tensions in Europe and the eventual outbreak of
war, however, drained French resources and the center was not established until the mid1940s.
When the cultural center, the Alianza Colombo-Francesa [Colombian-French
Alliance], was inaugurated at Bogotá in 1944, Paris was still occupied by Germany. The
new institute, like each Alliance Francaise [French Alliance] around the world and
similar to the Centros Colombo- Americanos, was founded as an independent cultural
institute at the local level. While chapters of the Alliance received an annual subsidy
from the French government, they relied heavily on local efforts of French residents
abroad, foreigners of French ancestry, and Francophiles of the host country to operate
and support the institute. Like the Colombo-Americanos and the institutes of the British
Council, the Alianza Colombo-Francesa enlisted local support through a board of
directors constituted in part by nationals of the host-country. But in contrast to the US
BNC and similar to its British counterpart, the Alianza Colombo-Francesa was focused
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exclusively on the goal of spreading its national language and culture. Indeed, as David
Gordon has shown, the growth of the Alliance Francaise around the globe beginning in
the late nineteenth century was an official French reaction to the decline of the nation‟s
linguistic and cultural influence. Particularly after World War II, as France lost its empire
and English replaced French as the language of diplomacy and business, Paris expanded
the Alliance Francaise network in hopes of maintaining its cultural influence through
language. 51 By the end of the twentieth century, there were 1,300 chapters of the Alliance
Francaise across the globe including more than 100 in the US. 52
When France was overtaken by Hitler‟s forces, Eduardo Santos was president of
the Colombian Republic. For a quarter century before assuming the presidency, he was
managing director of this family‟s newspaper, El Tiempo, Colombia‟s Liberal newspaper
and the national newspaper of record. Santos was a Francophile who had “spent a good
part of his adult life in Paris,” and his staunch support of the US efforts against the Axis
reflected a strong interest in saving France. 53 But his advocacy of Pan American unity
and US hemispheric initiatives during the war also signaled his willingness, and the
general willingness of Colombians of both parties, to embrace the doctrine of the Polar
Star. Under the doctrine, which was first enunciated by Conservatives in the 1920s,
Colombian leaders accepted US economic and political hegemony in some areas in
exchange for the benefits that came with it.54 From that decade forward, in economic and
political affairs, Colombia‟s ties to Europe were loosening as those with the US were
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tightening. And by the time of the next world war, this decline was as obvious in cultural
relations as economics and politics.
As Bogotá‟s Alianza Colombo-Francesa appeared in1944, change was
refashioning cultural dynamics in the capital. Elite and Catholic hegemony over national
culture was breaking down under the weight of modernity. Through radio, film,
photography, and print media, the new cultural trends of the popular and middle classes
became known to the nation and challenged elite construction of Colombianidad. As
more Colombians gained voice in the discourse and practice of national identity,
intellectuals became “marginalized in their traditional role as shapers of opinion,” and the
power of the Church to filter national culture was forever weakened. 55 In this process,
French and other European high culture that had held so much appeal to the elite was not
rejected, but it enjoyed a less privileged position in the Colombian capital and around the
nation.
On one level, Colombia was experiencing a broadening of national culture that
decreased the currency of imported European high culture and looked anew at regional
Colombian cultural forms for inspiration. Regional music and dance, especially, found
wider audiences outside their traditional geographic confines; Costeño music, for
example, was nationalized as the radio and recording industries sent warm Caribbean
sounds to receptive audiences in the cool Andean interior.56 On another level, foreign
influence on national and regional cultures remained strong, but a significant shift was
evident. Popular and middle-class Colombian cultures increasingly responded to foreign
influences that emanated not from Europe but from within the Americas. Beginning in
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the middle decades of the century, “Argentine tango, Mexican rancheras, the CubanMexican bolero…Afro-Caribbean dance music …soap operas and humor programs from
pre-Revolutionary Cuba” all found enthusiasts among non-elite Colombians. And
gradually over the course of that century, as Safford and Palacios assert, US popular
culture became the “archetype of mass culture in Colombia.” Because US popular culture
often reflected “egalitarian values,” it offered non-elite Colombians “a healthy
counterweight to the high culture of the traditional dominant classes.” 57
As detailed in subsequent chapters, US-sponsored BNCs in Colombia played an
important role in establishing US credentials in the realm of high culture and providing
some Latin American elites and intellectuals with an alternative to European cultural
forms. The early cultural programs of the Colombo-Americano in Bogotá, for example,
emphasized the literary achievements of the US and convinced some intellectuals, like
cultural columnist and poet Fernando Charry Lara, that in English-language literature US
works were “as important as the contributions of writers from Great Britain.” 58 At the
same time, BNCs also helped familiarize Colombians with elements of US popular and
middle-class culture. Focused on US democracy, education, entertainment, technology,
sports, recreation and consumer trends, cultural programs of the Colombo-Americano
presented and celebrated the daily life and the high standard of living in the US.
Reinforcing but also refining the image of the nation projected by transnational media
and commerce, the Colombo-Americano appeared at a time when Colombians across
class paid greater attention to US popular culture and lifestyle. That this attention
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diminished the status of French culture in the nation bothered Charry Lara and other
Francophiles. 59
When the Alianza Colombo-Francesa opened for French language courses and
lecture series in 1944, Bogotanos were already engaging with expanded and diversified
domestic and foreign cultural offerings. The monopoly of high cultural forms in shaping
and defining Colombian national culture was giving way, and, as a result, the days when
a French institute might singularly dominate the cultural landscape in the capital had
passed. Responding to this change, El Tiempo lamented that intellectuals and educated
Colombians were not embracing the new French cultural center: “It is completely
regrettable that the intellectuals of the capital have not realized the importance of the
development of the Alianza Colombo-Francesa, which was founded some months ago.”60
Over the course of that decade, the Alianza Colombo-Francesa in Bogotá would find its
audience and successfully established other chapters in the major cities of the country.
French cultural appeal remained strong. Yet French high culture, which many considered
(and few observers would have contested) “the most recognizable influence in
Colombian intellectual history,” now faced greater competition from other cultural
corners, both domestic and foreign. 61
Before World War II ended, Bogotá‟s cultural landscape had certainly lost some
of its traditional European flair. Since the 1930s, alternative Colombian and foreign
cultural forms had been gaining stature in the capital, and the war accelerated the pace of
59
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cultural change. With German cultural diplomacy suspended, French programs struggling
to attract crowds, and British initiatives increasingly limited by war finances, US cultural
diplomacy faced a less competitive international environment in the Andean capital. In a
matter of a few short years, the Centro Colombo-Americano de Bogotá had established a
formal US cultural presence and successfully integrated its programs into the cultural life
of the capital. Yet, a new challenge to US cultural stature was already forming. Before
the Cold War was even acknowledged, the Soviet Union ventured into cultural diplomacy
in Latin America. This alarmed many in Washington and Bogotá and, as later chapters
explore, would have definite implications for their nations‟ collaborative cultural
engagements.
Before the war, the intense anti-communism of the Colombian Catholic Church
and the Conservative party severely limited the viability of Soviet cultural activity in
Bogotá. With the war, the cultural climate moderated. Allowed by the Liberals, Soviet
culture enjoyed a brief period of tolerance in Colombia‟s capital. Concerts of
contemporary Russian music, additions of Soviet literature to the National Library‟s
collection, and more enthusiastic press attention to Soviet scientific achievements
followed.62 In 1945, the Soviet‟s formalized their cultural presence with the
establishment of the Instituto Cultural Colombo-Soviético [Colombian-Soviet Cultural
Institute]. Housed in the Soviet embassy, the institute was funded directly from Moscow
but a local board of advisors included prominent Colombian leftists and a future Liberal
president of the Republic. During its first year, the institute offered a Russian language
class, courses in Russian music, screenings of Soviet films, and variety of conferences
highlighting Soviet gender equality, industry, and literature. A small library included
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Russian works translated into Spanish, Spanish language writings on Russia, and a
section devoted to Colombian authors. In an attempt to reach organized labor, the
institute also organized some cultural activities outside the capital in smaller cities and
towns near oil fields and refineries.63
From the pages of the Revista Colombo-Soviética, an impressive monthly
magazine whose print quality far exceeded similar US or European offerings of the day,
the institute made clear its commitment to cultural reciprocity. Writings by both
Colombians and Soviets filled the pages of the magazine. Many articles emphasized
Soviet cultural interest in Latin America. Features showcased Spanish language teaching
in Moscow, books on Simón Bolivar recently translated into Russian, and profiles of
Colombian diplomats stationed in the USSR. However, pieces extolling Soviet modernity
and promoting it as a model to emulate were in the majority. 64
Like US cultural diplomats, the Soviets and their local supporters were interested
in combating Latin American stereotypes. Editorials, usually unsigned but asserting
Colombian authorship, called on the nation to rethink its negative attitudes about the
USSR. Noting the advances of the Soviets in political, scientific, industrial, agricultural,
military, and educational spheres, commentary argued that “it would be absurd not to
take advantage” [sería absordo desaprovechar] of the endless benefits of engagement
with the USSR. French and other European writers were explicitly blamed for a widelyheld but false image of Russia as “an immense prison, where millions of unfortunate
martyrs suffered cruel torture at the hands of an executioner motivated by nothing more
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than inflicting pain.” Mimicking the rhetoric of Pan Americanism with calls for mutual
understanding, the publication argued that time had come to “set aside those
interpretations and to understand each other face to face and in our own words.”65
Formal Soviet cultural diplomacy was short-lived in the Colombian Andes and in
the regional centers around its oil fields. As a new cycle of partisan violence plagued
Colombia at mid-century, international communism was the scapegoat that shouldered
the blame. With Conservatives back in power and a resultant resurgence in Church
political power, diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were severed in 1948. The
embassy and its institute were closed, and a formal Soviet diplomatic legation did not
return for twenty-years.
Conclusion
This chapter presented a macro-view of the emergence and early development of
US-sponsored cultural centers in Latin America and Colombia. Through entertainment
mass media and other forms of commerce some aspects of US culture were recognizable
in Andean Bogotá from the 1920s forward, but there was no formal US cultural presence
in the capital until the late 1930s. This absence was in stark contrast to the active cultural
diplomacy of European powers. With the development of the Colombo-Americano
cultural center, as well as the local American school, the US established an institutional
presence in Bogotá for the first time. These institutions were the infrastructure of the
new US cultural influence in the capital. Around mid-century, they encouraged and
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supported the shift in Colombian cultural orientation away from Europe and toward the
US.
Washington‟s support for cultural centers and schools grew out of concern for
strong European and especially Axis influence in Latin America as a whole. In Colombia,
as elsewhere, the war had the effect of limiting European cultural diplomacy and the US
was quick to take advantage of the times. Joining in cultural competition with European
allies and enemies, it established new institutional platforms from which its culture could
be projected. The original and all subsequent Colombo-Americano centers were,
however, locally controlled and structured by a commitment to cultural reciprocity. By
design, they were as much local/Colombian as foreign/US institutions. While they gave
the US an institutional presence in the nation, their programming responded to local
needs; around mid-century, educational opportunity was in high demand among urban
Colombians and Colombo-Americano centers proffered resources to meet that demand.
Such resources were available to elite Colombians, like librarian-diplomat Daniel Samper
Ortega, who were interested in directing modernization through educational and cultural
reforms. Yet, they were also accessible to members of the growing middle and
professional classes who were interested in constructing more personal pathways to
modernity. Importantly, and as will be argued throughout this dissertation, Colombia‟s
mid-century shift in cultural orientation had much to do with US engagement of these
non-elite classes.
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Chapter Five

Convergence: Colombo-Americano Culture
This chapter analyzes foreign/local encounters in the Centro Colombo-Americano
de Bogotá, and it demonstrates the growth in and diversity of US cultural influence in the
Colombian capital during the 1940s. Appearing during a period of accelerated cultural
change in the nation, the Colombo-Americano proffered alternatives to the traditional
models that framed Colombian education and culture. While elites who equated the US
with modernity were important supporters of the cultural center, the pronounced
participation of the capital‟s emerging middle and professional classes more broadly
signaled a new Colombian cultural orientation toward the US. Students, teachers, artists,
academics, intellectuals, journalists, librarians, career professionals, and business
employees responded enthusiastically to Colombo-Americano resources and adapted
them to their own needs. In the process, the center facilitated the spread of American
English, built infrastructure linking locals with higher education in the US, and displaced
traditional European influence in classrooms, on book shelves, and in visual and
performing arts venues. Fostering reconsideration of the US as a legitimate producer of
high culture was an important early success of the center, but programming also validated
the cultural practices and lifestyles of the US middle and popular classes. Locally
controlled and grounded in cultural reciprocity, the center was equally committed to the
exploration and diffusion of Colombian culture. At a time when Colombianidad was
openly contested and conflicts between tradition and modernity were playing out,
Colombo-Americano resources were well engaged by advocates of cultural change.
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While later chapters treat cultural encounters in the various ColomboAmericanos, American schools, and US-sponsored mass media programs in the
aggregate, the current chapter provides a more detailed analysis of the organization and
programs of the first binational center in Bogotá. The first half considers educational
programs and focuses on English language instruction and higher education placement
services. It demonstrates how each program responded to local demand while facilitating
broader Colombian familiarity with US culture and middle class modernity. The second
half of the chapter considers cultural programming more broadly by exploring lectures,
library services, visual arts, and music programs at the center. It demonstrates how
Colombian-US cultural encounters and transnational cultural connections developed
between individuals and communities in the US and Colombia. Together they evidence
the emergence of transnational educational and cultural communities as concrete
manifestations of the new Pan Americanism.
Pan American Classrooms: Colombo-Americano Educational Programming
While the local board oversaw the development of the Colombo-Americano in
Bogotá, a North American director was hired to manage day-to-day operations. In
Bogotá, as in most of the early centers, the directors were US citizens who had been
recruited with assistance from Washington and approved by the local board. Through the
1940s, many of the directors were academics drawn from English and foreign language
departments of US universities and colleges. Many served two years before returning to
teaching posts at home, but others moved on to similar positions at cultural centers in
other countries. 1 As new centers were opening across the region during that decade, there
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was plenty of demand for experienced directors. Through the 1960s, the salaries of many
of these directors were paid through US government grants to the institutions.
In the 1940s, the teaching staff of the Colombo-Americano was comprised of US,
Colombian, and third-country nationals. Most teachers taught part-time, but the few who
were professional language teachers had been recruited in Washington. As with the
directors, the salaries of these “grantee” teachers were paid through a US government
grant to the center‟s board. Importantly, however, these teachers were officially
employed by the local BNC. In surrendering employment authority over grantees to the
local board, the State Department wanted to avoid any impression that their recruits were
instruments of Washington policy. At the same time, the department held clear
expectations that the grantee teacher would help to interpret the US for foreign students
and, reciprocally, on return to the US make “a further contribution toward American
understanding of foreign countries.” 2 As compared to teaching salaries in the US, grantee
salaries were quite low. So in order to entice a wide pool of qualified candidates, the
department extended to them some of the in-country benefits provided to members of the
Foreign Service. Benefits did not include draft deferments for male teachers. 3
Of the seven teachers on staff at the opening of the Colombo-Americano in 1942,
two were full-time grantees and five were part-time “auxiliary” professors. At the end of
the decade as the demand for English courses grew, the staff of the center had increased
to eighteen professors of which four were grantees from the US and fourteen were locally
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hired auxiliaries (both full-time and part-time).4 Initially, many of those local hires were
drawn from among the families of US embassy personnel. Frequently, the wives of
Foreign Service officers assumed the role of teachers, and it was not unusual for the same
women to volunteer in the local American school. Other locally residing US citizens with
no affiliation to the embassy were also hired as teachers to help meet ever increasing
demand. Some were British, Canadian or other English-speaking foreign nationals. Some
were Colombians who had lived and learned English abroad. Many were the wives of
Colombian and resident US or European businessmen. 5 Few of the auxiliary professors
were trained teachers, and their periods of employment were often conditioned by their
husbands‟ transfers to other regions. For both of these reasons, turnover rates were quite
high among locally hired US and third-country nationals. However, English-speaking
Colombian educators who had lived in the US together with long-term US residents of
the capital quickly became the most desirable hires for the center. As compared to
teachers recruited in the US, these individuals were usually not professional educators.
Yet because they were more likely to remain employees over the course of several years,
professional development expenditures to train them in modern methods of second
language instruction were easy to justify. That they were already living in the local
community, understood Bogotano culture, and needed little cultural orientation added to
their appeal as employees.
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American English in Demand
From the beginning, language instruction was the essence of the ColomboAmericano‟s work. A basic objective of Washington‟s inter-American cultural diplomacy
was increasing the number of second language speakers of English, Spanish, and
Portuguese throughout the hemisphere. In the US, Rockefeller and the OIAA advocated
for and financially supported the study of Spanish, and to a lesser extent Portuguese, at
the secondary and university levels. They provided language education grants to schools,
colleges, and professional organizations as part of a broad effort to promote Pan
Americanism within the US. In Latin America, Rockefeller and his colleagues saw BNCs
as the most effective forum for meeting their language goals. In Bogotá, the board of
directors of the center concurred and believed there would never be “solid friendship
between the two countries without mutual understanding of the Spanish and English
languages.”6 English classes dominated the academic program, but courses in Spanish for
foreign residents were also offered. The center marketed the Spanish courses to the US
colony in Bogotá with front-page newspaper advertisements in English that asked “Have
you really tried to learn Spanish?” 7 Occasionally, in the spirit of Pan Americanism,
Portuguese courses were also offered. Still, through the 1940s and beyond, more than
90% of the language courses at the Colombo-Americano were English.
During and after World War II, English was replacing French as the global
language of business and diplomacy, and demand for English language instruction in
Latin America exploded. Clearly, through BNCs, the US encouraged and facilitated this
demand. Yet, if we examine the proliferation of English language courses in Colombia, it
6
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is obvious that demand for English instruction was also a function of contemporary
Colombian education reforms. Under Liberal reforms, both public and private secondary
school classrooms were subject to greater oversight by the inspectors of the Ministry of
National Education. National curriculum standards had been established under
Conservative ministers in the 1920s, but when it came to enforcement, much deference
had been shown to private schools (especially Catholic). Beginning in the 1930s,
however, all private school programs received new scrutiny, and the approval of
secondary programs by inspectors of the ministry was required for the awarding a
bachillerato certificate. Battles ensued over educational authority between Liberals and
the Church. As relates to this discussion, curriculum standards implemented and enforced
by Liberals placed new emphasis on English as a language of study in all secondary
schools throughout the country. Significantly, over the course of a decade, French, the
traditional second language taught to Colombian elites, was officially displaced by
English as the primary foreign language taught in the nation‟s secondary schools.
Though many elite schools previously required some study of English, it was
introduced as a subject requirement for all secondary schools in the 1930s. By the early
1940s when six years of French were obligatory for the bachillerato, the English
requirement had been increased to four years of study. Greater change came in 1945. At
that time, the English requirement was increased to a total of six years as the study of
French was reduced to four years. In presenting these changes the Ministry of National
Education aimed at establishing “English as the principal language so that students will
learn to speak it, write it and translate it, and leaving French as secondary, with the
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exclusive aim of [a student] being able to translate it correctly.” 8 Thus, as secondary
education was expanding in Colombia and becoming more accessible to non-elite classes,
greater numbers of Colombians began to learn English rather than French. Of course the
reach of the secondary schools remained limited and enforcement of curriculum
standards in private Catholic schools was still challenged, yet the rise of English was
clear. The shift toward English and away from French directly benefited the new
Colombo-Americano in the capital. As center director Clifford Prator reported
enthusiastically to colleagues throughout the Americas, “for the first time in the history of
Colombian education, English will be given the preference over French.” 9 Back in
Washington, the new changes were positively noted as well. 10
The immediate impact of the new English requirements was seen in demand for
qualified English teachers and English teaching materials in Colombian public and
private schools. There were simply were not enough qualified English teachers in the
nation, so many institutions and educators turned to the Colombo-Americano for
assistance. Some institutions sought to contract the center‟s teachers for their schools,
others asked for assistance in locating teachers, and some arranged to send entire classes
to the center for instruction. 11 The Instituto Colombo-Británico was also an English
language resource in the city, but it is noteworthy that those who turned to ColomboAmericano commonly stated a preference to learn American rather than British English.
Letters expressed a common sentiment that learning English with US teachers “would be
8
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more practical.”12 Similar sentiment was also expressed in requests received by the center
for English teaching materials or for assistance in securing such materials. Colombian
school administrators and teachers frequently noted that British materials were readily
available to them, but they were more interested in materials that engaged the “type of
timely English spoken in the United States” rather than the “classical” English spoken by
the British.13 Thus, as the first Colombo-Americano was emerging, its institutional
position was strengthened by new demand for English instruction and resources. As it
developed English programs around the new secondary school language requirements, it
was in a position to simultaneously promote American over British English among
Colombians.
To assist the Ministry of National Education with the growing need for English
instructors in the nation‟s schools, the center developed programs of professional
development for educators. Private group courses were taught to foreign language and
other faculties from universities and colegios throughout the city. Indicative of the
continuing dominance of the Church in secondary education, many of the participating
students in such private courses were priests and nuns. Additionally, beginning in 1943, a
free seminar was offered to Colombian teachers of English. The goal of the seminar, as
agreed upon between the ministry and the center‟s board, was to increase the number of
qualified Colombian teachers of English and improve their quality of instruction. Held
annually in the 1940s during the traditional December to February school vacation,
between 60-80 Colombian teachers of English came to the center for the month long
seminar. Members of the staff, both US and Colombian teachers, served as the instructors
12
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for the seminar. The ministry formally encouraged schools to send their teachers, and its
officials led some of the courses, lectures, and discussions. A representative of the
Instituto Colombo-Británico occasionally participated by giving a lecture on British
authors or the differences between American and British English, but overall British
participation was limited. Initially, most of the enrolled teachers were residents of
Bogotá, but as demand for the course grew in other regions, the center and the ministry
initiated travel grants to bring more teachers to Bogotá. Eventually as new ColomboAmericanos appeared, such courses would be repeated in regions throughout the
country.14 Seminars for English teachers were important to improving language teaching
quality in the nation‟s schools and many students learned from teachers who completed
the Colombo-Americano seminar. Still, a number of them chose to supplement the
instruction they received in their schools by enrolling directly in classes at the center.
From its inaugural date well into the 1960s, there was higher demand for English
classes than the center could meet. At the start in September 1942, there were 250
students.15 By the second semester, six months later, the center enrolled 600 students and
was filled to capacity. 16 As enrollments rose, the size of the original building limited the
growth of the student population. The center‟s director noted in 1944, classes were
“absolutely full” and it was “impossible to increase the number of courses or the number
of hours of courses due to physical space.”17 By the end of the 1940s, the center had
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moved twice to progressively larger rental spaces and annual enrollment averaged over
1,500 students. In less than a decade, more than 12,000 Colombians had studied
American English in the Bogotá center.18 Demand for English instruction continued
apace into the next decade and soon convinced the center‟s board to initiate construction
of a large building to serve as its permanent home.
During the 1940s, Colombo-Americano English classes were offered at the
elementary, intermediate, advanced, and conversational levels. In addition, there was a
class in perfecting English for those who aimed for fluency. 19 Special English classes for
children ages six to ten were offered using “modern methods with games, songs, [and]
rhythmic band.”20 Indicative of growing use of English in business, beginner and
advanced courses in commercial English and shorthand were offered for those with
existing English language skills and these classes faced especially high demand.
Additionally, special English courses were tailored to the needs of professional groups
such as doctors, nurses, dentists, lawyers, and engineers. 21
Middle-class students would eventually form the overwhelming majority of the
student population at all Colombo-Americanos, but initial tuition rates at the first center
were actually cost-prohibitive for much of that class. In 1942, members of the board were
hesitant to compete openly for students with the Instituto Colombo-Británico. The US
had recently entered the war, and board members were sensitive to maintaining Allied
unity at the local level. They heeded appeals from the US ambassador to avoid direct
18
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competition with the British. Thus, tuition and fees were initially set on par with those at
the British institute. At the same time, the board made clear it intended to serve a broader
segment of the city‟s population than its British counterpart. Reiterating its goal of
reaching all economic classes, the board called for gradual introduction of a tuition
schedule geared toward the middle and popular classes. 22 Over the course of its first
couple years, as the Instituto Colombo-Británico experience increasing demand for its
higher priced courses, the Colombo-Americano diversified its course offerings and
established tuition rates with the emerging middle classes in mind. Owing to its better
price points as well as the post-war budgetary limits of the British Council, the ColomboAmericano‟s growth outpaced that of the Instituto Colombo-Británico by the early
1950s.23
In the first years, average Colombo-Americano students were twenty to thirty
years old. Almost all were secondary school graduates, and many were university
students or graduates who were starting professional careers. 24 Notably, many of these
students would have graduated from secondary programs before English officially
displaced French as the primary foreign language in the national curriculum. Thus, as the
use of English in business and commerce was increasing, many who had not learned (or
only marginally learned) the language in their schooling turned to the center to improve
their language skills. In 1944, approximately 50% of the students were business

22

“Acta #6, 13 Sept. 1942, Actas1, CCA/Bogotá MSS.
Although the British Council maintained a presence in Colombia and were active in cultural
programming, each of the five centers it opened in the 1940s closed in the decade after the war. A post-war
recession was blamed. Several of the language institutes reopened and closed again over the following
decades. Since 1981, an Instituto Colombo-Británico has functioned in Bogotá. Instituto ColomboBritánico, The British Council in Colombia (Bogotá: The British Council, 2000), pp. 15-17.
24
“El Centro Colombo Americano una Institción (sic) Panamericana,” La Nueva Generación 1, no. 5
(Marzo 1943); “600 Alumnos Aprenden Idiomas en el Colombo-Americano,” El Espectador (Bogotá), 5
May 1943.
23

256

employees, owners of small businesses or independently employed professionals.
Another 30% were recent secondary school graduates seeking to sharpen their language
skills and improve their chances of securing business employment. 25
Simultaneous with the demand for classrooms and instructors, the need for
English language textbooks and other instructional materials multiplied during the war
years. While US publishers would soon respond to these market demands, initially the
Colombo-Americano (like Colombian secondary schools), had little choice but to rely on
locally available materials that had been produced or published in Britain. England
Calling was then the official English language text recommended by the Colombian
Ministry of National Education and was a compilation of readings for the English learner.
It focused heavily on British culture and geography. The coordination committee in
Barranquilla, then organizing English classes of its own, called it “propaganda” and along
with many others encouraged the OIAA to make US-content teaching materials available
to Colombian schools. 26 Locally available materials, framed with British cultural
references, also proved unacceptable for Bogotá‟s new center. The director stressed to the
OIAA, State Department, and private US publishers that the center was “desperate for
teaching materials” with American and not British content.27
As an immediate fix, the OIAA and State Department offered grants for the
publication of instructional pamphlets that teachers at the center were already creating for
their classes. Similar grants were provided to publish short textbooks written by US
university professors who were on State Department sponsored exchanges with
25
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Colombian universities. These materials were always sold to the students at cost and such
pricing was a key to attracting the middle class. Materials produced in-house helped keep
book fees lower than at the Instituto Colombo-Británico, which sold more elaborate,
more aesthetically appealing but more costly London-published textbooks to its
students.28 While US publishing houses soon responded to the new market for teaching
English-as-a-foreign-language, the Colombo-Americano in Bogotá continued to produce
high-quality and cheaply priced instructional materials. Indeed, across the decades it
became a textbook resource for BNCs throughout the Americas. 29
From an instructional materials standpoint, the principal method for introducing
US cultural content into the teaching of English was the adaptation of US prose for use in
anthologies and exercise booklets for students. Multiple staff-produced texts featured
short stories by US authors condensed into simplified English form. 30 Another method of
injecting US content into English instruction was creating classroom materials that
focused on day-to-day living in the US and presented the student with visions of US
lifestyle. In this category, the most commonly used text was Life with the Taylors by
James McGillivray. 31 McGillivray, who was director of the center in Bogotá from 19471949, expanded a series of mimeographed lessons that he had created for use in his
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classes and published it locally in 1948. Life with the Taylors was subsequently published
in the US, and throughout the 1950s its multiple editions were widely distributed to
BNCs in Latin America and beyond.
In Life with the Taylors, storylines and dialogues chronicle a year in the life of a
“typical” American family of five living in generic Mayville. Janet and Jim Taylor were
the parents of three children. In the course of a typical day, Janet spent her time preparing
meals, running the household, and shopping. Jim worked for a downtown advertising
agency. He had a secretary who took lots of shorthand, and a wife who was waiting with
a meal when he came home for lunch. In the course of the year, eldest son Phil attended
college, worked a summer job and fell in love. Mary, the sophisticated daughter, took her
high school studies seriously and occupied her free time with homework, babysitting,
dating, and reading Good Housekeeping magazine. Young Bobby, an elementary school
student, got into plenty of mischief and added comic relief to the narrative.
Complementing family dialogues, topical sections provided further explanation of US
customs. Family and neighborhood life, civic holidays, and popular sports were detailed
for the student.
As a representation of a post-war “American” family, the Taylors fit a US
constructed and popular stereotype of its middle class. They were white and financially
comfortable. Suburban not urban, they projected no ethnicity but a strong sense of
nationality. They lived a modern lifestyle with technology reaching into the family home
through kitchen appliances, telephone lines, and an automobile in the driveway. The
contemporaneously exploding US consumer culture provided the Taylors with multiple
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shopping options and readily available credit. Their lives were safe and happy and the
challenges they faced seem trivial.
On balance, the presentation of the Taylors did not challenge the then popular
Latin American stereotypes of the US as a modern, efficient, and consumer-driven
society. Indeed, the US of the Taylor family was proudly all of these things. However,
where Life with the Taylors did begin to challenge Latin American notions of the US was
in showcasing a middle-class family, their values and culture. At a time when many
Colombians‟ sense of US culture was built from Hollywood films and the newsreels that
accompanied them on the screen, the representation of US culture in the text stood in
sharp distinction from moving images of wealthy tycoons, glamorous and seductive stars,
rugged cowboys, spectacular cities, and criminal gangs. Through the text, the student saw
that life in the US revolved around the family unit, that educational resources were
plentiful and broadly dispersed, and that democratic governance provided individuals
with freedom and choices. The text placed particular emphasis upon education; at the
center of middle-class culture, education was highly valued by the Taylor family, their
local community and the nation in general. High school graduation was expected of each
child and a university education was encouraged for both sexes. Not surprisingly, the text
avoided reference to race segregation and other inequalities that then plagued the US
education system; as the question of education and race made its way through the US
court system and the post-war civil rights movement coalesced at the schoolhouse door,
Life with the Taylors simply explained that the “the Federal Government of the United
States does not interfere in any way with public education within the states.”32 The text
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additionally avoided a discussion of religion in the US. Between historically Catholic
Latin America and the majority Protestant US, religion served as a cultural divide; thus,
while explicitly defining the US as a Christian country, no mention was made of
Protestantism.
Significantly, in Life with the Taylors there is no high culture on display. Classical
arts were nowhere to be seen while many were the manifestations of popular culture and
customs. The Taylors‟ lived in a musical world filled with contemporary orchestras for
adults, teenage dance records, school marching bands and parades. The Taylor children
read American literature in school, but in their free time popular magazines were more
common. Football games and cheering crowds, surprise birthday parties with cakes and
candles, Halloween costumes and Christmas trees revealed the cultural flavor of the
family‟s middle-class life. Used consistently at each of the Centros Colombo-Americanos
into the 1960s (as well as BNCs throughout Latin America), McGillivray‟s text was
adapted to all levels. But with its strong emphasis on US educational and middle-class
cultures, it was mostly used with intermediate and advanced students that planned
university studies in the US.
Cultural Detour: A New Route to Higher Education
Few Latin American students chose to study at US universities before World War
II, but as new educational communities were built under the new Pan Americanism the
numbers grew rapidly. In 1939, just 6,670 foreign students attended US universities and
colleges. Ten years later in 1949, the total was 26,500. Within that four-fold increase, the
number of Latin American students grew five-fold.33 These figures signaled a new and
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accelerating trend in global higher education; the US was becoming an education
destination for the world. Within the following five decades, the number of international
students annually studying in US colleges and universities reached the half million mark.
While Asian students accounted for more than 50% of the new total, the number of Latin
American students also grew substantially. By the start of the twenty-first century, more
than 68,000 Latin Americans were annually enrolled in post-secondary programs across
the US. Significantly, Colombian students, who from the start demonstrated pronounced
enthusiasm for US higher education, accounted for 12% of the Latin American total.
Only Mexico and Brazil sent higher numbers of university students to the US. 34
The initial increases in Latin American enrollments in US higher education
resulted in part from OIAA domestic programs that encouraged educators to take up the
charge of Pan Americanism; increased dialogue, collaboration, and exchanges between
academics in the US and Latin America created transnational links among educational
communities that fostered student movement between North and South. The newly
elevated status of English in education, commerce and diplomacy in the hemisphere also
contributed to the growth. But, more significant in the initial enrollment boom were the
transnational educational effects of the war in Europe.
World War II temporarily prevented Latin American students from traveling to
and enrolling in European universities. In Colombia, where demand for space in
universities was increasing alongside secondary school graduation rates, the closure of
routes to Europe exacerbated that domestic demand. At the same time, paths to US
universities became more accessible than ever. The US High School Movement of the
34
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first third of the century had spurred a boom in post-secondary enrollments and led to the
founding of new institutions. But, the war in Europe negatively impacted enrollments.
With men drafted into the military and women going to work in war-related industries,
many of the smaller liberal arts, junior, and technical colleges were closing or on the
verge of bankruptcy. Even before the draft age was lowered to eighteen, many such
institutions experienced enrollment drops between 30 and 50%. Enrollments were also
down at larger, well-established institutions. 35 Attracting Latin American students was
one way to offset negative enrollment figures, and because doing so supported the
general scheme of US cultural diplomacy, the process was facilitated by the federal
government.
BNCs in Latin America played a significant though little recognized role in
preparing students from the region for US higher education. In Bogotá in the early 1940s,
the Colombo-Americano‟s first teaching staff was overwhelmed by the interests of
Colombians in US colleges and universities. The teachers unexpectedly found themselves
in the role of educational advisers as both Colombians interested in US education and US
educational institutions interested in attracting students sought their counsel. 36 Through
the 1940s, the center developed as a local servicing center for a growing number of
scholarships offered by US colleges and universities; typical of its locally grounded
approach, it established a scholarship committee with joint US and Colombian
representation to make determinations and recommendations about candidates. Various
US vocational, industrial and professional training programs also turned to the center to
attract foreign applicants. As local requests for information on US institutions multiplied,
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the center‟s library gathered and maintained an up-to-date collection of university
catalogs. The center also offered US institutions a suite of applicant screening services
including written and oral English proficiency exams and local reference checking.37
With the assistance of the center, eighty-one US educational scholarships were awarded
to Colombians in its first two years, and dozens of additional students were assisted prior
to their acceptances into US educational institutions.38
In its quest for modernity, the Colombian government encouraged this new wave
of foreign scholarships and educational exchanges. Acknowledging limited educational
resources at home, it took an active role in scholarship oversight.39 Hoping to enlist
foreign educated Colombians into the Liberal modernity project, the Ministry of National
Education established a Council of Foreign Scholarships in 1944 to disseminate
information, publicize opportunities, approve candidates, and supervise recipients. So
direct benefits to the nation might be assured, the new council required candidates to
demonstrate both fluency in the language of the nation where they intended to study and
a commitment to return to Colombia upon completion of their academic program. 40
Demonstrating the collaborative relationship that had developed between the ColomboAmericano and Colombian government cultural mangers, the scholarship committee at
the center enthusiastically supported the goals of the Council of Foreign Scholarships.
They offered English language proficiency exams for some applicants, provided English
language classes to others, and by the late 1940s required scholarship recipients to
37
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formally declare their intention to return to Colombia and work in their chosen field. 41
Constructing Pan American Culture: Colombo-Americano Cultural Programming
While language learning and university preparation constituted much of the
activity at the center, the goal of mutual understanding also structured an ambitious
cultural agenda. Extensive cultural programming during the first decade attracted many
non-students to the center. By the late 1940s, when annual course enrollment totaled over
1,500 students, more than 15,000 people were annually in attendance at ColomboAmericano cultural events outside of course requirements.42 Significantly, these
programs were just as likely to be Colombian as US-themed, and programs and
presentations were as often in Spanish as in English. In an attempt to avoid the onedirectional cultural promotion they associated with European cultural diplomacy, the
OIAA and State Department structured cultural reciprocity and binational leadership into
the organizational design. Such balanced cultural programming fostered new
transnational relationships that helped redefine Colombian-US cultural relations around
mid-century. It gave substance to the tenuous notion of broad Pan American culture.
While cultural reciprocity conditioned programming, goals of both US cultural
diplomacy and Colombian educational and cultural reforms were never far from the
surface. From the US perspective, programs fomented and solidified positive impressions
about the US among Colombians. The Colombo-Americano provided cultural venues
useful for confronting common stereotypes about the US, and a clear priority in the early
days was dismantling the widely-held notion that the US was devoid of culture. To
establish credibility in the elite cultural circles of the capital, some programs illuminated
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US appreciation of European high culture. Europe, after all, was common cultural ground
for both nations and recognizing shared historical roots was helpful toward building Pan
American identity. Yet, the louder argument made through the programs of the first
decade was that US culture had matured, gained independence and was now distinct from
its European roots; simultaneously, this discourse was explicitly distancing modern Latin
America from European culture as well. Much of the cultural programming at the center
moved beyond the narrow limits of European high culture and showcased representative
forms of US and Latin American popular culture. At the core of this broader view of
culture was a validation of modern, middle-class lifestyle.
Colombo-Americano programming put both traditional and contemporary
Colombian cultural forms on a high-profile stage and celebrated them. Many programs
were presented with the collaboration of the Ministry of National Education. Actively
constructing a more inclusive frame of Colombianidad to strengthen national unity and
facilitate their modernization agenda, Liberal cultural managers --officials of the Ministry
of National Education and cultural institutions it supported-- took full advantage of the
resources of the center. Certainly, European-influenced high culture remained a constant
theme in collaborative efforts, yet ministry-sponsored performances also began to
recognize and offer selective validation of popular culture. Dance and musical forms of
the Andean interior that could be packaged as authentic and folkloric --and were not, in
the opinion of Liberal cultural managers, commercialized, unsophisticated, or foreign in
origin--were deemed worthy of sponsorship. Still, the ministry had no monopoly over the
Colombo-Americano cultural stage, and the center opened its door to independent
performers, artists and organizations. In Bogotá, but especially outside the capital where
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the newer Colombo-Americanos had less collaboration with the ministry, programming
demonstrated active contemporary contestation over the meaning of Colombianidad. That
the Church and the elite (both inside and outside government) had lost the power to filter
national culture was evident. In this transformative process, cultural manifestations of
modernity, though they might be foreign in origin, commercialized, or considered
unsophisticated by the elite, were granted new respect.
Cultural programs at the Colombo-Americano centered around four activities.
First, lectures were presented in English and Spanish on various topics to both specialized
and general audiences. Second, a lending library was established and maintained not only
in support of academic programs but as a resource for the local community as well.
Third, a public art gallery at the center hosted exhibitions and sponsored art shows
around the city. Finally, an active music program supported local Colombian musicians
and introduced US trends through live and recorded performances. A brief analysis of
each of these activities follows.
Lectures: Defining Colombian and US Cultures
Lectures (or charlas) at the Colombo-Americano were free of charge and open to
the general public. Scheduled in late afternoon and early evening to attract professionals
and office workers, they covered diverse cultural topics and were presented in either
English or Spanish. During the war years, most lectures were explicitly framed by the
rhetoric of Pan Americanism and hemispheric unity. Introductions to lectures by the
center‟s director or a board member, commonly celebrated the new Pan American
approach to cultural collaboration, resource sharing, and open dialogue.
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Four types of lectures were common. First, the center‟s US teaching staff
developed lectures for English language learners. The goal of these short lectures was to
improve listening skills, and they were “slowly and carefully pronounced” in simplified
English that new language learners could understand. 43 Both students of the center and
students of English in the general public were encouraged to attend. Most frequently, the
topic was the geography and culture of the presenter‟s home region in the US. Such
lectures proved so popular that they were often repeated to accommodate high demand.
At times they were even scheduled at locations away from the center, like the National
Library, that could hold larger crowds. Not surprisingly, these lecturers usually avoided
potentially controversial references to race and religion while painting a portrait of
middle-class modernity in their home region. Following the lecture, all participants were
encouraged to practice conversational English at socials in the center‟s tea room.
A second type of lecture was presented by other US citizens who were visiting
Colombia in professional capacities. Lecturers in this category included individuals
contracted by Washington for BNC speaking tours, professors teaching at local
universities, graduate students conducting academic research, and US cultural diplomats.
Topics varied. The case of lecturer Arthur Aiton is illustrative. A professor of HispanicAmerican history at University of Michigan, Aiton was contracted by the State
Department and sent to Colombia to present a series of twenty-four lectures on US and
Latin American history. Aiton presented twelve lectures in each language over the course
of a month. The lectures were popular with university students and academics, but Aiton
drew a general audience as well with lectures on “Spanish Frontiers in the United States
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Today” and “The Role of the United States in the History of Latin America.” 44 Aiton‟s
charlas fit a general pattern of lectures at the center that highlighted commonalities in
colonial histories and cultural development within the Americas. When such lectures
addressed historical controversies in US-Latin American relations, they commonly
balanced explicit acknowledgement of past abuses with enthusiasm for the mutual
understanding of the present.
There was no shortage of US academics in Latin America in the 1940s, and BNC
lecture programs demonstrated the depth of US academic interest in the region. Since the
turn of the century and the opening of the Panama Canal, research in the region had
increased markedly. Encouraged by the PAU, private philanthropic foundations and
business interests through the 1920s, US academics and other observers in South
America embarked on what Ricardo Salvatore calls an “enterprise of knowledge” --a
quest to document and understand the little known region that in turn legitimized the
expanding US presence.45 With the Pan Americanism of the Good Neighbor years, direct
US government funding and administrative support increased the volume, accelerated the
pace, and diversified the foci of academic research. In Colombia, the national
government took steps to facilitate these transnational academic ties because they were
engaged in their own “enterprise of knowledge”; in attempting to build national unity and
legitimize the central state, it was crucial to have more knowledge about the diverse
regions, resources, and cultures of the nation. In 1936, recognizing a dearth of knowledge
and the inability of the nation‟s existing educational infrastructure to remedy it, Liberals
44
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determined to encourage and work more closely with foreign research missions. New
regulations encouraged foreign researchers to come to Colombia but placed such
missions under greater supervision so the government could take full advantage of their
findings.46 Research in scientific fields was most desirable because Liberal reforms
equated science with modernity. But research in the humanities and social sciences was
also welcomed to the extent that it might contribute to education reform and wider
framing of national culture. Government cultural managers, for example, gave particular
credit to US universities and philanthropic foundations for expanding their knowledge of
the nation‟s Indian past.47 Thus, it was not unusual for the Ministry of National Education
and its cultural division to cosponsor lectures by US researchers at the center.
The third most common type of lecture was delivered by Colombian nationals and
focused on contemporary aspects of either US or Colombian society. More often in
Spanish than in English, these lectures were always open to public and heavily promoted
in the press. As many of these lecturers were influential members of government or
professional communities, verbatim printings of their talks frequently appeared in
newspapers. Through the first decade, approximately half of the lecturers had visited the
US under OIAA or State Department grants that brought Latin American leaders and
academics to the US to familiarize them with US culture and trends in their professional
fields. From 1940 to 1949, more than five hundred distinguished Latin Americans visited
the US on these grants. Prominent among grantees were Colombian ministers of
government, newspaper editors, historians, directors of museums, engineers and
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lawyers. 48 These grants continued well into the Cold War under the auspices of various
diplomatic bureaucracies, and by 1971 more than 1,500 Colombian professors, research
scholars, business and government leaders had taken official tours of the US. 49 On return
to Colombia, many participants related their experiences in lectures, books, newspaper
articles, and on radio shows. Lectures at the Colombo-Americano were not required of
grantees, but they were encouraged by the State Department. Lectures by these grantees
as well as Colombians who had visited the US privately revealed developing
transnational dialogues, networks and resource sharing between professional and other
cultural communities in both countries.
By interpreting US culture and society for Bogotano audiences, Colombian
lecturers facilitated a reconsideration of commonly held stereotypes about the US. Given
the level of press coverage many of these lecturers garnered, positive reflections on the
contemporary US received wide circulation in Colombia. While fascination with US
accomplishments in science, particularly feats in engineering, had long been evident
among the educated class, most commentators had tended to compartmentalize such
achievements from the culture which produced them. Capital and markets, the standard
assessment went, drove the achievements of US modernity. Yet in the observations
presented in Colombo-Americano lectures by grantees and non-grantees alike, greater
appreciation of and interest in the cultural underpinnings of US modernity is clear.
Speaking at a center sponsored event for the Colombian Society of Architects, celebrated
architect Jorge Arango Sanin marveled at the success of Tennessee Valley Authority in
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taking an “immense, abandoned, uncultivated region” [un inmensa, abandonada e inculta
región] and making it one of “astonishing fertility” [asombrosa fertilidad]. Notably, he
attributed the achievement to a US culture of democracy which aimed to improve the
quality of life for all citizens through planning and engineering. 50 Attempting to move his
audience beyond stereotypes, Dr. Carlos Lozano y Lozano suggested in an “Introduction
to American Life” that a duality of pragmatism and idealism merged the sciences and arts
in US culture. The Colombian diplomat, who had been educated in Rome and Paris and
had represented his government in various European capitals, returned from a tour of the
US lauding the extent to which North American communities prioritized education. He
argued that the national culture in the US was characterized by a “happy and optimistic
spirit” [espíritu de alegria y optimismo] and that broad public support of educational
initiatives structured the public‟s optimism for modernity. 51 Lozano y Lozano echoed
new found respect for the culture of education in the US that other Colombian observers
had begun to articulate. Journalist Roberto García Peña of El Tiempo argued that…
Americans believe in education and believe above all in free education that is
available to all those that seek it, without limits. Not only available for those that
want it but obligatory for those who don‘t want it. The school is a typical
American symbol, more typical than the warship or the tank.52
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While such commentary infrequently acknowledged the racial and regional inequalities
that plagued the US education system, it demonstrated new Colombian interest in the US
as an educational model and the reconsideration of existing cultural stereotypes.
Finally, the fourth and most common category of lecture featured discussions of
the literary works and traditions of both nations. Celebration of literary canons had been a
central element of pre-war European cultural diplomacy in Colombia and throughout
Latin America. As the Colombo-Americano attempted to displace European cultural
dominance in the Andean capital, it engaged in similar promotion of its own literature. In
the spirit of cultural reciprocity, Colombian literature was equally celebrated and
explored. Typical in the early years was the very first cycle of literary lectures given at
the center in February 1943. The series of four lectures on poetry was delivered in
Spanish and featured the works of two Colombians, one Latin American, and one US
poet. All but one lecture was presented by a Colombian. 53 In addition to individual
lectures on literary figures and their works, there were also semester-long literature
courses on both US and Colombian literary themes.54
Public explorations of US and Colombian literature provided an opportunity to
assert North and South American achievement in a realm of high culture historically
dominated by Europeans. At the same time, for US cultural diplomats literature served as
a vehicle for presenting the diversity and complexity of US culture, confronting Latin
American stereotypes of the US, and constructing a transnational literary canon in
support of Pan Americanism. Thus did Herschell Brickell, cultural attaché for the US
embassy in Bogotá in the early 1940s, suggest novels for Colombians in which they
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would see North Americans as more than a “standardized people” who were “completely
regulated by” chain newspapers, radio, movies, and transportation. A former New York
Times literary critic, Brickell was well versed in Latin American literary traditions and
loudly credited literature with expanding his knowledge and enthusiasm for Colombian
culture. He encouraged Colombians to use US literature to a similar end because it
manifests the “infinite variety of life” in the US.55 Declaring that the US had, through
“blood and sweat,” created its own literature “pretty well leaving behind the patterns of
the Mother Country,” he proudly celebrated the contemporary popularity of US authors
in England.56 Brickell‟s assertion --that US literature and culture was no longer
dependent on European tradition and trends-- was reiterated in Colombo-Americano
cultural programming throughout the decade. It resonated in Bogotá because Colombia
was then reconsidering its own cultural dependencies on Europe.
US Cultural Influence: A View from Library Shelves
While literary lectures (and the press coverage they were given) were effective
methods of introducing US and Colombian literature to wider audiences, to achieve
deeper understanding of each nation‟s literature more people would have to read it. Yet,
as Daniel Samper‟s wife had discovered in the late 1930s, works by US authors or books
covering US themes were hardly available in Colombia. In the US, where growing
academic and public interest in Latin America was on the rise, the situation was no better;
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Colombian and Latin American literature was equally unknown and largely unavailable
to interested parties. 57
As new emphasis was placed on English language studies in the curriculum of
Colombian secondary schools, the need for reading materials in English increased. As
noted previously, basic level language textbooks and readers were in short supply. More
advanced students of English needed novels. To the rector of the National University,
novels were a “true vehicle of culture” [verdadero vehículo de cultura] and he
encouraged university students to read English and American literature in their original
language. 58 However, in a nation with a literacy rate well below 50%, successful second
language acquisition would logically be limited to a select student population. In
promoting mutual understanding through literature then, cultural policymakers from both
nations recognized that reaching wide audiences required that works be translated into
others‟ national languages.
Beginning in the 1940s, the OIAA fueled an increased movement of translated
books within the Americas, both from North to South and South to North. Responding to
calls from many educational quarters, both the OIAA and State Department issued grants
to individuals and publishers for the translation of major works by US writers into
Spanish and Portuguese and, reciprocally, Latin American works into English. In doing
so, they funded the construction and projection of a contemporary US literary canon
abroad and a Latin American canon in the US. In the process, a broader Pan American
canon also began to emerge, and it provided important literary alternatives to the
European classics for educators and students throughout the Americas. While BNC
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libraries were not the exclusive repositories of the translated US books that began to
appear in Latin America, they were a primary beneficiary of OIAA translation efforts.
BNC libraries were a major component of early cultural outreach in Latin
America, and they were well received in Colombia. Prior to the education reforms of the
1930s, Colombian libraries were few in number and almost exclusively academic in
content. Housed in universities and private clubs of the elite, access was restricted and
patronage low. Under Liberal education reforms, enthusiasm for public libraries grew
alongside literacy campaigns; they were celebrated as infrastructure of modernity. As
literacy became a national priority, the Ministry of National Education embarked on an
ambitious program to put reading materials within greater reach of the citizenry. Through
the 1930s, several hundred village libraries [bibliotecas aldeanas] and mobile truckbased libraries appeared in the nation. Such libraries were small, had limited collections,
and did not lend books; they mainly served as distribution points for government print
materials. Poorly funded after their establishment, most of these libraries disappeared
during middle decades of the 20th century. 59 Still, it is significant that US-sponsored
libraries first appeared in Colombia at a time when enthusiasm for their development ran
high. From both the US and Colombian perspectives, libraries were crucial institutions of
modernity. 60
The library of the Colombo-Americano began as a collection of 900 books in a
small room in the center.61 A commitment to cultural reciprocity was embedded in the
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library‟s development, and the board attempted to maintain parity on the shelves; indeed,
the stated goal of the center director was to add one Colombian book for each US
publication it stocked.62 While this balance was not maintained after the first years,
Spanish language books and other print media always remained a significant part of the
library‟s collection. By 1946, for example, when the collection included over 4000
volumes and 70 magazines/newspapers subscriptions, approximately one-third of these
materials were in Spanish. 63
Compared to most Colombian libraries, the Colombo-Americano library
presented an organizational model suited to the information demands of an increasingly
literate society. Designed with liberal borrowing privileges and open stacks, it extended
wide public access in a city, country and region where closed stacks, limited book
circulation, and intentionally limited patronage were the norm. The library employed the
Dewey Decimal classification system and introduced modern storage technologies, such
as microfilm. Additionally, library staffing projected the gendered pattern of US
librarianship into Colombia; women constituted the entire library staff. Revealing a
transnational gendering of the profession that was then in process, Semana magazine
concluded library science was “one of the best careers for women, but, perhaps the least
known in Colombia.”64 Overall, the library design reflected US trends in the emerging
field of library science.
Within the US, the Library of Congress and the American Library Association
provided technical guidance and institutional support for the development of community
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libraries. With grants to these organizations from the Pan American Union, these
programs had extended to libraries in Latin America in the decades between the world
wars. Later, as Washington‟s formal program of cultural diplomacy took shape, the
OIAA and State Department opened three sizeable US libraries in the region, awarded
grants for the development of BNC libraries, and offered US scholarships for Latin
Americans women to train in librarianship. 65 They also funded visits of US librarians to
the region, organized workshops for professional development, and in Colombia directly
aided the establishment of library schools. 66 For these projects, Washington continued to
rely on the staffs of the Library of Congress and the American Library Association.
As at other BNCs in Latin America, the Colombo-Americano library supported
language learning courses by providing quiet study space along with reference and
reading materials to language course students. However, the staff made tremendous
efforts to attract patrons from the broader community and especially the emerging
professional classes. For a nominal fee, locals could become socios [members] with full
library privileges and access to all cultural programs. 67 There were special membership
rates for academics, university and secondary students, intellectuals, and locally residing
US citizens. Additionally, reference collections were developed around the needs of
educators, physicians, engineers, dentists, and lawyers. 68
During World War II, demand for technical and science texts was especially
pronounced in Colombia, and the library had little trouble attracting professionals and
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professionals-in-training as patrons.69 Historically, European textbooks were used in
Colombian university, professional and technical-training programs. Often, French texts
were used in their original; they were not translated into Spanish because individuals
reaching higher education had usually achieved French proficiency in secondary
schools.70 However, the war in Europe interrupted the flow of educational materials from
France and other European nations, and as the Colombian education system expanded,
lost its elite exclusivity, and placed greater emphasis on English, a market for US
academic, professional, and technical books emerged. Locally residing US citizens, who
were well connected in professional communities (or were themselves the product of
Colombian schools), recognized a link between educational texts, cultural influence, and
international business. Karl C. Parrish, Jr., of Barranquilla‟s coordination committee,
adamantly argued to Rockefeller that it was not…
difficult to see why Latin students, having depended for the most part on
European texts, had always thought of Europe when opportunity arose to finish
off their educations, and later had always been heavily inclined toward the use of
European drugs and equipment, and the importation of European technical
personnel. 71
Acting on Parrish‟s advice, the OIAA encouraged US publishers to enter Latin American
educational markets, and they did so quickly. As new Spanish-language textbooks
became available, the Colombo-Americano showcased them in book fairs held in the
library and added reference copies to their shelves.72
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Gallery Art: Visualizing Cultural Change
A third component of the Colombo-Americano cultural program was sponsorship
of visual arts exhibitions in the center‟s own art gallery, the Sala Tayrona. Opening as the
traditional boundaries of art and culture in Colombia were stretching, it was quickly
integrated into the official cultural life of the city. As it evolved into a high profile
cultural venue, it provided new space for shaping Colombianidad. Analysis of its
activities demonstrates the extent to which the Colombo-Americano was evolving as a
local rather than foreign cultural institution.
Before the mid-1930s, access to formal art and cultural venues in Bogotá was
limited by the narrow frame of national culture. Change came as Liberal cultural
management moved more programming to the social spaces of the popular classes and
pushed open the doors of elite-exclusive theaters and museums. Cultural contestation
contributed to high demand for art space and slowly new options appeared; the Sala
Tayrona was one. Complementing these physical spaces, alternative cultural venues
continued to open in print, on radio, and in film. 73
The expansion of cultural space and broadening definitions of culture proved
unsettling in elite circles of the capital. Elite critics from both parties railed against
Liberal expenditures on programs for the masses, lamented a decline in high culture, and
dismissed the cultural value of mass media. Illustrative was a one critic who questioned
the value of art exhibitions at the Sala Tayrona on the grounds that it was a venue
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accessible primarily to students and, therefore, a waste of time. 74 However, a
“democratization of culture” --encouraged by Liberal cultural management, supported by
increasing literacy and expanding educational opportunities, and sustained by developing
patterns in mass media communication-- was well underway and the historically narrow
framing of Colombian culture and cultural space was no longer possible.
The Sala Tayrona was both host and contributor to Bogotá‟s cultural
transformation. Exhibitions and visual arts programming were frequently organized in
collaboration with the Ministry of Education or other cultural organizations in the capital.
While some US art was featured in the gallery through traveling shows funded by the
State Department and North American museums, most exhibitions were organized at the
local level and featured locally-residing artists, both Colombians and foreigners. Aspiring
and established local artists welcomed the gallery and lined up to be included in one of its
monthly exhibitions. Owing to the limited number of venues in the city, Colombian
government officials themselves frequently relied on the gallery to host exhibitions they
had organized. In light of its collaborative support of Colombian art through the 1940s,
the Ministry of National Education praised the Colombo-Americano and its gallery as an
important contributor to national culture. 75
Many of Colombia‟s most celebrated artists of the 20th century exhibited their
works at the gallery during their formative years, well before achieving national and
international fame. Among others, Enrique Grau, Fernando Botero, Edgar Negret,
Eduardo Ramirez Villamizar, Gonzalo Ariza, and Rodrigo Arenas Betancour presented
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their work to the public in the Sala Tayrona. The gallery was particularly popular because
it was a not-for-profit venture and assisted in the sale of pieces without charge to the
artists. In lieu of commissions on the sales of gallery pieces, written contracts between
the center and artists commonly negotiated the donation or a discounted purchase of one
of the works on display. Across the twentieth-century, accumulation of art by this method
left the center with a museum quality collection hanging on public display in the
corridors and common areas of its downtown Bogotá facility. 76 Recognizable to anyone
familiar with Colombian art, the impressive collection of the center attests to the
institution‟s evolution as a local Colombian rather than foreign cultural center.
Most of the artists exhibiting work in the Sala Tayrona never became household
names in Colombia or abroad, but transnational connections and lifestyles were
commonplace among them. Artists who were Colombian citizens born of foreign parents
or Colombians born abroad were frequent exhibiters. Margarita Soto de Murphy, for
example, who was born in the US but of Colombian ancestry, painted typical street
scenes of Bogotá. Moving between her and her family‟s native lands, vacationing in
Mexico, and painting the roads she traveled, Soto de Murphy‟s transnational identity
proved as intriguing to the Bogotá press as her watercolors. 77 The gallery hosted Emile
Roure, an art teacher in Miami who had been born to French parents in California; he
displayed oil paintings that took rural mestizo and indigenous cultures as subject.
Ephraim Andrade from neighboring Ecuador, Heinz Tesch from Germany, and Ladislav
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Hlavka for Czechoslovakia were part of a constant stream of foreigners whose Colombiafocused art hung in the Sala Tayrona.78 Among the resident US nationals given shows,
most were women and the wives of US diplomats and businessmen. Some were US
wives of Colombian citizens or the adult daughters of transnational marriages. 79 The
preponderance of biculturalism among Sala Tayrona artists in the 1940s raises interesting
questions about the status of arts education in Colombian schools as well as gender roles
within expatriate and diplomatic communities. However, another point is more
immediately clear. The center‟s gallery regularly contracted artists who brought
transnational perspective to their work. With mutual understanding the primary goal of its
cultural programs, the center valued such artists because their lives transcended cultural
borders; they and their art, like the Colombo-Americano itself, were neither completely
foreign nor entirely local.
The Sala Tayrona and its visual arts programs were also important for establishing
US credentials in the art world and invalidating dismissive Latin American stereotypes
about US culture. The OIAA and State Department funded tours of European fine art
from US museum collections to demonstrate the nation‟s appreciation for high culture;
one was the South American tour of the Rosenwald Collection of French and Spanish
masters from the National Gallery of Art in Washington. Jointly sponsored in Bogotá by
the Colombo-Americano and Ministry of National Education, the show attracted 1,800
people to the National Library, and in the process, familiarized many with the cultural
programs of the center. Such tours of European art from US collections created an
78
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opportunity for US and Latin American commentators to acknowledge their nations‟
“common cultural debt” with Europe.80 However, more than establishing US credibility
vis-á-vis European high culture, the overall visual arts programming put US and Latin
American art on display and engaged a discourse to validate it. Accompanying the
regular showings of American art (broadly defined), lectures and press commentary
stressed that while the art of the Americas had roots in European tradition, it had evolved
independently and uniquely. 81 Declaring a new reality in the art world and pointing Latin
Americans toward arts education in the US, University of Michigan Professor Harold E.
Wethey told an audience at the center “there are now many good American painters that
have never traveled to Europe or studied in its schools.” 82
That contemporary Latin American art had gained new stature in US cultural
circles was also clear. The Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Nelson Rockefeller,
was himself a board director of New York‟s Museum of Modern Art. His enthusiasm for
Latin American art is well documented and he personally encouraged art exchanges and
acquisitions between US and Latin American museums. When traveling in Latin America
in his official government capacity, building both transnational connections and
collections among art museums was always on his agenda. 83 Thus when he arrived in
Bogotá for the inauguration of the Colombo-Americano, his two traveling companions
were the curator of the Metropolitan Museum of Art and a board member of the Museum
of Modern Art.
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As new forces broadened notions of culture in Colombia, the Sala Tayrona, as a
local art venue, both reflected and encouraged this transformational process.
Complementing a decreased focus on European fine art and validation of broadly-defined
American art, center programming elevated non-traditional artists, welcomed popular art
trends, and explored modern techniques of art production and framing. The gallery
featured the caricature sketches of local newspaper cartoonists and the ceramics of
students from local secondary schools. 84 Gallery talks celebrated the artistic
achievements of the laboring classes in the projects of the Works Progress Administration
in the United States.85 Photography, then growing more accessible to a wider public and
evolving into a popular art form, was also well represented in shows. 86 At the same time,
exhibitions of modern graphic arts --with drawings reproduced through contemporary
print technologies (especially automated lithography and serigraphy)-- were hung for
viewing and sanctioned as gallery-appropriate. While the US held no monopoly on
artistic trends in printmaking, some Colombian observers believed that US artists were
stretching the traditional boundaries of art “in unison” [al unísono] with the impressive
pace of technical progress in the country. 87
Art on the walls of the Sala Tayrona also reflected a contemporary Colombian
trend toward more diverse race/ethnic representations of the nation. In the gallery, AfroColombians and Indians were important subjects of artistic representations, and this trend
reflected a broader movement in Latin American art. Observable in the contemporary
works of Mexicans Diego Rivera and José Clemente Orozco, Brazilian Candido
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Portinari, and Ecuadoran Oswaldo Guayasamìn among others, this new approach to art
celebrated rather than downplayed the multi-racial reality of Latin America. More
inclusive visual representations of nation still reflected contemporary cultural and
race/ethnic biases, and that fact should not be overlooked. Still, in Colombia new
diversity of subject in visual arts helped to complicated traditional artistic projections that
had sustained the fiction of elite, urban, and Andean Colombianidad.
By far, the most popular subject of exhibitions in the Sala Tayrona and, indeed, in
most Colombo-Americano art galleries that opened later in other cities, was the
Colombian Caribbean. Encouraged by rapid development of the Colombian airline
industry, the Caribbean was then emerging as a prime tourist destination for the Andean
interior. Art reflected this development and served as a colorful vehicle for reinserting
and reconstructing the region in the national imaginary. The walled city of Cartagena
with its famous colonial architecture was a popular focus of the center‟s exhibiters, and
paintings in the Sala Tayrona captured the beauty of the coast while suggesting a
playfulness in Caribbean lifestyle. At the same time, this art increasingly took AfroCaribbean inhabitants of the coast as subjects, and in doing so documented on canvas a
little-considered Colombian reality of poverty and race. 88
Complementing representations of coastal Colombia and its people, paintings and
drawings of Indians and peasants of the rural interior were also standard features of Sala
Tayrona exhibits. 89 In contrast to the absence of Afro-Colombian culture, symbolic
celebration of the nation‟s Indian past was a constant of Liberal cultural programs.
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Sanctioning ancient cultures as authentically Colombian, Liberal cultural managers
selectively employed pre-Colombian cultural forms in their attempts to construct a
unifying national culture. Grounded in the philosophy of indigenismo, these cultural
mangers selectively incorporated cultural products of long-vanished Indian civilizations
into national folklore. Then in vogue throughout hemisphere, political indigenismo
exalted Indians‟ past but lamented their present lack of modernization. 90 By the twentieth
century, Indian populations in Colombia were a small percentage of the population, and
the philosophy did not have the political legs it had in other areas of the Americas.
However, under the cultural management of the Liberal state, influence of indigenismo
was unmistakable.
A similar strain of indigenismo was observable in the US during this era, and US
cultural diplomacy projected it in Latin America. Employing variant forms of
indigenismo, both nations used rich indigenous cultural material toward constructing
more inclusive national identity. Yet, their increasing valuations of indigenous culture
were more about cultures of past than of the present; both nations were interested in
integration and modernization of the Indian and not a return to past indigenous glory. In
the developing Pan American dialogue, traditional Indian culture proved useful to the
construction of historical narratives that connected all areas of the hemisphere. The
contemporary celebration of Indian cultures in both the US and Colombia provided
historical grounds upon which Pan American identity could be constructed.
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In the visual arts programs of the Colombo-Americano, US educators engaged the
philosophy to showcase the indigenous roots their nation shared with Colombia and to
validate the frequent assertion of a broadly-defined American, or Pan American, culture.
Within the Sala Tayrona, a current of indigenismo ran strong. Introducing a lecture on
Indian art in the Americas, the center director declared that philosophy of indigenismo
was “important for everyone --regardless of Indian blood-- because it is the basis of
American heritage and identity.” 91 Other gallery talks emphasized the strong influences
of the “Indian cities” of Taos and Santa Fe on US art markets. Promotional information
the gallery provided to the local press stressed US appreciation for its own Indian cultures
and art.92 Indeed, the very name of the gallery honored the Tayrona Indians, who had
successfully resisted the European conquest on Colombia‟s Caribbean coast four-hundred
years earlier. Symbolic as an authentic American, authentic Colombian, and antiEuropean culture, the Tayrona name was well chosen for the mission.
Transnational Sounds: Music at the Colombo-Americano
Finally, music was the fourth major component of Colombo-Americano cultural
programming, and it too played an important role in stretching the traditional boundaries
of culture in the Colombian capital. Not dependent on linguistic translation, musical
presentations attracted large crowds to the center. From the start, all music programs
were open to the public and, similar to the visual arts programs, maintained considerable
focus on Colombian artists. In the first decade, the centerpiece of the program was a
weekly live concert by a Colombian musician. Although European classical music and
opera were the most common genres of these concerts, the overall music program was
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broader and also showcased popular US and traditional Colombian music. Significantly,
the music program also linked Colombians to US universities and schools as alternatives
to music education in Europe.
From the start, the weekly Young Artist Series supported rising music stars.
Participants in the series were young Colombians who the center directly assisted in
securing scholarships for the study of music in the US. The inaugural performance was
by Jaime Léon, a pianist who was “on his way to Juliard.” 93 Cecilia Dueñas, a celebrated
soprano was a Young Artist as well. While studying opera in Colombia under a French
professor, Dueñas began to study English at the Colombo-Americano. There, she also
gave concerts, which proved hugely popular and brought acclaim. By 1946, with the
assistance of the center‟s staff, Dueñas had secured a scholarship to the University of
Miami‟s School of Music. 94 Similarly, Young Artist Oscar Buenaventura was a pianist
and composer sponsored by the center. After winning a national music competition in
Colombia in 1944, the center supported his application to the music program of the
University of Rochester (New York). Granted a scholarship, he enrolled in 1945. Before
returning to Colombia a few years later, Buenaventura worked with US composer Aaron
Copeland and toured the world with various musical groups. By his own assessment,
some of his performances reflected US musical influences but his own compositions
drew most heavily on Colombian folkloric and popular themes. Back in Colombia, he
continued to perform at the Colombo-Americano, supported its local music program, and,
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notably, was later enlisted by his government to perform abroad in its own program of
cultural diplomacy. 95
Those pursuing music scholarships in the US were not the only Colombian
performers at the center. Among others, student choruses from the National Conservatory
of Music, young children from the center‟s rhythm band, local music teachers, and the
military‟s own marching band performed under center sponsorship. European classical
music was the theme in many such performances, but the traditional popular music of
Colombia‟s Andean interior was also showcased. In promoting popular Andean music
through concerts, as well as offering classes in the traditional dances to accompany the
music, the center supported the Liberal cultural agenda by validating folkloric
manifestations of Colombian popular culture.96 Though the music of the Colombian
Caribbean (or Costeño music) was then gaining in popularity and experiencing a
commercial boom that soon elevated it to national and international stature, it was then
only barely audible at the center. It was not endorsed by official government cultural
management as authentically Colombian. Commercialization was its route to national
popularity, and thus was it deemed less desirable as a representation of the nation.
Andean racial stereotypes of African-influenced Costeño culture were a contributing
factor.97
Comparatively, live performances by US musicians were less regular. Featured
musicians were most often drawn from locally residing US citizens including the
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teaching and administrative staff of the center as well as the “Ladies of the American
Colony,” the musical wives of diplomats and resident businessmen. 98 Occasionally,
touring musicians from the US gave concerts at the center; some such tours were
underwritten by US government funds, but others were independent and/or commercial
ventures. Once Cold War policymakers recognized the international appeal and political
power of live jazz, Washington would substantially increased funding for music tours.
However, through the 1940s most of the US music played at the center had been
previously recorded on discs. During much of the first decade, contemporary US music
was played on record machines in the common areas of the center between day and
evening classes as a social outlet for students. More formal “disc concerts” presenting a
specific musical genre, musician, or theme were scheduled twice a week. 99 Records also
provided the music for bimonthly and semester‟s end dances; priced with middle class
youth in mind, these well attended dances welcomed students and their “guests of the
opposite sex.”100 Big band, jazz, folk, and music from Broadway were popular at these
events. By the end of the war, various genres of Latin American music were also
common at the center‟s dances. Recordings from Cuba, Argentina and Mexico increased
the international sounds at Colombo-Americano social events.
The music collection housed in the Colombo-Americano library was the nucleus
of a musical outreach program in the capital area. More than a collection of record
albums, the American Music Loan Library, as it was known, was a vast collection of
music resources that could be borrowed for up to two weeks: sheet music for piano,
98
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voice, quartets, bands, and orchestras; folk songs for Colombian teachers of English; and
recordings for loan to commercial radio stations and educational organizations. The
initial collection was heavy on US titles and compositions, but Latin American and
European classical music were also well represented. 101 Bringing the American Music
Loan Library into Latin American BNCs was an OIAA project, but the program had been
established years earlier through the Pan American Union‟s efforts to connect musicians
throughout the Americas. At PAU-sponsored congresses in the 1930s, musicians,
composers and professional organizations from both continents identified two related
roadblocks to greater music sharing in the Americas: the lack of availability of North
American music in South America (and vice versa) together with the lack of international
copyright protections for musical scores. The American Music Loan Library emerged as
a solution to these roadblocks, and as US cultural diplomacy developed, BNCs became
the logical place to house and build collections in Latin America. 102
Notably, Negro spirituals and North American Indian songs were included in the
collection and prominently featured in Colombo-Americano disc concerts.103 Their
inclusion represented an effort on the part of the OIAA and State Department to
proactively project US appreciation and respect for its minority cultures. In raciallymixed Latin America, where those with African or Indian ancestry were the majority,
domestic US race relations were a potentially disastrous obstacle to Pan Americanism.
With growing Latin American attention to the status of minority communities in the US,
the OIAA became concerned that US race relations would derail progress toward mutual
101
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understanding. Rockefeller accepted the assertion of advisers that treatment of minorities,
and particularly impoverished Hispanics of the US Southwest, represented an “acid test”
for the new Pan Americanism. 104 He consistently amplified the recommendation of
advisers that “sounder and more consistently democratic practices of race at home are
necessary for the successful prosecution” of inter-American foreign policy programs. 105
While a full analysis of the intersection of Pan Americanism and race in
Colombia is not the objective here, it is none-the-less important to recognize that
domestic race relations did condition US cultural diplomacy in Latin America during
World War II.106 Some historians have demonstrated that global reaction to US race
relations during the Cold War elicited federal government activism on behalf of AfricanAmerican legal equality. 107 Yet, less attention has been paid to transnational dimensions
of the US civil rights struggles that are visible in the Pan American programming of the
1940s.108 Within the cultural programs considered by this study, Colombian and US
racial orders converged and collided as the new Pan Americanism evolved. As mutual
understanding became a privileged objective of diplomacy, substantial differences
distinguished Colombian and US race systems: acceptance (Colombia) vs. the rejection
(US) of race-mixture; the absence vs. the presence of legally sanctioned discrimination
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against blacks; and the predominance of three racially categorized groups in Colombia
(Indians, Africans, Spaniards) vs. the more complex, multi-racial/multi-ethnic
composition of the US. Because racial orders were fundamental structures of US and
Colombian societies, a transnational discourse on race logically developed as groups and
individuals from both nations worked toward deeper understanding of the other.
To many Colombians and Latin Americans, Jim Crow segregation was evidence
that the US did not live up to the tenets of equality and freedom that it so loudly
professed. Condemnation of US racism was common among those who opposed US-led
Pan Americanism and especially strong among the most vocal advocates of
Hispanidad.109 In Colombia and throughout Latin America critics buttressed their
condemnation of US race relations with assertions that their nations were racial
democracies where race discrimination simply did not exist. That was hardly the case
and, indeed, some contemporary US scholars pointed out the discriminatory realities and
nuances of race relations in Latin America. 110 Yet, compared to glaring, legally
sanctioned segregation in the US, more subtle forms of racism in the mixed-race region
were less exposed to an international spotlight. Still many observers in the US agreed that
the Latin American model of race relations represented a major improvement over that of
the US South, and they repeatedly expressed the hope that the US would learn racial
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tolerance from its Good Neighbors.111 OIAA film and print publications joined the chorus
and in doing so uncritically seconded Latin American assertions of racial democracy. 112
New Latin American interest in US minority communities and discrimination
against them prompted the OIAA to respond at home and abroad. On the domestic front,
Rockefeller‟s office promoted open dialogue among US educators over racial issues. It
funneled resources toward improvements in educational conditions for AfricanAmerican, Hispanic, and Native American communities in the US.113 The OIAA
publicized its domestic efforts in Latin America and encouraged BNCs to engage a more
positive discourse on US minority cultures. This discourse was evident in ColomboAmericano cultural programming: lectures on indigenismo and Indian artistry, a music
course highlighting black jazz musicians, OIAA pamphlets sympathetically portraying
“Spanish-Speaking Americans at War,” and efforts to keep racially biased texts off the
library shelves.114 Music recordings of Negro spirituals by Marion Anderson and hunting
songs by Shawnee and Cheyenne Indians were just a small part of a larger effort to
neutralize the racial roadblock to mutual understanding.
Conclusion
Examining the cultural programming of Centro Colombo-Americano de Bogotá
during its first decade, increasing contact among musicians and music enthusiasts in the
111
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Americas is clear. New energy for musical dialogue, resource sharing, and professional
exchanges characterized the period. As evidenced by the center‟s activities, participants
in Colombo-Americano music programs constructed foundations to support emerging
transnational music communities. The chapter demonstrates a similar phenomenon of
community development beginning among academics and intellectuals, artists, librarians,
professionals, educators, and students.
In the 1940s, official US-Colombian cultural engagement in Bogotá was built
upon a foundation of common interests. From the start, the Centro Colombo-Americano
positioned itself to respond to local Colombian realities. Common interests of Colombian
and US citizens and their governments in cultural diffusion and educational expansion
propelled the center‟s early successes. Appearing as European influence was waning in
the capital, the programs of the center provided a platform from which the traditional
boundaries of Colombian culture were dismantled and stereotypes of US culture were
reduced. Certainly, Washington played a crucial role in funding the activities of the
center and supporting the new transnational communities and networks that were
appearing around it. The programs of the Colombo-Americano, like those of the local
American school, explicitly asked Colombians to reconsider the US as both a legitimate
cultural producer and an accessible cultural resource. Many did, and in the process, the
US achieved one of its primary foreign policy objectives: it gained stature among the
Colombian middle, professional and upper classes. But, it is a mistake to overemphasize
Washington‟s foreign policy objectives in an analysis of foreign/local encounters in and
around these US-Colombian cultural institutions. Doing so underemphasizes the
centrality of local dynamics to these encounters; it dismisses the existence of and
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complexities in transnational cultural relationships and the communities that support
them; it draws sharp distinctions between foreign and local forces that are sustainable in
grand theory but not on the ground; and it ignores the role of common interests in
conditioning encounters between US and Colombian cultures.
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Chapter Six

Modernity, Mass Media and US Cultural Diplomacy
This chapter examines the implementation of US-sponsored educational and
cultural programs via radio, film, and print media in Colombia during World War II.
Like the programs of the Centro Colombo-Americano and the American schools in
Colombia, these mass media programs were initiated in the earliest days of US cultural
diplomacy. As such, they were grounded by the philosophy of Pan Americanism, and
their initial aim was to cultivate mutual understanding as a basis for hemispheric unity.
Yet, OIAA film, radio, and print media programming had broader radius than the USsponsored schools and cultural centers, and they reached more diverse populations across
vast regions. In contrast to the institutions of US cultural diplomacy, these programs were
not run by local boards. Nor were they structured upon cultural reciprocity. Thus, as warrelated propaganda became a Washington mandate in the early 1940s, mass media
programs could be easily adapted to short-term foreign policy objectives.
This chapter puts the evolution of OIAA radio, film, and print media campaigns
into local context and demonstrates how mass media programs met overlapping political
and social objectives of the US and Colombian governments. Furthermore, it reveals that
such programming also provided Colombian individuals, organizations, institutions,
businesses, and emerging social classes with resources for fashioning their own
approaches to modernity. Significantly, the convergence of US mass media resources
with Colombian interests was particularly pronounced in the realm of education. Though
direct political propaganda became a strong element in the OIAA programming mix,
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Colombians most actively engaged with educational and cultural rather than political
materials. Analyzing foreign/local encounters that evolved around OIAA mass media
reveals the extent to which the broad Colombian-US relationship was defined by
transnational educational and cultural connections; it also demonstrates the rise of the US
as an educational and cultural alternative to European influence. To these end, the first
section contextualizes the emergence of mass media as an innovative diplomatic tool, a
weapon of war, and an experimental instructional technology. Three subsequent sections
historicize the OIAA print media, radio, and film programs during the war.
Introduction: Mass Media and Foreign/Local Encounters
On Sunday evenings in the 1940s just south of Bogotá‟s city center, Monseñor
Diego Garzón offered free weekly movie showings for his congregation in the barrio of
Las Cruces. The pastor publicized these showings from the pulpit during mass, and this
produced huge crowds with as many as 7,000 regulars gathering after dusk on the plaza.
The atmosphere at these weekly screenings was festive and relaxed, and it contrasted
sharply with the formality of the church services many had attended earlier in the day.
Projected from the balcony of the rectory, the various films the monseñor offered for
viewing were supplied by the OIAA though its Bogotá coordination committee.
As darkness fell elsewhere across Bogotá, similar scenes played out. In the barrio
of 7 de Agosto, just north of the city center, Father Joaquín Caicedo also hosted a weekly
evening of film for his parishioners. There, enthusiasm for OIAA-supplied films also ran
high. To facilitate viewing for the large crowds that always gathered, the priest had
painted an outside wall of his church to serve as a huge movie screen. During the
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showings, Father Caicedo used a microphone to inject positive comments. Between films,
as the reels were changed, he made parish announcements and offered prayers. 1
Requests for loans of OIAA films and projection equipment from churches, local
governments, schools, political and cultural organizations were steady in Bogotá and
urban Colombia throughout the war years. Letters and notes poured into coordination
committee offices seeking loans from the OIAA film library in Colombia that by 1945
contained more than 300 educational, cultural, and war propaganda titles. While there
was always greater demand than the committees could meet, OIAA representatives in
Bogotá were especially enthusiastic about parish-based movie nights like those offered
by Monseñor Garzón and Father Caicedo, and they did their best to accommodate them.
Though the social and cultural hegemony of the Catholic Church was then loosening,
parish priests remained authoritative figures and cultural mediators in their communities.
Thus, the OIAA welcomed collaboration with priests and other community leaders
because their public endorsements of OIAA films lent legitimacy to a broad US mass
media campaign aimed at bringing a message of hemispheric unity to the widest possible
Colombian audience.
In contrast to the middle and upper-class focused education and cultural programs
at BNCs and American schools, OIAA mass media programming reached a broader,
cross-class spectrum of the population. Though the influential elite along with the
emerging middle class remained important target audiences of these mass media
programs, so too were the urban and rural poor, who constituted the Colombian majority.
Barrio film showings in Las Cruces, 7 de Agosto and hundreds of other neighborhoods
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throughout the nation granted the OIAA easy access to a public that included non-elites,
the urban poor, and the laboring --rather than the middle and professional-- classes. Like
other contemporary OIAA mass media efforts on radio and in print, the barrio film
campaign reached many Colombians who could never afford a ticket to a commercial
cinema, who would likely never enroll in a class at or visit the art gallery of the Centro
Colombo-Americano, and who would never have access to the classrooms of Colombia‟s
American schools.
Though hardly acknowledged in previous scholarship, the OIAA played a central
role in the expanding presence of US mass media in Latin America before mid-century.
Trying its best not to compete with extant US commercial media in Colombia, the OIAA
employed the changing communication technologies of the era to speak directly to the
Colombian people on behalf of US foreign policy. Examining how OIAA film, radio and
print media evolved in Colombia, this chapter details foreign/local encounters that
unfolded around mass media programs that originated with the Pan Americanism of the
pre-war years. The general US goal of mutual understanding grounded the early
development of the programs, and educational and cultural collaboration with
Colombians at the local level facilitated implementation. Yet, as World War II became
the overriding concern in Washington, OIAA mass media programs became more
intimately tied to the US war effort. Unlike the BNCs and American schools that were
directed by local boards and structured by cultural reciprocity, mass media programs
emanated from Washington and were more easily manipulated to serve short-term
foreign policy goals.
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In contrast to the BNCs and schools that fostered transnational educational
communities through dialogue, reciprocity, and cultural exchange, the mass media
programs of the OIAA appear as one-way information delivery mechanism that did not
create community among participants. Formulated in Washington, programs were part
education, part information, part entertainment, and part propaganda; the precise mix of
the parts varied by program, but they were message driven and centered on specific
diplomatic objectives. Diplomats always exercised strong control over them, something
that was neither possible nor desirable with the BNCs and schools. However, when these
mass media programs are placed in historical context, a high degree of collaboration
between the OIAA and local Colombian organizations and individuals is evident. Though
much of the design of the mass media messages came from Washington, program
implementation at the local level, as explored below, involved many filters that altered
the message to fit local needs. As was the case with BNCs and American schools,
common interests between Colombian and US nationals conditioned their development.
Exploring foreign/local encounters around the mass media programs of the OIAA further
reveals the complexities that structured Colombian-US relations at mid-century.
In the scholarship on Latin American-US relations written during the second half
of the 20th century, a pronounced trend defined US mass media in Latin America as a
powerful agent of cultural imperialism or cultural dominance. Focused largely on the US
media presence at the end of the century, this scholarship was narrowly framed by
economic analysis. Although cultural engagement through mass media received only
minimal consideration, scholars were quick to assume US cultural dominance via mass
media wherever US economic dominance was in evidence. Drawing on dependency
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theory, the common trope of a US media octopus, with tentacles attaching to
unsuspecting and powerless prey, prevailed in scholarship as well as in the literature of
the political left, in both countries, with which it was closely associated. 2
Metaphors of sea life aside, a strong US mass media presence in Latin America
before mid-20th century is undeniable, and the Colombian case is no exception:
Hollywood film dominated Colombian cinema even before the 1930s; radio stations
featured US music and advertised US-made consumer goods from that same decade
forward; and before Europe went to war for a second time in two decades, many
Colombian newspapers and magazines relied on advertising income from local offices of
US companies; some periodicals simultaneously used US wire services for filling blank
columns with news, feature stories and photographs. Then, in the 1940s, the US mass
media presence in Colombia increased significantly through the developing program of
cultural diplomacy. Before the middle of that decade in Colombia, more than ninety radio
stations aired OIAA programs, more than five million viewers had seen OIAA films, and
approximately three dozen daily and weekly newspapers and magazines used OIAAsupplied news and feature stories. Still, a dominating US cultural influence in Colombia
should not be automatically inferred from such a strong mass media presence. In the
absence of historical context, scholarship in the past casually granted US mass media
unchecked power to alter and control cultures in Latin America. In doing so, it failed to
identify the local dynamics, collaborative agents, and common interests that conditioned
2
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the expanding US mass media presence in the region. Reducing foreign/local encounters
to an uneven power relationship, scholarship never articulated the complexities that
framed the early US mass media presence in the region and, as a result, overlooked many
of the intricacies of Latin American-US cultural relations.
The Diplomat’s New Tool: Mass Media Meets Diplomacy
Projecting Mutual Understanding
Mutual understanding, the general objective of US cultural diplomacy, faced a
variety of obstacles in Latin America, but from the OIAA perspective two were the most
serious. First, owing to the elite cultural affinity for Europe, many aspects of US culture
were unknown in Latin America. Second, in the absence of knowledge, negative
stereotypes of US society and culture flourished. In part a reaction to the long history of
US intervention in region, such stereotypes were also built upon negative images of US
culture and society in Hollywood films and other forms of commercial mass media. The
OIAA was concerned about sensationalism over gangsters, violence and crime in the
news stories provided by US wire services to Latin American newspapers. Additionally,
it preferred that “flag pole sitters, polar bear bathers, and people who were utterly and
completely publicity mad” were not featured as comic relief in cinema newsreels
produced in the US for Latin American viewers. 3 It especially wanted to eliminate Axis
propaganda that circulated widely in pre-war Latin America, dwelt on US imperialism
and reinforced other negative stereotypes via radio and print materials. The OIAA thus
prioritized the elimination of negative images about US culture through its mass media
programs.
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As the basic tenet of US cultural diplomacy, mutual understanding proved easily
adaptable to a US-Latin American relationship in transition. As rhetoric and as practice, it
could be interpreted and applied differently at the policy level within the context of good
neighborliness, global economic crisis and international war. There were actually many
variants of meaning in which diplomats, policy makers, and cultural managers could
apply the tenet, but two strains were most in evidence. One framed mutual understanding
in the vein of culture and emphasized education while the other framed it in politics and
emphasized information or propaganda.
Reflecting professional educators‟ role in crafting cultural diplomacy, the first
strain posited that nations would gain knowledge about, understanding of and respect for
each other through cultural dialogue. Knowing each other was a learning process, so
cultural encounters in the realm of education were especially valued. Reciprocity was the
foundation of this strain, and American schools and BNCs were the most prominent
diplomatic institutions developed under its influence. The second strain emphasized
informational exchange rather than culture. Mutual understanding was still the general
aim, but countering fascist propaganda was the more important, short-term goal. Priority
was given to US policies and actions directly or indirectly related to the global conflict.
Under the pressure of war this strain was proudly propagandist; in reaction to fascism,
communism and perceived radicalism, it unapologetically argued the merits of US-led
democratic capitalism as Latin America‟s best path to security and modernity.
As proponents of these strains competed and collaborated in policy formulation,
mass media gave new form to foreign relations. Through radio, film, and print,
governments developed the means to speak directly to foreign peoples around the world
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and circumvent official diplomatic channels and layers of authority. Experimenting with
this diplomatic modernity, US government mass media programs in Latin America
reflected the tension between the cultural and political frames of mutual understanding.
However, when the war erupted, the political strain gained the upper hand. Education and
culture remained a focus of OIAA energies, but propaganda made ground during
wartime. Ideological persuasion became central to US cultural diplomacy. After the war,
Ben Cherrington, the first director of the Division of Cultural Relations of the
Department of State, made the point: in the wartime program of cultural diplomacy, “the
distinction between unilateral propaganda on the one hand and reciprocal cultural
cooperation on the other hand, so clearly perceived and adhered to in the prewar years,
became increasingly blurred.”4
Analyzing the projection of mutual understanding through mass media in this
chapter, I rely on Philip Taylor‟s distinctions between education and propaganda.
Education is “imparting of information and ideas” that “enable the recipient to make up
his or her own given mind on any subject.”5 In contrast, propaganda is…
the deliberate attempt to persuade people to think and behave in a desired
way…conscious, methodical, and planned decisions to employ techniques of
persuasion designed to achieve specific goals that are intended to benefit those
organizing the process. 6
As Taylor frames it, intent marks the difference between education and propaganda. This
is a logical conclusion, and it is important to keep in mind as this chapter proceeds. I do
not, however, want to overemphasize the original intent of propaganda in analyzing
foreign/local encounters around mass media. To focus too much on policy-driven intent
4
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distracts from analysis of audience where intent is often altered or lost in translation. In
the Colombian case, local, regional, and national filters refashioned the original intent of
OIAA mass media products; collaborators, like Monseñor Garzón and Father Caicedo,
asserted their own intentions that conditioned the messages carried by the media. Given
the wide range of local subjectivities that informed reception of the mass media products,
focusing too narrowly on original intent overlooks many of the complexities of this type
of foreign/local engagement. In historicizing mass media programs of the OIAA in
Colombia, then, I am interested in the variety of intentions and range of reception
accorded the mass media programs. Acknowledging both that variety and range
complicates views of the Colombian-US relationship.
Transnational Convergence: Education and Mass Media
Modernization of national education was the goal of professional educators and
politicians in both the US and Colombia in the 1930s and 1940s. They shared a basic
faith in the power of education to transform society although specifics differed in each
case. The educational focus of FDR‟s Pan Americanism, then, provided the point of
convergence for transnational engagement in the field. Shared educational discourse and
practice between Colombia and the US altered the historic transnational flow of
educational resources and influences from Europe. Significantly, high levels of optimism
characterized the discourse over instructional mass media in both the US and Colombia.
In both countries mass media technology was associated with modernity and, thus,
considered desirable for schools and classrooms.
Mass media was praised as an educational tool in the US during the 1930s. FDR,
who used radio to promote his New Deal reforms and prepare the US public for the
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European war, led a chorus of believers in the efficacy of mass media in formal and
informal education; government efforts in radio and film, he believed, had educated the
public “in the nation‟s business” and in difficult times taught the US “to think as a
nation.”7 In contemporary US educational journals, professional educators grappled with
application of instructional mass media in diverse educational settings. Film received the
widest consideration, and a range of organizations and enterprises --from the US Office
of Education (an executive branch office) to small commercial film studios to
professional educators‟ organizations like the American Council on Education and the
Women‟s Section of the American Physical Education Association-- were engaged in
aspects of educational film production. 8
In Colombia, as the Ministry of National Education was searching for practical
methods of educational expansion, interest in instructional applications of mass media
increased steadily throughout the 1930s. Echoing FDR, politicians and educators within
the ministry extolled the value of mass media as an educational tool. They expressed faith
that it could be harnessed toward reducing illiteracy and neutralizing its consequences.
And they too wanted to employ it to help their regionalized peoples think as a nation. 9 To
these ends, the ministry initiated educational programming via radio with a government
broadcasting station in 1929. Experimentation with film followed. Projecting the sounds
7
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and images of national festivals and customs through both media, government ministers
and bureaucrats hoped to instill an element of nationalism among Colombians, but
budgetary constraints significantly limited the ministry‟s ability to turn potential into
educational and cultural practice.10 High production costs and limited expertise led to the
closing of the national radio station and more failures than successes in educational
cinema. 11
Year after year, ministers lamented the opportunities lost by not widely
employing mass media as official educational and cultural instruments. That commercial
film and radio in Colombia were simultaneously experiencing substantial growth stood in
sharp contrast to official government efforts. The ministers and their subordinates were
frustrated that commercial media and not ministry programs seemed to be driving cultural
transformation. In the commercial sphere, on silver screens, through radio receptors, and
in glossy print images, Colombians found new channels for exploring and responding to
their world, for challenging the status quo, and projecting alternatives to the dominant,
elite culture that took inspiration from Europe. Importantly, an informational explosion
was then underway, and through it the Colombian public experienced greater exposure to
foreign cultures through news and entertainment media. With building tensions in
Europe, the Old Continent remained a steady focus in evolving news coverage, but
increasingly it was the news, entertainment and culture of the Americas, and especially
the US, that found the larger mass media platform. That these foreign influences arrived
directly into Colombian homes and communities, with no local filtering, was perceived as
a threat in various social quarters. The Church railed against indecency in commercial
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cinema. Hollywood films were a particular concern because many of the cultural traits
they projected and/or glamorized violated Church-enforced social standards. Alarmed by
projections of juvenile delinquency and sexuality in foreign-made police and detective
dramas, some regional governments created censorship boards.12 Even the Ministry of
Foreign Relations voiced strong concern that international influences via film and radio
“present dangers of changing the [nation‟s] traditional nature with the imposition of a
language, of a moral sensibility and of a foreign ideology.” 13
Because commercial mass media introduced what some considered undesirable
influences, a premium was placed on official government programs that could counteract
them in some way. Though lacking the necessary resources, the Ministry of National
Education remained convinced that instructional mass media would help overcome the
educational deficits of the nation. It would also allow Liberal cultural managers to
construct and project a new, more inclusive, and modern version of Colombianidad.
Colombian-produced film and radio projects promoting education and projecting
nationalism were the ideal, but in their absence the ministry proved very willing to
consider foreign sources. Under these circumstances, the ministry relied on foreignproduced mass media to sustain its educational and cultural programs. With a temporary
shutdown of European-Colombian educational exchange because of the war, the OIAA
became a primary foreign source of cultural and educational mass media. Coordination
committees throughout the nation facilitated distribution.
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Implementation: Coordination Committees, Information and Propaganda
Coordination committees were a temporary, but innovative structure of the war.
They were formed during the conflict and were disbanded with the peace. Nelson
Rockefeller considered locally-residing US businessmen an invaluable resource for
cultural diplomacy in Latin America, and he enlisted hundreds of them as volunteers in
the largest urban centers of the region. To Rockefeller and the OIAA, these men
constituted an untapped pool of talent who could assist in adjusting cultural programming
for local conditions and serve as a “rapid check on effectiveness.” 14 More than five dozen
men served on coordination committees in Colombia during the war, and they brought
important business knowledge and skills to the task; their extensive lists of business
contacts were a valuable asset along with their understandings of local economies,
experience in product marketing, and familiarity with local business customs. Yet, it was
not simply for their business backgrounds that these volunteers were so highly regarded
by the OIAA. Resident businessmen were grounded in local culture in ways that OIAA or
embassy officials were not. They lived day-to-day immersed in the social and cultural
rhythms of their adopted communities. Many were long-time residents of Colombia,
some were raising children there, and others had married into local families. From a
historical perspective, these volunteers cannot be reduced to agents of the US industries
and corporations they represented. In their daily lives and in their work implementing
OIAA programming, they were important transnational mediators of foreign/local
encounters.
Coordination committee volunteers were strong advocates of BNCs and American
schools. As seen in earlier chapters, they did much of the leg work in founding the first
14

Rowland, History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, pp. 245-260.

311

Centro Colombo-Americano and securing grants for the two existing American schools
in Bogotá and Barranquilla. And though the committee had been dissolved by the time a
second BNC and a third American school appeared in Medellín in 1946 and 1947, it had
been instrumental in advocating and planning for these institutions during the war.
Coordination committees favored educational and cultural institutions as the best means
for promoting long-term mutual understanding and eliminating negative stereotypes of
the US among the upper and middle classes. The committees‟ main priority, however,
was implementation of short-term mass media programs formulated in Washington. The
committees were given wide latitude to adapt these programs to local conditions, but the
tension between the cultural/educational and political/informational approaches to mutual
understanding remained evident. While cultural and educational content was a staple of
mass media programs throughout the war, OIAA intent with these programs was
explicitly informational and less concerned with promoting dialogue through cultural
exchange and reciprocity. Under the threat of war, Rockefeller believed informational
programming was essential to maintaining hemispheric unity and mass media reached the
widest possible audience. Free people, he told Congress, “can and will find the right
answers to their defense and salvation --whatever the challenge-- if they are given the
facts and an opportunity truthfully to understand and appreciate their mutual interest.” 15
The propaganda content of OIAA programs surged after the bombing of Pearl
Harbor in December 1941. Coordination committees throughout Latin America were
informed that “psychological warfare” had been elevated to priority status. While existing
cultural programs would continue, the new emphasis was “placed hereafter on direct
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propaganda.”16 Following the US declarations of war on Japan and Germany,
coordination committees in Colombia accepted their increased role in dissemination of
propaganda, but they continually asked the OIAA to proceed with caution. Speaking for
the regional committees throughout the country, the committee in Bogotá asked that war
propaganda be “steady and carefully planned rather than rapid” because “in Colombia
public opinion, the press, and the radio in general are eminently favorable to the cause of
the United Nations.” 17 It was the collective opinion of these volunteers that feelings of
“common interest and sympathy for the United States” already existed among many
influential sectors. While acknowledging that such sentiments might be intensified
through propaganda, many on the committees were more comfortable with the narrower
persuasive mission of only attempting “to influence those who oppose us or hesitate.”18
Importantly, this aversion to propaganda among the volunteer businessmen conditioned
the way they implemented OIAA programs. In Washington, some OIAA officials
criticized the Colombian coordination committee because it seemed “to be stronger on
the cultural side than on the direct propaganda phase.”19
Throughout the war, each of the various regional committees also advised caution
in their direct communications with the OIAA in Washington. As residents of Colombia,
volunteer businessmen understood that anti-Yankee sentiment might easily be stoked
with propaganda that locals deemed aggressive, crude, or insulting. Committee members
advised that propaganda should be limited in volume and scope and that it should always
16
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be tailored to local conditions. They were adamant, for example, that OIAA propaganda
not paint all Germans with a Nazi brush; Germans were well regarded for their historic
contributions to Colombian national development and failure to distinguish between
Germans and Nazis in posters and print materials was “quite likely to boomerang.” 20
Additionally, as the war progressed, committees criticized the abundance of war related
propaganda films sent to them and asked for more educational films. 21 They refused
materials that caricatured and homogenized Colombian or Latin American cultures, and
they demanded that propaganda “should pay the people the compliment of being slightly
subtle.”22 Well before global conflict ceased in either theater, they were emphatic that
“outright propaganda” should be immediately replaced by cultural and educational
programming at war‟s end.23
By the time the OIAA shifted emphasis toward direct propaganda, pro-Axis
propaganda had already been circulating in Latin America for years. As Washington
recognized the historic German cultural and educational presence in the region and
tracked recent Nazi propaganda activities, its fears of Axis fifth columns became more
acute. In the US, both the press and government were preoccupied with tracking such
propaganda, and all were quick to grant it strong influence over politicians and public
alike. 24 This high degree of sensationalism in US press reports and diplomatic analyses
has been well documented, and it is also clear that Bogotá recognized it for what it was
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and attempted to temper it.25 Still, Colombian officials were concerned enough about
Nazi propaganda to monitor it actively themselves.
Before Bogotá cut diplomatic relations with Berlin, the daily press releases of the
German legation were the primary source of overt Nazi propaganda in the capital and on
the coast; later, anonymously printed materials replaced that official source. Colombian
police investigators and officials of the Ministry of Foreign Relations gathered all
circulating print materials, and they investigated distribution networks. On the Caribbean
coast and in bordering regions, police showed particular concern for Berlin‟s shortwave
radio broadcasting and clandestine radio networks.26
In the pro-Axis and Nazi propaganda that circulated in Colombia from the late
1930s forward, the most common theme was justification of Nazi actions in Europe; such
materials were infused with a high dose of Hitler idolatry. 27 Nazi respect for Catholicism
was also a popular focus; playing to religious sentiment in the nation, Berlin touted its
funding of church construction in Catholic Poland and alleged that British air strikes
targeted Catholic cemeteries in Germany. 28 This propaganda also emphasized the long-
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term economic benefits of the German-Colombian relationship. 29 Increasing and strong
Nazi criticism of Pan Americanism as farce, as detrimental to Latin American
sovereignty, and as a roadblock to modernity was also noted by Colombian diplomats. 30
Not all pro-Nazi propaganda, however, came from German sources. Booklets printed by
Falange and other pro-fascist presses in Spain and Argentina were common among those
gathered by local police investigators.
Pamphlets and broadsheets authored and printed by Colombian activists added to
the volume of war-related propaganda then circulating. Some of these locally produced
materials were overtly pro-Nazi and simply repeated official Nazi lines or articulated
Nazi themes in local context. Colombian Jews, for example, were labeled true vampires
[verdaderos vampiros] who sucked the blood of the people and destroyed commerce. 31
Still, much of the locally produced propaganda was not of direct Nazi origin or sentiment.
It was instead the product of fervent nationalists who advocated Colombian neutrality in
the war. The US press and diplomatic bureaucracy usually saw this local propaganda as
decidedly sympathetic to Hitler, but such a simple interpretation ignored local history and
the complex relationships Colombia had with both Germany and the US. Reminding
Colombians of Germany‟s contributions to national development --“its sons made the
Magdalena navigable...they gave us the best organized airline in the world…they fought
at our side against Peru” --was a common persuasive tactic of this pro-neutrality
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propaganda.32 Another nationalist approach was rejecting a wartime alliance with the US
as a threat to national sovereignty:
The Yankee Fifth Column is numerous, it is everywhere and it is energized by
something more effective than anything used by Hitler: the dollar. With this tool it
has gone about equipping an army of mercenaries, politicians, journalists and
lawyers who have been playing a sinister role in Colombian history since the
memorable theft of the Isthmus of Panama. For this reason we affirm: it is right
to fight against the Nazi Fifth Column; but at the same time we must fight against
all the Fifth Columns, especially against Yankee Imperialism and its wretched
agents, the national traitors.33
As the European war shifted into a new phase after Pearl Harbor, OIAA-produced
mass media continued to extol Pan Americanism as Latin America‟s best path to security
and modernity. However, given the OIAA objective of combating Nazi propaganda (or
what Rockefeller called “imperialism of ideas”), mass media programming now carried
more specific anti-German, anti-Nazi, and anti-fascist as well as pro-Allied, pro-US, and
pro-democratic intent. 34
Print Media: Press and Publications
With more than 200 hundred staffers, the Press and Publications Section of the
OIAA in Washington produced much of the print propaganda the US circulated in Latin
America during the war. News and feature articles were written for placement in Latin
American publications; magazines, newsletters, posters, pamphlets, photography and
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cartoons were produced in-house or gathered for distribution.35 Initially, the coordination
committees distributed these print materials directly in their regions, but as information
and propaganda gained importance in US cultural diplomacy this work placed untenable
time burdens on the volunteers. In response, the OIAA established press offices in
national capitals to assist the regional committees and facilitate smooth expansion of their
work. In Bogotá, the section grew significantly across the war years and eventually
employed more than three dozen bilingual secretaries, stenographers, office boys,
projectionists, script writers, and assistants. Overseen by an OIAA representative, the
director of information, almost all of these paid staffers were Colombian citizens, and
they worked out of offices in central Bogotá that were removed from the US embassy. 36
From the start, embassy officials in Colombia were uncomfortable with the
concept of a separate press office. In part, this discomfort grew from State Department
resentment of the OIAA; Rockefeller‟s office encroached on the department‟s turf and
established new diplomatic channels outside the traditional sphere of Foreign Service.
Emphasizing direct communication with Colombians through mass media, the OIAA
challenged the embassy‟s control over diplomacy. More immediately, however, it was the
embassy‟s assessment of the Colombian press --as largely supportive of US wartime
objectives-- that made it nervous about OIAA propaganda and information activities. To
the extent possible, the ambassador imposed restrictions on the OIAA and specifically
barred aggressive activities he associated with a contemporary British propaganda
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campaign. 37 While welcoming the administrative support, volunteers on regional
committees continued to value cultural engagement over propaganda. They accepted a
role in supplying information to editorial writers, for example, but argued that it was best
to secure column lineage in local newsprint through public ceremonies, educational
activities, flag presentations, and reciprocal cultural engagement.38
The news staff of the OIAA in Washington included reporters, writers and editors
who covered wartime events in Washington and Europe. Special coverage was devoted to
events that held particular appeal for Latin American newspapers like Pan American
conferences and visits of the region‟s heads of state to the US. The role of the Brazilian
Expeditionary Force, the only Latin American military contingent fighting with the Allies
in Europe, was heavily covered. Because timeliness is crucial is reporting, OIAA news
articles were sent directly, in Spanish or Portuguese, to newspaper offices throughout the
hemisphere. In Colombia, the OIAA press section found that 90% of the articles sent
were published somewhere in country. Bogotá was the exception to OIAA success with
news article placement. There, competition among daily newspapers was particularly
strong and staff writers more plentiful, so few OIAA news articles appeared. 39 Medellín
was the opposite. There OIAA articles were in popular demand as long as they had not
previously appeared in any other newspaper. The principal daily of that city, the
Conservative-affiliated El Colombiano, for example, would not print articles if they had
appeared in Bogotá‟s Liberal El Tiempo or any other papers the day before.40
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In distributing news articles, a key OIAA concern was avoiding competition with
US wire services operating in the region. The Associated Press (AP), United Press (UP),
and International News Service (INS) had over 200 customers throughout Latin America,
and where the local newspapers used these services, the OIAA made no effort to place its
news articles. Though the OIAA could be critical of wire service coverage, it was more
concerned with getting news from a US perspective into the region‟s press than getting its
own articles printed. Indeed, cognizant that its mandate would likely end with the war,
the OIAA helped to negotiate reduced wire service rates for newspapers in areas where
US news perspective was absent; in effect, it expanded the customer bases of the AP, UP,
and INS. In Colombia, where newspapers showed a preference for European wire
services, an OIAA priority was filling news columns formerly supplied by Transocean,
the German wire service, with either its own or US wire service articles. Additionally, the
OIAA was interested in establishing a US presence in smaller press markets where
subscriptions to British Reuters or French Havas wire services were common. 41
In contrast to time-sensitive and battle-focused news articles, feature stories
produced in Washington focused on US culture and Pan American themes. The OIAA
used these articles as a vehicle for combating persistent negative stereotypes about and
lack of knowledge of the US. More than 1,200 publications in Latin America printed
these feature stories during the war. In addition to daily newspapers, features appeared in
monthly journals, magazines and newsletters covering economic, political, and cultural
topics. Labor and education publications were especially targeted by this OIAA service. 42
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Feature stories were distributed through the OIAA press sections in each country with the
assistance of the various coordination committees. In Colombia, getting features articles
accepted proved difficult unless exclusive publishing rights were granted and articles
were rewritten by Colombian staffers of the Bogotá press office. Once local context was
added, Spanish vocabulary was regionalized, and guarantees of exclusivity ensured,
articles were more readily accepted. While many feature articles appeared without
attribution, it was not uncommon for newspapers and magazines to acknowledge the
OIAA as the source.43 At least thirty-two Colombian publications regularly printed these
feature stories although OIAA representatives reported little success with labor
publications because, in their opinion, unions were “in the main Communistcontrolled.”44 In addition to articles authored by the OIAA in Washington, feature articles
were also made available by US magazines for translation and reprint.45
During the war, newsprint was rationed and this placed a premium on column
space in Latin American newspapers. Almost all of the US and Latin American supply
came from Canada, but it was distributed through US firms. Wartime restrictions on
shipping forced rationing throughout the hemisphere, and at the start of the war, the
United States was briefly in a position to deny newsprint export licenses to individual
Latin American newspapers that it deemed pro-Axis or at least anti-Allied. In the case of
Colombia, Washington used this tactic only once against a Conservative newspaper, El
Siglo. Soon after, however, a newsprint allocation agreement was worked out with
governments throughout the hemisphere, and each nation divided its share of newsprint
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as it saw fit. 46 Thus, as far as restricted newsprint was concerned, Washington maintained
little leverage to encourage editors to carry OIAA articles. Indeed, under the new
allocation system, it was in Washington‟s best interest to increase newsprint supply so
that editors could if they chose devote additional column space to Allied and Pan
American news. 47
The US did have greater leverage with newspapers in advertising. Though
wartime importation restrictions and priority transport schedules prevented them from
maintaining adequate sales stock, many US businesses continued to advertise in Latin
American newspapers during the war. Looking toward the post-war years with the hopes
of expanding market share, these businesses chose to promote their products even though
they were often unavailable to the public. Reporting that 44% of all advertising space in
Latin American newspapers was from US businesses, Rockefeller considered such
advertisement “good-will copy” and was keenly aware of Latin American dependence
upon it.48 In Colombia, the loss of significant US advertising by Bogotá‟s conservative El
Siglo forced a clear change in its editorial positions --from criticism of US-led Pan
Americanism and Bogotá‟s alliance with Washington to support for the United States and
the efforts of the Allies. While the paper‟s loss of advertising was not orchestrated by
representatives of the US government, the perception that it could intervene was enough
to set editorial reversals in motion in the hope of stopping the loss. 49 For other
newspapers, a greater concern was being black listed or added to the Proclaimed List of
Certain Blocked Nationals. First published in Washington in July 1941, the list identified
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alleged Axis agents, enterprises and sympathizers with whom US businesses and
individuals were barred from dealing. Colombian enterprises and individuals figured
prominently on the initial list; Colombia had more listees than any other Latin American
country except for Argentina and Brazil, which had significantly larger German
immigrant populations. 50 Washington‟s propensity for finding Nazis in Colombia
certainly gave editors pause as they articulated editorial positions and considered column
space for OIAA news and feature articles.
A rush to identify and label allies and enemies is common in times of war, but the
process is frequently imprecise. Lacking local perspective, the State Department and the
OIAA were quick to misread content in the Colombian press. The case of El Colombiano
in Medellín is illustrative. A partisan Conservative newspaper in a conservative Catholic
city, El Colombiano editors were at times labeled pro-Nazi by the State Department and
the OIAA. They were not, and such a label was sustained only by US ignorance of
Colombian politics, culture, and economics. El Colombiano‟s attacks on the national
Liberal administration and its alliance with the United States was evidence of deeply
partisan politics and lingering resentment of US imperialism but not Nazi sympathies.
Intense anticommunism in Catholic Medellín infused El Colombiano‘s commentaries on
the US alliance with Russia, but it was not anti-Allied. 51 And when coffee rationing was
instituted in the US, strong criticism of the policy in El Colombiano grew not from the
influence of a Nazi fifth column but from the potentially devastating economic impact of
the policy. As the local coordination committee rushed to explain to the OIAA, news of
the rationing of one cup per day for Americans had “engendered considerable ill feeling”
50
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in the press because “anything that affects coffee affects everyone in Colombia.” The
committee in Medellín was especially alarmed by articles circulated through the AP that
detailed how coffee substitutes were growing in popularity in the US. It asked the OIAA
to produce and distribute feature articles quickly stressing that “the love of coffee is
ingrained in the American public” and would never dissipate.52
While OIAA article placement in the largest and most influential Colombian
newspapers and magazines often required marketing efforts by the Bogotá press section
or the regional coordination committees, placements in smaller publications were more
easily achieved. Indeed, many low circulation newspapers and magazines made daily
requests for material at the OIAA offices throughout the country. Many of these
publications had been established only recently, explicitly professed anti-Nazi
sentiments, and accepted OIAA materials without condition. Others, however, were
struggling financially and expected economic support in exchange for article
acceptance. 53 In Medellín, the publisher of Temas, a monthly magazine, had heard that
local committee was offering to assist “publications with a democratic orientation that do
not have great financial resources.” He asked that his magazine receive articles and
financial support because it was “loyal to the democratic cause.” 54 Similarly, in
Barranquilla, Sr. Alirio Bernal repeatedly asked for propaganda and monetary aid for his
magazine, Acción Democrática [Democratic Action].55 OIAA policy prohibited direct

52

P. L. Collins to OIAA/Washington, “The Desirability of Counteracting the Unfavorable Impression
Created in Colombia By the Recent Order Rationing Coffee in the United States,” 1 Dec. 1942, NARG
229, DI/CCC, B1369, F: Medellín.
53
Rankin, “Narrative Report on Press Operations in Colombia.”
54
Eduardo Rendon to Mr. Caney, 12 Oct. 1942, NARG 229, DI/CCC, B1369, F: Medellín.
55
Forney Rankin to Karl C. Parrish, 10 Oct. 1944, NARG 229, DI/CCC, B1358, F: Barranquilla from
January 1944.

324

financial subsidies to these and other publications and only news and feature articles were
offered to them.
When it came to the Catholic publications, however, the OIAA was willing to
bend its policy and offer direct financial assistance because some factions within the
Church decidedly resisted US leadership and influence. Supportive of Spain‟s fascist
regime for its commitment to a Catholic nationalism, some prominent Catholics loudly
argued for a rejection of Pan Americanism in favor of Hispanidad. Many resented the
growing presence of US Protestant missionaries in the nation. Others could not see past
the US alliance with “godless” communist Russia. Thus, the OIAA actively pursued their
own alliances with the Colombian Catholic Church --its hierarchy, clergy, and faithful-to counter existing resistance. It made small cash donations to assist anti-Nazi Catholic
newspapers, and it published pamphlets by prominent Colombian Catholics who
recognized a common, anti-Nazi interest with the US. In exchange, Colombian clergy
provided the OIAA with mailings lists of influential Catholics and enthusiastically agreed
to distribute Spanish-language publications authored by US Catholics. Thus, for example,
Colombian bishops distributed materials of the National Catholic Welfare Conference
(US), such as La Guerra Nacista Contra la Iglesia Católica [The Nazi War Against the
Catholic Church], to clergy throughout the nation. 56
Purely Catholic themes accounted for a small but important percentage of the
fifteen million pamphlets financed and distributed by the OIAA in Latin America during
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the war.57 Many of the pamphlets were printed in Washington, but others were developed
locally. In Colombia, war-themed propaganda pamphlets stressed Allied strength, the
need for hemispheric unity, and the value of democracy while highlighting German
atrocities. Coordination committees found high demand for such material; local schools
were resource poor and proved especially eager to gather OIAA pamphlets to use in the
classroom.58 The committees also made pamphlets with education-specific content --most
frequently the products of the American Council on Education, the National Education
Association, and the Pan American Union-- available to schools and libraries. Pamphlets
on broader cultural topics, from reviews of contemporary North American literature to
explanations of Boy Scouting, were also widely disseminated by the committees in
Colombia. 59
The most high-profile OIAA publication for Latin America was a defense-themed
magazine titled En Guardia [On Guard]. The target audience of the magazine was Latin
America‟s literate upper class, who the OIAA sought to convince of the US ability to
defend the hemisphere. Printed monthly in Spanish and Portuguese (quarterly in French
for Haiti), each issue contained fifty pages and was filled with photographs of military
equipment and engagements. High quality printing and use of color made it an impressive
publication, and it was very popular. Based on demand, over 500,000 copies were
distributed per issue by 1945.60 In Bogotá, hundreds of people visited the OIAA offices
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each month to collect a free copy, and regional coordination committees distributed
hundreds more to influential government, business, and cultural leaders. 61 Another
widely circulated OIAA magazine was the American Newsletter, which detailed the
extensive Pan American cultural activities organized by the OIAA in the US.
Additionally, it was common for coordination committees to donate subscriptions to
commercial magazines such as Life, National Geographic, Better Homes and Gardens,
and Popular Mechanics upon request by schools and libraries. 62
While newspaper articles, pamphlets, and magazines targeted those who were
literate, OIAA posters, cartoons and photography targeted broader audiences. Posters
were most commonly cartoon or photographic style, and they used few or no words to
present Pan American themes and anti-Axis ideas. Designed for display in public spaces,
posters were also reported to be commonly used as wall decorations in homes in poorer
urban and rural areas. In rural Colombia, US businessmen distributed posters as they
traveled their sales and service routes.63 Coordination committees handled poster
distribution in urban areas but often found they created more problems than they were
worth. Committees often rejected posters as inappropriate for their locales and refused to
distribute them. Modern graphics were confusing, generic representation of Latin
America were insulting, and those hung in easily accessible public spaces tended to get
marked up by vandals. The Medellín committee reported that one poster had even caused
a “cantina disturbance.” The poster at the center of the bar fight was cartoon style and
showed Allied flags imprisoning Hitler and Japanese Emperor Hirohito; the Colombian
flag was not included in the design and this omission (and alcohol) fueled an aggressive
61
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flare of nationalism. 64 Posters aside, OIAA cartoon propaganda took a variety of other
forms. Political cartoons and cartoon strips were sent directly to newspapers but
infrequently used because humor did not always translate. Cartoon booklets that
explained Pan American unity, detailed Nazi atrocities, or chronicled key battles and
personalities of the war in pictures were popular in rural areas where literacy rates were
low. Finally, approximately 25,000 photographs were distributed monthly by the OIAA
in Latin America. Drawn from US news syndicates and the military, photographs were
sent directly to newspapers and magazines or converted into posters. In Colombia, the
OIAA press office noted that photos sent to newspapers and magazines were almost
always used. Many of the publications credited the OIAA or US news syndicates as the
source of the photos, but doing so was not a requirement of use. 65
Radio Broadcasting
Radio broadcasting in Colombia was still a novelty when the war broke out, and
OIAA programs actively used this developing media to reach literate and illiterate
Colombians alike. Broadcasting had begun in the nation as public enterprise with a
government channel in 1929, when it was introduced with fanfare in the last days of the
Conservative hegemony. The national station was enthusiastically adopted by Liberals
with their ascension in 1930, and contemporary Liberal rhetoric privileged the new
medium as an important educational and cultural tool that could clear a path to
modernity. In the words of Daniel Samper Ortega, who was an early director of the
station, radio was “as important as that of the schools and universities in the cultural
development of the country” because it could reach “the working-classes who have
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neither money nor time” for formal education. 66 Such ambitious and lofty goals did not
sustain. The station lacked resources, technical expertise and programming, and in 1938
it went off the air. In contrast, the commercial radio sector grew significantly. By 1934
there were seventeen commercial stations in the nation; the number had more than
doubled to forty-four by 1939, and there were seventy by 1941; by the end of the war in
1945, there were ninety-three. The majority were located in the urban centers.67 The
OIAA tapped into this rapidly developing industry to reach a wide Colombian audience
with its campaign for hemispheric unity. Built within the local context and structured
upon common interests, Colombian-US collaboration through radio fostered transnational
cultural connections that informed the wider binational relationship.
Colombia‟s established newspaper industry resisted rise of radio. Indicative of
contemporary challenges to elite hegemony, many of the emerging stations were owned
and operated by members of the middle class. 68 Because programming was often
designed to attract middle and lower-class audiences, the elite press accused the new
media of promoting low level culture. In reality, newspaper owners‟ cultural concerns
had as much to do with the new competition they faced for advertising revenue as it did
with lowering of cultural standards. Like the print media, many of the new radio stations
were affiliated with one of the two political parties while others were entirely sponsored
by a business or product brand. Still, with so much growth in the industry, competition
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for listeners and sponsors remained intense. To attract both, stations offered a diverse line
of programming including radionovelas (soap operas), radio theater, musical shows, and
news commentary. Based on foreign models from elsewhere in Latin America and the
US, contests testing trivia and music knowledge were exceptionally popular by the late
1930s.69 With the onset of war and a decline in imported products, advertising revenues
suffered and stations had to rely more on advertising from national firms. There was
resulting turnover in the industry, but the continued and rapid increases in the number of
stations reflected the overall industry success in finding commercial sponsorship.70
With its expanding networks and listener base, radio began to offer Colombians
across regions a variety of unifying cultural experiences. Though not in the officially
controlled way government cultural managers had envisioned, the medium began to
support a national reconsideration of what it meant to be Colombian. Importantly in this
cultural process, radio listenership was not limited to those who could afford a receiving
device. The costs of radio receivers certainly priced the majority of Colombians out of
ownership, but costs rapidly spiraled downward as the industry grew and equipment
became affordable for the growing middle classes. Further, in these early days, radio
listening was not solely a private activity for the home. It was also a public activity that
took place in a variety of venues. Radio speakers were regularly installed in cinemas,
schools, and transit stations and on many a plaza, in large cities and small towns,
residents could freely gather to listen to popular programs or special broadcasts.71 In
those same public locations or in the privacy of their own homes, Colombians could also
tune in to shortwave radio signals that carried government propaganda and cultural
69

Pareja, Historia de la Radio en Colombia, pp. 43-4.
Ibid., p. 177
71
Stamato, “Dias de Radio.”
70

330

programming in Spanish from the national capitals of Europe, Russia, and Japan.72 Some
commercial programming was also received from points in the US.
Given the dynamism of these new media in Colombia and throughout the
hemisphere, the work of the OIAA Radio Division was extensive during the war, and the
division‟s budget far exceeded any other sector within the agency. In Colombia, the press
office worked in some capacity with each of the commercial stations that existed by
war‟s end. Based on radio surveys it conducted in each region of the country, the office
provided coordination committees with detailed reports on the radio station preferences
of upper, middle, and lower-income families. Committees could use the data to target
listeners in specific class categories as they arranged for local airings of OIAA
programs.73 In general, the OIAA either received free airtime or paid low rates for prime
evening hours for its programs.
Wherever possible, the OIAA encouraged local production of its radio shows.
Scripts were provided from Washington for the coordination committees to offer to local
producers and stations. While the OIAA cultivated a pool of Latin American radio talent
in its New York and Washington studios, it prized the credibility garnered when local
voices, accents, and contexts anchored its programs. 74 Transcriptions, or pre-recorded
programs on discs or tape, however, were more easily accepted by Colombian stations
because they were ready to air. More often in the vein of entertainment and/or
propaganda than education and culture, transcribed programs included melodramatic
plays, mysteries, and detective series grounded directly in war themes. Mr. V, a counterespionage drama, and Dear Adolph, a series of letters written to Hitler read in dramatic
72
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character, were typical fare. More general cultural programs included adaptations of the
world‟s great plays (from the Allied nations) and cowboy song sessions interspersed with
narration. Most of these programs had originally aired in English on US radio stations. 75
Through coordination committees, the OIAA urged US and Colombian businesses to
sponsor these programs, and the press section in Bogotá worked with local advertisers to
plan radio campaigns around shows. The net effect over the course of the war was
increased commercial sponsorship of OIAA programs in Colombia. 76 Indeed, in the last
two years of the war, at least sixteen Colombian and US firms became the sole sponsors
of various OIAA radio programs on local stations. 77
Another method of gaining local airtime for OIAA programs was through
network affiliations. Both NBC and CBS collaborated extensively with the OIAA, and
between them produced many of the OIAA transcriptions sent to Latin America. In
addition, both also produced most of the OIAA material aired from the US via shortwave.
The two networks had affiliations with a dozen Colombian stations and over 200 stations
across Latin America.78 Local affiliates carried regular, often nightly, hours of network
programming relayed via shortwave for broadcast. Coordination committees always had
multiple transcriptions available for these affiliates whenever relays failed --as they
commonly did. 79
News delivery was another important aspect of OIAA radio programming, and a
primary goal was connecting Latin American stations with US sources of news. Just as
the OIAA promoted US wire services for print media, it did the same among radio
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stations. In encouraging local stations to affiliate with NBC or CBS, it sought to further
extend US news perspective on the airwaves. 80 Additionally, coordination committees
hired well known Colombian and Latin American journalists with pro-Allied sentiments
as news commentators and bought them prime airtime on local radio. 81 Common political
interests often framed these relationships. In Barranquilla, Sr. Peréz Domenech was hired
as a news commentator by the local committee. A Spaniard who had fled the Franco
regime, Domenech was strongly anti-Falangista and anti-fascist. He had approached the
coordination committee for funding of a new pro-allied commentary on radio and when
they found him ideologically compatible they quickly hired him. 82 His news
commentary, which aired three times a week for an hour, included three distinct
programs. On Tuesdays El Arsenal de las Democracias [The Arsenal of Democracies]
aired, emphasizing the “material and moral resources of the US” for defeating Hitler;
Thursday‟s commentary was called El Momento Interamericano [The Inter-American
Moment] and focused on Inter-American cooperation; finally, his Sunday program, La
Semana Bélica [The Week at War], reviewed and analyzed war developments from the
week past.83 Similarly, in Medellín, the committee hired a popular commentator,
Hernando Téllez, to present war news and to encourage pro-Allied solidarity. With a
growing audience, the show soon attracted the interest of local commercial sponsors; a
local hosiery mill, whose owners professed strong support for the US and the Allies, soon
took over as the sole advertiser. In effect, the Colombian business bought the program
80
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from the OIAA. Under the arrangement, the business allowed Téllez to retain complete
editorial freedom over the program. 84
While hiring commentators and paying for time on radio stations was common
OIAA practice, providing direct support to maintain radio stations was not. Alfonso
Arboleda operated a radio station in Barranquilla that was popular with the middle and
lower classes. Strongly anti-Axis, he began one radio broadcast with a diatribe against the
Nazis and a call to boycott all blacklisted firms (or those on the US Proclaimed List of
Certain Blocked Nationals). Owing to a high concentration of German and Italian
immigrant business owners on the coast, he soon lost two-thirds of his sponsors.
Investigation by a member of Barranquilla‟s coordination committee, a US citizen of
German ancestry, noted “threats of violence and two offers from Nazis to subsidize him
sufficiently if he would stop his attacks.”85 Arboleda refused such offers and turned to the
OIAA and the embassy for assistance. He asked that they use their influence to get US
advertisers to pick up the sponsorship he had lost. The embassy was nervous about taking
such direct action to support the station, so the local committee privately took up a
collection from Americans in the city and made a donation with no official connection to
the US government.86 The collection was not enough to sustain the anti-Axis station, and
Arboleda was soon off the air.
Though war-related information and propaganda content dominated the overall
OIAA radio program, educational and cultural programming continued to be developed
and aired. Colombia‟s national radio station, which had been reestablished by cultural
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managers within the Ministry of National Education in 1940, frequently aired OIAA
programs. The new public station, Radiodifusora Nacional, maintained a vigorous
campaign of educational and cultural diffusion throughout the war years. Its directors
actively sought collaboration with schools, universities, and cultural organizations, and in
the first year the station offered courses in Colombian literature, national and
international music, world literature, poetry, history, theater, and film. It presented
various types of news reports as well. 87 Over the 1940s, the station was joined in its
selective cultural and educational mission by emerging university radio stations in
Bogotá and Medellín. 88
Many OIAA radio programs fit within the educational and cultural mission of
Radiodifusora Nacional and were enthusiastically accepted for airing. Station managers
granted OIAA programs prime-time evening hours free of charge. In 1943, for example,
OIAA programs accumulated 124 of “the best listening hours” with additional hours
granted for special event broadcasts. By 1944, total OIAA hours on Radiodifusora
Nacional increased to 324. Most programs were weekly half-hour presentations and
focused broadly on cultural aspects of Pan Americanism; such shows as Tierras de
Libertad [Lands of Liberty], Radioteatro de America [American Radio Theater], and
Cuentos de America [American Stories] promoted hemispheric unity by exploring the
peoples and cultures of the Americas. And on many occasions, Radiodifusora Nacional
cleared program schedules for special OIAA event broadcasts such as live addresses by
FDR and other prominent Pan Americanists. 89
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Radio collaboration between the OIAA and the Ministry of National Education
also resulted in the development and distribution of educational resources for Colombian
classrooms. To accompany Grandes Hombres de las Americas [Great Men of the
Americas], a series of eighteen radio dramas celebrating historical figures from the US
and Latin American (in which Colombians figured prominently), the OIAA published a
companion booklet. The ministry found the series useful for schools and its adult literacy
campaign, and it collaborated with the OIAA to distribute more than 20,000 copies of the
booklet.90 For a later radio series, Nuestro Mundo Maravilloso [Our Marvelous World],
the ministry donated all the printing paper in exchange for one third of the booklets.
Focused on unique geographical features, the natural resources and the agriculture of the
hemisphere, the ministry considered the series and the booklet valuable educational
resources.91
As seen in the music program of the Centro Colombo-Americano, the OIAA
recognized the power of music to bridge cultural divides as well as to establish US
cultural credibility with Latin Americans. Thus, radio performance series were common
OIAA offerings on Radiodifusora Nacional. Concerts by the Metropolitan Opera of New
York, the Cleveland Symphony Orchestra, and other fine arts and high-culture musical
organizations were regularly aired on the station. 92 University radio stations were also
enthusiastic about such performance series. Given this enthusiasm, these emerging
stations were also venues for OIAA music education programs such as “La Música en los
Estados Unidos” [Music in the United States]; the series of 26 half-hour programs on
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discs, covered “all phases of music in American life” from opera to folk and included
Spanish commentary explaining the origins and significance of each. 93 Radiodifusora
Nacional, university stations, and the rapidly appearing commercial stations also had
access to and borrowed from the American Music Loan Library housed in Bogotá‟s
Colombo-Americano.94
More current and commercially popular US music, however, was simultaneously
receiving increased airplay on Colombian stations with little assistance from the OIAA.
Jazz and big band sounds were just being introduced on commercial stations in the
interior, but on the Caribbean coast these had been recognizable genres since pre-radio
days because international music, like international languages, were part of the cultural
blend of the trans-Caribbean. Barranquilla‟s proximity to Panama was important to the
spread of US music from the Canal Zone, but it had been the arrivals and departures of
cruise lines --with their on-board orchestras and dance bands-- that introduced new US
music to the region. While in port, ship musicians often played local venues and gathered
with Colombian musicians, and this practice facilitated movement of musical influences
between the Americas. 95 Thus, as soon as commercial radio stations were established on
the coast, contemporary US music was played in the mix with local Costeño, Caribbean
and Latin American records. Later, OIAA music programs simply expanded the variety
of US genres available in those local markets.
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Radio English
Measuring the radius and quality of signals allows for a technical understanding
of radio reception, but such measurements reveal little about how listeners receive,
process and respond to broadcast information and content. Articulating the non-technical
aspects of human reception can be particularly challenging in the historical analysis of
mass media; sources are more specific, more plentiful and easier to identify around the
points of production and transmission than in the vast fields of reception. Thus far this
chapter testifies to this source limitation. While historicizing significant collaboration
between US and Colombian bureaucracies, businesses, and individuals in planning and
transmitting OIAA radio programs and print resources, the analysis relies mostly on
sources closer to the points of transmission than reception. As compared to the BNCs and
American schools, OIAA mass media programs were not centered in well-defined
educational communities and, thus, questions regarding reception of programs cannot be
answered in institutional histories and analyses of community cultures. With regard to
OIAA radio programs, many questions concerning local reception will remain
unanswered because of the sheer size of the listening audience, its geographic dispersal,
and the infinite subjectivities that conditioned listeners‟ engagement with program
content. Yet, because education remained an important focus in radio programming,
direct encounters between Colombian radio listeners and OIAA educators indeed took
place. This was the case with English language courses presented via radio by the OIAA.
While examining these educational encounters provides nothing close to a complete
picture of how Colombians received, processed and responded to all OIAA radio
programs, it is useful for identifying the range of Colombian reception.
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The first OIAA English courses aired on Radiodifudora Nacional in collaboration
with the Ministry of National Education in 1942. The ministry was then working toward
establishing English as the primary foreign language of the national curriculum, and radio
English courses supported its plan. Thus, it provided the OIAA with free airtime. At first,
an intermediate/advanced level course was offered twice a week to coincide with the
opening of the new Colombo-Americano. A beginner course followed with three weekly
airings during prime evening hours.96 Though the signals of Radiodifusora Nacional were
received throughout the nation, it had limited listenership away from the capital and,
notably, attracted very few listeners on the Caribbean coast.97 That the station‟s
programming was culturally Andean certainly gave it less appeal for potential listeners in
Barranquilla, Cartagena, and Santa Marta. Thus when the OIAA repeated the course on
the coast, it paid to air those programs on popular commercial stations. In Medellín,
courses were given free airtime on the university station.
Demonstrated by a high volume of letters and comments it received, the ministry
considered the courses a great success. 98 Among students at the National University,
Rector Julio Carrizosa reported “extraordinary interest” in the courses.99 Textbook sales
provided a more concrete measurement of listener engagement with the courses in
Bogotá and other locales. For each radio course, the OIAA printed a companion pamphlet
with dialogues, exercises and grammar rules to serve as the course text. These short texts
were usually created by staffers at the Centro Colombo-Americano in Bogotá, and
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commonly as many as 3,000 copies sold before each airing. 100 So high was the demand
for these print materials among the general public that courses were occasionally
postponed so more texts could be printed before the scheduled start of a course.
Coordination committees handled text distribution, and many were mailed to requesters
outside urban centers but within the radius of the signal. Texts were always sold at or
below cost as a specific strategy to attract a different class of radio students than the
British, who charged a much higher fee for texts accompanying their occasional radio
literature courses.101
The notion of teaching a language via radio seemed absurd to some. Rafael
Guizado, who had been first Director of Radiodifusora Nacional, was a high profile critic
of the OIAA courses. While confessing a comical fascination with the radio English
lessons airing on his former station, he was not convinced the medium was a very good
method for learning a language: “Language is the vehicle of dialogue; lacking dialogue
it‟s useless.” Guizado, an ardent Colombian nationalist, was also concerned with the
cultural implications of broadly expanding English usage in Colombia: “History teaches
us that nations that become powerful impose and teach their languages, while the nations
destined to endure foreign influences, submit to the task of learning a foreign
language.”102 While there is historical precedence for Guizado‟s point, all Colombian
engagement with the English language did not fall so neatly on a polarized continuum
between imposition and submission, between coercion and consent.
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In Medellín, growth of OIAA English programs was driven by the local business
community. The Department of Antioquia with its capital at Medellín was Colombia‟s
industrial and agricultural powerhouse. Textiles and coffee led the region‟s economy and
provided more abundant resources for structuring modernity than in any other area of the
nation. Medellín was also the political center of partisan Conservatism and ground-zero
of Catholic traditionalism. As compared to other departments, Antioquia‟s educational
system was bolstered by its more substantial economic resources and its strong links to
the Catholic Church. Not surprisingly, literacy rates in the department were higher than
almost anywhere else in the nation. While the rate was just over 50% at start of war, in
urban areas it approached 75% among school age children. 103
As a second language, English was less audible in Medellín than in the national
capital and on the Caribbean coast, but in the early 1940s demand for English courses,
teachers, and resources exploded in the city. Local schools turned to the coordination
committee for teachers, textbooks and assistance planning curriculum. Significantly,
requests from businesses outpaced those from educational institutions. Banks, factories,
and export firms all repeatedly asked the committee to arrange courses for their
employees. Given the volume of requests, the committee believed a cultural center,
similar to the new Colombo-Americano in Bogotá but with a more specific business
orientation, was the best way to meet local needs. The British had recently opened a
branch of their Instituto Cultural Colombo-Britanico in Medellín, but the committee
found businesses to be more interested in learning American English. The committee
identified the establishment of a BNC as its first priority. Yet, Washington was unwilling
103
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to commit to a second Colombo-Americano until the success of the new center in Bogotá
was clear. In the meantime, the Medellín committee contracted locally residing US
citizens to teach business English courses. 104 For the general public, it began radio
courses.
Medellín‟s radio course was a repeat of those offered in Bogotá over
Radiodifusora Nacional, with one important innovation in course format. In Medellín,
“students of the air” were encouraged to complete homework assignments and mail or
deliver them to the instructor at the committee‟s office. Assignments were corrected and
returned weekly. The first course to air was for advanced students; twenty-six of them
regularly submitted assignments. Many from that group later enrolled in a free follow-up
course offered by the instructor; delivered in-person, the follow-up class allowed the
instructor to have more personal interaction with his students, whom he described as
having “good educations,” coming from “fine families,” and, given the advanced level of
the course, knowing plenty of English. They were a mixture of old and young, and
included police officers, housewives, and businessmen. 105 However, the general public
widely criticized the first radio course because it was too advanced for most listeners.
Requests for basic level courses poured into the committee office. 106 Quickly, such
courses were planned and broadcast from a local university station “giving the programs
the proper cultural backdrop.” The committee also arranged to have the signal relayed to
a more powerful commercial station which was popular with middle-class listeners, who
formed an important core of Medellín‟s growing professional and business classes. To
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give the lessons more interactive appeal, the instructor hired local assistants to
“dramatize” the class and add local accents.107
In Barranquilla demand for English was quite different. The Department of
Atlántico of which Barranquilla is the capital also had an overall literacy rate near 50%.
Comparable to that of Antioquia, the rate distinguished the department from the rest of
the coast and most of nation. A small department centered on its capital, Atlántico‟s
population was 90% urban; its relative success with literacy reflected the national norm
of greater concentration of educational resources in urban rather than rural communities.
More specifically, higher literacy reflected the city‟s relative ability to finance basic
primary education through the import and export trade of the local economy. As
compared with Medellín, however, secondary school options in Atlántico were limited.
Importantly, foreign languages were commonly spoken in and around
Barranquilla. German, Italian and Middle Eastern immigrant populations added their
national languages to the region‟s trans-Caribbean linguistic mix. Long before the OIAA
began promoting English language teaching in that port city, English words and phrases
were part of the international vocabulary that made its way into local usage through
music, commerce, tourism and sport (especially baseball). While US culture was the root
of some English language influences on the coast, it was not an exclusive source. 108
English speaking islands dot the Caribbean and include a unique Colombian
territory, the archipelago of San Andrés and Providencia. Settled by the British as slave
plantations, the islands eventually ended up under Spanish control and joined with Gran
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Colombia at independence. In the 1930s, the islands‟ population was small, but owing to
the British legacy of schooling, it was highly literate. At approximately 87%, the
descendants of slaves on the archipelago had the highest literacy rates in Colombia. 109 In
addition to the language influences of these native English-speaking Colombians,
Barranquilla and the coastal region also encountered the English tongue via radio signals
from the British West Indies and Panama. Additionally, as a major metropolitan port,
Barranquilla was home to English speaking foreigners from across the Greater
Caribbean; most notable were locally-residing Jamaicans.110
As compared to Medellín, demand for English teaching resources was lower in
Barranquilla because there were greater options for learning and using the language. As a
result, the coordination committee never recommended a cultural institute for the city;
indeed, members recommended against establishing one even as the OIAA was interested
in making the city the second Colombian site for a BNC. The committee believed the
market for English teaching in Barranquilla was already satisfied. They noted an
abundance of Jamaican and other Caribbean English teachers in the city as well as a
growing number of small commercial schools run by North American and Cuban women.
Additionally, they detected an “indifferent attitude of students” on the coast that limited
their enthusiasm for a BNC. Suggesting influences of geographic determinism in vogue
in that era, the committee thought the indifferent attitudes of some students was “possibly
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because of the climate.”111 The response to OIAA radio English courses in Barranquilla,
however, was anything but indifferent.
The first radio English courses in Barranquilla were transcribed rebroadcasts of
the original Bogotá course. Popular from the start, subsequent courses followed the more
engaging format established in Medellín and were repeated throughout the war. To reach
the widest audience, the OIAA paid for evening time-slots on commercial stations.112
Initiated with a US instructor, locally produced radio courses were subsequently
presented by Margot de Zuñiga, a Cuban national who had lived most of her life in New
York and was a teacher at the Colegio Karl C. Parrish. Students could interact with the
instructor by sending assignments for correction, and, remarkably, approximately one
hundred students did so weekly when each course aired. In addition, the instructor
scheduled office hours for twelve hours a week to meet and converse with students.
Students took full advantage, and they made constant appeals to the coordination
committee to expand course offerings. On the committee‟s recommendation, the OIAA
was willing to finance courses on an ongoing basis under Zuñiga except during Carnival
season; during that two month period from Christmas through the start of Lent,
Barranquillero culture was (and continues to be) dedicated to socializing and celebrating
in the streets. Serious pursuits are put on hold. 113
Response by individuals to radio courses in Barranquilla can be gauged by
purchases of course texts, completion of weekly assignments, and attendance at office
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hours. Further, insight into reception can be garnered from the many letters received by
the coordination committee at the conclusion of each course. Such letters expressed
appreciation, requested continuation, and suggested course modifications. Filled with
terms of endearment for the instructors, letters written in English were replete with errors
in grammar, spelling, phrasing, and word choice that is typical of English language
learners. Most letters were written in Spanish with apologies from the authors for not
being yet able to communicate adequately in written English. 114
One recurring theme characterized the letters received. Most of the students
equated English with modernity and believed learning it was important for their futures.
Self-conscious about the quality of his wording but willing to make mistakes, Euclides
Barrios expressed just that point in imperfect English: “We are in an epoch of advance
and progress consequently humanity need prepare themselves with a practically
fundament and theory. This is the way we are going in the cross of life.” 115 Tulia O. de
Berdugo concurred; she believed learning English should be a major concern for anyone
thinking toward the future.116 Alfonso Soria, who described himself as “a diligent
listener” [oyente diligente] of the program, offered that English would be important in
Colombia for the duration of the war and well after.117 For some students, like Sols
Barrios, future career opportunities were the incentive for learning English. 118 Others
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approached language learning as crucial to uniting the Americas. Endorsing a close
Colombian and US relationship, they painted the future in political and cultural shades of
Pan Americanism. 119
Also clear from these letters was that OIAA radio English was not imposed upon
the listeners. Nor were radio students passively submitting to linguistic imperialism.
Living in a large urban center within the Greater Caribbean, foreign languages and their
influences were already imbedded in Barranquillero culture. Use of English in commerce,
politics, and entertainment was clearly on the rise, and the new national curriculum
standards further reinforced this trend. Yet, beyond the level of primary schooling, formal
educational resources were limited on the coast; easy access to OIAA radio lessons, texts,
and instructors gave adults on the coast educational options they lacked. Thus did Elsa
Nieto and others consider the OIAA lessons generous support toward cultural
developments in the city. 120 Students were especially grateful for the low priced texts.121
That direct relationships were encouraged and supported between instructor and learners
through office hours was also highly appreciated; limited only by her English vocabulary,
Carmen Solano expressed her “gladness for the huge idea of talking with the own pupils,
in order to practice the conversation which is most important thing in learning of this
language.”122 Significantly, as she and hundreds of others actively engaged with radio
resources of the OIAA, the English program was adapted to their needs. The coordination
committee and its Cuban instructor responded to requests for slower enunciation, interest
119

L.A. Buitrago to Margot de Zuñiga, 6 June 1945, NARG 229, DI/CCC, B1358, F: Barranquilla from
January 1944.
120
Elsa Nieto to Margot de Zuñiga, 3 Jan. 1945, NARG 229, DI/CCC, B1358, F: Barranquilla from
January 1944.
121
Ramon Renowitzsky to Frederick Stimson, 30 Dec. 1944, NARG 229, DI/CCC, B1358, F: Barranquilla
from January 1944.
122
Carmen Solano to Margot de Zuñiga, 6 June 1945, NARG 229, DI/CCC, B1358, F: Barranquilla from
January 1944.

347

in more difficult vocabulary, calls for more varied content, and repeated demands to
schedule new courses.123 In this process, students and teachers constructed nontraditional
but modern transnational educational communities in a region where available resources
were scarce. These communities were certainly less developed and more fleeting than the
educational and cultural communities that developed around BNCs and American
schools, yet in their moment they were functional for Colombians who sought crossborder tools to construct their futures.
Non-Theatrical Film
Tremendously popular with the laboring classes, commercial cinema grew as an
entertainment outlet in the principal cities of Colombia apace with accelerated
urbanization. Though French, Italian and German films had strong Colombian screen
presence before World War I, the silent films produced in Hollywood became the
common fare in the course of that war.124 Because studios recovered production costs and
made considerable profit in US markets, films were exported cheaply to Latin America
allowing for low ticket prices that were within the reach of some categories of laborers. 125
By the early 1930s, when talking soundtracks complemented moving images,
Hollywood‟s dominance of commercial film showings in urban Colombia, as throughout
Latin America, was well established. Significantly, these films gave many Colombians
their first glimpses of contemporary US cultures and lifestyles. Though these glimpses
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were often heavy with caricature and sensationalism, they were, nonetheless, the most
tangible representations of the US and its peoples available to many Colombians. At the
same time in the US, Hollywood films were also influential in reinforcing views of Latin
America as Indian lands that were lost to modernity.
During the war, the OIAA collaborated with commercial film studios in both the
US and Mexico in its campaign for hemispheric unity. In Mexico this work entailed
direct OIAA support to build the national film industry. 126 In the US, the agency worked
with Hollywood studios. Production of films to promote Pan American unity and to
eliminate film depictions that fed stereotypes within the Americas was the goal. To this
end the OIAA considered its efforts very successful. In the course of the war, the OIAA
made recommendations to the industry for specific films as well as suggested changes to
scripts, final edits and everything in between. If the agency‟s Motion Picture Division
identified films it thought would be particularly effective in Latin America, Hollywood
producers agreed to accelerate sound tracking in Spanish and Portuguese, and the
division secured transport priorities for the films. Additionally, the OIAA often paid
studios to print extra copies of films in order to get wider exposure. Separately, the
division also collaborated with the major newsreel companies in the US to get more Pan
American, Latin American, and anti-Axis content into their weekly distributions to
region.127 By the end of the war, when weekly audiences of US commercial films in
Latin America reached over 20 million, Hollywood studios had produced 134 theatrical
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films in direct cooperation with the OIAA. These films accounted for almost half of the
industry‟s wartime output. At the same time, OIAA-Hollywood collaboration resulted in
100 non-theatrical short subject films with Latin American content. Such “shorts” had
cultural, educational, and propaganda value and were screened in commercial cinemas as
bonus reels with feature films. 128
OIAA efforts with non-theatrical film were not limited to commercial shorts
produced by Hollywood studios. Indeed, during the war the OIAA was actively involved
in producing and distributing educational, cultural, and war propaganda film for noncommercial viewing. This non-theatrical film program brought OIAA films to schools,
factories, churches, public parks and plazas throughout Latin America, and it reached a
monthly audience of more than five million by the end of the war. 129 Using 16mm reels,
which were easier to project and transport than bulkier 35mm reels used in commercial
cinemas, the OIAA established film collections throughout the region and relied on
coordination committees to develop distribution channels at the local level. 130 To
facilitate screenings, more than 300 projectors were transferred to the committees. The
OIAA also negotiated for the use of a fleet of more than 200 sound trucks owned by US
businesses in the region.
The early OIAA films had been originally produced by US government agencies,
foundations, educational institutions, and businesses; the OIAA acquired rights to these
films and often added Spanish or Portuguese soundtracks before films were shipped to
128
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coordination committees. Educational and cultural titles were most common. While this
method of repackaging continued throughout the war, the OIAA soon began contracting
for original films to meet more specific policy objectives as the war intensified. By the
last months of the war, the OIAA catalog contained more than 600 titles available for its
Latin American and domestic film program. More than half of these films were focused
on the war effort while education, medicine and culture were also well represented. Films
on industry, transportation, agriculture, and health rounded out the collection. 131
In Colombia, the Ministry of National Education encouraged non-theatrical film
showings by the OIAA. The interest of ministry officials in film as an instructional
medium matched their enthusiasm for radio. Through an organizational division for
educational cinema and cultural propaganda, the ministry had itself attempted to harness
the power of film to unify the nation in a quest for modernity. Ministry officials professed
faith that the medium could be used to rectify deficiencies in the national education
system and reach the nation‟s undereducated and illiterate majority. National educational
and cultural values would be established and reinforced through films treating a range of
themes: nation and region, literacy and art, industry and agriculture, health and hygiene.
As school expansion campaigns played out, classrooms were a primary venue for
educational and cultural film, and the ministry --concerned that the medium be more than
spectacle-- promoted pedagogical standards for integrating the technology into learning
environments. It strongly recommended that students always have introductory
assignments related to each film, that teachers use microphones during projection to
provide commentary, that lectures on film topics immediately follow screening, and that
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students write follow-up compositions or create drawings explaining the focus of film. 132
The ministry‟s film program was not, however, developed exclusively for school
children. Educational and cultural films were to be brought to barracks, prisons, hospitals,
asylums, orphanages, and public plazas. At such sites, where most audiences were
captive audiences, the ministry believed film could be effectively used to plant an
“educational seed” [semilla eductiva]. In addition to planting that seed, it hoped film like
radio would help to cultivate nationalism by exalting common virtues across regions. 133
To convert educational rhetoric into practice, the ministry needed a supply of
films that were explicitly tied to its goals. Thus, it initiated a plan for documentary films
on each region of the nation. Though the ministry produced some films and made funding
and technical assistance available, actual film production was largely left to the
departmental governments.134 Not surprisingly, few departments had adequate resources
and expertise to complete the films. Those films resulting from the initiative mostly
projected the cultures of historically dominant cities and regions: Bogotá, Medellín, the
Department of Antioquia, and the surrounding coffee region. 135 To this sparse collection
of films in the ministry‟s collection were added reels produced by the military and poorly
edited footage of national monuments, political ceremonies, regional festivals and
parades. Short films explicitly promoting commercial products but set against regional
backdrops were also available from Avianca Airlines, the National Federation of Coffee
Growers, various Colombian tobacco companies, and departmental lottery agencies.
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Through the early 1940s, the ministry continued to produce films and contract with
commercial filmmakers while encouraging production in each of the departments. Yet,
by 1942, it was forced to conclude that “the quality of the films do not justify the cost.”136
The ministry soon suspended production and limited itself to distribution.
Government reliance on foreign sources of educational film was well established
before the OIAA film program began. Before the war, the official collection housed in
Bogotá contained many titles produced in the major industrialized nations. German,
Italian and the US films dominated. Most of the European films were subtitled or
soundtracked in Spanish, but most from the US were not. As a result, projection of US
films usually necessitated the use of speakers and microphones so the audience could be
given explanations and commentary. 137 Many of the foreign films in ministry and
department collections had been purchased by Colombian diplomats overseas or donated
by foreign governments: reels, projectors, and portable generators which were
“transportable on the back of a mule” were purchased by the Colombian legation in
Rome, while the British government presented a variety of documentary films including
Around the Village Green and Heart of an Empire to Colombian representatives in
London.138 Significantly, most of the educational and cultural films from the US had been
donated upon request of the Colombian government; film exchange protocols had been
established through earlier Pan American conferences, and the ministry actively invoked
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them to supplement its slim collections.139 While the ministry did not expect foreign films
to contribute directly to nationalist sentiments, it valued many of them for their
educational content. Additionally, relying on foreign sources was the only way to keep
the ministry‟s educational cinema program functioning as a model for the various
departmental school systems.140
The film program in Barranquilla and the Department of Atlántico before the war
demonstrates the vast gulf between the promise and practice of educational cinema in
Colombia. In that department, education officials recognized film as a powerful medium
that should be used in education to the greatest extent possible. 141 Excepting Medellín,
Bogotá and their immediate environs, Barranquilla‟s film program was more active than
those of most other regions. Still, economic resources for the program were not sufficient.
Equipment costs and ongoing repairs taxed educational budgets, and projectionists, who
were paid at the municipal level, were often cut from payrolls. 142 Further complicating
the program, adequate facilities for screening film with school children were lacking;
given the intense, year-round heat and humidity of the Caribbean coast, hanging
darkening curtains over classroom windows was impractical and unwise. Only one school
in the entire department could comfortably accommodate an audience, and the logistics
and costs of transporting students from a distance made its use impractical. Education
officials occasionally sent a projectionist to schools and social clubs throughout the city
and region, and they saw such circulating tours as the best approach for reaching both
children and adults. They just did not have the resources to mount a regular program.
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Despite these challenges, the department‟s education officials remained committed to the
program and managed to hold almost 500 showings for children and adults in 1938.
Atlántico‟s film catalog, however, reveals just how difficult it was to achieve the
program‟s broad goals of building nationalist sentiment and increasing educational levels.
The meager catalog of just three dozen titles included some Colombian-made films about
Catholicism and air travel but most were of foreign origin. There were several German,
Italian, and Argentine cultural films, and a full third were from the US. Received through
Pan American exchange programs and focused on the infrastructure of modernity, some
of these films on water power, fire fighting, census taking and electricity had general
educational value. Yet, much of their content was US-specific and most were only in
English. The other US films in the catalog had more dubious educational value:
promotional materials from Hollywood and older, commercially produced cartoons
featuring Popeye, Sinbad, Mickey Mouse and Ali Baba. 143 As it existed before the war,
educational cinema in the Department of Atlántico was more about entertainment and
exposure to things foreign than Colombianidad and educational improvement. Later,
when the OIAA film program was established, US additions to departmental collections
increased substantially, and screenings of educational, cultural and propaganda films rose
dramatically on the coast and throughout Colombia.
US Educational, Cultural and Propaganda Films
For US educators interested in film as instructional media, federal government
departments were a primary source in the late 1930s. The Departments of Agriculture,
Interior, and War had their own production facilities and thus had the most extensive
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collections. Of the estimated 500 federal government films then in circulation, more than
two-thirds had an agricultural focus; these films were educational in nature, but they had
limited appeal as classroom resources outside farm communities. Films by the
Department of the Interior had wider educational appeal. Framed by the philosophy of
indigenismo, many of the films chronicled North American Indian cultures facing the
challenges of modernity. National parks, dam projects, mining, and petroleum were also
popular subjects. Other titles useful to educators were produced by the US Office of
Education and the Surgeon General as well as private schools and colleges. Notably, the
early instructional films produced by government bureaucracies were known to be dry
and dull. Yet, as this genre of film developed, government producers better understood
that education and entertainment need not be mutually exclusive; more interesting titling,
more compelling narration, more appealing angles, and a sense of drama increasingly
infused instructional film. 144
Through the Pan American educational and technical exchange arrangements of
late 1930s, US educational films began to flow to Latin America via US ambassadors and
the Pan American Union.145 The pre-war US film catalog offered for distribution in the
region included thirty short films. Most had been produced by the Departments of
Agriculture and Interior. One of the agricultural films had been produced for Spanish
speaking populations in the US Southwest and had a Spanish soundtrack, but all others
were in English. 146 As the war approached and the OIAA appeared, the catalog boasted
more diversified subjects and increased Spanish and Portuguese sound tracking. Cultural
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and educational content remained the focus, and the catalog now included educational
films commercially produced for US classrooms. Health and science topics were more
plentiful. So, too, were instructional sports films like Basketball Technique, an 8-minute
short produced by MGM and featuring university players from UCLA, Fordham, and
Iowa State. But whereas earlier film exchanges sent titles produced exclusively with US
content, films in the new OIAA program featured objective-driven Pan American
content. Some films emphasized the shared religious and cultural heritage between the
US and Latin America: Archbishop Cantwell‘s Pilgrimage chronicled the visit of the
Catholic prelate of Los Angeles to Guadalupe Basilica in Mexico City and La Fiesta de
Santa Barbara highlighted “Spanish-American” festivals in California. Other titles
focused on Latin America‟s natural resources that were in high demand for wartime
defense. More politically focused films, like Ten Years of Progress Under President
Vargas, celebrated Latin American leaders who were actively supporting Washington‟s
Pan American programs or the Allied cause. 147
After Pearl Harbor, the OIAA non-theatrical film program shifted more explicitly
into the domain of propaganda. Two new film series were initiated and dominated OIAA
production for the remainder of war. Films in the “Power to Win” series emphasized the
military and industrial strength of the US to defeat the Axis. One of the first releases in
the series was Victory for the Americas. The film chronicled a group of Latin American
journalists visiting war production plants across the US on a State Department sponsored
tour. Ending in a meeting with US Vice President Henry Wallace, who addressed the
journalists in Spanish, the film was marketed to coordination committees as “potent and
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persuasive.” The second series was categorized as “ideological” and promoted
democracy and Pan Americanism over fascism and radicalism. What the OIAA
considered “hard-hitting” comparisons of democratic and Axis ways of life were
common; Hitler‘s Plan for the Americas, for example, detailed a Nazi plan to “dominate
Latin America, destroying industry, encouraging a slave agricultural economy and
creating a continent of peons.”148 With the introduction of the two new propaganda
series, OIAA film catalogs rapidly reflected the change. Of eighty-one OIAA films
available in Colombia in August 1942, approximately one third of the selections were in
the series “Power to Win”: films featured US military resources, emphasized combat
power, and explained the selective service. The second third were from the “Ideological”
series. Films featuring Pan American cultural unity included Sons of America,
documenting the enlistment of a young New Mexican of Spanish ancestry into the army.
Economic interdependence in the Americas was stressed in Pan American Bazaar, which
featured scenes of Latin American products being enthusiastically purchased by New
Yorkers. Nobel Prize Winners in Exile presented the US as an intellectual sanctuary for
Europeans and Education for Slaughter explained how German youth were indoctrinated
in Nazi controlled classrooms. Such films as America is Not Imperialistic and The US
and the Philippines reinforced that respect and mutual understanding grounded FDR‟s
approach to foreign policy. More general educational, cultural, agricultural, and health
films made up the final third of the catalog.149
Showings of non-theatrical films in Colombia were organized by coordination
committees with assistance from the OIAA press office in Bogotá. Committees hired
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Colombian projectionists, secretaries, and technicians to run the day-to-day operation,
and the program grew through direct collaboration with the Ministry of National
Education, educational officials in the departments, the military, schools, cultural groups,
businesses and professional organizations. In the course of the war, thousands of
showings took place, and non-theatrical OIAA films reached a total audience of over five
million Colombians. The laboring class (workers and their families) accounted for 42%
of all showings and more than half of all viewers. While screenings were at times
arranged in factories and on job sites, most of this viewing took place on the plazas of
working class neighborhoods or barrios. The second highest number of screenings, 23%,
was for professional groups such as medical doctors, lawyers, educators, engineers, and
architects, but because these professional classes were relatively small, these showings
were often for only a handful of people at a time. Thus, they represented just 1% of total
viewers. Members of the Colombian military actually made up the second highest
category of viewership; a prime audience of the “Power to Win” series, soldiers were
given just 13% of total showings but were 34% of total viewers. Schools, at 15% of
showings and 6% of
viewers, and church groups, at 8% of showings and 3% of viewers, rounded out the
program. 150 While at least 346 cities and villages across the nation hosted screenings
through 1945, most viewers lived in urban areas. 151
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Urban Screenings: The Barrio Film program
Reaching the laboring class with educational and cultural film was a prime
objective of the Ministry of National Education. In and around the national capital, where
its influence was most concentrated, the ministry initiated a barrio film program in line
with its broad goals of educational and cultural outreach. Bringing film into the
neighborhoods where poor workers lived gave the ministry a forum for reaching an urban
population that was largely illiterate. With its pool of national films limited in quality and
quantity, and with a deepening aversion and eventual refusal to use German and Italian
films in its collection, the ministry‟s barrio film program relied heavily on OIAA films.
Officials regularly chose titles from the OIAA collection in Bogotá and held them until
each had been shown throughout its barrio circuit. Significantly, they borrowed only
educational and cultural films and avoided subjects that were too closely tied to war
propaganda. In reports offered to the OIAA as a courtesy, projectionists employed by the
ministry noted audience size and anecdotal comments about viewer reception for each
film. Such comments were very general but infrequently noted any critical reaction. 152
Following the ministry‟s model and with its approval, the OIAA began its own
barrio film programs. In bringing film into working class barrios, the OIAA chose locales
where they could reach “a class so poor that they would never be able to attend the
theater.”153 Coordinated with local community leaders, screenings took place on a regular
schedule in barrios of cities where coordination committees existed. Popular and in high
demand at the local level, showings were soon extended into surrounding towns. Where a
local leader or community organization owned projection equipment, the program was
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run at the neighborhood level. Local organizers, such as Monseñor Garzón and Father
Caicedo, simply chose from the OIAA collection and made their own arrangements for
viewing. Where local equipment did not exist but interest was high, a projectionist
employed by the OIAA arrived on a weekly basis and held showings after dark on a
central plaza. Crowds varied by barrio and town but usually ranged from 100 to as many
as 4000. Projectionists consistently reported high enthusiasm for films and always noted
that sports films and cartoons received animated and extended applause. 154 To spur
educational officials at the department level to develop barrio film programs of their own,
the ministry had provided departments with sound trucks. Equipped with projection
equipment including portable generators, these trucks were also mounted with speakers to
accommodate outdoor screenings in both urban and rural settings. Recognizing their own
limitations for developing a program, education officials in Bogotá, Medellín and
Barranquilla loaned their trucks to coordination committees to do it for them. 155 All
continually expressed deep appreciation to the committees for their efforts to spread
educational film in marginal barrios and remote rural zones.
Significantly, OIAA film screenings often served as de facto community meetings
at which civic organizations made announcements or held discussions with the crowds
gathered. Where no community spokesperson came forward, the OIAA projectionist was
often asked to make announcements on such topics as school schedules, government
price controls on butter and sugar, or the needs of local orphans. 156 On the coast,
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showings had a decidedly festive atmosphere. OIAA projectionists in Barranquilla had
originally reported considerable difficulties holding the attention of the crowds through
the changing of the reels. The committee‟s solution was playing Caribbean and Latin
American dance music (indicative that international music was already popular in that
region) through the speakers of the sound truck to encourage a “neighborhood fiesta.”157
Such informality on the coast contrasted sharply with showings in more formal Medellín.
There maintaining order among the masses was taken more seriously. Strong
anticommunism was ingrained in the cultural psyche of the city, and concern for working
class radicalism was especially pronounced among political, business, and church
leaders. Thus, the city often arranged for a police presence for OIAA screenings in
working class barrios.158
In Bogotá, an additional venue for OIAA films was the Teatro Cultural [Cultural
Theater]. A theater in a park in central Bogotá, the teatro staged puppet shows and
screened films directly tied to the cultural and educational objectives of the ministry.
Daily showings were free of charge with local schools attending during early hours and
the general public invited in the afternoon. Running programs from the early 1940s
forward, the teatro was the site of one-third of all ministry film showings. 159 Importantly,
the aging film collection of the teatro was supplemented with films selectively chosen
and borrowed from OIAA catalogs. The teatro provided huge audiences for OIAA films.
In a run of a half dozen films shown repeatedly over the course of a couple months, more
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than 50,000 people were reached. Regular communications from theater administrators to
the Bogotá coordination committee expressed gratitude for collaboration. The director
also indicated that films about aviation, sports, student life in the US, boats, and
geography received the most positive reaction from school groups.160
Rural Screenings: Escuelas Ambulantes and the Sydney Ross Company
While urbanization was changing the character of Colombian society before midcentury, the majority of the populations still lived in rural zones where illiteracy rates far
exceeded 50%. To extend education and culture into the countryside, ministry officials
established Escuelas Ambulantes [traveling schools] in 1940. These mobile educational
units were financed by donations from national and foreign businesses including public
utilities, breweries, mining, tobacco, and oil companies. As part of a campaign to
democratize culture, they were outfitted to provide educational, cultural, and health
programming in areas where schools did not exist. Staffed by educators, artists,
musicians, and health professionals, the trucks also carried projection and sound
equipment for use with radio and film. From the start, the ministry borrowed heavily
from the OIAA film catalog for the program. 161 While the ministry ran the program for
the first two years to establish it as a model, it subsequently transferred the trucks and
responsibilities to the departments. There, local education officials continued to rely on
OIAA film resources. In Barranquilla, as in other areas of the nation, the coordination
committee lent projectors in addition to films to the Escuelas Ambulantes because it was

160

List of Films that are Screened by the Teatro Cultural, 1943, Ministerio de la Cultura, 13/25/1, AGN;
Antonio Angulo, Report on Film Screenings in the Teatro Cultural, 4 May 1942, NARG 229, DI/CCC,
Motion Pictures, B1371, F: 1942.
161
Jack Fahy to Secretary of the Minister of National Education, 11 Dec. 1941, NARG 229, DI/CCC,
Motion Pictures, B1371, F: 1942; MEN to OIAA,”Questions Regarding Educational and Commercial
Films,” 25 Aug. 1942.

363

a “very effective method of reaching a wide range of spectators.”162 There, as elsewhere,
education officials had unrestricted choice of films, but they always borrowed those they
perceived to have educational and cultural value. Film screenings proved important to
drawing audiences to these traveling schools; audience sizes ranged from a few dozen to
several thousand people depending on the population in rural areas visited. Totals of
10,000 people reached during a visit were not uncommon in reports and “enormous
enthusiasm” for OIAA films was frequently noted.163
OIAA resources also reached rural areas of Colombia as a result of OIAA
collaboration with US businesses. Traveling salesmen and repair technicians employed
by US agricultural equipment, sewing machine, and beverage companies often
volunteered to distribute OIAA print propaganda on their rural routes. Some agreed to
carry portable projection equipment and to screen OIAA films. In Colombia, the Sydney
Ross Company projected OIAA films to over 800,000 rural viewers in the course of the
war. This was 15% of the total OIAA film audience. 164 In addition, Sydney Ross
salesmen were also responsible for distributing 40% of all OIAA‟s pamphlets and posters
in Colombia. 165 A subsidiary of Sterling Drug, Inc., Sydney Ross was then engaged in an
aggressive campaign to capture Latin American markets that had been controlled by a
German pharmaceutical competitor before the war. 166 Before the OIAA began to supply
films to the company, Sydney Ross had already been screening films in small villages as
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a marketing scheme to extend its brand recognition. In Latin America it had eighty
delivery trucks outfitted with sound and projection equipment for this purpose. In
Colombia it had eight sound trucks as well as a delivery boat that traveled along the
Magdalena and Cauca Rivers projecting entertaining films at town docks.167 Because
Sydney Ross traveled to remote places where even Escuelas Ambulantes did not reach,
the OIAA considered it an especially valued partner in its information and propaganda
programs.168 Notably, Sydney Ross and other business collaborators were not as
concerned with screening educational films as the Colombian educators and cultural
managers with whom they shared the OIAA resources. The objective of product
marketing was simply to attract and entertain crowds, and Sydney Ross employees
considered many of the OIAA educational films too dry and boring for its audiences.
They preferred to show US cartoons and sports films for that reason. To the extent that
war-time propaganda films were exciting to watch, they were acceptable, but Sydney
Ross reports indicated that many did not hold the audience. Company salesmen strongly
suggested propaganda cartoons as the best match of corporate interests and OIAA
objectives. Cartoon characters, they reported, were “almost always received with wild
enthusiasm by small town, country, and Indian audiences.” 169 However, rural illiterate
audiences were by no means the only demographic that responded enthusiastically to
cartoons. Throughout urban Colombia, they were popular with school children, teachers
and many adults. In response to the genre‟s wide appeal, the OIAA contracted with Walt
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Disney to produce a series of films with educational and propaganda content for both
theatrical and non-theatrical distribution.170
Requests for Screenings
As propaganda content increasingly defined the catalogs of the film program,
OIAA representatives in Washington identified government officials, business leaders
and middle-class professionals as “specialized groups” that coordination committees
should target. The explicit intent was winning over these influential sectors to the Pan
American approach while simultaneously building support for the Allies and eliminating
Axis influence. From the perspective of the OIAA representatives in Washington,
however, the initial Colombian program was developing too broadly. They complained
that too many screenings were missing the target audiences because they focused on
school kids, older students, soldiers, and church groups.171 Preference among Colombian
coordination committees for cultural over propaganda activities was one important reason
for this deviation from official intent, but just as important was the role of Colombians in
structuring the program. As articulated above, the objectives of education leaders at the
national and regional levels significantly conditioned how OIAA film resources were
disbursed. The very audiences Washington policy makers were complaining about had
been identified by the Ministry of National Education as targets for its educational
cinema program; these were the groups within which the ministry hoped “educational
seeds” would be planted via film. At the same time, the program was also driven by
requests for film that poured into committee offices from various social sectors. Such
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requests --made in writing, by telephone, and in person-- provide important insights into
the variety of intentions that further structured program development in Colombia during
the war.
The majority of requests for film came from schools: public and private, Catholic
and Protestant, primary, secondary, and technical as well as university level. Resource
poor schools made it clear that they were happy to get any films. Thus, many requests
simply and broadly asked for educational and cultural subjects. Other requests were more
specific: Jesuit academics wanted science films for their university classrooms; Bogotá‟s
well-regarded Presbyterian colegio wanted to review the current catalog so teachers could
plan film-based curriculum units; and educators commonly requested films on
geography. 172 Importantly, school requests always exceeded the ability to meet them. For
the limited number of schools that owned projectors, it was easy to loan films. Yet when
an OIAA projectionist was required, the problem of finding adequately darkened
facilities was always a problem. Sometimes, collaboration with local businesses provided
solutions for schools. In Medellín, a member of the coordination committee was the
owner of several local cinemas; he allowed schools to use his theaters during normally
inactive morning hours.173 In Barranquilla, businessmen from the civic improvement
society offered a large room in their headquarters for school screenings. 174 Notably,
schools frequently asked for cartoon and sports films because they were popular with
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students and they varied the tone of more serious educational reels. 175 Similar requests for
entertaining films also came from the army. Historically, the German military model had
been most influential in Colombia, so coordination committees and embassy officials
were very enthusiastic about obliging such requests. They regularly loaned films from the
“Power to Win” series. However, while commanders at barracks and training facilities
always expressed appreciation for war films, they also asked for more entertaining
subjects, especially sports and cartoons. OIAA war films were appealing because they
modeled military modernity, but, clearly, films were also desirable as spectacle for
soldiers who were restricted to military campuses. 176
Though the barrio film program reached the working class in their neighborhoods,
laborers also viewed OIAA films during the work day. Throughout the war years,
coordination committees met requests for screenings at factories and job sites. Like most
OIAA films those screened for labor had variably educational, cultural, and propaganda
content. Many presented US industrial and labor models, and many business owners and
managers requested them because such films projected visions of economic modernity.
Industrialists chose films on modern production to show at the start of shifts, textile
workers saw films on modern fashion so as to connect production and consumption, and
mining techniques and safety films were the chosen by owners of salt mines. 177 Most
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requests for screenings at work sites came from Medellín. There management approaches
to labor were infused with Catholic paternalism and conditioned by a strong
anticommunist cautiousness. Concerned that film content precisely match their
objectives, Medellín business owners often visited the coordination committee office to
screen films before they were shown to their work forces. 178 As seen in the case of OIAA
English teaching projects in the city, the film program in Medellín had a decidedly
business orientation. When the month-long Medellín Industrial Exposition was held in
warehouses of the coffee growers‟ federation in 1943, organizers featured OIAA films.
The oil industry, diesel fuels, engine lubrication, electron technology, and bridge building
were film subjects chosen by organizers. Because the films were in English without
subtitles, a Spanish translation was read by microphone from a script prepared by the
OIAA. The scripts deviated from the original soundtracks slightly in that they referenced
local context and injected anti-Axis commentary. 179
Finally, requests for OIAA films also came from many who explicitly expressed
political solidarity with the Allied cause or publicly embraced US-led Pan Americanism.
Concerned with the chaos of the Old Continent, anti-Fascists political groups, European
diplomats exiled from their occupied homelands, Colombian Francophones horrified by
the Nazi occupation of Paris, and activists who identified with the fight “to conserve the
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democratic principles of the world” asked for films to maintain political support.180
Invoking the rhetoric of mutual understanding, politicians at the local level requested
OIAA films to engage their own political bases. Letters of request from mayors of small
towns across the nation asked, sometimes pleaded, for films and projection equipment to
arrive. Many expressed interest in providing educational and cultural experiences for
their constituents. Others sought direct propaganda. Some were clear that purely
entertaining films would meet their needs.181 As Seth Fein has shown for the Mexican
case in the postwar period, US government film resources were as adaptable to the
projects of regional and local politicians as they were to national and transnational
programs orchestrated by diplomats and ministers of government.182 In the 1940s and
well beyond, free film showings in Colombia were a novelty that drew sizeable crowds to
plazas. Local leaders who could tap into the film distribution networks of OIAA‟s
coordination committees could frame the projections to their own intent.
Conclusion
Ben Cherrington has argued that line between cultural and propaganda content in
US cultural diplomacy was blurred by the strains of world war. While OIAA activities in
the first half of the 1940s bear out his point, it is also clear that the line is never precise
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and is even blurry under the strains of peace. In formulating foreign policy and building
international relations, nations act in their own interest. They aim to benefit their own
position vis-à-vis other nations, and this reality informs policies and programming.
Beginning in the 1930s, when Washington funded elaborate Pan American programs and
focused on mutual understanding, its intention was to change the dynamic of Latin
America-US relations. It was not looking to surrender its military nor economic
hegemony in the region but to minimize potential for conflicts. Since the turn of the
century, interventionist shows of force and full military occupations had not worked to
bring political and economic stability to the region. World War II was a glaring example
of the disastrous course international rivalries and resentments could take. Thus did FDR
emphasize collaborative engagement in the hemisphere under US leadership.
Ideologically diffusionist from the start, his Pan American program intended to convince
Latin America of the benefits of the US, rather than European, model of modernity.
Significantly, when the OIAA mass media programs are examined in the local
Colombian context, the extent to which local intent conditioned implementation is drawn
into focus. On the national level, OIAA collaboration with the Colombian government
was facilitated by common interests in securing regional peace and building the
infrastructure for hemispheric modernity. Though partisan conflict could flare over
specific diplomatic policies, elite politicians from both parties had come to terms with US
leadership well before the war. While historically resistant to US cultural influences and
more comfortable with European tradition, some elite had begun to see the US as a model
of modernity worthy of emulation. In the economic sphere, the trend had building since
the since the 1920s; in the 1930s, as consensus built around education reform, elite
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leadership began to look to the US as an educational model as well. European educational
models had not worked for the majority of Colombians. Thus, as US resources were
made available through the OIAA, government officials in Bogotá employed them
selectively in support of educational and cultural reforms.
European, Catholic and exclusive, the educational system in Colombia was
inadequate, and a lack of schools and educational programs was an impediment to
national unity and development. The Ministry of National Education experimented with
solutions, but the burden of building new classrooms and programs fell most directly at
the local level. Departmental educational bureaucracies proved most enthusiastic about
engaging OIAA resources, but so did civic organizations, educators and students, church
groups, the military, professional communities, and other individuals. As Colombians
refashioned OIAA resources to meet local needs, they added a variety of filters that
conditioned the original intent associated with the media products. Many, including
domestic and foreign businesses, used OIAA resources to their own economic and
political advantage. Yet what remains most evident is that many Colombians engaged
with OIAA mass media programs because of the scarcity of educational resources in their
communities. Through OIAA mass media, new and alternative educational options
reached across borders, class and region; in the process, new transnational connections,
networks and communities informed evolving Colombian-US cultural relations.
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Chapter Seven

Transnational Education and Culture in the Early
Cold War
This chapter analyzes the intersection of anticommunism and cultural diplomacy
by tracking the evolution of American schools, binational cultural centers, and mass
media programming in Colombia during the first half of the Cold War. Anticommunism
was a well-funded political imperative in the US and it fueled increased spending on
cultural diplomacy and information programming in the 1950s and 1960s. That the
philosophy was shared among many US and Colombian political, economic and cultural
leaders energized existing US-sponsored programs in urban centers throughout the South
American nation. The chapter treats the Cold War as a political process and articulates
the growth of transnational educational and cultural infrastructure in response to both
anticommunist and local intent. It demonstrates continuing enthusiasm among urban
Colombians from the middle, professional and upper classes for US educational and
cultural models and resources. This was a sharp contrast to the previous generation when
the transnational influences on Colombian education and culture had been more
exclusively European, traditionally Catholic, and decidedly elite.
The Cold War was common political ground for the US and Colombian
governments, and their political and military collaboration impacted American schools,
cultural centers, and media programs. Existing American schools at Barranquilla and
Bogotá were joined by four more in the two decades after the war: Medellín (1946), Cali
(1948), Cartagena (1952), and Bucaramanga (1963). Others followed. US-sponsored
binational centers also proliferated. Following the establishment of the Colombo-

373

Americano de Bogotá, independent, sister institutions were founded at Medellín (1947),
Cali (1954), Barranquilla (1956), Cartagena (1957) and Bucaramanga (1957). Additional
Colombo-Americanos later appeared in the coffee region at Manizales, Pereira, and
Armenia. During the same period, the mass media programs of the US government in
Colombia also intensified. Film, radio, and print media were used in a global propaganda
campaign aimed at discrediting communism and presenting a US-led capitalist
alternative.
Colombian-US political collaboration was extensive during the Cold War, and
this chapter examines its impact on schools, cultural centers, and mass media
programming. It begins with a brief overview of converging Colombian and US political
agendas during the first half of the Cold War and contextualizes Colombian and US
efforts to contain radicalism during two decades of extreme violence and social unrest.
The next section, placing emphasis on film, considers the extent to which Cold War
imperatives infused US mass media programming. The final two sections analyze how
existing Andean schools and BNCs at Medellín and Bogotá together with their Caribbean
counterparts at Barranquilla and Cartagena responded to and grew with the politics of the
anticommunism.
Violence, Fear and Modernity in Colombia
Colombia, like many places in Latin America, experienced a brief period of
electoral growth during and after World War II. As domestic modernization agendas and
the war abroad forced important changes to national economies, political systems and
social structures, most countries in the hemisphere recorded increased voter participation
among sectors historically removed from politics. The flourish of democratic rhetoric in
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wartime political discourse certainly supported a climate that was favorable for this
development. Yet accelerating rates of urbanization, rising incomes, and higher education
levels were most significant toward facilitating new political activism and emerging
electoral constituencies. In Colombia as elsewhere, however, the “democratic spring”
was quickly squashed. Frightened by the radical potential of emerging voter bases and
empowered by the developing force of Cold War anticommunism, entrenched elites
quickly contained the potential of their broadening electorates and turned to nondemocratic governance and especially dictatorship.1 In Colombia, the first post-war
decade was marked by declared states of siege, closures of the national congress, and
eventually a brief dictatorship. Significantly, it also marked the start of a renewed
government campaign against communism and a strengthened Colombian-US political
alliance.
In Colombia, a brutal period of violence that claimed hundreds of thousands of
civilian lives began in the middle of the 1940s. The phenomenon known as la Violencia
encompassed distinct phases. It has been periodized in a variety of ways, but it had
defined geographic trajectories between 1946-1966. It was rural rather than urban and
Andean rather than coastal. While this violence manifested the confrontational patterns of
national partisanship, it was fully grounded in local tension, resentment, and competition.
Partisanship was a catalyst, and as violentologists have shown in regional studies, it was
frequently just a veneer that masked complex local conflict. Cultural clashes provoked by
migrations from rural zones to cities and to new settlement frontiers contributed to the
developing chaos, and criminal opportunists played a bloody role as well. In this conflict,
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guerilla movements formed that carried violence in new directions and into a new
century.2
Scapegoating communism for the violence of the late 1940s, Conservatives, who
had regained the presidency in 1946, severed relations with the Soviet Union and forced
the closing of the then active Instituto Cultural Colombo-Soviético in Bogotá. Joining the
UN forces on the Korean peninsula shortly thereafter, Colombia established cold warrior
credentials that cemented an already collaborative relationship with Washington. Yet,
while sending troops abroad to contain Soviet aggression, Conservatives failed to contain
violence at home. Blaming communism for broad domestic disorder became increasingly
difficult to sustain. By 1953, Conservatives dissatisfied with ongoing disorder sanctioned
a bloodless military coup against their own president. In the long run, neither the
Conservative nor the Liberal elite proved willing to tolerate dictatorship because it
circumvented their traditional authority. Thus, as peacefully as it had been established,
the coup was reversed by an agreement of the two parties in 1957. By 1958, the parties
had established the Frente Nacional [National Front], an agreement under which the
nation returned to electoral politics but within a narrow range of predetermined
outcomes. Presidential elections were held, but terms officially alternated between the
parties. Balloting was also structured to achieve bipartisan parity in Congress and in the
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elective bodies of the departments. The agreement fully determined the structure of
Colombian politics through the 1970s and its effects still linger to this day. 3
Proponents celebrated the arrangement as a noble effort to end violence and foster
national unity, but the compromise also secured a high degree of elite control of the
political system for decades to come. It also ensured continuing and better coordinated
engagement with the post-war development programming offered by the US, UN and
Organization of American States (OAS). The National Front actively engaged the
financial infrastructure of international capitalism --the World Bank, Export-Import
Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, UN Economic Commission in Latin America,
and the International Monetary Fund. While economic projects were the immediate focus
of National Front leaders, they also acknowledged the nation‟s stark social inequalities.
Gradually, the National Front followed the lead of the Church in searching for moderate
social solutions to calm the volatile social climates that sustained violence, encouraged
radicalism, and blocked modernity. By the start of the 1960s, the US joined the search for
social solutions in Colombia and throughout Latin America.
The Cuban Revolution convinced Washington that it had underestimated Latin
America‟s vulnerability to communism and overestimated the ability of local
governments and military dictatorships to contain it. Driven by determination not to lose
another nation in the hemisphere to communism, the Kennedy administration declared its
commitment to assisting Latin America with necessary social, economic, and political
3
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reforms. The administration‟s programs were constructed around contemporary
development theories that privileged local decision making but still saw progress arriving
via North-to-South diffusion. Under the loose banner of the Alliance for Progress, long
term planning and community development became the new foci of US diplomatic
energies in the region. Participating nations formulated elaborate plans for social reform
and submitted them for review to a panel of experts. While the US role was coordinating
technical assistance and financing, the nations themselves were expected to fund 80% of
their programs. Addressing basic human needs was a priority of the Alliance, and clean
water, health and housing projects were the most common activity. Land reforms, public
works, literacy campaigns and educational infrastructure were also popular projects. To
sustain community development after the building of schools, hospitals, and drainage
systems, alliance programs also concentrated on building local financial structures to
extend credit and guide capitalist modernity. 4 Colombia‟s National Front embraced the
Alliance for Progress and allowed the nation to be a showcase for the program.
Education, Anticommunism and Community Development
By the 1960s, Colombia had made clear progress in educating it citizenry.
National education was now more expansive and more diverse than it has been three
decades earlier. Literacy gains were one indicator of progress. In 1938, just over 50% of
Colombians (of school age or older) were literate, but by 1964 the figure had risen to
almost 70%. Urban areas with a literacy rate of 86% recorded greater success than rural
zones where the rate was just 59%, but both gains were significant. Importantly, primary
schooling had been extended to a majority of children in the nation. Hidden, however, in
4
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the improving literacy rates and increased number of primary classrooms was Colombia‟s
more limited success with secondary education. That same year, only 11% of those
completing primary school programs were enrolled in secondary programs. Of those who
did enroll, approximately half completed just two years or less. Just 1.2% of those who
received instruction in Colombian schools made it to university. 5
While government literacy and school expansion campaigns continued in the first
half of the Cold War, new agricultural, commercial, technical and professional education
programs brought diversity to the national education system by the 1960s. 6 As many
Colombian students continued to seek educational opportunities abroad, Conservative
leaders and industrialists collaborated to more precisely co-opt foreign resources toward
their national development goals. With creation of ICETEX [the Institute of Technical
Specialization Abroad] in the early 1950s, the government took a lead role in sending
students abroad for training. The organization identified national training needs in
technical areas, selected candidates, found spaces in educational programs abroad, and,
importantly, provided government loans for students. By the late 1950s, ICETEX
annually sent hundreds of Colombians abroad for technical training, and it enrolled half
of the participants in programs in the US.7 Simultaneously, efforts to develop domestic
training programs eventually led to the creation of the Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje
[National Apprenticeship Service or SENA] in 1957. Through SENA, the government
5
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began to rely more heavily on domestic industry to provided commercial and industrial
education and training for the laboring classes.8
Education and training programs were crucial to elite visions of modernity, but
alone they did not resolve the civil discord that continued feeding horrific cycles of
violence. Moreover, these programs did little to reduce elite concerns over the
vulnerability of impoverished Colombians to communism. The Catholic Church, not the
government, took the initial role in this fight. Pronounced concerns over communism had
been a fixture of Church discourse since the Russian Revolution, but in the 1930s
increasing communist organizing in Colombia intensified Church fears. With decreased
influence over government policy as well as the nation‟s classrooms, the Church sought
new bases of authority for exerting its influence over the processes of modernization.
Encouraged by the Vatican‟s evolving social doctrines, Catholic leaders turned to social
and labor organizing. Through lay organizations and Catholic labor unions, activists
within the Church experimented with Catholic solutions to violence and modernity.
Successes and failures of these programs aside, it is clear that Catholic Church activism
from the 1930s forward targeted communism as an enemy.
Scared by ongoing violence and intent on containing radicalism, National Front
politicians in the late 1950s began to echo Church concerns and engage in a more
meaningful search for social solutions. 9 In line with community development theories of
the era that promoted community empowerment and local decision-making, Acción
Comunal [Community Action] emerged as the National Front‟s most significant early
8
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effort at social reform. The Acción Comunal program funded the formation of local
boards across the nation in an attempt to engage poor urban and rural communities in
solutions and planning.10 While less than one-hundred communities participated in the
program before 1960, there were 15,070 community boards by 1969. Indicative of still
growing demand for educational services in the 1960s, school construction accounted for
more than 40% of Acción Comunal activities in that decade. Other typical projects
included building latrines, roads, bridges, and housing. Constructing orphanages,
telephone systems, slaughter houses, health centers, school cafeterias, parks, sports clubs,
and theatres were popular community projects as well. 11
Acción Comunal reflected mid-century technocratic approaches to governance
and reform, and it specifically relied on community development models then in vogue
with the UN, US, other foreign governments, and international organizations.12 Acción
Comunal became a favored site for US-Colombian development programs because it
provided a network for accessing the “vulnerable” communities who frightened Cold
War planners. The program rested on the goal of engaging communities in their own
improvement and making them collaborators with rather than adversaries of government.
It modeled a new relationship between citizen and central state that, though remaining
paternalistic, was initially a sharp contrast to traditional clientelism. Collaboratively and
separately, US and Colombian development programs also emphasized building the
middle class as the essential foundation of stable democracy. The dominant development
discourse of the early Cold War placed significant responsibility for reforms on the
10
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middle class and, as Abel López argues for the Colombian case, this included the task of
reformulating elite expectations. Education and training programs proliferated in the
nation in the 1950s and 1960s as transnational development programs gathered educated
and professional groups into a middle class that could take on the task. Through such
education and training, the Colombian middle class would gain technical expertise to
guide the nation toward modernity. As it did, this emerging class would play a crucial
role in mediating social relations. It would sympathize with, advocate for, and empower
the masses as it sought to change elite social attitudes. 13
Cold War Culture: Evolution of US Cultural and Informational Programs
When the OIAA was officially dissolved in 1945 and its volunteer coordination
committees disbanded, US attention to Latin America decreased. Washington‟s focus
shifted to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Europe. Support programs for schools
and cultural centers continued in the State Department while popular film and radio
programs moved into embassies and consulates around the globe. As the transition to
Cold War unfolded, the information/propaganda strain of cultural diplomacy exerted
increasing influence within foreign policy bureaucracies. Advocates of
cultural/educational approaches still retained influence among policymakers and
members of Congress, as the Fulbright Act of 1946 (and subsequent acts that expanded
exchange programs) indicated. However, the rapidly developing Cold War energized a
search for effective information and propaganda programs that could challenge Soviet
influence. Harry Truman settled on the “Full and Fair” approach to propaganda shortly
after the war in 1946. The goal, he asserted, was not…
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to outstrip the extensive and growing information programs of the other nations.
Rather, it will endeavor to see to it that other peoples receive a full and fair
picture of American life and of the aims and policies of the United States
Government. 14
At this early phase, Truman charged mass media programmers with presenting the virtues
of the US and its diverse culture to the world. Quickly, however, pressure mounted for a
more aggressive campaign to correct Soviet propaganda and expose Soviet vice. As the
Full and Fair approach transitioned to explicit anticommunism, it was rebranded by
Truman as the “Campaign of Truth.” Significantly, as Nicholas J. Cull explains, under
the new directive US information programming became a sales pitch. As far a mass
media programming was concerned, mutual understanding as a policy principle gave way
to the imperative of understanding the US.15
The Campaign of Truth gave new life to US mass media information programs in
Latin America and around the globe: a 300% increase in US film production and the
printing of more than one hundred million propaganda pamphlets and other print
materials. Radio operations were centralized in the Voice of America which was then
broadcasting across the globe.16 Because the State Department was struggling to balance
cultural and informational approaches within diplomacy, a new government propaganda
agency was created. The United States Information Agency (USIA) was established in
1953 to combat international communism through mass media programming.
In addition to running Washington‟s information program, the USIA was also
assigned responsibility for binational cultural centers. Like the State Department before
14
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it, the USIA had quickly recognized the value of BNCs as accessible sites for engaging a
pro-democracy discourse, distributing propaganda materials, and developing goodwill
through cultural reciprocity. The agency enthusiastically continued US support for the
centers through salary grants for US directors and some US teachers, programming
resources, and the funding of capital expansion. The agency supported the organizational
model and even began to fund new BNCs in Colombia, Latin America and across the
globe. Yet toward its anticommunist policy objectives, the USIA began to rely more
heavily on a different institutional model, US information centers.
Information centers were first established by the Office of War Information in the
early 1940s and were significantly expanded by the State Department in the immediate
post-war years. The centers functioned around a small library that carried US books,
serials, pamphlets, government documents, and film. In Germany, Italy, and Japan, the
centers were important support structures for post-war reorientation programs. They
promoted international democracy and capitalism based upon a US model. These libraries
were staffed by professional librarians, who did not consider themselves propagandists
and tried to maintain some level of balance on the shelves; yet their mission was a narrow
one –to provide information about the US and US-led capitalism. By 1953, when the
USIA assumed control over these centers they numbered more than 100. Appreciating the
direct control these centers offered the agency in contrast to the BNC model, the USIA
quickly doubled the number of centers around the world. In Latin America, however, the
BNC model remained dominant. Few information centers appeared. 17
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American schools, BNCs, and mass media programs in Colombia responded to
the transnational development agendas of the Cold War. As detailed below, schools and
cultural centers evolved as important, and in some cases necessary, support structures for
collaborative US-Colombian development programming. Given that anticommunism was
common political ground for the US and Colombia, Cold War propaganda was never far
removed from programming in schools or BNCs. Both institutions engaged educational
and cultural resources of US and Colombian origins that projected varying degrees of
anticommunism in program content: in subtleties of US and Colombian elementary level
history texts and the not so subtle analyses of their respective high school versions; in the
themes of graduation speakers and arguments posed in lecture series; in the films that
were projected on plazas and in factories; and in the books that librarians chose for their
shelves. Because these institutions remained committed to cultural reciprocity and mutual
understanding, and because fighting the Cold War was common ground, anticommunism
was well embedded in their community cultures.
Anticommunism was also the vehicle through which crucial capital expansion
funding (for new buildings, campuses, property and plant) and grants for academic and
professional development were offered by the US. In the 1950s and 1960s, State
Department aid allowed small and often struggling schools to establish credible academic
programs and strong identities within their communities. Similar funding for BNCs
allowed them to grow with the increasing demand for English language instruction and to
develop new educational and cultural programs to meet local demand. As American
schools and Centros Colombo-Americanos adapted and grew with the Cold War,
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participants in these education and cultural communities used Cold War resources to
build and strengthen educational infrastructure linking the two nations.
The new foreign policy imperative directly impacted post-war mass media
programming as well. By the mid-1950s, USIA mass media programming was as
sophisticated as that of the Soviets. Film, radio, and print media was focused around
messages of anticommunist persuasion. In Colombia, where Church and national leaders
were suspicious of the laboring classes and university students, US mass media programs
specifically targeted these groups.
In Colombia, the USIS (as the USIA was known abroad) had a central office in
Bogotá with branches in consulates in Medellín, Barranquilla, and Cali. 18 The office
supported the US embassy‟s overall objective of containing communism and supporting
the growth of international capitalism. It also developed more specific objectives for its
own information programs. In the early 1960s in aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, for
example, the USIS office in Bogotá had three objectives: building support for the
Alliance for the Progress, reducing the “influence and appeal of Communism and other
hostile efforts,” and persuading Colombian elites to support social and economic
reforms. 19 Persuasion was the basic mission of the USIA, and it employed mid-century
information science to sharpen its messages. Its research division used public opinion
surveys extensively to better understand the sentiments of foreign populations and plan
information activities accordingly.

18

In this and subsequent references, when the name USIS is used, it refers specifically to the local USIA
operation based in Bogotá. When USIA is used, it refers to the broader agency based in Washington.
19
“USIA Inspection Report: USIS Colombia,” 22 June 1962, NARG 306, Inspection Reports and Related
Records:1954-1962, B2, F: Colombia: Oct 27, 1959- June 22, 1962.

386

In the mid-1950s, USIA surveys of Colombian public opinion revealed largely
positive perceptions of the United States. In a broad survey of 1,500 Colombians
conducted for the agency by a Bogotá company, approximately 77% of respondents had a
good or very good opinion about the United States. The rate far exceeded percentages for
Britain and Spain as well as dismal percentages recorded for the USSR and “Communist”
China.20 On specific cultural questions, approximately a quarter of the respondents
acknowledged that they did not know enough about US and other foreign cultures to rate
them. Still, the majority offered consistently high opinions of the US: 65% favorability
for the US political system, 70% for its standard of living, and 75% as model of
technology and industrial development. While only 40% had a favorable opinion of
religious life in the US, it is noteworthy that only 5% held a “bad” or “very bad”
opinion.21 Asked to rate US culture (defined as art, music, and literature), 71% of
respondents had a very good or good opinion as compared to 18% for the USSR, 58%
France, 52% Spain, and only 50% for Colombia itself. 22 Positive perceptions of culture,
however, did not necessarily translate to an embrace of US foreign policies. When asked
if the US government tried to dominate world affairs too much, 47% said yes and just 32
% said no. When that same question was asked about the Soviet Union, however, 70%
responded in the affirmative and only 4% in the negative. 23 Results were skewed toward
the urban middle and upper classes. The favorable results were great news for the agency.
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Propaganda and Information on Film
US film production for cultural and informational programs had declined in the
immediate post-war, and by the early 1950s the collection in Colombia was aging. The
barrio film program had been moved into regional consulates and was much reduced. In
part, this was due to la Violencia and the fears it provoked after dark but mostly it was an
effect of the region‟s low priority status in US foreign policy during the early Cold War.
Even the Colombo-Americanos in Bogotá and Medellín were using film only sparingly.
At that time, the newer films in the collection were products of the Campaign for Truth
and focused intently on political tensions along the East-West axis. Such themes, in the
opinion of the director of Medellín‟s Centro Colombo-Americano, had become
“monotonous” and of limited to interest to his students. 24 With the birth of the USIA in
1953, the film program was recharged. In a push to recapture the non-theatrical film
audiences of the war era, the USIA rebuilt and diversified the existing film catalog. It
purchased new mobile units that allowed the USIS in Colombia to expand the much
diminished barrio film program. It also purchased a new line of 16mm projectors that
were lent out to target groups for six months at a time.
By the end of the 1950s the non-theatrical film program had been reactivated and
had a Colombian audience of more than a million viewers a year. Several times that
figure were also reached via newsreels that included weekly USIA news clips projected
without ascription in commercial theaters. 25 Newsreels aside, audience figures for nontheatrical screening were still much reduced through the 1950s as compared to the OIAA
24
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program the decade before. Interested in recapturing that audience, the USIS turned to
BNCs for assistance; it took specific advantage of the centers‟ local connections and
affiliations to rebuild the program. Along with grants to the Colombo-Americanos to
administer and expand the program, film libraries were relocated from consulates to the
cultural centers. In-house collections proved a boost to the Colombo-Americanos as
educational and cultural cinema became a stronger component of academic and cultural
programming from the early 1960s into the next century.
While both the in-house and barrio film programs of the Colombo-Americanos
increased audiences, films loaned upon request still provided the majority of viewers. 26
With high demand for loans, the USIS office in Bogotá identified the principal targets for
screenings as university groups, worker‟s unions, and barrios of the laboring classes.
Under the direction of the various Colombo-Americanos, the audience for non-theatrical
film screenings (excluding newsreels) quadrupled between the late 1950s and early
1960s. More than four million Colombians viewed USIA films annually by 1962. The
identified target groups were an important segment of the overall viewership, but
educational and cultural institutions and organizations still made up important segments
of audiences. Figures rivaled those achieved by the OIAA programs in the 1940s, yet
program content was much changed since the Rockefeller days. Whereas the original
collection of films were framed in the narrative of Pan Americanism, East-West tensions
now dominated the center of inter-American relations. Cultural and educational themes
continued in abundance, but now they were more directly tied to promoting US-led
models of international democracy and capitalism as the alternative to communism.
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The USIA film collection in Colombia included more than 1,000 titles by the
early 1960s. As with the former OIAA program, loans were made upon requests of civil,
military, and ecclesiastical authorities. Educators and their institutions, scientific and
professional groups, industry and commerce, labor and its unions, private clubs and
social service groups were typical requesters. The catalog printed by the USIS office in
Bogotá grouped films under a range of categories and provided synopses of content and
message. The majority of films could be grouped into the two broader categories:
capitalist modernity (emphasizing industry, labor, science and technology) and life in the
US (highlighting art, education, sport, civic and community life). Anticommunism was
an implicit theme of many of the films that examined US culture or explored the
workings of capitalism, but explicit treatments of that Cold War imperative were also
featured.27
Titles in the category “Revealing the Communist Menace” constituted just 4% of
the catalog, but they were among the most viewed films in Colombia. Films on
agriculture, US sports, science, and education were in high demand from the public as
well. 28 Most commonly, anti-communist films presented the difficulties of life in nations
under communist control by contrasting life on either side of the cortina de hierro [iron
curtain]. In Now We Are Free, a Hungarian family escaped communism for freedom in
the US. Orphans in Korea stressed how communism destroyed families. A variety of
films on Tibet, Laos, and Poland did the same, and Cuba was a developing theme.
Unhappy Island, for example, used edited footage of a JFK press conference to positively
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spin the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Films on Vietnam were also then starting to appear as the
collection followed the geography of East-West tensions.29
Significantly, many of the films treated modern capitalism and were educational
in intent. Films explaining the institutions, infrastructure and functioning of the free
market economy were made to teach developing countries and newly independent
colonies how international capitalism functioned. They were, at the same time, persuasive
pieces selling “Democratic Capitalism” based on the US lifestyle. People‘s Capitalism,
for example, documented a 1956 USIS exhibit in Bogotá that walked viewers through the
economics of community and family life in the US.30 Bananas, ¡Si Senor! [Yes Sir,
Bananas!] followed a banana from a tree in the tropics to a breakfast table in the US and
emphasized the benefits of this agricultural industry for developing countries. 31 The more
than two dozen films on unionism presented organized and anticommunist laborers as
noble citizens who built modernity with their hands; their reward, as the films made clear,
was a financially secure, middle-class lifestyle. 32
Some of the films on capitalist modernity took Colombia as subject and treated its
petroleum, mineral and agricultural industries. Presidential or ministerial visits to New
York, Miami, and Washington were also regular features that emphasized the close USColombian economic and political relationship. 33 There were cultural subjects focused on
Colombia as well. Arte Colombiano en los Estados Unidos [Colombian Art in the United
States] documented a critically acclaimed exhibit of Colombian ceramics, sculpture, and
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paintings at the University of Miami. 34 Highlighting the centrality of transnational capital
to the persuasive mission of the USIA, International Petroleum, a Canadian affiliate of
US Standard Oil, had sponsored the exhibit, produced the film, and donated it the agency.
Persuasive techniques in USIA films varied, but the message regarding capitalist
modernity as the alternative to communism was always clear. The film industry had
matured since the OIAA days, and sophisticated techniques, better editing, and greater
use of color gave USIA filmmakers new tools for crafting a message. Some films were
still gathered from sources in and out of government, but because the USIA used film to
promote specific US foreign policy initiatives the agency contracted for many of them.
Eisenhower used film to promote his Atoms for Peace campaign, and JFK used film to
showcase achievements of the Alliance for Progress. Colombia was the focus of three
films produced for the purpose of celebrating Alliance projects. Acclaimed director
James Blue‟s A Letter From Colombia extolled the virtues of land reform and housing
developments in the Colombian interior. Evil Wind Out focused on medical
professionals‟ successes in overcoming rural Colombian resistance to modern diet, health
and hygiene programs. 35 And the beautifully filmed School at Rincon Santo told the story
of a one-room school house built in a remote Andean village. The film celebrated “small
victories” of Colombia‟s Acción Comunal program, and projected it to viewers in
Colombia and across the globe as a model of community empowerment. The Alliance for
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Progress was mentioned just once and this intentionally sent the message that local
initiative was the basis of the program. 36
James Blue‟s film about the village school was well received internationally, and
even won high profile awards at the international film festivals at Venice, Amsterdam,
and Bilbao in 1963. Yet, The School at Rincon Santo like other USIA productions was
not shown to US audiences. By practice and later by law, US government propaganda
films were banned from screening before the US public. The ban was observed in
deference to lawmakers concerns over both promoting incumbent presidents and
competing with commercial mass media.37 Importantly, this ban marked a very sharp
philosophical distinction between the film programs of the USIA during the Cold War
and the OIAA during World War II. In Pan American unity campaign in the 1940s, the
OIAA not only organized and funded a film program in Latin America, but it ran an
expansive reciprocal program in the US. Non-theatrical films, largely documentaries,
were pulled from the same catalogs used in Latin America and screened to over 2.5
million US viewers annually at the height of the war. Specific titles were produced to
educate the US public about the region and introduce the diversity of its culture. Schools,
civic organizations, and Pan American clubs were the sites of most screenings. 38 This
domestic program focused on educational and cultural themes and the OIAA considered
it necessary toward winning public support for its hemispheric unity campaign.
Rockefeller was committed to building mutual understanding and understood that it had
to be cultivated in the US. Later, during the Cold War, USIA films were produced not
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around a general principle that privileged educational and cultural exchange (mutual
understanding) but around a clear intent to persuade and propagandize. Educational and
cultural films remained a strong component of the collection, but now they were more
tightly focused on US culture, on an anticommunist message and a broad campaign to
sell international capitalism and democracy.
Like film, radio programming was also quite different during the Cold War as
compared to the earlier Pan American days. Television was beginning to make a mark in
USIA mass media programming around the world and radio received less attention. Now
centralized in the Voice of America (VOA) and under USIA authority, local radio
productions were now just a minor project for in-country USIS staffers. Across the globe,
the VOA competed directly with shortwave broadcasts from European capitals on both
sides of the iron curtain, and in Colombia, the USIS reported that the signal of Radio
Moscow was “one of the best --if not the best-- received.” 39 Modeled on the British
Broadcasting Service, the VOA resisted pressure to do heavy political advocacy, and, in
part, it was able to do so because the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) took on that task
with Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberation and other covertly funded broadcast
operations. 40 VOA broadcasts from Washington aside, the USIA did encourage some
local radio programming by USIS offices. In Colombia, for example, its Let‘s Learn
English series aired on 16 stations during the 1950s. It also encouraged and funded radio
programming by BNCs. The Colombo-Americano in Bogotá developed its own news and
cultural program and contracted for air time on local stations. Radio Sutatenza, a Catholic
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radio station that led an anticommunist campaign across the rural Andes at mid-century,
carried the Colombo-Americano‟s programs free of charge. 41
In the area of print media the USIA enjoyed similar success to the OIAA in
getting stories accepted by the Colombian press. By the early 1960s, stories from the
USIA news service were regularly printed in all mainstream newspapers. Sometimes
articles even appeared under an overt USIS dateline. 42 Pamphlets were also an important
element of the information program, and outside of Latin America, USIA information
centers were key distribution points for such materials. In Latin America, where the
USIA did not have information centers as distribution points, BNC libraries were
encouraged to play a similar role.
Growth and Reformulation of American Schools in the Cold War Era
As evidenced in earlier chapters, initial US government support for American
schools in Latin America developed amidst heightened concerns over both Axis fifth
columns and European cultural influences in the region. During the Cold War, however,
as Washington continued support to these schools, concern for European influence was
less pronounced. In Colombia, German, British, Italian and French schools and cultural
centers returned after the war, but by then their US counterparts were well established on
the cultural landscape. As compared to a decade earlier, the US-sponsored institutions did
not have to compete with Europeans to fill their classrooms and galleries.
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In the early decades of the Cold War, the US government made a commitment to
strengthening and expanding American schools abroad. A post-war boom in US business,
diplomatic and military personnel overseas created higher demand for these schools in
national and regional capitals across the globe. Rising interest among foreign nationals in
US-style, bilingual education significantly added to this demand. The State Department
extended support to existing and new schools with grants to educational organizations,
like the previously discussed Inter-American School Service (IASS). Schools relied on
these organizations to screen applicants, advertise teaching vacancies, secure curriculum
resources, and to provide professional development and college placement services. More
directly, the State Department provided periodic grants to fund capital expansion
projects. Such grants were helpful in the 1950s and 1960s as schools were developing
secondary programs and building new campuses to accommodate growing local demand.
The State Department retained and expanded existing support programs for
American Schools after the USIA assumed program responsibilities for BNCs in 1953.
Between the end of the Second World War and the 1964 founding of the department‟s
Office of Overseas Schools, the number of United States citizens working abroad
increased significantly. In part, the increase was due to the larger US diplomatic and
military missions, but the post-war spread of US business was also contributing to the
growth. US citizens abroad continued to found elementary and secondary schools for
their children in collaboration with nationals of their host countries. By 1965, 121
independent, nonsectarian American Schools were receiving grants and professional
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assistance through the State Department‟s program. Over a third of these schools, a
disproportionate number, were located in Latin America. 43
As the Colombian population doubled between 1940 and 1964, so too did the
number of US citizens living in that nation. Almost two decades after the world war, US
citizens were 10% of the nation‟s total foreign population. 44 Cold War development
programs and especially the Alliance for Progress had driven up the number of US aid
workers, development specialists, and diplomats. Post-war military and business
relationships between the two countries strongly contributed to the growth as well.
Significantly, as compared to a generation earlier when restrictive citizenship laws and
Foreign Service marriage regulations discouraged US families from living abroad, the
1950s and 1960s recorded higher numbers of US children living with their parents in
Colombia and overseas. Established American schools expanded to meet the influx but
new institutions were founded as well.
The US government grew more reliant on Colombia‟s American schools in the
post war decades because Cold War anticommunism was implemented by large
diplomatic, civilian and military staffs. Schools, especially the Colegio Nueva Granda in
the capital, were a necessary support structure for the broad diplomatic mission. Members
of the US diplomatic community expected their government to assist the schools their
children attended, and Washington now obliged. At the same time, US businesses in
Colombia continued to demand support for the schools their children attended.
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In Medellín, Barranquilla, and Cartagena, US business interests were instrumental
in founding local American schools. Though US children were fewer than three of ten in
the schools‟ student bodies, US nationals were well represented on boards of directors, in
administrations, faculties and parent-teacher organizations. While US business families
were residing in Colombia, they demonstrated strong interest in strengthening these
schools. They actively pursued US funding and the official designation as an “American
School” that came with it. As compared to the 1930s, educational arrangements for the
children of US families abroad were now a serious government concern. Business and
diplomatic families had the support of the State Department.
Still, neither US reliance on these schools nor the key roles US citizens played in
their operation should mask the role of local Colombian populations in developing them.
US turnover was high in the schools as children moved in and out of Colombia as their
parents‟ careers demanded. While US families and teachers came and went both in the
midst of and at the end of school years, Colombian families remained. Not surprisingly,
school and community cultures were more heavily influenced by these local families and
local traditions. And Colombians were at the forefront of efforts to stabilize these
institutions and strengthen their programs for the long term.
For the Colombian families that enrolled their children in American schools,
bilingualism was always an important goal. As secondary programs were added to all
schools in the 1950s and 1960s, accreditation by educational authorities in both countries
made the schools even more attractive to these families. A bilingual education that
terminated with both an official US high school diploma and an official Colombian
bachillerato certificate positioned local graduates for smooth transition into higher
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education and professional careers at home and abroad. In a nation with limited and
largely traditional educational resources, credentials secured via graduation from an
American school opened alternative routes to higher education.
Colombians involved in the operation of American schools were from upper-class
families. Within their class, these were modernist elites who were attracted to a technical
rather than a classical European humanist education. Fathers of students were business
owners or had professional careers in and out of government. Wives and husbands had
lived or traveled abroad, and they usually spoke second languages (often English). As
these schools grew in regional settings and expanded with Cold War funding,
Colombians who identified with US democracy, capitalism or culture chose these schools
for their children. These parents often had broad business, familial, educational and
cultural ties to the US, but they might also have similarly deep connections to a third
nation. On the cosmopolitan Caribbean coast, for example, Colombian families of recent
Syrio-Lebanese decent were a significant minority within the school communities at
Cartagena and Barranquilla. In Medellín especially, European families joined an
American school community dominated by Colombians who were well connected to
local industry and international commerce. By the 1970s, many of the families in these
schools had established generational connections to them.
In the 1960s, elite Colombian families were well represented in Bogotá‟s Colegio
Nueva Granada, and the school was popular with lawyers, doctors, engineers, and
architects from the capital‟s expanding professional classes. The school, however,
retained a US majority among its student body, and in this regard it was unique among
the American schools of Colombia. It‟s location in the capital fed the high diplomatic
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demographic of its classrooms, and increasing numbers of Foreign Service employees,
development specialists, and military personnel engaged in the US diplomatic mission
were dependent on the school to educate their children. Indeed, through the 1960s US
government employees comprised 20% of the colegio‟s parent community. US citizens
working in business also relied on the school; parents employed in the various aspects of
the oil industry or as representatives of US and other foreign firms made up
approximately another 25%.45 The school was a crucial secondary support system for
private organizations like the Ford and Rockefeller foundations and for US businesses in
and around the capital.
In contrast and more typical of Colombia‟s American schools, the Colegio Jorge
Washington in Cartagena catered to fewer US families. Opened in 1952, it replaced a
small school operated by the Andian National Corporation, a US oil company, for the
children of its US and Colombian managers. The new school was a collaborative effort
between US and Colombian parents and the local Cartagena business community.
Toward the school‟s founding, the high profile support of the commander of the US
Naval mission in the city proved helpful as well. 46 Notably, among the Colombian
founders of the school were members of the local chamber of commerce and civic
organizations that believed a strong American school would help attract international
business to their city. As school board members, these Colombian men led a capital
campaign among local and foreign businesses, and they actively lobbied the US State
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Department and affiliated educational agencies for support.47 Schools are complicated
institutions to establish, and even after its founding the colegio struggled to piece together
business donations and loans to cover its operating costs. Yet, the school was also
immediately attracting Colombian families who were interested in elementary programs
in English. 48 While US oil companies and the naval mission initially continued as
important advocates for the new school, US children were always few in number in its
classroom. It was Colombian families that made the school viable as they molded US
educational resources around local needs.
Because most American schools in Colombia did not have secondary programs
through most of the 1950s, many US families sent students home upon completion of
elementary programs. Local students moved into Colombian secondary schools, but
finding spaces for them was often difficult because secondary classrooms were still at a
premium. This was especially true on the Caribbean coast. Abruptly ending Englishspeaking instruction after graduating from eighth grade created further disadvantages
from the perspective of local families who valued bilingual education. When schools
subsequently added full secondary programs and secured accreditation by US and
Colombian educational authorities, Colombian enrollments skyrocketed.
For US and Colombian students, accreditation provided a recognizable high
school transcript and an officially recognized US high school diploma. Accreditation was
secured through the Southern Association of Schools and Colleges (SACS), a regional
47
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accreditation agency in the US South. SACS provided schools with an ongoing review
process and professional guidance for meeting regional US elementary and secondary
education standards. Importantly, accreditation allowed for a smooth transition for both
US and Colombian graduates into US universities; applicants from American schools
could be evaluated by the same standards as all other applicants who had received an
official US high school diploma. Questions about language proficiency, credits, courses
and preparation that had complicated the process for decades disappeared. From the
standpoint of linking Colombian nationals with US higher education, accreditation by
SACS was a most important development. SACS accreditation was crucial educational
infrastructure that facilitated growth in US cultural influence.
At the same time, it was reciprocally important to the Colombian majority in these
schools that academic programs meet the Ministry of National Education‟s requirements
for secondary education. Attainment of bachillerato status was necessary for admittance
to Colombian universities. Because many American school graduates wanted the option
to attend a university at home and because a few chose to attend European
universities, it was necessary to satisfy all of the ministry‟s requirements. To meet
curriculum standards, the schools placed new emphasis on Spanish language instructions
in literature, history and geography courses. As a result, the number of Colombian
educators on staff increased, and by the mid-1960s Colombians represented up to 40% of
each school‟s faculty. Indicative of the ongoing Colombianization of the schools, the
figure exceeded 50% in all institutions by the 1970s. 49 Maintaining bilingual and dually
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accredited academic programs was a challenge for these young American schools, and
US government support as well as direct assistance from the Ford Foundation was central
to their successes. 50 Over time, the schools developed demanding academic programs and
earned reputations that placed them among the best schools in the nation. Securing
accreditation from both nations allowed schools to grow from small bilingual elementary
programs with a decidedly US orientation into rigorous college preparatory programs that
met requirements of both governments. The schools were models of cultural reciprocity.
Notably, the gender composition of Colombia‟s American schools changed as
accreditations were secured from SACS and the Ministry of National Education. Student
bodies were more heavily female in their early years, but once dual accreditations were in
place more Colombian families began to send their sons to the schools. In Bogotá,
accreditation resulted in greater gender balance among a student body that had been more
female than male. In Medellín, accreditations gave the high school a clear male majority;
there, in the 1960s as accredited secondary programs were added, male graduates
outnumbered females by a ratio of 2:1. Medellín families who enrolled their children in
the school were well connected to the industries that made the city and the region the
engine of the national economy, and they valued English language instruction because it
was the language of modern business. Even more, they valued the access the accredited
school granted their sons to US and Colombian university programs in science and
technology. In fact, most Colombian male students entering the school in the early 1960s
who continued through graduation planned to begin US university programs in
engineering. Medicine and architecture were also popular career choices for the young
Communications Office, The Columbus School, Medellín, Colombia (hereafter CS/Medellín MSS); Pages
Torn Form Time [1973 Yearbook of the Colombus School] (Medellín: Colegio Cristóbal Colón, 1973).
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men. While some young women planned to study medicine, more intended to become
bilingual secretaries. 51
On the coast, the American schools were also heavily female from the start, but
there too gender demographics changed with accreditation. In Cartagena, for example,
girls outnumbered boys by a ratio of 4:1 until accreditations were secured in the late
1960s. In that region, girls historically had fewer secondary options because there were
fewer schools run by the Church, and the American schools initially attracted families
that valued English fluency for their daughters. Here, too, among secondary students, it
was also common for girls to aspire toward a career as a bilingual secretary. The few
boys attending the coastal high schools before accreditation were foreigners or
Colombians with specific plans to study in the US. Once dual accreditations from the US
and Colombia were secured, an influx of male students into the schools eventually
produced approximate gender parity.52
As schools expanded secondary programs to meet local demand, US support came
for curriculum and professional development to strengthen the academic programs.
Cultural programmers in Washington recognized the importance of the schools as model
of US education. They were of course interested in maintaining influence among elite
51
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Colombian families, but they also saw the schools as part of broader educational
communities in their host cities and regions. They envisaged schools not as isolated elite
campuses, but as models of US education that could support local Colombian efforts to
expand and improve schooling. Logically, the school in Bogotá was the initial focus of
State Department efforts to raise academic standards and make it a model. Yet, as rapidly
as they appeared in other cities, new American schools also received direct State
Department support toward the goal of academic excellence.
State Department programs fostered direct educational relationships among the
various American school communities in Colombia and educational institutions in the
US. The State Department funded organizational processes and subsidized transportation
costs for establishing regional education associations like the Colombian-American
Association of Binational Schools. The department worked with and encouraged the Ford
Foundation, US universities, and public school systems to help schools abroad to become
models of US education. The department supported relationships like that which
developed between the schools in Colombia and the University of Alabama in the early
1960s. The university offered degree programs in education that were uniquely created
for these schools. University of Alabama professors traveled regularly to Colombia and
gave multiple courses each year. By end of 1960s, 114 educators --US, Colombian, and
third country nationals-- earned graduate credit toward a degree. At the same time, more
than a dozen bachelors, masters, and doctoral degrees were granted to teachers. The
program allowed US teachers to complete a degree while living abroad, but it also
granted Colombian educators uncomplicated and subsidized access to a US university
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education. 53 In the course of the Cold War, the University of Alabama continued to
develop its programs for teachers abroad extending it to American schools in other
Andean and Caribbean nations and, then, around the world.
Additional transnational links were established between the American schools of
Colombia and the US public educational systems. In the interest of improving these
schools‟ academic programs and helping them to model the best practices of US
education, the State Department initiated its School-to-School program. The program
aimed to pair “highly active, forward looking, school districts” in the US with an
American school in Latin America. 54 Exchanges of faculty and students were common
and there were exchanges of administrators as well. The Colegio Karl C. Parrish in
Barranquilla was paired with Huntsville, Alabama in the 1960s. The city was home of the
Marshall Space Flight Center, which was then developing the technology for carrying
man and materials into space. At a time when the violence of the Civil Rights era cast a
negative international spotlight on Selma, Montgomery, and other Alabaman and
Southern US cities, Huntsville stood out as a symbol of a modernity and progress. The
Colegio Nueva Granada in Bogotá was selectively paired with Newton, Massachusetts,
because the city was home to Boston College, a Jesuit school with a growing
international reputation. Catholic Medellín and Cartagena were paired with modern
communities rising in the desert Southwest: Las Vegas, Nevada and Mesa, Arizona. 55
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Collaboration resulting from such programs constructed transnational community among
educators, students, and families on both continents.
Anticommunism rather than mutual understanding became the ideological
impulse behind US government support for American schools in the post-war period.
Individually, the institutions‟ philosophies remained very much grounded in mutual
understanding, and their dual academic programs modeled cultural reciprocity. 56 But,
anticommunism was very much part of each school‟s culture because it was central to the
contemporary politics of both nations. Indeed, shared anticommunism was itself grounds
for mutual understanding. Stressing appreciation for democratic values, the executive
board of Bogotá‟s Colegio Nueva Granda asserted that:
the school will have failed in one of its most important missions if it does not
produce students who will become public-spirited, active citizens who know the
nature of the conflict between the Free World and International Communism and
are prepared to dedicate themselves to the protection and improvement of
individual rights and the heritage of the Free World.57
Given its ties to the diplomatic community, the Bogotá school intersected more closely
with explicitly anticommunist government programming than the other schools in the
nation. Seniors and juniors, for example, were involved with community service projects
of Acción Comunal and the Alliance for Progress. Students volunteered to work in
literacy programs at Ciudad Kennedy [Kennedy City], a housing community built
through the Alliance for Progress and renamed for the fallen president by locals. 58 For
those same students, their parents, and the wider school community, lecture series and
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public affairs forums were held at the school to encourage elite support for the social
reforms. Lectures and follow-up discussions on public housing, illiteracy, agricultural
reform, and labor courted elite support for anticommunist collaboration in line with
National Front and USIA objectives.59 The other American schools were less closely
positioned to the diplomatic and bureaucratic structures of the capital, but anticommunist
values were explicit in their programs as well. Such values were reinforced by
institutional collaboration and transnational links to the US educational system, but
communism was already a popular concern among the elite Colombian families who
chose US-style education for their children.
Centros Colombo-Americanos on the Cold War Cultural Stage
Collectively the four cultural centers in Barranquilla, Cartagena, Medellín and
Bogotá enrolled almost 8,000 students annually by the mid-1960s. Other ColomboAmericanos at Cali, Bucaramanga, and Manizales brought that figure to well over
10,000.60 Significantly, by that decade there were now many more commercial schools
and university programs that competed for a share of the English teaching market, and
this presented a challenge especially for the centers on the coast which were more
recently founded and, thus, less established. On the coast as elsewhere, boards of
directors and administrators adjusted programming to remain competitive, and they
always kept tuition and fees at middle-class levels. There was some variation between
centers, but in general Colombo-Americanos offered English language courses in the
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evening that were popular with professionals, university students, and employees of local
businesses. Secondary students, who were often sent by their parents, filled classrooms in
the early morning and mid-afternoon, before and after their regular school days. In all
centers, new business programs and, especially, bilingual secretary courses were popular.
At the same time, cultural programming remained an important aspect of the BNCs‟
activities, and art exhibits, musical presentations, library programs and lecture series
continued.
From the start, the OIAA and the State Department valued BNCs as institutes
that were directed locally, contributed to mutual understanding, and reached the emerging
middle class.61 When the USIA was later established and assumed responsibility for BNC
support programs, it sought greater control over institutes; USIA management initially
wanted to bring BNC programs more directly in line with its information mission. Yet, it
quickly realized it had little authority over the institutes. USIA documentation is replete
with frustrated acknowledgement that BNCs were foreign entities controlled by local
boards.62 They could not be easily manipulated. Still, that the USIA continued to fund
existing BNCs and enthusiastically facilitated their expansion through the 1960s
evidences the agency‟s appreciation for the binational center model. Most members of
the centers‟ boards of directors were educated, upper-class Colombians with modernist
visions. Their voluntary participation in directing the centers evidenced their enthusiasm
for engaging US cultural and educational resources and models. They were Colombian
civic, business and cultural leaders who demonstrated ideological anticommunism and
61
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commitment to international capitalism through the programming they directed. Often
they were individuals who had or would later serve in government. At Medellín, for
example, the director of the board in 1961 had to resign the post because he was
appointed as governor of the Department of Antioquia. 63 As the USIA quickly recognized
that BNCs provided an arena for engaging with influential elites, intellectuals, and the
emerging middle and professional classes, its support for them grew. Before the 1970s,
each of the Colombo-Americanos were categorized as “class A” institutions by the USIA,
and this made them eligible for the highest level of support: capital expansion grants, full
salary for a board-hired US director, some grants for administrative positions, and one or
two grantee teachers.
The USIA especially appreciated BNCs‟ roles in linking Latin American students
to higher education in the US. In the early Cold War, the agency was concerned over the
increasing numbers of Latin American students studying behind the iron curtain. By its
own estimates, the number was small before Cuba strengthened its ties to the Soviet
Union. For the 1960-61 academic year, it estimated that 400 Latin Americans were
studying in Communist Bloc nations. Just nine were known to be Colombian. However,
the total number had risen to 3,500 students the following year. With such rising
numbers, the USIA was determined to maintain and expand the educational infrastructure
that supported Latin American enrollment in US colleges and universities. 64
Indicative of the growing appeal of US higher education in Colombia, the number
of Colombian students enrolling in US colleges rose rapidly in the early Cold War.
American schools on average sent 50% of their graduates to study in the US, and some
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years the percentage was higher.65 Colombo-Americanos assisted many other students
with application and scholarship processes. By 1955, as the US emerged as a global
education leader, approximately 34,000 foreign students were enrolled in US higher
education. Latin Americans comprised 25% (or 8,446 students) of the total. Significantly,
at that time Colombia sent more of its students to the US than any other Latin American
nation. Colombians were 15% of the region‟s total (or 1,301 students), and males
outnumbered females by a ratio of 8:1. Most students were undergraduates, and close to
half (48% or 625 students) were studying engineering, medicine, or science. Programs in
the social sciences, education, and the humanities were chosen by another 31% of the
students while business and agriculture were popular in smaller percentages. 66
Significantly, the number of Colombian students in US higher education in 1955 was up
almost 45% over enrollment five years earlier. 67 By 1970, Latin Americans were then
less than 20% of the foreign student population in the US. There were more Cubans and
Mexicans studying in the US than Colombians, but the nation ranked third in the tally of
students among all Latin American countries. Colombian enthusiasm for US higher
education was not abating; indeed, between the 1955 and 1970, the number of
Colombians enrolled in US colleges and universities increased by one-third. 68 American
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schools and Colombo-Americano cultural centers did not account for all of the movement
of Colombian students into US higher education, but they initiated crucial processes
toward establishing and sustaining the trend. By the turn of the century, approximately
6,700 Colombians came to the US annually as foreign students.69
Within Latin America, the USIA also showed great concern for a growing number
of cultural centers and friendship societies affiliated with communist nations. In 1961, it
counted 122 Sino-Soviet centers and societies in the region: two-thirds were affiliated
with the USSR or nations of the Soviet bloc while the others were connected to China. In
Colombia, formal relations with Moscow had been suspended for more than a decade but
small, independent Colombian-Soviet cultural centers and friendship societies legally
existed in Bogotá and Medellín. A Colombian Association of Friends of China was also
active in the capital, and there were four Cuban-Colombian cultural organizations
throughout the country. Radio and television broadcasts from communist nations added
to the USIA anxiety over communist influences as did East German and Czechoslovakian
participation in Bogotá trade shows.70
Colombo-Americano policy forbade formal participation in diplomatic politics
but in reality the centers were never very distant from them. Ideological compatibility
regarding Cold War principles was clear among many directors, faculty, and participants
in center programming and such compatibility blurred distinctions between politics and
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culture. As detailed below, BNC programming drew on local, national, and transnational
resources that were embedded in cultures of anticommunism, but support for the Cold
War was not the institutional mission of these centers. In the early 1950s, the Korean War
had provided an important point of collaboration between the two nations and spurred a
flurry of activity in the centers. Colombia‟s military band performed the US national
anthem and other US songs at Colombo-Americano Fourth of July celebrations and US
consuls organized lectures on “The UN and Korea.” But there were limits to the centers‟
embrace of Cold War military culture. Supporting a discourse of anticommunism through
lectures was acceptable, for example, but allowing Colombia‟s Korean War Veterans to
hold meeting at the centers was not.71
Building library collections was one method employed by the USIA to support a
culture of anticommunism within BNCs. Collections had declined in the early Cold War
with decreased funding as most efforts in the area of print publications focused on the
growing network of US information centers. After the OIAA‟s demise, fewer books from
either country were translated and donated by the State Department to cultural center
libraries. In those centers, boards of directors struggled with book costs and import fees.
Maintaining English-Spanish parity on the shelves remained a goal of all centers, but it
was never achieved. Centers at Bogotá and Medellín had advantages in this regard
because their founding collections had been established when OIAA-inspired programs
were still operating at full speed. For the newer centers like those on the coast at
Barranquilla and Cartagena, building collections and keeping them current posed huge
financial challenges.
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With the decline of book translation programs after the war, Colombo-Americano
libraries in the 1950s often relied on donations from locally residing US citizens.
Personal collections were donated at the death of long-term US residents. Diplomatic
wives organized fundraising efforts, and consulates and US businesses donated old
magazines.72 From the perspective of professional librarians, this was not the best way to
build a collection; from the political perspective of the USIA, Colombo-Americano
libraries were failing to attract intellectuals, academics and professionals who could
support its anticommunist mission. The agency did not control the libraries, but it did
increase its influence over them at the start of the 1960s with an infusion of resources to
expand collections, professionalize staff, and build new facilities. Across that decade,
BNC library collections grew, periodical holdings expanded, and all locales noted
significant boosts in the number of users. Spanish language holdings were also increased,
but English remained the dominant language of the stacks.73
USIA-subsidized books tended toward themes of capitalism, communism,
democracy, and US-Colombian relations. Contemporary professional reference materials
in medicine, economics, architecture, energy and engineering were also regularly
received from the agency. 74 Still, USIA influence in shaping these library collections
should not be overstated. Boards of directors welcomed the USIA library books, grants

72

Acta (23 July 1957) and Acta (12 May 1958), Actas/Bq, CCA/Barranquilla MSS; Acta (9 Jan. 1951),
Actas1/Med, CCA/Medellín MSS.
73
Acta (14 Sep. 1965), Actas/Bq, CCA/Barranquilla MSS; Conozca su Biblioteca: Boletín Informativo
[library bulletin of the Centro Colombo-Americano de Medellín] No. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1965), Centro de
Documentacion - Biblioteca, CCA/Medellín MSS. See also the following issues of the bulletin: No. 2 (Aug.
1965), No. 3 (Oct. 1965), No. 5 (May 1966), No. 6 (Aug. 1966).
74
“Activities of the Centro-Colombo Americano: March 1963” [monthly calendar of events], LH1,
CCA/Bogotá MSS; “Nuevas Obras para la Biblioteca del Colombo-Americano,” Diario del Caribe
(Barranquilla), 1 July 1964; Acta (16 May 1967), Actas/Bq, CCA/Barranquilla MSS; “USIA Inspection
Report: USIS Colombia,” 22 June 1962.

414

and the professional guidance that came along with them. 75 Cold War ideology was
common ground and library resources unapologetically reflected it. At the same time,
boards, administrators, and librarians were not always willing to move in the
programming directions suggested by its book patrons. Boards of directors rejected, for
example, USIA pressure to create portable circulating collections to lend en masse to
civic organizations in working-class barrios. The program was too costly and would have
depleted library shelves of resources needed to serve students and library members inhouse. Boards also refused to extend library hours to support USIA programs unless all
financial costs were covered.76
In the early post–war decades, labor radicalism was a primary concern of
Colombian politicians, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, and US diplomats.
Indicative of the seriousness with which Washington approached the issues, labor
attachés were now on staff at many US embassies throughout the world. The USIA
wanted to engage BNCs as part of its persuasive apparatus, and it pressured centers to
reach out to labor groups. In Colombia, the USIA asked Colombo-Americano boards to
establish new branches in barrios of the laboring classes. As envisioned, these community
centers would provide small libraries, exhibits, sports equipment, “elementary English
teaching,” and meeting space for “responsible” community leaders in order to “offset at
least some [communist] infiltration.” 77 Encouraged by the agency and organized by the
US labor attaché, three centers briefly existed in Bogotá and Cali, but plans to have
Colombo-Americanos guarantee their financial viability failed. None of the BNCs were
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in position to do so, and their boards were not inclined to enter so closely into political
planning with the embassy. Ideological anticommunist compatibility was one thing, but
expanding programs to specifically accommodate US policies was another. The Bogotá
Colombo-Americano, always more embedded in diplomatic currents, did offer
consultative guidance to the community centers, but such support was limited. Indeed,
the center‟s board explicitly refused to extend financial assistance or loans. 78
Colombo-Americanos were certainly willing to work with the USIA to the extent
that their own institutional objectives were met. All centers willingly assumed
responsibilities for the barrio film program in the early 1960s because it fit their overall
educational and cultural missions. Communism was an acute concern among Colombian
business and civic leaders who made up the majority on centers‟ boards, so they were
also willing to assist local projects of Acción Comunal and SENA. Most centers also
provided direct support for US Peace Corp volunteers. In Barranquilla, the president of
the board of directors believed his center should be “on guard against all forms of
communist infiltration” and he willingly accepted USIA propaganda to help educate
those populations that were considered most vulnerable to communism. 79 In industrial
Medellín, outreach to labor had been part of US cultural diplomacy from the start; in the
1940s, the coordination committee had arranged English language classes in factories at
the requests of management and owners. Later, the local Colombo-Americano board
continued these classes, allowed the US Consul to use the center for showing films to
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union leaders, hosted exhibits on the post-war US labor movement, and consistently
granted scholarships for English classes to individuals from the laboring classes. 80
Increasing the center‟s influence among labor was certainly an institutional objective in
Medellín, and this reflected the heightened concern for radicalism among civic leaders in
that region more than any USIA pressure. 81
During the 1960s, the second important target group identified by the USIA was
university students. Taking its cue from the Church and the Colombian government, the
agency was concerned about radicalization among the educated youth of the rising
middle class. In Bogotá, USIS efforts involved covert propaganda activities to counter
communist influence in student organizations within national universities. 82 At the same
time, the agency pressured Colombo-Americanos to develop new programs to reach this
vulnerable demographic. Because university students were already a significant segment
of the center‟s student body, boards of directors were more comfortable and enthusiastic
in pursuing initiatives among them. Working within the Acción Comunal model, the
Bogotá center organized a group of student volunteers to assist local communities with
their development projects and “to demonstrate the center‟s interest in the socioeconomics of the people.” 83 In Barranquilla, the center was becoming a venue that many
local groups relied on for their own meetings and events. Preferring to steer clear of
political controversy, the board backed away from loaning its facilities to organized labor
but university groups were infrequently refused. After anti-US sentiments were expressed
during a university group‟s poetry recital at the center, some attempts were made to
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screen student groups and ensure a basic level of philosophical compatibility. Yet,
university groups remained the most frequent users of the center.84 In Medellín, plans to
draw university students into the center were more intense. Free library cards were
offered, a committee of university students was organized “to advise the director,” and
discussion forums were planned to explore such questions as “Why Castrosim is not the
answer for Colombia.”85
Public lectures were the most important Colombo-Americano activity which
promoted a culture of anticommunism. General cultural discussions of literature, art,
film, and music were still common, but each of the centers was also an important venue
for presenting Colombian and US approaches to modernity. The broad discourse centered
on collaborative Colombian-US development agendas, but implicitly or explicitly
anticommunism was always very much a part of the program. More than during the
decade before it or in those that followed, lecture series of the 1960s were more closely
tied to Cold War themes. Logically, the trend was most pronounced in diplomatic
Bogotá. Lecturers from both nations and from inside and outside of government argued
the need for social reforms. They analyzed the challenges facing Colombia and
celebrated the achievements of Acción Comunal, SENA, and ICETEX. 86 Fulbright
scholars from the US, on exchange with Colombian universities, were frequent lecturers
on community development, economic models, and contemporary theories of social
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change.87 Colombians lectured on local engagement with the Alliance for Progress and
the Church used the BNC‟s lecterns to promoted its own approach to unionism.
Roundtable discussions with all such lecturers brought students directly into these
conversations.88
Cold War Clash: Violence, Guerillas, and the Centros Colombo-Americanos
Among those who used the Colombo-Americano cultural stage to promote visions
of modernity was Father Camilo Torres Restrepo. University chaplain and professor of
sociology at the National University, the Catholic priest lectured at the Bogotá center in
July and August of 1964. His presentation focused on Colombia‟s social inequalities and
was part of the national speaking tour he had begun several months earlier. 89 The priest
scholar‟s own academic research focused on rural migration to Bogotá, and his urban
sociology courses at the university required students to complete a practicum in one of
the city‟s marginalized barrios.90 Students drawn to Father Torres and his courses were
exactly the type of university student the National Front, the Church, and the USIA hoped
to prevent from radicalizing. They were young, idealistic and of the rising middle class.
Many were frustrated by continuing elite control of national politics through the National
Front. Many were searching for opportunities to exert their own influence over the
nation‟s path to modernity.
Some of Torres‟ students did become radicals, but, significantly, they were
following the lead of their priest professor. By the start of 1965, Torres was spearheading
his own national reform movement and promoting solutions ranging from expropriations
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of land to nationalization of hospitals and banks. By October of that year, Torres had left
the Church and the academy to join the start-up Ejército de Liberación Nacional [Army
of National Liberation or ELN]. Taking up arms against the National Front, the guerilla
priest died on the front lines of violent rebellion shortly thereafter.91
In looking at the trajectory of Torres‟ academic life, post-war US educational
influence in Colombia is clear. Typical of young intellectuals in the Church, he had been
educated in Catholic universities of Europe, yet the foreign educational influences in and
around him at the National University were more heavily of US origin. Most
significantly, his colleague, friend, and the chair of the sociology department was
Orlando Fals Borda. The most influential Colombian sociologist from mid–century
forward, Fals Borda had completed his own doctoral studies on rural migration at the
University of Florida at Gainesville, and he understood how to tap into the educational
resources of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, the developing Fulbright
bureaucracies, and transnational educational communities in general. 92 During the
Alliance for Progress years, US resources were plentiful in Latin American higher
education and were particularly available to social scientists and their departments. As
Fals Borda built his department and career, he was quite successful at securing
transnational educational resources. Significantly, Camilo Torres‟ course that had placed
students in migrant barrios had grown out of a larger departmental research project that
had been funded with a Rockefeller Foundation grant. Ironically, just prior to the priest‟s
departure for the ELN, his friends were worried about his safety in the capital and began
exploring academic options for him in the US. They encouraged him to take advantage of
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their and his connections to the Ford and Rockefeller foundations and the US university
system in general. 93 While transnational education communities around him provided
multiple academic options, he was on a more radical path.
In the glow of Castro‟s victory, the early 1960s witnessed the birth of guerilla
movements throughout Latin America. In Colombia, these organizations were anti-elite,
anti-National Front, anti-imperialist, and anti-US. They engaged with various models of
revolution advocated by Che Guevara, Mao, and Marx, and using the resources offered to
them by international communism linked their movements to polarized currents of the
Cold War. Over the course of the next quarter century of international cold warring,
many domestic revolutionaries groups made their agendas known in Colombia through
violence and discourse. Movements drew support among intellectuals, university
students, and dissidents of National Front-style democracy, but the soldiers of these
armies were usually the rural and urban poor. Most guerilla organizations were shortlived, but two rebel armies survived long-term and kept the Colombian Cold War alive
into the new century: the Cuban-inspired ELN and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC] that emerged as the
armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party. The ideologies of the ELN and the
FARC, like many of their contemporaries, developed under strong influences of foreign
communism. Yet while they drew inspiration and supplies from Havana and Moscow,
these guerilla movements were responding to local realities. 94
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The formal emergence of guerilla movements brought increased violence and fear
to the principal urban centers of the nation in the early 1960s. Especially from 1963
forward, guerilla activity in urban Colombia began to target individuals and institutions
associated with the National Front, international capitalism, and the US in general. In that
year, from May through November a particularly extensive bombing campaign reigned in
Barranquilla, Bogotá, and Cali. In the course of single nights, from the urban Caribbean
to the urban Andes, dozens of small bombs were planted and exploded by nascent
guerilla organizations. The ELN, in its earliest formation and through its scattered fronts,
was responsible for much of the bombing, but other groups with whom they merged,
collaborated, or competed were active as well. In Barranquilla, offices and institutions
associated with the US and international capitalism were popular targets: oil company
offices, Sears retail showrooms, Caterpillar equipment outlets, and commercial English
schools started by foreigners. The city‟s Centro Colombo-Americano was bombed on
successive nights in August of 1963. Two “miniature bombs” were planted. One in the
library caused smoke and dirtied some books. Female callers claimed responsibility in the
name of the Frente de Liberación Nacional [National Liberation Front]. 95 With later
arrests, the bombers‟ motive was made clear; the front placed the bombs to protest joint
US-Latin American military maneuvers then underway along the Colombian Caribbean. 96
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In diplomatic Bogotá, many more US and foreign targets were hit during the
1960s bombing campaigns. US military officers stationed at the embassy were prime
targets, but only property was ever damaged. 97 The USIS office in downtown Bogotá
became a target as well. 98 So did the Centro Colombo-Americano which had limited
security and an open door policy for the community. One bomb destroyed the center‟s art
gallery, the Sala Tayrona, and ruined the paintings of Blasco Caballero, a Cartagena artist
whose exhibit had opened a few weeks before. 99 The gallery was cleaned up, repairs were
made to the walls, and its cultural mission continued as the art of two other Colombian
artists was hung the next week.100 Two months later, when bombs damaged a new and
larger facility being constructed to house the center, damages were again quickly
repaired.101 Some bombs, however, resulted in greater tragedy. A US teacher from
Wisconsin, married to a Colombian and raising their two children locally, was among
four people killed by a bomb in 1966. The other dead were Colombian nationals as were
the dozens of people injured in that and other bombings of the center.102 The ELN
claimed responsibility for most though not all attacks.
Not surprisingly, the center in Medellín, like its host city, was buffered from
violent bombings of the 1960s. There, civic and Church leaders then retained enough
social control to prevent the chaos being experienced in other cities. The city‟s success
eventually came to an abrupt halt when drug lords began to exert local authority in the
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late 1970s. From then forward, as the phenomenon of violence in Colombia entered its
drug phase, the Centro Colombo-Americano in Medellín suffered destructive bombings
along with other institutions across the city. 103 By that time, security had also become an
important consideration for the families of the Colegio Cristóbol Colón [The Christopher
Columbus School] in Medellín as it had for the families of children at each of the
American schools across the nation.
Conclusion
Cold War diplomacy strengthened and expanded cross-border infrastructure that
linked Colombian and US educational and cultural communities. Anticommunism was
common political ground for Bogotá and Washington, and strong collaboration between
the governments was reflected in the educational, cultural and informational programs
that had evolved during World War II and the first half of the Cold War. By the 1950s,
mass media programming was centered squarely on a persuasive mission --to convince
Colombians (and the world) to reject communism and look to the US as model of
capitalist modernity. Mutual understanding as a policy objective was effectively replaced
in USIA media programs, and the goal was now to foster understanding of the US and its
Cold War policies.
Examining the implementation of the USIA film program in Colombia, the
agency‟s non-theatrical screenings projected an anticommunist message to enormous
numbers of people. Because there was consensus between governments about fighting the
Cold War, anticommunist films from Washington were welcome in the nation. Film
messages were honed and packaged in the US, but they did not stray from a general
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anticommunist and pro-capitalist narrative that was popular in the rhetoric of the National
Front. Laboring classes and university students were important target audiences of the
program because both governments agreed that these groups were most vulnerable to
international communism. Yet, many USIA film screenings in Colombia were initiated
by request from local educational and cultural groups. Choosing from a catalog,
Colombians viewed US made films as educational and cultural resources. As they did,
multiple local filters altered the original propaganda intent of the USIA productions.
By contrast, American schools and BNCs were locally directed institutions that
retained their independence and commitment to mutual understanding. These institutions
were not so easily manipulated to conform to short-term foreign policy objectives, and
cultural reciprocity still conditioned their growth. Cultural funding and support from
Washington was clearly crucial to such growth during these decades, but this should not
mask that school and cultural centers responded in the majority to local, Colombian
demand. In the communities that developed around these schools and cultural centers,
middle and upper-class Colombians accessed US resources --funding and scholarships,
cultural stages and classrooms, faculty exchanges and school-to-school collaborations-not as means of connecting themselves to a foreign culture but as a means to develop
their own life paths within the currents of modernity. Until the 1930s, the Colombian
education system had been a restricted arena of privilege. Structured around elite needs,
the system was sustained with heavy doses of European influences and resources.
Beginning with Liberal education reforms of the 1930s, the system was expanded and
European influences were displaced. By the end of that decade, Washington‟s new efforts
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in cultural diplomacy were introducing US educational and cultural influences to a broad
cross section of the nation, and the response was overwhelmingly positive.
Importantly, Colombian participation in the new transnational educational and
cultural communities which developed around schools and cultural centers did not
automatically create US loyalists. Clearly, it gave participants greater familiarity with the
US, and many who were attracted to these institutions came to value US educational and
cultural models, standards, and philosophies. Yet, local families and students affiliated
with these institutions because they met their local educational and cultural needs. As
their national education system struggled to expand across mid-century, Colombians used
US cultural resources to build these institutions to their own advantage.
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Chapter Eight

Transnational Catholicism and the Growth of US
Influence in Colombia
This final chapter examines the role of religion in negotiating US cultural
influence in Colombia during World War II and the first two decades of the Cold War. A
source of conflict and antagonism that threatened to derail mutual understanding at the
start of cultural diplomacy, religion was neutralized as an obstacle to Colombian-US
relations around mid-century. The chapter demonstrates how collaborative educational
efforts between Washington, the Colombian Catholic Church, and the US Catholic
Church built bridges across the inter-American religious divide. The end result was
crucial flexibility for Colombian-US relations in both political and cultural spheres as war
became Cold War. Significantly, as the Colombian Catholic Church began to use US
educational resources in reasserting its educational authority, it sanctioned and
encouraged the spread of US cultural influence in the nation.
Diplomats and clergy, however, were not alone in negotiating the boundaries of
the new inter-American religious culture. Around American schools, binational cultural
centers and mass media programs, individuals and families were at the center of these
negotiations. Across mid-century, as accelerated cultural change diminished the social
and political influence of the Colombian Catholic Church, participants in emerging
education and cultural communities constructed their own religious modernity.
Examining religious negotiation at community levels, this chapter continues to evidence
how common cultural interests conditioned the evolving Colombian-US relationship.
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The first section of the chapter examines conflict that erupted between the
Colombian Catholic Church and US Protestant missionaries at mid-century.
Contemporary challenges to its educational, cultural and political authority fueled a
forceful Church response to Protestant advances around the nation. At the parish level,
conflict between Catholics and Protestant became entangled in the violence of the era and
threatened then emerging US cultural diplomacy. Next, the chapter historicizes the active
role of the US Catholic Church in shielding Washington‟s educational programs from
attacks by influential Colombian Catholics. It demonstrates how collaboration between
the two national Churches facilitated the spread of US educational and cultural influence.
Finally, the chapter examines how American schools and US-sponsored cultural centers
negotiated Catholicism at the institutional level.
Protestantism, Catholicism and US Educational Influence
As Michael LaRosa demonstrates, the 1930s brought “an avalanche of bad news”
for the Colombian Catholic Church. Liberal victory at the polls brought an end to the
Conservative Hegemony and precipitated unprecedented challenges to Church influence
over national politics and culture. Constitutional changes affirmed the supremacy of the
central state, and deference to Church authority from politicians declined. The
diminishing cultural authority of the Church was evident in the new cycles of violence
that erupted in the 1940s and continued unabated for two decades. In Bogotá in 1948, in
the mob rioting that accompanied the assassination of populist leader Jorge Eliécer
Gaitán, Church property was destroyed and its archives burned. As la Violencia spread
across time and space claiming hundreds of thousands of lives, the Church proved unable
to arrest the bloodletting. In 1958, with the establishment of the National Front as an
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unprecedented bipartisan compromise, Conservatives formally marginalized their longstanding alliance with the Church. With the subsequent emergence of leftist Catholicism,
liberation theology and radicalized priests during the 1960s, the avalanche gained
momentum from within. 1
As LaRosa explains, the mid-century Church was forced to moderate its
approaches to national politics and culture in the face of these and other challenges to its
authority. In order to retain social and spiritual relevance amidst accelerated cultural
change, factions within the Church broke with reactionary tradition and sought modern
solutions to the nation‟s problems. Crucial to the initial moderation of the hierarchy was
abandoning Liberalism as the primary target of its ire and targeting two new enemies,
communism and Protestantism. 2 Church crusades against both of these enemies had
specific implications for US cultural diplomacy in Colombia during war and cold war.
When the Cold War emerged, anticommunism provided an important point of
convergence for Church activism and US cultural diplomacy. New opportunities arose to
share resources and support each other‟s modernizing agendas. The Church was far from
monolithic and within its ranks opponents of US cultural influence had been plentiful and
vociferous from the 1930s forward. Still, a softening of broad clerical resistance to US
culture was apparent by the early 1940s. An important indicator, as detailed throughout
this study, was the clerical embrace of US cultural and informational resources during the
war. Such engagement constituted a shift in broad Church opposition to US influence as
diverse aspects of US culture became more widely recognizable and acceptable to its
clergy. Moving into the Cold War, clergy continued to employ US cultural resources in

1
2

LaRosa, “Cleavages of the Cross,” p. 12.
Ibid., pp. 78-85.

429

support of their own anticommunist and modernizing agendas. Significantly, diverse
factions within the Church used US resources as they worked to retain or reassert
authority over Colombian culture and education.
The second of the Church‟s new enemies, Protestantism, was a deterrent to
emerging US/Church collaboration. US Protestant missionaries had arrived in Latin
America in increasing numbers during the 1930s and 1940s. In Colombia, where Church
authority was on the decline, clergy framed Protestantism as an assault on national
culture. Though missionaries were small in number during the period, their growth was
sizeable. Their numbers had doubled in decade before the war, and global conflict
spurred further growth. As Protestant proselytizers were displaced from areas of conflict
in Asia and Africa, many looked to Latin America as fresh spiritual terrain. In the US, the
OIAA‟s domestic Pan American programs, which fostered greater domestic interest
about Latin America, likely contributed to fixing a new Protestant gaze on the region.
Estimates place the number of Protestant missionaries in Colombia at approximately 300
(including ministers, wives, and teachers) by the mid-1940s. While Colombian followers
numbered less than 8,000 at that time, the figure grew to an estimated at 64,000 by 1966. 3
Though they were an insignificant percentage of the national population, Colombian
Protestants represented a growing threat to the already diminishing cultural authority of
the Church.
Protestant proselytizing in Colombia took many forms, but like the OIAA,
missionaries actively employed the communications technology of day. Initially, The
Voice of the Andes, a radio station based in Ecuador, reached the dense population centers
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of Andean Colombia, but missionary programming on local stations became common by
the early 1940s. Missionaries also operated a boat along the Magdalena and Cauca rivers.
Similar to the Sydney Ross Company‟s river boat, The Good News projected films at
town docks. In addition, buses fitted with bookcases and sound equipment brought
religious culture to rural villages. 4 Occasionally, instances of proselytizing were
confrontational and aggressive. Explicit attacks on Catholicism went to the extreme of
charging the Church with keeping the people impoverished and vulnerable to
communism. More controversial were direct Protestant condemnations of the veneration
of the Virgin Mary, an especially pronounced feature of Latin American Catholicism. 5
While such aggressive proselytizing was not the norm, it provided abundant fodder for
Catholic reaction.
Notably, Catholics in Colombia were most outraged by Protestant participation in
the field of education. Two high profile schools founded in the nineteenth century by US
Protestants, the previously discussed Colegios Americanos at Bogotá and Barranquilla,
had strong academic traditions and powerful Liberal defenders. 6 These schools were a
thorn in the side the Church, but it could do little about them. Easier targets were the
smaller institutions that had appeared with the waves of Protestant missions of the 1930s
and 1940s. Often small churches with nothing more than an attached classroom, these
missions were located in both rural and urban areas and often focused on teaching
literacy through the Bible. As discussed in chapter two, the 1942 Corry report had
identified thirty-six such schools in Colombia, which were operated almost exclusively
4
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by US Presbyterian missionaries. Schools operated by other Protestant denominations
from a variety of other nations added to the total, and the number continued to grow
during the war. Estimates suggest that more than two hundred small schools served
upwards of 12,000 Colombian students by the mid-1940s. Importantly, families who sent
their children to these schools did not necessarily identify as Protestants; with classrooms
in short supply, Catholic parents were willing to take advantage of all educational options
for their children.7
In the early 1940s, as clerical rhetoric against Protestant missionaries amplified,
US cultural diplomacy was caught in the middle. In Bogotá, the board of the newly
established Centro Colombo-Americano aggressively defended itself against accusations
that it was spreading Protestant propaganda. When a priest from a parish just a few
blocks away from the center warned his parishioners of the Protestant intentions of new
English teaching centers in the city, the Colombian president of the board contacted the
priest‟s superiors to correct the record. Stressing the center‟s Colombian identity and its
Catholic credentials, Jorge Obando detailed the Colombo-Americano‟s extensive
collaboration with Catholic academics and educators during its first year. He asked that
such collaboration continue. Monseñor Emilio Brigard, on the verge of assuming the
office of Bishop of Bogotá, assured the board that he would correct the record. 8
Outside the Colombo-Americano, the situation was more volatile, and reports of
violent attacks and property damage to Protestant churches and schools were registered
with the US embassy. By all assessments the incidences of violence were limited, but
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they spread alarm among diplomats who were focused so tightly on securing Pan
American unity. The embassy met with US missionaries to acknowledge their concerns,
but also asked Washington to quietly curtail Protestant emigration from the US. At home,
the State Department was feeling pressure from all sides. Some saw the Protestant
expansion into Latin America as a great threat to hemispheric cooperation. In a
controversial book, John W. White called Protestant missionaries “Our Good Neighbor
Hurdle” and saw them as violating the US pledge against interference in the internal
affairs of Latin American nations: “we continue sending our missionary agents to
interfere in their internal affairs at the same time that we are fighting with everything at
out command to prevent Hitler‟s agents from doing the same in our country.” 9 An
enthusiastic Pan Americanist, White argued that Catholicism was the foundation of Latin
American culture and the essence of Hispanidad. He declared that any effort to “win our
southern neighbors away from their faith will be self-defeating, politically as well as
religiously.”10 He advised restriction of Protestant émigrés to the region.
Against such arguments, US Protestants leaders invoked the language of “mutual
understanding” and reminded the State Department that “thousands of Latin Americans
welcome the Protestant Church and are grateful to the country from which its
missionaries have come.”11 They were joined by Latin Americans like Benjamin
Subercaseaux, a Chilean writer, who supported greater religious freedom in the region;
“the act of offering us now a limitation of freedom of belief as a proof of Good
Neighborliness is like serving us a totalitarian dish to reward our good anti-Nazi

9

White, Our Good Neighbor Hurdle, pp. 201-202.
Ibid., p. 18.
11
“Reformed Synod Defends Missions,” NYT, 29 Aug. 1943. See also “Presbyterians Ask Freedom to
Expand,” NYT, 1 June 1944.
10

433

feelings.”12 Protestant voices nervously but loudly noted the growing influence of the US
Catholic Church in hemispheric foreign policy. They demanded that Secretary of State
Hull reject public calls to his department by National Catholic Welfare Conference to
impede US Protestant missions in Latin America. 13
Persecution of Protestants in Colombia rose again to the level of diplomatic
concern during the early 1950s. Coinciding with the peak periods of la Violencia, the
Colombian Evangelical Confederation alleged that their missionaries and faithful were
suffering death and injury at the hands of Catholics: their churches burned, their ministers
jailed, and their schools closed. They charged priest involvement and government
complicity. As they had been doing for years, confederation members continued to
pressure the embassy to take up their cause, but the phenomenon of violence was by then
so widespread that persecution of Protestants was only a very minor subset of the general
bloodshed.14 In reality, the embassy could do very little. And it didn‟t want to antagonize
the sitting Conservative president, a man who had been the most influential and vocal
critic of a US-Colombian alliance during the war. Laureano Gómez‟s distaste for US
cultural influence was well known. Indeed, he told the New York Times in 1941 that
North American culture had always “destroyed” Latin American culture “whenever the
two have met,” and he made clear that Colombians did not “want to be culturally
conquered” and would “defend our culture against absorption.” 15 Now, in the early Cold
War as president of the nation, staunchly anticommunist Gómez was a developing US
12
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ally who had committed Colombians troops to Korea. Washington had nothing to gain in
making an issue of the Protestants‟ allegations and widespread violence affecting
thousands upon thousands of Colombians provided it with cover.
The missionaries did find greater support in the US press. Over the course of the
1950s, accusations and rebuttals over protestant persecution in Colombia kept printing
presses in both nations active.16 Though later historical analysis evidenced some
instances of Catholic clergy inciting this violence, it is clear that US Protestants and their
followers were not disproportionately victimized during the period. 17 Also clear is that
this issue lingered threateningly over educational and cultural initiatives of US cultural
diplomacy as they evolved during the Cold War.
When Conservatives had returned to national power after the war, the influence of
the Church in political affairs increased substantially. Highly charged rhetoric against
secular and Protestant schooling increased. Blaming the violence on non-Catholic and lay
education promoted by Liberals, Conservatives reasserted Church authority over national
culture; they allowed wide latitude for the hierarchy of the Church in educational
affairs.18 Conservative factions within the Church and their supporters were emboldened
by their regenerating political alliance. In a 1951 pastoral letter, for example, Colombian
bishops boldly declared that Colombian parents who sent their children to non-Catholic
16
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schools were making themselves suspect of heresy and candidates for excommunication.
Claiming secular and Protestant schools worked against the integrity of Christian life, the
bishops were formalizing a threat many priests had been making for years at the local
level. Education in Colombia, they declared had to be Catholic. 19 Their threats were
repeatedly issued at regional and national levels throughout the 1950s. 20 Heresy was a
powerful charge, and while the Church did not have the power it held before the 1930s,
all educational institutions had to take notice.
Clarifying precisely where heresy was in evidence, the Jesuit editors of Javeriana
Magazine published a list of non-Catholic schools in Colombia. Labeling the schools “the
enemy in sight” [el enemigo en la vista] the magazine identified ninety-seven schools that
were “disassociated” with the nation and its religious unity. Most were small Protestant
church schools including many that had been noted, a decade early, in the Corry report.
But the two highly regarded Protestant secondary schools in Bogotá and Barranquilla
made the list as well. More significantly, so, too, did the Centro Colombo-Americano in
Bogotá, one of the few cultural centers on the list. The Colegio Karl C. Parrish,
Barranquilla‟s American school, was included as well. As an educational institution on
the Caribbean coast, Colegio Parrish was not alone. Indicative of the Catholic Church‟s
historical absence on that coast, the consequential lack of schools, and the resulting
positive reception afforded Protestants who offered instruction there, more than a third of
the schools on the list were in the Caribbean region. Prominent were the Baptist-run
schools of highly-literate, English-speaking archipelago of San Andrés and Providencia;
19
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the Church and the central state were determined to Colombianize these distant islands
and linguistic and religious conversion had long been central to their plan. 21 The
Conservative government collaborated with the Church and forced many of the “enemy”
schools, including small church schools and all of those on San Andrés and Providencia,
to close. Kept informed by the Protestant mission lobby, the US press detailed the
closings, and Time magazine opined that “sensitive Colombians may be astonished to
learn that their country is well on the way to earning a reputation for bigotry second,
among Western nations, only to Spain.”22 For his part, then-dictator Rojas Pinilla
dismissed criticism, and in the useful parlance of the Cold War justified school closures
on the grounds that Protestant schools destroyed Colombian religious unity and opened a
door to communism. 23
Colombia‟s ardent supporters of Catholic nationalism applauded the regenerating
Conservative-Church alliance in the 1950s, and they also called for bolder steps to rid the
nation of creeping Anglo-Saxon influences. In advocating a “return to Hispanidad” in the
mold of Spain‟s dictator, General Franco, Hugo Velasco called for a holy war between
Catholics and Protestants.24 His war would be fought on many fronts, but he saw
classrooms as the most important of modern theaters. Lamenting Colombia‟s new
educational orientation toward North America, Velasco argued for a national school
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system built around spiritual education. Yankee educational models had no place in such
a system because they were Protestant in origin, prioritized technical over spiritual
knowledge, and aimed at worldly and material gain. 25 Velasco also vehemently argued
the necessity of stopping Latin American enrollments in US universities because such an
education indoctrinated young male minds into a commercialized, Protestant culture of
decline. Even worse for Velasco, Yankee cultural imperialism emasculated young men
and gave them an “idiotic and effeminate soul” [alma imbecile y afemindada].26 The
Latin American student in the US was ignorant of his own culture yet he had…
deep and exhaustive knowledge of the personal life of Rita Haywoord [sic] and
knows with mathematic precision the number of divorces in the town of Reno.
Moreover, without seeing it, he distinguishes the make of an automobile in
motion and even the model and year of its manufacture. 27
Simultaneously, other Catholic nationalists advocated more moderate approaches
to curbing US cultural influence. Jesuit Gustavo Amigo understood that Colombia‟s
educational shift toward the US was not going to be reversed anytime soon. The study of
English was too popular, and US universities and scholarships were too abundant. The
priest recognized that technical and career programs in the US appealed to many young
Colombians because they were disillusioned by the limited educational offerings in their
own nation. Instead of futile attempts at ending the northward migration of students,
Amigo wanted to increase Catholic influence over the process. His was a strategy of
cooptation as opposed to open conflict; he represented the moderate voices within the
Church that offered modernizing alternatives to reactionary stances. Catholic Universities
25
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in the US, he argued, needed to open their enrollments to accommodate more Latin
Americans. They needed to compete actively with public and secular institutions to
attract these students. He also called on the US Catholic Church to open Catholic cultural
centers for foreign students so to support religious solidarity and uninterrupted religious
practice. 28 Certainly, educational experiences in the US would introduce the Latin
American student to new cultural influences, but Amigo believed there was no reason
why those influences could not be more Catholic. As detailed below, influential members
of the clergy in both nations agreed.
US Cultural Diplomacy and the Transnational Catholic Church
After the return of the Conservatives to national power in 1946, many Colombian
Liberals were purged from educational bureaucracies at the national and departmental
levels. The Church had been granted seats on important educational boards and
commissions. The most conservative clerical voices, especially the Jesuits of Javeriana
University, enjoyed considerable access to national political leadership and educational
policy makers. Yet, as compared to the pre-1930 period, this restored, mid-century
authority of the Church over education was only partial; it was more heavily symbolic
than functional. Like Liberals, Conservatives wanted a broad national education system
that supported their goals of capitalist modernity. Their rhetoric aside, they were not
looking to prioritize spiritual education, and they resisted efforts to reform the national
curriculum along that line. Notably, they even rebuffed efforts from within the Catholic
lobby to reduce the priority status of the English language in secondary programs. 29
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The church had two primary mechanisms for asserting authority over nonCatholic schools. Excommunication was the first; a new Ministry of National Education
requirement that all Catholic students be provided with religious instruction in school was
the second. This second requirement became the legal justification for many of the school
closures of the decade, but a few prominent Protestant schools successfully fought back.30
They avoided closure with official policies of not enrolling Catholic students. Suggesting
the developing indifference among some Colombian Catholics to Church threats, the
Protestant-founded Colegio Americano in Bogotá found many of its Catholic parents
suddenly identified their children as religious “independents.” All of a sudden the school
was enrolling a surprising number of Buddhists as well. 31 Comparatively, Colombian
parents at the US-sponsored American schools were not so cavalier, and their school
boards took the excommunication threats and curriculum demands more seriously. For
the existing binational schools in Bogotá, Barranquilla, Medellín and Cartagena, the
challenge was how to remain non-sectarian (and, thus, eligible for US funding) while also
responding to the needs of the local, educated Catholic Colombian families. As they
negotiated their institutional relationship with Catholicism, these schools received
valuable assistance and influential support from the US Catholic Church.
From its start, Bogotá‟s Colegio Nueva Granada had arranged after school,
Catholic religious instruction for its Colombian students. Classes were held off campus,
paid separately from tuition, and directed by a locally resident priest from the US.
Through the 1940s, the school made similar arrangements for religious instruction for
Protestant students, who were nationals of the US or other foreign countries. Because the
30

“Religious Abuses Grow in Colombia,” NYT, 24 Jan. 1956; Jaime Eustasio Pieschacón, S.J.,
“Establicimientos de Educación de los Protestantes,” Revista Javeriana 56, no. 276 (Julio 1961), p. 16.
31
“Church v. Schools,” Time, 26 Dec. 1955.

440

number of Colombian students was on the rise and approaching parity with US students,
threats of excommunication and talk of the “enemies in sight” made all parents very
nervous; if Colombian families were to withdraw their children, the stability of the young
school would be at stake. Fortunately, however, the school had the ear of the US
ambassador, whose Foreign Service staff had children in the school. At the direct request
of the embassy, Cardinal Francis Spellman of New York, the leading voice of US
Catholicism at mid-century, made a high profile visit to the school in late 1951. Touring
Colombia and the Andean region at the height of controversies over Protestant schools,
Spellman appeared at the colegio and gave it his endorsement. Coming just days after
Colombia‟s bishops had issued their pastoral letter regarding excommunication, the visit
was powerful political theater. And it eased the Colombian parents‟ concerns.32
Spellman‟s advocacy on behalf of the non-sectarian educational institution
neutralized its vulnerability to attack in the heated atmosphere of day. Importantly
though, this was not an isolated example of US Catholic diplomacy in support of
Washington‟s hemispheric policies. The US Catholic Church had been an active
participant in US cultural diplomacy from the start, and it played a crucial role in
breaking down Latin American stereotypes about the US. Well before Spellman‟s timely
appearance in 1951, diplomats had regularly turned to him to help the US establish its
Catholic credentials in the region. Enthusiastically complying, Spellman had often sent
Bishop John O‟Hara, president of Notre Dame University, to the region in support of
Washington‟s Pan American campaign. At the direct request of the US embassy, O‟Hara
had arrived in Bogotá in the early 1940s to help quell the anti-US sentiment stoked by the
activities of Protestant missionaries. He was a logical choice for such missions. A
32
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member of the official US delegation to the Pan American conference at Lima in 1938,
he had been raised in Uruguay by US parents in the Foreign Service, traveled widely in
the region, and spoke fluent Spanish. Of the Church and an outspoken advocate for it, he
understood the power of religious symbolism in Latin and even advocated for adoration
of a common blessed virgin – “Our Lady of America.” In the realm of education, O‟Hara
encouraged Latin American Catholics to send their brightest students to Catholic
universities in the US. He similarly encouraged US university students to study in Latin
America‟s Catholic universities. 33 Through O‟Hara, Spellman and their national church,
US cultural diplomacy for Latin America passed through influential US Catholic filters.
Importantly, both O‟Hara and Spellman saw education as way to counter the
narrow framing of US culture as Protestant. In collaborative efforts with leaders of the
Latin American Church, they encouraged US Catholic orders to establish new schools in
the region to counter Protestantism. Because Catholic missionaries, like their Protestant
counterparts, were also being displaced from theaters of war in Asia and Africa, many
educators were available. 34 Such transnational Catholic efforts enjoyed the support of the
US government, and the first schools founded by US Catholic orders in Peru and Chile
received early assistance from the OIAA in forms of books, maps, and classroom
materials. 35 In Colombia, where several US orders arrived after the war, such new
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Catholic schools meet a variety of local Catholic objectives as well. Newly returned to
power, Conservatives had explicitly turned to the Church to expand the number of
classrooms in the nation. Taking up the charge, the Church did as it had always done and
tapped into its transnational network to import religious orders to found and operate new
institutions. 36 However, reflecting the contemporary shift in Colombian cultural
orientation toward the US, the Church not only brought in European priests and nuns but
English-speaking orders from the US as well. As it did, the Colombian Catholic Church
encouraged further growth of US influence in national education and culture.
In the 1940s, nuns of the Marymount order from Tarrytown, NY, were formally
invited by Bogotá‟s Archbishop to open schools for upper-class girls. Most of the
existing secondary schools for girls in Colombia were then run by the Church;
historically, the state prioritized education of boys while making few provisions for girls.
For the daughters of the non-elite, post-primary schooling was often non-existent. And
while Catholic colegios for girls from elite families were more plentiful, there were not
enough of them to meet growing demand. By the 1940s, Church leaders had developing
concerns for the number of wealthy Colombian families who were sending their daughter
abroad for secondary schooling. Recognizing the strong interest of Colombian families in
US-style education in English, the Archbishop wanted to specifically provide domestic
alternatives to sending Catholic girls to the US. Marymount nuns, who were usually US
and Irish nationals, opened secondary schools for girls in Bogotá, Barranquilla, and
Medellín beginning in the late 1940s. Soon, other orders followed under the
encouragement of both the Colombian and US Catholic hierarchy. Among others,
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Viatorian brothers from Illinois and Benedictine brothers from North Dakota founded
English-speaking secondary schools for boys in Colombia. 37 Such schools limited the
number of Colombian students who studied in US high schools, but the overall impact
was minimal. Completely halting Colombian exchange students from studying in the US
would not be possible, and so other alternatives were sought to make their experiences
abroad more Catholic. As one solution, Catholic leaders in both nations collaborated to
place Colombian secondary exchange students in US Catholic, rather than public or
secular private high schools. Scholarships provide by the National Catholic Educational
Association of the US to Colombian students were an effort in that direction, and students
from Colombia‟s various American schools were among those who received the
scholarships. 38
Negotiating Transnational Catholicism
The Catholic Culture of Colombia‘s American Schools
As American schools developed across the 1950s and 1960s, negotiating
Catholicism was an ongoing process. While each school exhibited deference to the
Church, the degrees of deference varied greatly across region just as Church influence
varied. Colombianization of the schools‟ student bodies, boards of directors, and PTAs
meant that Catholics formed both a majority of the members and the influential leaders
within the school communities. Bogotá‟s Colegio Nueva Granada was an exception to
this norm because it retained a US student majority (54%) through the 1960s. 39 Balancing
religiosity in the school was a diplomatic dance because the school was closely tied to the
37
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formal diplomacy of the capital. As evidenced in the last chapter, US Foreign Service,
military and development agency families were reliant on the school in the immediate
post-war, and this only deepened with the Cold War. Given their proximity to the
diplomatic stage, it was in the best interest of the school board and administrators to keep
the school outside religious controversy. They did so by incorporating Catholic
instruction and some Catholic cultural traditions into school programs.
In the early 1950s, Catholic instruction within the Bogotá school became
necessary to avoid public confrontation with the Church. Offsite, after-school Catholic
instruction which had been initiated at the founding of the colegio would no longer
suffice. At the same time as the Catholic-Conservative alliance was regenerating, such
instruction also became essential toward gaining Ministry of National Education approval
of the school‟s developing secondary program. 40 Thus, did each grade have a religion
teacher who was usually a young female and often a native English-speaking nun. A
locally-residing US Catholic priest, the chaplain for Bogotá‟s US Catholics, served as a
teacher as well. His mission was religious but his cultural influence was broader; he was
also the school‟s basketball coach. Because the student body included a high number of
Protestants as well, the board continued its original policy of hiring Protestant ministers
for voluntary religious instruction. The local chaplain of the Protestant diplomatic
community and his wife provided religious instruction in the school for those children
whose parents desired it. With close ties to the diplomatic culture of the city, the school
gradually embraced a role as an US educational model of religious tolerance. Indeed, it
was impressed upon teacher‟s that a “basic purpose” of the school was to “stress
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tolerance and understanding” of all religions. 41 School ceremonies, as manifestations of
the institutions religious culture, modeled religious tolerance with an air of diplomatic
formality. Catholic priests were commonly flanked by Protestant ministers at the school‟s
public functions: graduations, award ceremonies, and inaugurations of new buildings. It
was not unusual for a local rabbi to join such significant assemblies when a member of
his congregation was involved.42
The Columbus School in Medellín more singularly embraced Catholicism.
Opened in 1947 to support North American families employed by a Canadian mining
company, the school grew amidst the strong Catholic tradition of its region. With just 20
students at founding, the Colombus School had grown to 600 students by the mid-1960s
and three-quarters were Colombian. 43 Given the strength of the church in Antioquia and
its historically active role in education there, the school offered Catholic religion classes
on campus from the start. Fees for these classes were paid separately from tuition, and
this allowed the board to remain eligible for US grants. In contrast to Bogotá, where
diplomacy conditioned community culture, this school community felt little pressure to
showcase religious freedom. While Catholic religion classes were voluntary, no
Protestant religious instruction was offered. A priest on staff oversaw the religious
program and this extended to preparation of entire classes of children for receiving
Catholic sacraments. This brought a more serious level of Catholic ritual and pageantry
into the school as it met the practical religious needs of the community. As the school
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grew and added a secondary program, university-educated nuns from orders in the US
were often brought to teach religion.44
Because Catholicism as a political and cultural force was weaker on coast, the
Colegio Karl C. Parrish had historically maintained institutional indifference to
Catholicism. The founding board chose not to offer religious classes and the tradition was
well established at mid-century. This explains why the school was included on the
enemies list in the 1951. To avoid more direct conflict with the Church, the school soon
moved away from its strictly secular tradition and began to offer voluntary religious
classes for Catholic students. Here, too, education ministry approval was necessary for
retaining Colombian students who were 70% of the 600 strong student body by the
1960s.45 Still, religion did not manifest broadly in ceremonial religiosity of the Parrish
school as it did in Medellín and Bogotá. As just one telling indicator, no prayer or
blessing was included in formal graduation ceremonies. 46
Indicative of the new politico-religious reality of the early 1950s, the new
American School on the coast at Cartagena recognized the need to appease the Church.
Opened in 1952, amidst the binational controversies over Protestant schools, the Colegio
Jorge Washington was deferential to the Church from the start. US and Colombian
business interests had founded the school, and it quickly developed a Colombian student
majority. 47 The school scheduled on-campus religion classes during the school day to
comply precisely with new Ministry of National Education mandates, and administrators
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contracted with a local Colombian priest to teach classes and prepare students for first
communion. There, as at Medellín, Catholic rites also became part of the pageantry of the
school, and eventually masses were offered on Holy Days in the common area where
assemblies and recess were held. 48 Participation in all religious activities, however,
remained voluntary.
American schools were also part of the broader negotiation between the Church
and society over the social role of women. Schools are educational infrastructure on
which national and regional gender systems rest, and traditional Catholic framing of
women as modest mothers and wives gave the Church tremendous influence over the
number of classrooms open to women. Pre-1930s, when Church hegemony over
education was more secure, secondary school options for girls were almost exclusively
within Catholic institutions. State-run normal schools were an option for a few, but
otherwise women‟s choices for education and training were severely limited. Change was
initiated with Liberal education reforms of the 1930s. Slowly as Colombian educational
infrastructure expanded beyond Church control, gender systems in schools would begin
to look less Catholic. Yet, while the doors of colegios and universities were legally
opened to women, the gender balance was slow to change because coeducation at the
secondary level was strongly opposed by the Church. Indeed, many girls were refused
admission to schools with all male student bodies, and some who were admitted were
later driven out by verbal assaults from local parish priests. 49
While Liberals expressed commitment to equal education and even codified the
principle in law, Church pressure with regard to coeducation proved stronger. By the
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early 1940s, the Liberal government gave in to the pressure; it established separate
requirements for a feminine bachillerato curriculum and encouraged the establishment of
sex-segregated colegios that could meet exploding educational demand from girls. The
curriculum still met the necessary requirements for university admission, but it
diversified content to include courses in areas considered sex-appropriate: domestic
economy, diet, and childrearing. 50 Because new secondary schools for girls were
established slowly, more and more young women (and their families) of the middle and
upper classes turned to education abroad. And an important option for those who chose to
remain at home were the coeducational programs offered by American and other private,
secular schools.
Coeducation was not new to Colombia. At the primary school level in rural areas,
where educational resources were sparse, mixed sex classrooms were the norm. Such
schools were, however, rare in urban centers, and they were almost nonexistent at the
secondary level. When Conservatives regained national leadership after the war, Church
opposition to coeducation in secondary programs was strengthened as a Ministry of
National Education decree back it up. In the 1950s, when Bogotá‟s Colegio Nueva
Granda was in the process of adding a secondary program to accommodate growing
enrollment, division of students by sex was not financially feasible. Yet, the school was
located in the capital and its board had to walk a fine diplomatic line to avoid
controversy. The school ran a small secondary program out of the basement of the
principal‟s rented home, and classes were mixed. However, a rope divided the basement
classroom and a curtain could, if necessary, be pulled to separate one side of it from the
other. Though students moved about the room freely and seating was mixed, each was
50
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assigned an official seat on the sex-appropriate side of the room that they could quickly
return to when a ministry official appeared. 51
In actuality, outside the capital there was less interest and little effort by the
regional governments to limit coeducational programs. On the Caribbean, part of the
attraction of the schools at Cartagena and Barranquilla was that they offered
coeducational programs and made few curriculum distinctions between the sexes. The
schools marketed themselves to Colombian families who were looking for a modern
coeducational model. In Catholic Medellín, it was no different. There, the Colegio Colón
had a mixed student body from the start, and Antioqueño education officials held it up as
model for other schools to emulate. Reflecting the Catholic morals of the region,
inspectors closely observed the mixing of the sexes during the school day, but they did
not pressure the school to make changes. They were particularly satisfied that interaction
among the sexes was strictly supervised during recess. 52 (In later generations, political
leaders even took to honoring the school for introducing coeducation to the city. 53)
Medellín had a long tradition of embracing educational and capitalist modernity and this
did not conflict with traditional Catholic values. As long as Catholic sensibilities were
demonstrated in administration of technical education programs and commercial schools,
in the personnel policies and on the floors of textile factories that employed women, and
in the classrooms and common areas of coeducational secondary schools, the Church in
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Medellín did not resist modernizing trends. 54 In the 1950s the only private schools forced
to segregate existing mixed sex classrooms were the high profile Protestant schools that
were historical targets of the Church. 55
Centros Colombo-Americanos and Catholic Culture
Like American schools, the Centros Colombo-Americanos were also involved in
negotiating transnational Catholicism. Yet, while schools accepted a role in spiritual,
Catholic instruction, Colombo-Americano cultural centers usually avoided programming
with explicit religious content. Religion was rarely a lecture topic because public
controversy was easy to spark on a diplomatic stage. At the end of the war, for example, a
teacher at the Bogotá center, Lionel Landry, gave a lecture on religious freedom in the
US. A Catholic himself, Landry posited that the “the greatness of a nation, depends on its
morals.” His assertion was that US strength was tied to its religious diversity. His lecture
received swift criticism from the Catholic press in the capital which pointed to divorce as
a sign of decaying US morals. 56 Such negative publicity made the Bogotá center very
cautious about engaging religious discourse, but its overall programming hardly denied a
voice for Catholicism. Jesuit academics, among others, gave regular lectures at the center
on a wide range of topics; Church authorities were honored guests at many of these
lectures. As detailed above, priests and nuns were active participants in the center‟s
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language programs, and the library liberally lent academic and mass media resources to
local Catholic schools. Given the center‟s history of collaboration with the Church, it was
shocking to its board when the center appeared on the 1951 enemies list. Along with the
Parrish School in Barranquilla, it was the only other institution of US cultural diplomacy
to make the list. Placed in historical perspective, however, it is clear that strong Catholic
resistance to US cultural influence was much more muted than it had been just a decade
before, and the list reflected the sentiments of only a small faction within the Church.
The Colombo-Americano that opened in Barranquilla in 1956 followed Bogotá‟s
lead in not explicitly engaging religious discourse. On the coast, lectures by academic
Catholic clerics were less common, but this was a function of the relative absence of
Catholic universities and colegios in the region. They had fewer local Catholic academics
to engage with. Indeed, the few lectures given by members of the clergy were usually
presentations by priests from outside the region who were traveling a State Department
lecture circuit. Collaborative anticommunist efforts between the church and the US
government were often behind such lectures: a Colombian priest from Bogotá detailed
how a new Alliance for Progress housing project had impacted his impoverished
parishioners; the former rector of a Jesuit university in Chile spoke on combating
communism through higher education. 57 In the area of English teaching, the center
supported the efforts of Catholic schools and especially the newly arriving religious
orders from the US. Local woman who joined the English-speaking Marymount order,
for example, were allowed to enroll in the center‟s language classes free of charge. The
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board also commonly extended scholarships to students at the city‟s Catholic secondary
schools upon direct requests of mother superiors.58
Not surprisingly, the Colombo-Americano in Medellín had more intimate
connections to church authority. Catholicism was deeply embedded in the cultural and
educational systems of Medellín and Antioquia, and the center‟s collaboration with the
Church reflected this complex reality. Within that center, the Church had greater ability
to filter Colombian-US educational encounters. The Archbishop of the city was an
honorary member of the center, and thus he or his official designee was commonly
involved in the cultural pageantry of the institute. At the opening of the semester in 1949,
for example, a crowd of 250 students heard the pastor of the city‟s cathedral lecture on
“Why We Should Learn English”; the center provided mimeographed copies of the
speech so students could follow the language more closely. But the Church role was more
than ceremonial, and it had a more official voice in center activities. The center‟s
scholarship committee included the Archbishop‟s designate, who was in a position to
judge the moral character of candidates for US educational programs. Following the
Bogotá model, this committee screened candidates for a variety of US university and
technical training scholarships and also made recommendations for university
acceptance. At times, two priests served on the small committee and could make their
presence felt in the overall operation of the center.59 In one incident a priest
committeemen charged a US teacher at the center with making anti-Catholic statements
in class and pressed for his removal. Though an investigation by the board found no
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evidence to support the charge, they terminated his employment because of the way he
conducted himself toward the Church during the investigation process. 60 Still, the power
of Church to filter the staff was not absolute. Here, as in the other Colombo-Americanos,
well-respected staffers regularly included wives of those US Protestants who ministered
to local foreigners (and, thus, were not perceived as a proselytizing threat). 61
Additionally, loans of film and teaching equipment to schools and other cultural centers
in the region did not exclude Protestant schools. 62
Administering barrio film programs gave each of the Centros ColomboAmericanos an additional role in negotiating transnational Catholicism. Films these
centers screened in neighborhoods or offered to educational institutions in the 1960s
continued to assert the Catholic cultural credentials of the US. Features treated secular
efforts at preserving California‟s historic Franciscan missions (Rosary of the Missions),
US Catholic priest-pilots flying into remote New Mexican villages to say mass on
Sundays (News Magazine no. 56), and a celebration of Easter with a Catholic mass at the
outdoor amphitheater of Arlington National Cemetery (Easter in the U.S.A.).63 Logically,
the US Southwest figured prominently in USIA films with Catholic content, and
continuing the tradition established in OIAA film, the agency also emphasized Hispanic
and Indian contributions to US culture. Such films served the purpose of blurring the
limiting dichotomies that historically framed Latin American-US encounters: Latin vs.
Anglo, modern vs. traditional, and Catholic vs. Protestant. And Now Miguel told the story
60
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of a Catholic New Mexican sheep ranching family who valued modern education
alongside its ranching traditions. 64 Navajo rug weaving was the subject of Indian Life in
New Mexico but it made references to Native American Catholicism. 65 An especially
dominant focus in cinematic projections of the Hispanic US was Puerto Rico. The island
commonwealth was presented as a Latin American and Catholic society that was
transforming into a model of modernity. Beyond the Valley emphasized the Catholic
island‟s rapid transition from “agricultural country with a limited number of crops to an
expanding industrialized country.” 66 Such documentaries implicitly challenged narrow
framing of US culture as Anglo-Protestant.
Importantly, as Church hegemony over national education declined around midcentury, Colombo-Americano educational programs were prominent among the new
educational options for women. From the start, there was approximate gender parity
among the student bodies of each Colombo-Americano, but usually the number of
women quickly grew to far exceed the number of men enrolled in courses. Such a high
enrollment of adult and young-adult women in coeducational programs was a novelty on
the Colombian educational landscape. Observing the mixing of students in classrooms,
cultural spaces, social programs, and common areas of the Bogotá center during its first
two years, El Tiempo declared that the Colombo-Americano had “knocked down the
barriers” between the sexes. 67 Across mid-century, the tremendous response of women to
programs at each cultural center is well documented in their archives. Women enrolled at
the BNCs for English language classes but also for the various commercial courses that
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were offered. Especially since the 1930s, private commercial education programs had
grown increasingly popular among women of the middle classes. Though Liberals had
championed the principle of equal educational access for women, they like Conservatives
and the Church before them did not build the schools to meet demand. Secondary
programs for women were few in number; only about 1,400 Colombian women were
enrolled in such programs in the early 1940s and by the end of that decade the figure was
only 3,500.68 There was a clear growth trend, but the increases came very slowly in the
nation of eleven million people. As a result, commercial/business schools and English
language course became popular, modern alternatives for younger, urban females of the
middle classes.
Whether with a bachillerato program completed or just a couple years of a
secondary school behind them, career and employment minded women were drawn to
Colombo-Americano classrooms. Courses in business administration and bookkeeping
were popular when they were periodically offered, but by the 1960s bilingual secretary
programs were a regular part of programming. On the coast, these programs were crucial
to the financial viability of the centers. Generally a two year cycle of semesters, these
programs developed students‟ English language and secretarial skills. For successful
graduates, salaries were considered quite good, even high (for women) and this sparked
demand for the program. In Medellín, for example, other private and commercial
institutions offered similar secretarial training programs, but the center‟s strong
connections to the local business community gave it a competitive edge. The center
marketed this advantage explaining to prospective applicants that businesses across the
city regularly hired its students. To emphasize the point, the course prospectus identified
68
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the most prominent local companies that employed its graduates. It argued that a diploma
from the Colombo-Americano secretarial program was “proof that [students] had the
qualifications required” for a professional position. 69 Through that decade, the center
graduated several hundred women in the program and placed many of them in local
offices of national and foreign companies. 70 In Cartagena, the bilingual secretary program
was popular from the start and initially attracted many of the female students from the
local American school.71 At Barranquilla, the program faced especially high demand and
had to turn away 150 applicants in its first year. By the mid-1960s, a new building
allowed the board to expand the program and it enrolled more than 200 women. A presecretarial program was even added to meet demand from younger students. 72
Most women who enrolled at Centros Colombo-Americanos were not in the
popular secretarial program but in the English language courses. In those classes and in
the various public spaces of centers, the sexes mingled more freely than they could in
other Colombian educational institutions. And owing to the high enrollment of women,
programming in each city engaged in a national discourse over changing gender systems.
Suffrage was not extended to Colombian women until the mid-1950s, and before that it
was a developing political issue. Thus did the public speaking clubs formed among
students at the centers debate that and other popular gender questions of day: Should
women be immediately granted the right to vote? Is a single person happier than a
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married one? And which is the stronger sex? 73 At the same time, the centers celebrated
prominent Colombian and US women as lecturers, artists, and musicians, and their
scholarship and college advising services were as equally accessible to women as men.
Through their educational and cultural programs, the centers maneuvered in and bridged
Colombia‟s educational gender gap --in part a legacy of Church control over education.
Conclusion
As Colombians were challenging Church and traditional elite hegemony over
national culture from the 1930s forward, US models of modernity were gaining currency.
Colombian familiarity with US culture had been rising via commercial entertainment
since the decade before, but such familiarity was skewed by the exaggerated style of
Hollywood films and the negative stereotypes it fed. Beginning in the 1940s,
Washington‟s emerging cultural diplomacy presented Colombians with more diverse
representations of US culture and lifestyle in the interest of building cultural common
ground. The new diplomacy proffered educational and cultural resources that individuals
and institutions across-class could access and employ as they negotiated their own paths
toward modernity. For segments of the elite, emerging middle and new professional
classes, the US rapidly became an alternative model to the European Catholic educational
system of the nation.
Though the cultural authority of the Catholic Church was waning, it remained a
powerful force in Colombia. From the beginning, the OIAA had to mount a strong effort
to overcome historical tensions that narrowly framed US culture as Anglo-Protestant and
Colombian culture as Latin-Catholic. Establishing US Catholic credentials became a
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priority of the OIAA, the State Department, and later the USIA. In the 1940s, converging
concerns over Protestantism and communism opened new collaborative spaces where the
cultural and political agendas of both nations and both national Catholic churches found
common ground. Gradually, the Colombian Catholic Church began to use US educational
resources in attempts to maintain its cultural authority over students. Promoting English
language instruction, establishing US-style educational institutions, and linking
Colombians to Catholic schools in the US, the Colombian Church used US cultural
resources to target Protestantism, reassert its influence over national education, and make
Colombians‟ foreign educational experiences more Catholic. Both the US Catholic
church and the US government enthusiastically collaborated in these processes in a quest
for Pan American unity against fascism and then communism. As the US exerted
leadership against international communism in the early Cold War, the Catholic Church
sanctioned a strengthening political relationship between Bogotá and Washington.
Though some Catholic nationalists inside and outside the clergy continued to be vocal
critics of US cultural influence in the nation, it is clear that Colombia‟s mid-century
cultural shift away from Europe and toward the US was fostered in part by leaders and
educators within the same church.
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Conclusion

Modern Alternatives
Under the influence of revisionist scholarship during the second half of twentieth
century, explanations about the growth of US cultural influence in Latin America
commonly rested upon economic analyses and assertions of dependency. That US
imperialism, both classical (territorial) and neo-imperial (economic), produced cultural
dominance over the region was widely proclaimed and uncritically accepted. Commercial
mass media was a common target for critics because it promoted North American
lifestyle based upon capitalist consumption. In scholarship and in political discourse
(emanating from the left), US-produced advertising, film, radio, print publications,
photography and television were ascribed the power to colonize thought and charged with
destroying local cultures. A second popular target for revisionist critique was the growing
movement of Latin Americans into US higher education. Latin Americans with education
credentials granted in the US --most notably, high profile politicians, government
ministers, and business leaders-- were suspect of cultural betrayal and their loyalties to
the patria [fatherland] were openly and loudly questioned.
Over the course of the mid-century decades (1930s-1960s), the presence of US
commercial mass media in Latin America certainly increased dramatically, and the
influence of US higher education in the region was clearly on the rise. This dissertation
evidences both of these trends. Yet as an examination of the Colombian case also
demonstrates, the US mass media presence in Latin America was not restricted to the
commercial sphere. Nor was Latin American engagement with US education models and
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resources confined to the university level. Though diversity and depth characterized interAmerican cultural relations around mid-century, historiography did not reveal it.
From the 1930s forward, collaborative educational and cultural programming
between US and Latin American governments, institutions, organizations, communities
and individuals was robust. Over the course of the four decades that framed mid-century,
US cultural influence increased dramatically as traditional European cultural influence
declined. Encouraged by US cultural diplomacy, Latin American government policies,
and local reception of US resources, new venues of inter-American cultural contact
emerged to play a crucial role in expanding Latin American-US relations beyond
traditional economic, political and military boundaries. The institutions and media
programs considered in this study were not the only venues to appear, but they were
central to introducing and sustaining new US educational and cultural influences in the
region. Importantly, they fostered new familiarity with US culture not only among the
elite but among the emerging middle classes, professional groups and the lower classes as
well. Yet, American schools, binational cultural centers and US-government film, radio,
and print media programs were infrequently recognized in historical scholarship because
researchers seldom examined Latin American-US encounters in local context.
Analyzing the content of commercial mass media from the sites of production in
the US, scholarship made sweeping and unsubstantiated assertions about the power of
such content in the far-off fields of reception. It casually assumed rather than articulated
US cultural dominance via modern technologies of mass communication. Failing to
historicize the US mass media presence in the region, it never considered the mass media
programming of the OIAA nor the extensive transnational collaboration it engendered. It
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left unexplored the broad use of transnational media resources in modernization
campaigns, education reform, and other political, economic and religious projects that
were initiated from within the region. As a result, it never acknowledged the ability of
locals to filter the original intent of foreign mass media products. In such literature, mass
media content was defined as powerful propaganda that ensured US economic dominance
and secured US cultural imperialism.
Regarding the increased movement of Latin Americans into US universities,
historical context was equally ignored. Scholarship never articulated the in-county routes
that Latin Americans took to US higher education; collaborative projects between Latin
American and US educational, professional and cultural organizations, libraries, and
schools were occasionally noted, but they were infrequently explored. Largely
overlooked was the availability of US-style education in the American schools and USsponsored cultural centers that had emerged on urban landscapes across the region. As a
result, scholarship offered limited insight into the popularization of US educational
models as alternatives to traditional elite, Catholic and European-style education.
Important questions about why educational and cultural paths were leading so many Latin
Americans to US universities, colleges, technical training, and professionalization
courses were left unanswered in analyses focused narrowly on cataloging abuses by
imperialists (or neo-imperialist) and identifying their local, US-educated surrogates.
As Marxist influence declined, however, subordination of cultural development to
economic processes gave way to new approaches that defined culture as decidedly more
complex. Peeling back historiographical layers, new scholarship repositioned culture
beside, and not behind economics and politics. In this process, the sub-field of cultural
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history began to emerge. Among scholars interested in cultural processes within empire,
Gramsci‟s theory of hegemony proved especially popular because it provided a useful
framework for analyzing cultural dominance. Coercion alone, Gramsci posited, was
never enough to secure the dominance of one group or ideology over another. Instead,
individuals had to consent to their own domination by embracing aspects of the dominant
culture; only with such consent could the culture of the dominant group become
normative. The theory lent much needed nuance to analyses of cultural encounters and
kept questions and concerns over cultural imperialism and dominance relevant, even as
Marxist-influenced paradigms lost currency. Importantly, new attention to hegemony also
helped to shift researchers away from the imperial centers of power (and their
metropolitan archives) and toward local sites where cultural contact actually took place.
In the last two decades, the influences of post-colonial scholarship and cultural
history in general have taken the study of US foreign (and especially Latin American-US)
relations in new directions. State-centered analyses of economics and diplomatic strategy
defined this historiography for most of the last century, but now cultural questions are
often at the center of analysis. This study responds to an important development within
the new historiography of Latin American-US relations: recognition of transnational
connections, networks, and communities that develop across national borders and loosen
the influence of nation-states over individuals‟ life paths and identities. Inspired by calls
to explore transnationalism, the study considers cross-border cultural processes that
structured Colombian-US relations during the mid-twentieth century. Analyzing the
growth of US cultural influence in urban centers in the Andes and on the Caribbean, the
study articulates a mid-century shift in Colombian cultural orientation away from Europe
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and toward the US. Asking why this shift began and how it sustained, the study evidences
high degrees of transnational collaboration between governments, churches, educational
and cultural institutions, and individuals in both nations. Through such collaboration
schools and classrooms, cultural centers and performance stages, galleries, radio
programs and outdoor theaters developed as crucial infrastructure that facilitated the
spread of US cultural influences.
Articulating transnational cultural collaboration in Colombian-US relations, this
study deemphasizes two oppositional dichotomies that have been central to theories of
cultural dominance and analyses of empire. The first is the foreign/local dichotomy.
Because revisionist scholarship relied too heavily on sources far removed from sites of
cultural contact, much of it rigidly distinguished between the foreign and local forces that
converged in contact zones. Employing static views of culture that labeled foreign
influences contaminants of local authenticity, it drew sharp distinctions between things
foreign and local while glossing over many of the complex identities and impulses that
frame cultural encounters. Individuals, groups, ideas, and activities that defied simple
categorization as either foreign or local were often left out analysis. Framing foreign and
local as oppositional, as mutually exclusive and as jointly exhaustive of the range of local
realities, analysis marginalized complex regional, national, and transnational influences
that construct culture. In contrast, and following the lead of contemporary scholarship,
this study probes the blurred lines between foreign and local. Attending to the fluidity of
each category, it demonstrates how common cultural interests and shared cultural
experiences have been as crucial to the construction of inter-American cultural relations
as cultural differences, conflict and clash.
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The second oppositional dichotomy reconsidered in this dissertation is that of
coercion/consent. This particular dichotomy remains central to theories of hegemony, but
it has serious limitations for examining transnational cultures. Hegemony reduces all
foreign/local encounters to power relationships. Approaching US-sponsored education
and cultural projects in Latin America through such a narrow lens restricts our ability to
see how common interests, intersecting needs, and shared visions of modernity structured
inter-American cultural encounters at mid-century. Asymmetrical power relationships
were certainly evident around Colombian-US cultural encounters. Indeed, multiple
hegemonic projects converged where schools, cultural centers and mass media programs
developed: Liberal plans for national unity and their designs for modernity, Catholic
Church attempts to retain cultural authority, and US government promotion of Pan
Americanism, anti-Communism, and international capitalism. But power relationships
did not exclusively condition educational and cultural processes that unfolded; to
privilege such relationships from the outset, marginalizes the individuals, families,
institutions and communities that enthusiastically and aggressively fashioned US cultural
resources around their own intent. To base analysis of cultural encounters upon equations
of coercion and consent is to determine in advance that some form of cultural domination
took place.
Clearly, scholars of Latin American-US relations should continue to probe
questions of cultural dominance and to identify the variant forms of US imperialism that
have impacted the region. During the twentieth century, the US had territorial possessions
in Latin America, and it exercised degrees of economic hegemony over other parts of the
hemisphere. Additionally, its political concerns in war and cold war set an inter-
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American political agenda to which most nations had to respond. Throughout the period,
extreme asymmetries of power certainly conditioned Washington‟s relations with
governments, militaries, industries, institutions, and national citizenries. Yet, when we
move out of metropolitan archives and examine cultural encounters in contact zones, it
becomes clear that few encounters are reducible to those power relationships that exist
around them. In those zones, what is foreign is not always distinct and distinguishable
from what is local. Ideas, resources, organizations and individuals frequently defy both
categories. Further, if we approach the Colombian-US educational and cultural projects
examined in this study through the lens of power relationships, we limit our ability to see
how transnational collaboration evolved through common interests, intersecting needs,
and shared philosophies rather than through coerced or consensual submission to foreign
authority.
As evidenced in the chapters above, US educational and cultural models held
tremendous appeal in mid-century Latin America. Throughout the region, individuals,
families, institutions, and governments willingly engaged US resources as alternative
approaches to modernity. Thus, recognizing this appeal is crucial toward an
understanding of Latin American-US cultural relations from the 1930s forward. To the
extent that frames of imperialism and dominance overlook this appeal or to the extent that
it is dismissed as the coercive success of a neo-imperial power, many of the complexities
of inter-American cultural relations will be left unexplored. Scholarship on Latin
American-US relations will remain --as it was during much of the twentieth century-blinded by empire.
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Colombian Cultural Change
Colombia‟s mid-century shift in cultural orientation away from Europe and
toward the US is best understood in a local context. During the 1930s and 1940s, the
nation experienced a period of accelerated cultural change in urban centers across the
Andes and on the Caribbean. At the center of these processes of change were the
expansion and reform of the national education system. At that time, new political
leadership recognized elite exclusive secondary education and an inadequate primary
school system as obstacles to modernity and set out to reform them. Returning to national
power after a fifty year absence, Liberals articulated new social functions for education
that supported their modernist visions. In a departure from tradition, their programs
attempted to extend literacy to millions of impoverished Colombians whose educational
needs had been historically ignored. Connecting the rural majority and the rising urban
populations more closely to the central state and the national economy was a primary
objective. School expansion and curriculum diversification projects also served to enlist
the small but growing middle and professional classes in the state modernization project.
Significantly, as these new programs were implemented, the long-standing elite
monopoly over Colombian education resources was slowly dismantled.
This new education agenda was a key component of a broader Liberal project of
cultural reform. Intent on developing greater national consciousness among diverse
regions, the overall program aimed to construct a more inclusive and more politically
useful frame of Colombian culture. Until then, the dominant frame of Colombianidad
projected elite interests and was built around narrow representations of upper-class
Andean lifestyle. Supported by an exclusionary secondary education system with strong

467

transnational ties to Europe, it reflected affinities for languages, literature, music, art, and
fashion of the Old Continent. Not surprisingly, this cultural frame was far removed from
the lived realities of most Colombians and its usefulness as an agent of national unity was
severely limited. Broadening the official government definition of national culture,
Liberal programs shifted attention away from European cultural models and began to
emphasize “authentic” Colombian customs, traditions and practices. As never before,
select indigenous symbols, art and mythology, rural Andean music and dance, and the
literature of national authors were in vogue and officially promoted.
New Liberal enthusiasm for authentic representations of Colombianidad
developed as war was overtaking Europe. Before the first battles of World War II
occurred, the Spanish Civil War placed two governmental approaches to modernity in
sharp relief for Latin American observers: tradition-laden Catholic authoritarianism and
secular Popular-Front Republicanism. In Colombia (as throughout the region), the
primary cultural question of that Spanish war, the meaning of Hispanidad in a modern
world, infused discourse over national identity and modernity. As Colombians debated
their cultural and political ties to Spain, the Second World War broke out and fueled an
even broader reconsideration of Colombian cultural ties to the Old Continent. For those
interested in distancing Colombian culture from European tradition, warfare provided
ample avenues for drawing sharp distinctions. At the same time, the building continental
conflict disrupted transatlantic cultural migrations that historically reinforced European
influences among Colombian elite: ocean travel became difficult, universities temporarily
closed, and the flow of European cultural products and consumer goods was much
reduced.
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To project more inclusive representations of the nation and facilitate broader
diffusion of national rather than European culture, the government funded performance
groups and tours, mobile theaters and libraries, and radio and film programming. It also
used the growing number of classrooms across the nation as laboratories for
reconstructing Colombian nationalism. New curriculum emphasized the teaching of
Colombian geography, history, and literature by educators who were citizens of the
nation (and not French religious or other European foreigners). Schools also introduced
national symbols and customs to the young. Certainly, the new cultural programming
reflected the biases of government cultural managers, who dismissed non-Andean
cultural practices, who glorified indigenous cultures of the past but devalued the Indian of
the present, and who demonstrated greater comfort and enthusiasm for working with
urban rather than rural populations. Indeed around mid-century, Liberal plans for the
“democratization” of Colombian culture had well-defined limits. Still, Liberal reforms
significantly contributed to important cultural shifts of the era. No longer would elite
lifestyle, customs and traditions exclusively define what it meant to be Colombian. And
no longer would European high culture set the standard for Colombianidad.
Also at the center of contemporary cultural change was the diminishing influence
of the Catholic Church over the nation‟s classrooms. Asserting government control over
education in the 1930s, Liberals had reignited century-old secularization debates and
launched an aggressive assault on Church privilege and power. Identifying the Church as
an impediment to progress, they successfully stripped it of its constitutional role in
educational oversight. Thus as mid-century approached, Colombian education was no
longer organized and directed in accordance with Catholicism. Officially-sanctioned
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pedagogy and curriculum were refashioned to conform to Liberal visions of modernity
rather than Catholic tradition and doctrine. The Church hierarchy did not take the Liberal
reforms lying down, and with or without constitutional authority it remained a powerful
force in national education. Especially at the secondary level, the nation remained
dependent on Church personnel and resources. Yet authority had clearly shifted, and as
the system expanded across mid-century, the central state and not the Church drafted the
blueprints for educational modernity.
While cultural change was fueled by Liberal reforms and the diminishing
authority of the Church, it was also accelerated by rapid urbanization and the
proliferation of mass media communication. Through the mid-century decades, as the
rural republic became what Safford and Palacios call a “nation of cities,” millions of
middle and lower-class Colombians radically transformed their lives; abandoning
agricultural communities for new urban landscapes, individuals and families negotiated
new challenges as they cleared their own paths to modernity. Importantly, many of the
new urbanites recognized education as fundamental to their goals and began to demand
greater educational resources and services from their government. Ideologically, Liberals
were committed to meeting the rising demand, but in practice building the necessary
educational infrastructure would take decades to accomplish. Thus, where both state and
Church educational options were lacking, Colombians began to turn to new schooling
and training programs emerging in the commercial and private sectors.
Simultaneously, new mass media resources and channels were further
contributing to Colombian cultural change. Film, radio, and print publications offered
Colombians across class new platforms for challenging the traditional elite construction
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of national culture, the more inclusive frame of that culture proffered by Liberals, as well
as the overall cultural authority of the Church and elite. As radio stations appeared and
multiplied, cinema audiences grew, and print publications diversified, new cultural
models circulated in the nation. In concert with slowly rising literacy rates and higher
education levels, the broad diffusion of alternative cultural models via mass media
limited the ability of the elite and the Church to successfully filter, frame and project a
dominant version of Colombianidad. With written culture no longer the exclusive domain
of the elite, urban growth redefining Colombian lifestyles, and access to diverse media
resources expanding among the middle and popular classes, neither Church nor
government were in a position to control the contemporary processes of cultural change.
Under such dynamic conditions, Colombians across-class developed greater familiarity
not only with regional cultures within their nation but with foreign cultures within their
hemisphere. Greater interest in, familiarity with, and access to US educational and
cultural models developed within this context.
The US Educational and Cultural Alternative
Through the campaign for Pan American unity that began in the 1930s,
Washington‟s new cultural diplomacy established direct communication channels to the
Latin American public. Competitively joining European nations in presenting cultural
programming in the region, the US made substantial effort to introduce and reintroduce
itself to its hemispheric neighbors. Programs intensified as war then cold war came to
dominate mid-century geo-politics, and mass media became a crucial tool of modern US
diplomacy. Responding first to European and Axis influence in the region and later to
fear of Soviet and Cuban Communism, an influx of film, radio, and print resources
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presented US cultural, political and economic models to millions. Produced with the
intent to persuade, the mass media products were propaganda. They focused implicitly
(and often explicitly) on the principle concerns of US foreign policy at mid-century:
building Pan American unity, challenging fascism and communism, and promoting
democratic capitalism. In Colombia, however, the government, the national Catholic
Church, and the powerful coffee and industrial lobby shared Washington‟s foreign policy
concerns. As a result, the persuasive potential of US mass media content, as foreign
propaganda, was muted. At mid-century, hemispheric unity, anti-radicalism, and
capitalist development were Colombian as much as US political objectives.
Throughout mid-century, demand for US mass media programs and resources was
always high among the Colombian public. Audiences for non-commercial OIAA films
topped five million annually by the end of the Second World War. After significantly
decreasing in the post-war decade, the USIA reinvigorated the film program. By the early
1960s, audience figures rose again to that wartime level and remained so throughout that
decade. Educators, factory owners, military commanders, local politicians, government
cultural managers and parish priests were among the many that projected US government
films for their educational, cultural, entertainment and/or propaganda value. National,
university, and local radio stations did the same with US-produced programs that
included news and commentary, contemporary music, and English language courses.
Owing to high demand, stock of US-produced print materials including magazines,
pamphlets, and posters was difficult to maintain, and the Colombian response to library
collections, especially academic textbooks, periodical holdings and musical recordings,
was tremendous throughout these decades.
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Mid-century mass media programs of the OIAA and USIA introduced diverse
aspects of US culture to a wide cross-section of the Colombian public and strongly
contributed to the spread of US cultural influence in the nation. Through film, radio, and
print publications, many Colombians were exposed to US history, geography, culture and
lifestyle for the first time. That most of the mass media content met the definition of
propaganda is clear, but based on the ways locals used the media resources, it is also clear
that such a definition is too limiting. Once in the hands of Colombians, US mass media
resources were subject to multiple layers of local intent that altered original meaning and
purpose. Closer to the fields of reception and far from the distant sites of production,
Colombian filters qualified messages and reframed content to conform to local, regional
and national agendas. Significantly, that Washington‟s mass media programs had strong
cultural, and especially educational, content explains much of their local appeal. In a
nation struggling to expand educational infrastructure and adapt new models of
modernity, such resources were enthusiastically received across region and class.
As the new Pan Americanism had evolved during the 1930s, US diplomats
quickly recognized strong Latin American interest in US educational models and
resources. When a formal program of cultural diplomacy was initiated at the end of that
decade, education became the early dominant theme of the film, radio, and print
resources gathered for circulation in the region. That education was granted such a central
role in contemporary US diplomacy should not be surprising. Though often overlooked in
historical analyses that treat the era, education was then a dynamic force reshaping US
culture, economics, and politics. In just three decades, the High School Movement had
increased enrollments in US secondary schools dramatically; whereas a small minority
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attended high school just prior to World War I, almost three-quarters of the ageappropriate US population were enrolled before the bombing of Pearl Harbor.
Graduations rate reached above 50% before FDR sent troops off to war, and that
achievement –as much as skyscrapers, automobiles, telephones or lifestyles of
consumption-- defined US modernity at mid-century.
The US success in harnessing education to modernize society did not go
unnoticed abroad. Given the opportunity in the 1930s and 1940s, Latin Americans were
quick to experiment with the educational resources Washington offered. In Colombia, as
elsewhere, European Catholic education models had not worked for vast majority of the
population. As government and community leaders searched for new models to reform
and modernize the national education systems, individuals and families looked for
solutions to meet more personal needs. As presented in OIAA film, radio and print
programs (but also observable in practice), the US educational system was not
monopolized by a narrow elite class. Nor were it resources confined to formal and
traditional educational institutions. The US approach to education was a work in
progress, and equitable distribution of resources among regions, economic classes, and
race/ethnic and gender groups had not been achieved. Yet, more than other models in
circulation, US education demonstrated success in reaching the middle and working
classes --groups that had been historically blocked out of Latin American classrooms.
Technical and pragmatic, US models defined education broadly and privilege flexibility
and responsiveness to community needs.
While mass media programs were projected to broad audiences, American
schools and Colombo-Americano cultural centers provided more intimate and more long-
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term venues for inter-American cultural encounters. As these institutions appeared in
urban centers in the Andes and on the Caribbean, they caught the attention of individuals
and families from the middle, professional and upper classes who viewed US culture
favorably and associated it with modernity. Locally controlled and embracing a
philosophy of cultural reciprocity, they evolved as a reflection of their urban Colombian
communities. Starting as small schools which catered to US and other English-speaking
foreigners, the first American schools in Barranquilla and Bogotá immediately attracted
elite Colombian families. As sister schools opened in urban centers across the country,
the trend continued. While these schools were strongly associated with US culture, they
functioned within elite Colombian realities and, as a result, grew around locallydetermined needs. For the tens of thousands of Colombians who graduated from these
schools in the second half of the twentieth century, the American schools of Colombia
were local institutions that provided an alternative to traditional Colombian education.
They offered Spanish-English bilingualism, secular coeducation, binational
accreditations, rigorous and modern curricula that emphasized technical learning and
science, and easy access to university programs at home or abroad. Comparatively, the
various Colombo-Americano cultural centers also evolved to meet local needs. They, too,
provided alternative educational and cultural options at a time when Colombia‟s national
educational system was expanding and diversifying but unable to satisfy middle-class
demand. For the more than 100,000 Colombians who enrolled in language and business
courses at one of eight Colombo-Americano cultural centers since the early 1940s and for
the many more who participated in the centers‟ cultural programs over those decades,
these locally-directed institutions provided flexible educational and cultural options at
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reasonable costs. Some academic classes and many cultural events were free of charge.
The emerging middle class was the primary beneficiary of programming, but so too were
the new professional classes. The Colombo-Americanos each established a variety of
programs designed around the career interests, training needs and work schedules of the
populations they served. Women especially enjoyed greater access to classrooms at the
Colombo-Americanos than they would have in within the national education system. And
those who wanted access to the centers‟ cultural stages –Colombian artists, writers,
musicians, intellectuals, academics, government officials, or members of the clergy-found these centers to be enthusiastic about cultural diffusion and committed to
Colombian-US cultural reciprocity.
Around the American schools and Centros Culturales Colombo-Americanos,
transnational educational and cultural communities emerged as Colombians responded
enthusiastically to collaborative cultural projects with the US --its people, governments,
educational institutions, and cultural organizations. Through these developing
communities and the diverse relationships they fostered, segments of the national elite
and the growing middle and professional classes had direct and sustained contact with US
culture, resources and models. As a result, some developed new affinities for US
language, history, culture and lifestyle. They built relationships with individuals and
institutions in the US, and they participated in cross-border dialogues, exchanges, and
cultural projects. For many individuals and families, the US offered attractive alternatives
to the traditional elite models of culture that had long structured their world and limited
their educational paths. Participants in these new communities opted for new approaches
to education and cultural diffusion that they perceived to be more modern and flexible
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and appreciated as secular. In sharp contrast to the generations that preceded it, this new
Colombian generation prioritized transnational relationships not across the Atlantic but
within the hemisphere. Shifting traditional Colombian cultural orientation away from
Europe and toward the US, they expanded their educational and cultural options at home
and abroad. In the process, they reconstructed inter-American relations.
In the aggregate, American schools, Colombo-Americano cultural centers, and
mass media diplomacy facilitated greater Colombian familiarity with US culture at midcentury. Clearly, these institutions and programs met US diplomatic objectives.
Successfully challenging stereotypes of the US as culturally inferior to Europe or void of
culture, the schools, cultural centers and media programs examined in this study
cultivated new respect for the US as a legitimate cultural producer and, especially, an
international education provider. These institutions and programs offered Colombians
new opportunities to formally engage with US education and cultural resources, and
across class and region they proved very receptive to the offer. Exploring schools,
cultural centers and media programming in local contexts, this dissertation evidences
extensive educational and cultural collaboration among governments in Colombia and the
US as well as the Catholic Churches in both nations. Equally evident are increasing
communications, exchanges of personnel, and sharing of resources among Colombian
and US cultural institutions, schools, colleges, professional groups and organizations. The
new transnational educational and cultural communities that emerged as a result of such
collaboration manifest Colombia‟s mid-century cultural shift away from Europe and
toward the US. While US cultural diplomacy should be credited with encouraging this
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shift, this dissertation demonstrates that Colombian enthusiasm and energy sustained the
trend across the mid-century decades.

478

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Archives
Archivo Distrital de Bogotá, Bogotá
Archivo General de la Nación, Bogotá (AGN)
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (AMRE)
Ministerio de Educación Nacional (MEN)
Ministerio de Cultura, Dirección de Extensión Cultural
Archivo Histórico del Atlántico, Barranquilla
Archivo Histórico del Antioquia, Medellín
Archivo Histórico de Cartagena, Cartagena de Indias
Biblioteca Bartolomé Calvo, Cartagena de Indias
Biblioteca Luis Ángel Arango, Bogotá
Biblioteca Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá
Biblioteca Piloto del Caribe, Barranquilla
Biblioteca del la Universidad de Antioquia, Medellín
Centro Colombo-Americano, Barranquilla (CCA/Barranquilla MSS)
Centro Colombo-Americano, Bogotá (CCA/Bogotá MSS)
Centro Colombo-Americano, Cartagena de Indias, (CCA/Cartagena MSS)
Centro Colombo-Americano, Medellín (CCA/Medellín MSS)
Colegio Cristóbol Colón, Medellín (CS/Medellín MSS)
Colegio Jorge Washington, Cartagena de Indias (CJW/Cartagena MSS)
Colegio Karl C. Parrish, Barranquilla, (KCP/Barranquilla MSS)
Colegio Nueva Granada, Bogotá (CNG MSS)
Museo Romántico, Barranquilla
US National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (NARA)
Office of Inter-American Affairs, Record Group 229
United States Department of State, Record Group 59
Records of the US Information Agency, Historical Collection, Record Group 306
University of Arkansas Libraries – Fayetteville, Special Collections
Archives of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (US Department of
State)
Newspapers, Magazines, and Journals
The American Journal of International Law
Américas
The Americas
Association of American Colleges Bulletin
Boletín de Historia y Antiguedades
Boletín Cultural y Bibliografico
Bulletin of the National Association of Secondary-Schools Principals
The Bulletin of the Pan American Union
The Catholic Historical Review
El Catolicismo (Bogotá)
Catholic World
Cromos

479

Diario del Caribe (Barranquilla)
Diario de la Costa (Cartagena)
Educational Research Bulletin
El Espectador (Bogotá)
Journal of Educational Sociology
The Journal of Negro Education
The Journal of Negro History
El Liberal (Bogotá)
Insights (Colegio Nueva Granada, Bogotá)
Hispania
Hispanic American Historical Review
El Heraldo (Barranquilla)
The Library Quarterly
Mejoras (Barranquilla)
Music Educators Journal
New York Times
La Nueva Generación (Universidad Nacional, Bogotá)
The Phi Delta Kappan
La Prensa (Barranquilla)
El Pueblo (Medellín)
La Razón (Bogotá)
La Razón (La Paz, Bolivia)
Review of Educational Research
Revista del Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Señora del Rosario (Bogotá)
Revista Colombo-Soviética
Revista Javeriana
El Scout: Revista Official de los Boy Scouts de Colombia
Semana
El Siglo (Bogotá),
El Tiempo (Bogotá)
Time
Universidad Católica Bolivariana (Medellín)

Government Publications
Colombia
Blanco, Julio Enrique. Informe del Director de Educación Nacional al Señor
Gobernador del Departamento. Barranquilla: Dirección de Educación Publica del
Departamento del Atlántico, 1939.
Contraloría General de la República. Censo general de población: 5 de Julio de 1938,
Resumen general del país. Bogotá, 1942.
Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE). Censo de Población
1951 (May 9), Resumen general del país. Bogotá: DANE, 1954.

480

---.
---.

XIII Censo Nacional de Población (15 de Julio 1964), Resumen general del país.
Bogotá: DANE, 1967.
Censo de estableciminetos educativas 1968. Bogotá: DANE, 1969.

Diario Official. Bogotá: 1944.
Dirección de Extensión Cultural, Ministerio de la Cultura. Informe: Departamento de
Extensión Cultural y Bellas Artes, 1942. Bogotá: 1942.
ICETEX, ICETEX: Un Instrumento para el Desarrollo integral de Colombia: 1950-1965
– Sus Perspectivas: 1966-1968. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1966.
Ministerio de Educación Nacional. Disposiciones vigentes sobre instrucción pública de
1927 a 1933. Bogotá: 1933.
---.
Instrucción publica: disposiciones vigentes. Bogotá: 1927.
---.
La Obra Educativa del gobierno en 1940: la Extension Cultural, Volume III.
Bogotá: 1940.
---.
Memoria de Educación Nacional. Bogotá: 1943.
---.
Memorias del Ministro de Educación. Bogotá: 1931, 1934, 1936, 1939.
----. Memoria del señor Ministro de Educación Nacional. Bogotá: 1946.
SENA, SENA: organización, funcionamiento, modos de formación. Bogotá: SENA,
1973.
United States
Advisory Committee on Education. The Report of the Committee: February 1938.
Washington: Government Printing Office (GPO), 1938.
---.
The Federal Government and Education. Washington: GPO, 1938.
Blauch, Lloyd E. and William L Iverson. Advisory Committee on Education. Education
of Children on Federal Reservations: Staff Study Number17. Washington: GPO,
1938.
Calkin, Homer L. Women in American Foreign Affairs. Washington: United States
Department of State, 1977.
Corry, Andrew V. “Memoir Proposing American Sponsored School Program, 1942
-1943.” 22 Sep. 1942. Washington: US Department of State, 1942.
Furbay, John H. Education in Colombia. Washington: US Office of Education, 1946.
Greene, Dorothy and Sherly Goodman Esman. Cultural Centers in the Other American
Republics. US Department of State, Publication 2503. Washington: GPO, 1946.

481

Inter-Departmental Committee on Cooperation with the American Republics. Report of
the Inter-Departmental Committee on Cooperation with the American Republics,
Report #508.Washington: GPO, 1938.
Moore, R. Walton, US Department of State. “Marriage of Foreign Service Officers with
Foreign Wives.” 28 Nov. 1936. Reprinted in The American Journal of
International Law 31, no.1, Supplement-Official Documents (January 1937): 50
-51.
Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. The Office of the Coordinator of
Inter-American Affairs. Washington: OIAA, 1941.
Rowland, Donald W. History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs,
Historical Reports on War Administration. Washington: The Office of Inter
-American Affairs, 1947.
Servicio de Información de los Estados Unidos de América (USIS/Bogotá). USIS
Catálogo de Peliculas. Bogotá: United States Embassy, 1961.
US Department of State. America – ―A Full and Fair Picture‖: The Government‘s
Information and Cultural Relations Program Overseas. Washington: State
Department - Office of Public Affairs, 1946.
---.
The Cultural Cooperation Program 1938-1943, Publication 2137. Washington:
GPO, 1944.
---.
Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 1938, The American
Republics, Vol. V. Washington: GPO, 1938.
---.
The Program of the Department of State in Cultural Relations, Inter-American
Series 2, Publication 1702. Washington: GPO, 1942.
---.
The Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals: Promulgated Pursuant to the
Proclamation of July 17, 1941. Washington: GPO, 1941.
---.
Office of Overseas Schools, “World Wide Fact Sheet – 2006-2007: American
Sponsored Elementary and Secondary Schools Overseas.” Accessed 1 October
2007. http://www.state.gov/m/a/os/1253.html.
---.
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, “English Language Programs
Abroad: I. Binational Centers.” Accessed 16 October 2008.
http://www.state.gov/education/engteaching/eal-elp.html.
Wilkerson, Doxey Alphonso. Advisory Committee on Education. Special Problems of
Negro Education: Staff Study Number 12. Washington: GPO, 1939.

US Congressional Hearings
US Senate Committee on Education and Labor. Hearing on Senate Bill 419. 75th Cong.,
1st sess.,February 1937.

482

US Senate Committee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Senate Bill 251. 75th Cong.,
1st sess., February 1937.
US House Subcommittee on Appropriations. Department of State Appropriation Bill for
FY 1939. 75th Cong., 3rd sess., December 1937.
US Senate Subcommittee on Education and Labor. Hearings on Senate Bill 1305. 76th
Cong., 1st sess., March 1939.
US Senate. Report: Federal Aid to Education Bill of 1939. S. Report 244. 76th Cong., 1st
sess., 1939.
US House Subcommittee on Appropriations. Second Deficiency Appropriation Bill for
FY 1940. 76th Cong., 3rd sess., June 1940.
US House Subcommittee on Deficiency Appropriations. Second Deficiency
Appropriation Bill for 1941. 77th Cong., 1st sess., June 1941.
US House Subcommittee on Appropriations. Hearings of Department of State
Appropriation Bill for FY 1943. 77th Cong., 2nd sess., January 1942.
US House Subcommittee on Appropriations. Hearings of Department of State
Appropriation Bill for FY 1944. 78th Cong., 1st sess., February 1943.

US Government Film
Colombia-Crossroads of the Americas. Dir. Julien Bryan. US Dept. of the Army, 1942.
And Now Miguel. USIA, 1953.
Orphans in Korea. USIA, 1953.
People‘s Capitalism. USIA, 1956.
Indian Life in New Mexico. USIA, 1958.
Beyond the Valley. USIA, 1959.
Now We Live Free. USIA,1960.
Unhappy Island. USIA,1961.
Evil Wind Out. Dir. James Blue. USIA, 1963.
A Letter From Colombia. Dir. James Blue. USIA, 1963.
School at Rincon Santo. Dir. James Blue. USIA, 1963.

Publications of Other Governments
Department of Press and Propaganda. Facts and Information About Brazil. Rio de
Janeiro: Indústria do Livro, Ltd., 1942.

483

Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. Sinopse do censo demografico, dado
gerais. Rio de Janeiro: Servico Gráfico do IBGE, 1947.
Instituto Nacional de Estudos Pedagógicos. Outline of Education in Brazil. New York:
Brazilian Government Trade Bureau, 1947.
British Council, The British Council en Colombia. Bogotá: The British Council
Colombia, 2000.
Montague, Arthur. “The Council in Colombia.” The Monthly Review of the British
Council (July 1946).

Reports, Pamphlets, Educational Materials and Published Speeches
American Association of School Administrators. The Mission Called the O/OS.
Washington: AASA, 1966.
The Anglo-American School. The Anglo-American School. Prospectus. Bogotá: 1939.
Anuario de la Iglesia católica en Colombia. Bogotá: Editorial el Catolicismo, 1938.
Association of Colombian-American Bi-National Schools (ACABINS). Association of
Colombian-American Bi-National Schools. Barranquilla: ACABINS, 1966.
---.
International Education Bridges the Gulf. Bogotá: ACABINS, 1968.
Association of Colombian-American Schools (ACAS). Manual for School Board
Members. Bogotá: ACAS, 1963.
Brickell, Herschell. Literatura Contemporanea Norte Americana, translated by Enrique
Uribe White. Bogotá: Prensa de la Biblioteca Nacional, 1943.
Centro Colombo-Americano de Bogotá. 15 Años del Centro Colombo-Americano: 1942
-1957. Bogotá: 1957.
---.
Centro Colombo-Americano de Bogotá: Prospecto – 1944. Bogotá: 1944.
---.
Centro Colombo-Americano de Bogotá: Prospecto – 1945. Bogotá: 1945.
---.
Realizaciones Culturales. Monthly Events Calendar. Bogotá: 1962-1965.
Centro Colombo-Americano de Medellín. Conozca su Biblioteca: Boletín Informativo.
Monthly Library Newsletter, 1965-66. Medellín.
Chin, Hey-Kyung Koh, ed. Open Doors: Report on International Education Exchange,
2003. New York: IIE, 2003.
Coordination Committee for Colombia (OIAA/Bogotá). Nuestro Mundo Maravilloso.
Bogotá: Editorial ABC, 1945.

484

Colegio Anglo-Colombiano, Anglo 50: 1956-2006. Bogotá: Puntoaparte Editores, 2006.
Colegio Alemán de Barranquilla. “Historia del Colegio Alemán de Barranquilla.”
Accessed 10 October 2007.
http://www.Colegioaleman.edu.co/English/enacerca Historia.html.
Colegio Karl C. Parrish. “Academics.” Accessed on 10 December 2007.
http://www.kcparrish.edu.co/en/academics/academics.htm.
---.
The Karl C. Parrish School. Prospectus. Barranquilla: Tipografia Escofet, 1943.
Colegio Nueva Granada. Colegio Nueva Granada Student Guide: 1964. Bogotá: CNG,
1964.
---.
Teacher‘s Manual - Colegio Nueva Granda. Bogotá: CNG, 1963.
Conferencias Episcoplaes de Colombia, tomo I: 1908-1953. Bogotá: Editorial de
Catolicismo, 1956.
Diaz Diaz, Oswaldo. Grandes Hombres de las Americas. Bogotá: Coordination
Committee of Inter-American Affairs for Colombia (OIAA/Bogotá), 1944.
Institute of International Education (IIE). Report of the Committee of Foreign Student
Advisers, Cleveland, Ohio: April 28-30, 1942. New York: IIE, 1942.
---.
Open Doors: A Report on Three Surveys. New York: IIE, 1955.
---.
Open Doors: Report on International Education. New York: IIE, 1970.
---.
IIENetwork, Data Tables/2001, “Foreign Students by Academic Level and Place
of Origin, 2000/2001.” Accessed 13 March 2010. http://opendoors.iienetwor.org.
Landry, Lionel, ed. English Conversation for Advance Students: Exercises Based on
Contemporary North American Authors. Bogotá: Camacho Roldán & Cia, 1946.
McGillivray, James H. Life with the Taylors: The Story of an American Family for
Students of English Conversation, 2nd ed. Bogotá: Selca, 1948.
---.
Life with the Taylors: Conversational Narrative and Exercises in American
English. New York: American Book Company, 1955.
National Catholic Welfare Conference. La Guerra Nacista Contra la Iglesia Católica.
Washington: National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1942.
Prator, Clifford, ed. Br‘er Rabbit and Br‘er Fox. Bogotá: Centro Colombo-Americano,
1944.
---.
ed. Pecos Bill. Bogotá: Centro-Colombo Americano, 1944.
Roosevelt, Franklin D. “Address to the National Education Association,” 30 June 1938.
In Douglas Ellsworth Lurton and Franklin D Roosevelt, Roosevelt‘s Foreign

485

---.

---.

Policy 1933-1940: Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s Unedited Speeches and Messages,
142-144. New York: Wilfred Funck, 1942.
“Address of the President Delivered by Radio from the White House.” Fireside
Chat 10: On New Legislation, 12 October 1937. Transcript and audio. Miller
Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. Accessed 11 November 2009.
http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3311.
“White House Statement on Conference of American States in Montevideo,
Uruguay,” 9 Nov. 1933. In Douglas Ellsworth Lurton and Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Roosevelt‘s Foreign Policy 1933-1940: Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s Unedited
Speeches and Messages, 28. New York: Wilfred Funck, 1942.

Swiggett, Glen Levin. Proceeding of the Second Pan American Scientific Congress.
Washington: GPO, 1917.
Office of the Commissioner of Education, San Juan, Puerto Rico. The InterAmerican
Newsletter. San Juan: 1944.
Pan American Union. Report on the activities of the Pan American Union, 1938-1948,
submitted by the Director General to the member governments in accordance
with the resolution of the Fifth International Conference of American States.
Washington: 1948.
Samper Ortega, Daniel. ―Cultural Relations among the American Countries.” In Inter
American Solidarity: Lectures of the Harris Foundation 1941, edited by Walter
H.C. Cleaves, 177-219. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941.
Sanín Cano, Baldomero. Un Pueblo en Defensa de un Mundo: con unos Documentos
Historicos de los Estados Unidos. Bogotá: Centro Colombo-Americano, 1943.
School Yearbooks
Andean. 1960 . Colegio Nueva Granada. Bogotá: Editorial El Catolicismo, 1960.
Andean. 1961, 1962, 1963. Colegio Nueva Granada. Bogotá: Editorial Guadalupe.
Andean. 1964, 1968, 1969. Colegio Nueva Granada. Bogotá: CNG.
Anuario 2002. Colegio Jorge Washington. Cartagena: 2002.
Atarayya 1977. Colegio Jorge Washington. Cartagena: 1977.
Justice 1974. Colegio Cristóbal Colón. Medellín: 1974.
Pages Torn Form Time. 1971. Colegio Cristóbal Colón. Medellín: 1971.
Pages Torn Form Time. 1973. Colegio Cristóbal Colón. Medellín: 1973.
Periscope ‘70. Colegio Cristóbal Colón. Medellín: 1970.
Pioneering ‘66. Colegio Cristóbal Colón. Medellín: 1966.
Windleaf 1971. Colegio Jorge Washington. Cartagena: 1971.

486

Secondary Sources
XIII Congreso de Colombianistas. Colombia y el Caribe. Barranquilla: Ediciones
Uninorte, 2005.
Abel, Christopher .“Misiones protestantes en un Estado católico: Colombia en los años
cuarenta y cincuenta.” Análisis Político no. 50 (Jan-April 2004): 10-15.
---.
Política, Iglesia y partidos en Colombia, 1886-1953. Bogotá: FAES, Universidad
Nacional de Colombia, 1987.
Abello Vives, Alberto, ed. El Caribe en la nación colombiana: Memorias. Bogotá:
Museo Nacional de Colombia, 2006.
---.
“Una catedra para entender el Caribe: superar los estereotipos.” In El Caribe en la
nación colombiana: Memorias, edited by Alberto Abello Vives, 21-30. Bogotá:
Museo Nacional de Colombia, 2006.
Acosta, Leonardo, Virginia Erhart, and Pastor Vega. Penetración Cultural de
Imperialismo en America Latina: Comics y Revistas Femeninas. Bogotá:
Ediciones Los Comuneros, 1973.
Adams, Michael. “Leadership and School Climate: A Mixed Methods Study of United
States Accredited Colombian Schools.” PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 2006.
Adams, Richard Newbold. Nationalization. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967.
Alarcón Meneses, Luis. “Representaciones sociales y politicas sobre el Caribe
colombiano.” In El Caribe en la nación colombiana: Memorias, edited by Alberto
Abello Vives, 214-236. Bogotá: Museo Nacional de Colombia, 2006.
Alliance Francaise de Washington, “About Us: About the Alliance Francaise.” Accessed
1 February 2008. http://www.francedc.org/en/About.aspx.
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. London: Verso, 2006.
Appelbaum, Nancy. Muddied Waters: Race, Region, and Local History in Colombia,
1846-1948. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003.
Appelbaum, Nancy P., Anne S. Macpherson, and Karin A. Rosenblatt, eds. Race &
Nation in Modern Latin America. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina
Press, 2003.
Arenas Reyes, Jaime. La guerilla por dentro; análisis del E.L.N. colombiano. Bogotá:
Tercer Mundo, 1971.

487

Arias, Ricardo. “Estado laico y catolicismo integral en Colombia: La reforma religiosa de
López Pumarejo.” Historia Crítica, no. 19 (2000).
Atwood, Rita and Emile G. McAnany. Communication and Latin American Society:
Trends in Critical Research, 1960-1985. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1986.
Avella, Franciso. “El papel de la geohistoria para construcción de la región Caribe.” In El
Caribe en la nación colombiana: Memorias, edited by Alberto Abello Vives, 106
122. Bogotá: Museo Nacional de Colombia, 2006.
Bell Lemus, Carlos.“Urbanización El Prado en Barranquilla: Karl Parrish.” Revista
Credencial Historia no. 114 (June 1999).
Bergquist, Charles W. Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 1886-1910. Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1978.
Bergquist, Charles and Ricardo Peñaranda, eds. Violence in Colombia: The
Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective. Wilmington, DE: SR Books,
1992.
Bethel, Leslie and Ian Roxborough, eds. Latin America between the Second World War
and the Cold War: 1944-1948. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1992.
Borstelmann, Thomas. The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in
the Global Arena. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.
Braden, Spruille. Diplomats and Demagogues: The Memoirs of Spruille Braden. New
Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1971.
Briggs, Laura, Gladys McCormick and J.T. Way. “Transnationalism: A Category of
Analysis.” American Quarterly 60, no. 3 (Sept. 2008): 625-648.
Brown, Jonathan C. “The Genteel Tradition of Nineteenth Century Colombian Culture.”
The Americas 36, no. 4 (April 1980): 445-464.
Bucheli, Marcel. Bananas and Business: The United Fruit Company in Colombia, 1899
2000. New York: New York University Press, 2005.
Burgess, Terry Lee. “Teacher In-Service Needs of English/Spanish Bilingual Schools of
Bogotá as Perceived by their Academic Staffs.” PhD diss., University of
Alabama, 1979.
Burgos, Adrian Jr. Playing America's Game: Baseball, Latinos, and the Color Line.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007.

488

Bushnell, David. Eduardo Santos and the Good Neighbor, 1938-1942. Gainesville, FL:
University of Florida Press, 1967.
---.
The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993.
Butler, George M. “The Progress of Education in Brazil.” School and Society 53, no.1378
(May 24, 1941): 657-660.
Cadby, P. “The Adoption of American Bilingual Schools in Costa Rica: A Study in
Sociocultural Choice.” PhD. Diss., University of Montana, 1975.
Cadena, Marisol de la. Indigenous Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco,
Peru, 1919-1991. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000.
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique and Enzo Faletto. Dependencia y desarrollo en América
Latina. Mexico City: Siglo Ventiuno, 1971.
Casey, Clifford B. “The Creation and Development of the Pan American Union.” The
Hispanic American Historical Review 13, no. 4 (November 1933): 437-456.
Castillo Mier, Ariel, ed. Respirando el Caribe: Memorias de la Cátedra del Caribe
Colombiano. Cartagena de Indias: Observatorio del Caribe Colombiano, 2001.
Chilcote, Ronald H. and Joel C. Edelstein, eds. Latin America: The Struggle with
Dependency and Beyond. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974.
Conlon, A. “The Contributions of American Sponsored Overseas Schools in Fostering,
Promoting, and Maintaining Cross-cultural Understanding between the Peoples of
the Americas.” PhD diss., University of Alabama, 1982.
Cott, Nancy F. “Marriage and Women‟s Citizenship in the United States, 1830-1934.”
The American Historical Review 103, no. 5 (December 1998): 1461-1464.
Crawford, Sharika. “Under the Colombian Flag: Nation-Building on San Andrés and
Providence Islands, 1886-1930.” PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2009.
Cremin, Lawrence A. American Education: The Metropolitan Experiment, 1876-1980.
New York: Harper & Row, 1988.
Crowl, Kenneth Edwin. “A Comparative Study of the Programs between the College of
Education, University of Alabama, and the Association of Colombian-American
Binational Schools; and the College of Education, University of Alabama, and
Selected Ecuadorian Schools.” Ed.D. diss., University of Alabama, 1972.
Cull, Nicholas J. The Cold War and the United States Information Agency. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008.

489

Daily, Suzanne Marie Claire. “United States Reactions to the Persecution of Protestants
in Colombia during the 1950s.” Master‟s thesis, St. Louis University, 1971.
Dawson, Alexander S. Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico. Tucson: University of
Arizona Press, 2004.
Diffie, Bailey W. “The Ideology of Hispanidad.” Hispanic American Historical Review
23, no. 3 (August 1943): 457-482.
Donaldson, Frances Lonsdale. The British Council: The First Fifty Years. London: J.
Cape, 1984.
Dore, Elizabeth and Maxine Molyneux, eds. Hidden Histories of Gender and State in
Latin America. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000.
Dorfman, Ariel and Armand Mattelart. How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology
in the Disney Comic. Translated by David Kunzle. New York: International
General, 1982.
Dudziak, Mary L. Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Dworkin, Martin S. “John Dewey a Centennial Review.” In Dewey on Education:
Selections, edited by Martin S. Dworkin, 1-18. New York: Teachers College
Press, 1959.
El Problema de Protestantismo en Colombia. Por un Sacerdote Católico Convertido del
Protestantismo, 19th ed. Bogotá: Cooperativa Mariano Nacional de Colombia,
1958.
Espinosa, J. Manuel. The Inter-American Beginnings of US Cultural Diplomacy, 1938
-1948. Washington: US Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs, 1976.
Falino, Louis P., Jr. “The Binational Center and US Foreign Policy.” The North-South
Agenda Papers 19. University of Miami, 1996.
Farnsworth-Alvear, Ann. Dulcinea in the Factory: Myths, Morals, Men and Women in
Colombia‘s Industrial Experiment, 1905-1960. Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2000.
Fein, Seth. “Everyday Forms of Transnational Collaboration: US Film Propaganda in
Cold War Mexico.” In Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History
of US-Latin American Relation, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C.

490

---.
---.

LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, 400-450. Durham: Duke University Press,
1998.
“Hollywood and United States-Mexico Relations in the Golden Age of
Mexican Cinema.” PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1996.
“Myths of Cultural Imperialism and Nationalism in Golden Age Mexican
Cinema.” In Fragments of a Golden Age: The Politics of Culture in Mexico Since
1940, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph, Anne Rubenstein, and Eric Zolov, 159-198.
Durham: Duke University Press, 2001.

Fejes, Fred. Imperialism, Media, and the Good Neighbor: New Deal Foreign Policy and
United States Short-Wave Broadcasting in Latin America. Norwood, NJ: Ablex,
1976.
Fernández, Jesús Maria and Rafael Granados. Obra civilizadora de la Igelsia en
Colombia. Bogotá: Libería Voluntad, 1936.
Figueroa Sanchez, Cristo. “Cultura: Introducción.” In El Caribe en la nacion
colombiana: Memorias, edited by Alberto Abello Vives, 317-376. Bogotá: Museo
Nacional de Colombia, 2006.
Flournoy, Richard W. “Revision of Nationality Laws of the United States.” American
Journal of International Law 34, no.1 (January 1940): 43-46.
Fraiser, Steve and Gary Gerstle, eds. The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930
1980. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
Frank, André Gunder. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1967.
Freidman, Max Paul. Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign against
the Germans of Latin America in World War II. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2003.
Frenkel, Stephen Wolff. “Cultural Imperialism and the Development of the Panama
Canal
Zone, 1912-1960.” PhD diss., Syracuse University, 1992.
Gaddis, John Lewis. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1972.
Gallón Giraldo, Gustavo. La república de las armas: Relaciones entre fuerzas armadas y
estado en Colombia, 1960-1980. Bogotá: Centro de Investigación y Educación
Popular, 1983.
García Estrada, Rodrigo de J. Los Extranjeros en Colombia. Bogotá: Planeta, 2006.

491

Gellman, Irwin F. Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United States Policies in Latin America,
1933-1945. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979.
Gilderhus, Mark T. “An Emerging Synthesis? U.S.-Latin American Relations since the
Second World War.” Diplomatic History 16 (Summer 1992): 429-452.
---.
Pan American Visions: Woodrow Wilson in the Western Hemisphere, 1913-1921.
Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986.
---.
The Second Century: US-Latin American Relations Since 1889. Wilmington, DE:
Scholarly Resources, 2000.
Gil Tovar, Francisco. El Arte Colombiano. Bogotá: Plaza & Janés, 2002.
Giles, Paul. “Transnationalism and Classic American Literature.” PMLA 118, no. 1 (Jan.
2003): 62-77.
Glick-Schiller, Nina, Linda Basch, and Cristina Szanto-Blanc. Towards a Transnational
Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered.
New York: NY Academy of Sciences, 1992.
Goff, James Ernest. “The Persecution of Protestant Christians in Colombia, 1948 to 1958:
with an investigation of its background and causes.” Master‟s thesis, San
Francisco Theological Seminary, 1965.
Golden, Claudia. “America‟s Graduation from High School: The Evolution and Spread of
Secondary Schooling in the Twentieth Century.” The Journal of Economic
History 58, no. 2 (June 1998): 345-374.
Golden, Claudia and Lawrence F. Katz. “The Legacy of U.S. Educational Leadership:
Notes on Distribution and Economic Growth in the 20 th Century.” The American
Economic Review 91, no. 2 (May 2001): 18-23.
Gordon, David C. The French Language and National Identity: 1930-1975. The Hague:
Mouton, 1978.
Graham, Richard, Thomas Skidmore, Aline Helg, and Alan Knight, eds. The Idea of Race
in Latin America. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990.
Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Edited by Quintan Hoare and
Geoffrey Nowell-Smith. New York: International Publishers, 1971.
Greenburg, Cheryl. “Twentieth Century Liberalism: Transformations of an Ideology.” In
Perspectives on Modern America: Making Sense of the Twentieth Century, edited
by Harvard Sitkoff, 55-79. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Guerra, Lilian. “From Revolution to Involution in the early Cuban Republic: Conflicts
over Race, Class, and Nation, 1902-1906.” In Race & Nation in Modern Latin

492

America, edited by Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson, and Karin A.
Rosenblatt, 132-169. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.
Hamblin, David W. “A Social History of Protestantism in Colombia: 1930-2000.” Ph.D.
diss., University of Massachusetts, 2003.
Hart, Justin. “Making Democracy Safe for the World: Race, Propaganda, and the
Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy during World War II.” Pacific Historical
Review 73, no. 1 (February 2004): 49-84.
Hart, Ronald Lee. “The Colombian Acción Comunal Program: A Political Evaluation.”
Ph. D. diss., University of California/Los Angeles, 1974.
Helg, Aline. La educación en Colombia: 1918-1957, una historia social, económica y
politica, translated by Jorge Orlando Meló and Fernando Gómez. Bogotá: Plaza &
Janés, 2001.
Hyde, Charles Cheney. “The Nationality Act of 1940.” The American Journal of
International Law 35, no. 2 (April 1941): 314-319.
Inmaculada, Teresa de la. Quien ha educado la mujer colombiana? Bogotá: Pontificia
Universidad Javeriana, 1960.
Jaramillo Uribe, Jaime. “El Proceso de la Educación del Virreinato de la Época
Contemporánea.” In Manual de historia de Colombia, Tomo III, edited by Jaime
Jaramillo Uribe, 249-339. Bogotá: Procultura, 1982.
Jiménez, Emmanuel, Bernardo Kugler and Robin Horn. “National In-Service Training in
Latin America: An Economic Evaluation of Colombia‟s SENA.” In Economic
Development and Cultural Change 37, no. 3 (April 1989): 595-610.
Jiménez, Michael. “The Limits of Export Capitalism: Economic Structure, Class, and
Politics in a Colombian Coffee Municipality, 1900-1930.” PhD diss., Harvard
University, 1985.
Johnson, John J. and Doris M. Ladd. Simón Bolívar and Spanish American
Independence, 1783-1830. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1968.
Joseph, Gilbert M. “Close Encounters: Toward a New Cultural History of US-Latin
American Relations.” In Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural
History
of U.S.-Latin American Relations, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C.
LeGrand, and Ricardo Salvatore, 3-46. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998.

493

Joseph, Gilbert M., Catherine C. LeGrand and Ricardo Salvatore, eds. Close Encounters
of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations.
Durham: Duke University Press, 1998.
Joseph, Gilbert M. and Daniel Nugent, eds. Everyday Forms of State Formation:
Revolution and Negotiation in Modern Mexico. Durham: Duke University Press,
1994.
Joseph, Gilbert M. and Daniela Spencer, eds. In from the Cold: Latin America‘s New
Encounter with the Cold War. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008.
Kaplan, Amy and Donald E. Pease, eds. Cultures of United States Imperialism. Durham:
Duke University Press, 1990.
Karl, Robert Alexander. “State Formation, Violence and Cold War in Colombia, 1957
-1966.” PhD diss., Harvard University, 2009.
Kaufman, J. B. South of the Border with Disney: Walt Disney and the Good Neighbor
Program, 1941-1948. New York: Disney Editions, 2009.
Ker, Anita Melville. “Interest in Hispanic America Manifested at Richmond Conference
of the American Library Association.” Hispanic American Historical Review 16,
no. 3 (August 1936): 402-409.
King, Cylde S. “Horace Mann‟s Influence on South American Libraries.” History of
Education Quarterly 1, no. 4 (December 1961):16-26.
King, John. “Cinema.” In A Cultural History of Latin America: Literature and the Visual
Arts in the 19th and 20th Centuries, edited by Leslie Bethel, 455-518. NY:
Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Klein, Alan M. Sugarball: The American Game, the Dominican Dream. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1991.
Knight, Alan. “Weapons and Arches in the Mexican Revolutionary Landscape.” In
Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and Negotiation in Modern
Mexico, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, 24-66. Durham: Duke
University Press, 1994.
Koffman, Bennet Eugene. “The National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia.”
PhD diss., University of Virginia, 1969.
Krug, Edward A. The Shaping of the American High School: Volume 2, 1920-1941.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972.

494

Krzys, Richard and Gaston Litton. A History of Education for Librarianship in Colombia.
Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, 1969.
Lael, Richard. Arrogant Diplomacy: US Policy Toward Colombia, 1903-1922.
Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1987.
LaFeber, Walter. The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860
-1898. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963.
LaTorre Cabal, Hugo. La Hispanidad. Bogotá, Editorial Kelly, 1950.
LaRosa, Michael J. “Cleavages of the Cross: The Catholic Church from Right to Left in
Contemporary Colombia.” PhD diss., University of Miami, 1995.
Lambert, Jacques. Latin America: Social Structure and Political Institutions. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1967.
Landers, Lester. “Factors Which Influence Parental Choice of American Sponsored
Overseas Schools in Colombia.” PhD diss., University of Alabama, 1985.
Leonard, Astrid N. “Historical Factors Associated with Changes in the American
Sponsored Overseas School in Bogotá, Colombia: A Case Study of Colegio
Nueva Granada, 1938-1988.” PhD diss., University of Alabama, 1991.
Lesser, Jeffrey. Negotiating National Identity: Immigrants, Minorities, and the Struggle
for Ethnicity in Brazil. Durham: Duke University Press, 1999.
Levine, Robert. The Vargas Regime: The Critical Years, 1934-38. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1970.
Lipset, Seymour Marin and Aldo Solari, eds. Elites in Latin America. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1967.
Londoño-Vega, Patricia. Religion, Culture and Society in Colombia: Medellín and
Antioquia, 1850-1930. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
López, Abel Ricardo. “A Beautiful Class, An Irresistible Democracy.” PhD diss.,
University of Maryland, 2008.
MacCann, Richard Dyer. “Film and Foreign Policy: The USIA, 1962-67.” Cinema
Journal 9, no. 1 (August 1969): pp. 23-42.
Manger, William, ed. The Alliance for Progress: A Critical Appraisal. Washington:
Public Affairs Press, 1963.

495

Martin, Gerald. “Literature, Music and the Visual Arts, c. 1870-1930.” In A Cultural
History of Latin America: Literature and the Visual Arts in the 19th and 20th
Centuries, edited by Leslie Bethel, 47-130. NY: Cambridge University Press,
1998.
Martz, John D. The Politics of Clientelism: Democracy & the State in Colombia. New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996.
Maullin, Richard. Soldiers, Guerillas, and Politics in Colombia. Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books, 1973.
Molano, Alfredo and César Vera. Evolución de la Politica Educativa en el siglo XX:
1900-1957. Bogotá: Universidad Pedagogica Nacional, 1982.
Maymí-Surgrañes, Héctor J. “The American Library Association in Latin America:
American Librarianship as a „Modern‟ Model during the Good Neighbor Policy
Era.” Libraries & Culture 37, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 307-338.
McAvoy, Thomas T. Father O‘Hara of Notre Dame: The Cardinal Archbishop of
Philadelphia. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967.
McCormick, Thomas J. America‘s Half Century: United States Foreign Policy in the
Cold War and After. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.
McFarlane, Anthony. Colombia before Independence: Economy, Society, and Politics
under Bourbon Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
McGuinness, Aims. Path of Empire: Panama and the Californian Gold Rush. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2008.
Messerli, Jonathan C. Horace Mann: A Biography. New York: Knopf, 1972.
---.
“Localism and State Control in Horace Mann‟s Reform of the Common School.”
American Quarterly 17, no. 1 (Spring 1965): 104-118.
Moreno, Pablo. “La educación protestante durante la modernización de la educación en
Colombia, 1869-1928.” Cristianismo y Sociedad 107 (1991): 69-87.
Múnera, Alfonso David. ”Failing to Construct the Colombian Nation: Race and Class in
the Andean-Caribbean Conflict.” PhD diss., University of Connecticut, 1995.
---.
El Fracaso de la Nación: Región, clase y raza en el Caribe colombiano, 1717
-1810. Bogotá: Banco de la República, 1998.
Muñoz, Catalina.“To Colombianize Colombia: Cultural Politics, Modernization and
Nationalism in Colombia, 1930-1946.” PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania,
2009.

496

Musto, Stefan A. Los medios de comunicación social al servicio del desarrollo rural:
análisis de eficiencia de ―Acción Cultural Popular—Radio Sutatenza.‖ Bogotá:
Acción Cultural Popular, 1971.
Nguyen, Khac Vien. Breve Historia del Neocolonialismo Norteamericano. Medellín:
Editorial La Oveja Negra, 1973.
Nieto Arteta, Luis Eduardo. Economia y cultura en la historia de Colombia. Bogotá:
1962.
Novik, Peter. That Noble Dream: The ―Objectivity Question‖ and the American
Historical Profession. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Nystrom, J. Warren and Nathan A. Haverstock. The Alliance for Progress. Princeton: D.
Van Nostrand Company, 1963.
Orfield, Lester B. “The Citizenship Act of 1934.” The University of Chicago Law Review
2, no.1 (December 1934): 99-118.
Orr, Paul G. A Research Matrix: The American-Sponsored Overseas School. Buzzards
Bay, MA: Center for International Education, 1974.
Ospina, Eduardo. The Protestant Denominations in Colombia: A Historical Sketch with a
Particular Study of the So Called ―Religious Persecution.‖ Bogotá: Imprenta
Nacional de Colombia, 1954.
Paéz Reyna, Gabriel and Armando Moreno Mattos. La Educación en Colombia, 1963
-1964. Bogotá: DANE,1966.
Palacios, Marco. Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875-2002,
translated by Richard Stoller. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006.
---.
Coffee in Colombia 1850-1970: An Economic, Social, and Political History. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
Pareja, Reynaldo. Historia de la Radio en Colombia. Bogotá: Servicio Colombiano de
Comunicación Social, 1984.
Patterson, Thomas G. Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the
Cuban Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Pécaut, Daniel. Orden y Violencia: Colombia 1930-1954. Bogotá: CEREC, 1987.
---.
Pólitica y sindicalismo en Colombia. Bogotá: La Carreta, 1973.
Penfield, Walter Scott. “The Legal Status of the Pan American Union.” The American
Journal of International Law 20, no. 2 (April 1926): 257-262.

497

Peralta, Victoria. “Distinctions and Exclusions: Looking for Cultural Change in Bogotá
during the Liberal Republics, 1930-1946.” PhD diss., New School of Social
Research, 2005.
Percy Alvin Martin, ed. Who‘s Who in Latin America: A Biographical Dictionary of
Outstanding Men and Women of Spanish America and Brazil. Second edition.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1940.
Pérez, Louis A. On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and Culture. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1999.
Phillipson, Robert. Linguistic Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Pizarro Leongómez, Eduardo. Las FARC (1949-1966): de la autodefensa a la
combinación de todas las formas de lucha. United Nations, Instituto de Estudios
Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales, 1991.
Pole Acuña, José. “Desde la otra orilla: las fronteras del Caribe en la „historia national.‟”
In El Caribe en la nación colombiana: Memorias, edited by Alberto Abello
Vives, 171-188. Bogotá: Museo Nacional de Colombia, 2006.
Posada-Carbó, Eduardo, ed. Colombia: The Politics of Reforming the State. New York:
St. Martin‟s Press, 1998.
---.
The Colombian Caribbean: A Regional History, 1870-1950. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1996.
Pratt, Mary Louise. “Arts of the Contact Zone.” In Ways of Reading, edited by David
Bartholomae and Anthony Petrosky, 515-534. New York: Bedford/St. Martin‟s
Press, 1999.
---.
Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation. London: Routledge, 1992.
Prieto, Luis B. and James D. Parsons. Simón Bolívar: Educator. Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1970.
Randall, Stephen J. Colombia and the United States: Hegemony and Interdependence.
Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992.
Reese, William J. The Origins of the American High School. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1995.
Rippy, J. Fred. Globe and Hemisphere: Latin America‘s Place in Post-War Foreign
Relations of the United States. Chicago: H. Regnery, 1958.
Rivas, Darlene. Missionary Capitalist: Nelson Rockefeller in Latin America. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2002.

498

Roldán, Mary. Blood and Fire: La Violencia in Antioquia, Colombia, 1946-1953.
Durham: Duke University Press, 2002.
Rose, R.S. One of the Forgotten Things: Getulio Vargas and Brazilian Social Control,
1930-1954. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000.
Ruck, Rob. The Tropic of Baseball: Baseball in the Dominican Republic. Lincoln, NE:
University of Nebraska Press, 1998.
Safford, Frank. The Ideal of the Practical: Colombia‘s Struggle to form a technical elite.
Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976.
---.
“In Search of the Practical: Colombian Students in Foreign Lands, 1845-1890.”
Hispanic American Historical Review 52, no. 2 (May 1972): 230-249.
Safford, Frank and Marco Palacios. Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Salcedo-Bastardo, J.L. and Annella McDermott. A Continent and Its Destiny. Richmond,
England: Richmond Publishing Co., 1977.
Salcedo Silva, Hernando. Crónica del cine colombiano, 1897-1950. Bogotá: 1981.
Salvatore, Ricardo D. “The Enterprise of Knowledge: Representational Machines of
Informal Empire.” In Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History
of US-Latin American Relation, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C.
LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, 69-104. Durham: Duke University Press,
1998.
Samper Gnecco, Armando. Daniel Samper Ortega: motor de la cultura colombiana.
Bogotá: Gimnasio Moderno, 1995.
Sánchez, Gonzalo. Los Días de la Revolución: Gaitanismo y el 9 de abril en provincial.
Bogotá: Centro Cultural Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, 1983.
Sanders, Jamie. Contentious Republicans, Popular Politics, Race and Class in
Nineteenth-Century Colombia. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004.
Sayer, Derek. “Everyday Forms of State Formation: Some Dissident Remarks on
Hegemony.” In Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and Negotiation
in Modern Mexico, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, 367-378.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994.
Schiller, Herbert I. Communication and Cultural Domination. White Plains: International
Arts and Sciences Press, 1976.

499

Scott, James C. “Forward.” In Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and
Negotiation in Modern Mexico, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent,
vii-xii. Durham: Duke University Press, 1994.
Sigmund, Paul E. Multinationals in Latin America: The Politics of Nationalization.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980.
Silva, Renán. República Liberal, intelectuales y cultural popular. Medellín: La Carreta
Editores, 2005.
Stamato, Vincente. “Dias de Radio.” Revista Credencial Historia 186 (June 2005).
Accessed on 12 Dec. 2009.
http://www.lablaa.org/blaavirtual/revistas/credencial/junio2005/radio.htm.
Stoller, Richard. “Alfonso López Pumarejo and Liberal Radicalism in 1930s Colombia.”
Journal of Latin American Studies 27, no. 2 (May 1995): 367-397.
Stowell, Ellery C. “The Ban of Alien Marriages in the Foreign Service.” The American
Journal of International Law 31, no. 1 (January 1937): 91-94.
---.
“Cramping Our Foreign Service.” The American Journal of International Law 29,
no. 2 (April 1935): 314-317.
Taylor, Philip M. Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient
World to the Present Era. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1995.
Telléz, Hernando. Cincuenta Anos de Radiodifusion en Colombia. Medellín: Editorial
Bedout, 1974.
Thorp, Rosemary. Progress, Poverty and Expulsion: An Economic History of Latin
America in the 20th Century. Baltimore: Inter-American Development Bank,
1998.
Tirado Mejía, Alvaro. Aspectos políticos del primer gobierno de Alfonso López
Pumarejo, 1934-1938. Bogotá: Procultura, 1981.
Tomlinson, John. Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1991.
Torres, Camilo and Berta Corredor Rodríguez. Las escuelas radiofónicas de Sutatenza,
Colombia: evaluación sociológica de los resultados. Bogotá: Oficina
Internacional de investigaciones Sociales de FERES, 1961.
Tovar Zambrano, Bernardo. La intervención económica del estado en Colombia, 1914
-1936. Bogotá: Biblioteca Banco Popular, 1984.

500

Triana y Antorveza, Humberto. La Acción Comunal en Colombia: Resultados de una
evaluación en 107 municipios. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1970.
Tyack, David B. The One Best System: A History of American Urban Education.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974.
Universidad Autonomo del Caribe. “Influencia de los Estadounidenses en Barranquilla,”
Documento 19 (March 2006).
Urban, Greg and Joel Sherzer, eds. Nation-States and Indians in Latin America. Austin:
Texas University Press, 1991.
Uribe de Hincapié, María Teresa. Raíces del poder regional: El caso antioqueño.
Medellín: Editorial Universidad de Antioquia, 1998.
Usabel, Gaizka S. de. The High Noon of American Films in Latin America. Ann Arbor:
UMI Research Press, 1982.
Velasco A., Hugo. Retorno a la Hispanidad. Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Cultura
Hispánica, 1953.
Villegas Arango, Jorge. Petróleo, oligarquía e imperio. Bogota: El Ancora Editores,
1982.
Wade, Peter. Blackness and Race Mixture: The Dynamics of Racial Identity in Colombia.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.
---.
Music, Race, & Nation: Musica Tropical in Colombia. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2000.
Waldinger, Roger and David Fitzgerald. “Transnationalism in Question.” The American
Journal of Sociology 109, no. 5 (March 2004): 1177-1195.
Wagnleitner, Reinhold and Elaine Tyler May, eds. ―Here, There and Everywhere‖: The
Foreign Politics of American Popular Culture. Hanover, NH: University Press of
New England, 2000.
White, John W. Our Good Neighbor Hurdle. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing
Company, 1943.
Williams, Daryle. Culture Wars in Brazil: The First Vargas Regime, 1930-1945.
Durham: Duke University Press, 2001.
Williams, William Appleman. The Roots of the Modern American Empire. New York:
Vintage, 1969.
---.
The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. New York: Delta, 1962.

501

Zuluaga, Olga Lucia, Clemencia Chiappe, María Eugenia Romero Ibarra, and Hernán
Suárez. Historia de la Educación en Bogotá, Tomo I. Bogotá: Panamericana
Formas e Impresos, 2002.

